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There is no education without some form of media. The field of educa-
tional media is a growing area of interest in education, as educational 
policy papers on the ‘digital agenda’, the rapid expansion of media sec-
tions in national and international educational research associations, and 
the range of academic books on media in education show. Educational 
media are crucial to producing knowledge and shaping educational prac-
tices. Conflicts over the contents of textbooks and curricula, widely dis-
cussed in the daily news, illustrate how many different stakeholders are 
invested in sharing their particular understandings of our (shared) past, 
the current society and potential imagined futures with the younger gen-
eration. Policymakers, politicians and activists regard educational media 
as important tools which not only foster young people’s media skills and 
world knowledge, but which also shape which ways of living are consid-
ered desirable or even legible. Textbooks and other educational media are 
deeply embedded in the socio-political contexts in which they are devel-
oped and used. Given this context, alongside the emerging interest in 
digital technology in education, the Palgrave Studies in Educational Media 
series takes stock of current research on educational media by focusing on 
three issues:
First, today’s vibrant and dynamic research and scholarship on tech-
nology stems from a broad range of disciplines, including sociology, 
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 history, cultural studies, memory studies, media studies and education, 
and also information, computer and cognitive science. Traditionally, this 
research has drawn on textbooks and other educational media in order to 
engage with specific disciplinary questions, such as device-specific read-
ing speed or social inclusion/exclusion. Studies on educational media are 
only beginning to be consolidated into the kind of inter- or transdisci-
plinary field which can build and develop on insights generated and 
exchanged across disciplinary boundaries.
Second, the majority of work in this field is focused on best practices, 
individual learning processes, or concerns over the risks involved when 
young people use technology. There are still relatively few studies which 
attend – empirically or conceptually – to the embeddedness of educa-
tional media in contemporary cultural, social and political processes, 
and to the historicity of the media used in education. If we see educa-
tional media as a highly contested and thus crucially important cultural 
site, then we need more studies which consider media in their contexts, 
and which take a carefully critical or generative approach to soci-
etal concerns.
Third, current work emerging in this field has turned its attention to 
computers and other digital technologies. Yet looking at today’s educa-
tional practices, it is clear that (i) they are by no means predominantly 
digital, and simultaneously (ii) ‘post-digital’ practices abound in which 
the digital is no longer seen as new or innovative, but is integrated with 
other materials in daily teaching and learning. The potentials and risks 
of digital education emit a fascination for politicians, journalists and 
others concerned with the future of education, and are undoubtedly 
important to consider. Empirical observations of education around the 
globe, however, demonstrate the reach and visibility of a broad range of 
media (textbooks, blackboards, LEGO™, etc.), as well as the post-digital 
blending of digital and non-digital media in contemporary educa-
tional settings.
Palgrave Studies in Educational Media aims to address these three issues 
in an integrated manner. The series offers a dedicated space which brings 
together research from across the academic disciplines, encouraging dia-
logue within the emerging space of educational media studies. It  showcases 
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both empirical and theoretical work on educational media which under-
stands these media as a site of cultural contestation and socio- political 
force. The focus lies primarily on schools, across the school subjects. The 
series is interested in both local and global perspectives, in order to 
explore how educational media are entangled with broader debates about 
continuity and change in today’s society, about classroom practices, inclu-
sions and exclusions, identifications, subjectivations, economies and 
global political projects.
We are delighted to present this fourth book in the series, on the inter-
play of educational media and memory practices in the classroom when 
teaching the history of the Cold War. Increasingly used as a label to cover 
the whole period between 1945 and 1989, the Cold War is now – as the 
thirtieth anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall approaches – an increas-
ingly institutionalised issue. Numerous handbooks and journals are dedi-
cated to the topic; specialised research institutes and museums are 
opening up around the world, bringing global perspectives to the period. 
This institutionalisation goes hand in hand with increased awareness of 
the contested nature of the subject, with lively debates opening up in 
both scholarly and public spaces: Global perspectives have become more 
prominent; there is a strong awareness that not only has the East col-
lapsed, but there is also uncertainty as to what the West stands for and 
indeed whether it remains a useful concept.
The Cold War in the Classroom: International Perspectives on Textbooks 
and Memory Practices explores how the memory of the Cold War, the 
story of the confrontation between East and West that was once crucial 
for the articulation of political identities all over the world, is negotiated 
in history textbooks, teacher narratives and history classrooms. It brings 
together perspectives from Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin America. The 
volume not only introduces new approaches to the field of educational 
media studies by orienting to the uptake of textbook discourse in class-
room practice, and by embedding the analysis of textbook discourse in its 
socio-economic and political contexts; it also enriches memory studies by 
shifting attention from the rather more settled memories of the two 
World Wars to the still very much disputed memory of the Cold War. It 
does so by concentrating not only on the representation but also on the 
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appropriation of mediated memory, and finally by introducing the social 





It is always the case that many more people are involved in the creation 
of a book than the table of contents can depict, and indeed this book is 
no exception to the rule. Authors are important, but they are not alone in 
their endeavours. This book is the result of a three-year international 
project on ‘Teaching the Cold War: Memory Practices in the Classroom’, 
funded by the Leibniz Association.
It is an elaborate procedure via which project proposals are designed 
and negotiated in today’s academia, a world increasingly dependent on 
third-party funding. Sometimes one is required to describe one’s ideas 
and plans within a meticulous word limit. I was highly fortunate in that 
I did not have to navigate these mires alone. I am indebted to Eckhardt 
Fuchs, Simone Lässig and Inga Niehaus, who with their usual aplomb 
were sources of great support during this process.
Research proposals are one thing; inspiring ideas another. The idea 
for this project and thus also for this book was first voiced at my break-
fast table by its ‘spiritual father’, my husband, Bernard Christophe. 
Back then, we were musing as to why studies on memory cultures and 
history teaching focus so often and almost exclusively on National 
Socialism, a topic that nowadays is only rarely subject to differing 
interpretations. While Bernard did not have an answer to this ques-
tion, he did point out that a different topic, the Cold War, was indeed 
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the fulcrum of lively debate in many societies. Thus the project was 
born, and my thanks go to him.
Our research, however, was not limited to the Cold War itself, but to 
how the Cold War is taught in schools. In Germany, Sweden and 
Switzerland we spent hours pelting teachers with questions, and eventu-
ally penetrated their sacred territory, the classroom, with video cameras. 
We extend our sincere thanks to all these teachers, who allowed us 
insights into their work with an openness that is by no means self-evi-
dent. However, no matter how cooperative teachers may be, data collec-
tion in schools is always a troublesome thing to do with bureaucratic 
hurdles to overcome and permits from ministries, head teachers and par-
ents to obtain. The authors of this book are very much indebted to 
Kathrin Zehr and Nora Zimmermann who did a great job in supporting 
us with all this and in conducting field research in German and 
Swiss schools.
We all know that the road from project to publication can be long and 
rocky. This applies in particular to projects like this, involving researchers 
not only from different national academic cultures but also from different 
academic disciplines. Peter Gautschi, Markus Furrer, Nora Zimmermann 
and Nadine Ritzer from Switzerland, and also Robert Thorp from 
Sweden, are historians or history didactics experts. Eva Fischer and I from 
Germany are social scientists. The thread of communication between 
them remained smooth and unbroken, which is also thanks to Katharina 
Baier, who coordinated the project with efficiency and sensitivity. To her 
too we express our gratitude.
It is generally good academic practice to discuss the initial results of a 
project with others before publishing them, and indeed this is something 
we did with enthusiasm. In this regard we are indebted to all those who 
asked us shrewd and critical questions, thus contributing valuably to 
more precisely defining and clarifying our findings. Special thanks go to 
the students of Karina Korostelina at Georg Mason University in 
Washington, D. C., the staff and guests of Christian F. Ostermann at the 
Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, to Francisco Ramirez and his 
colleagues at Stanford University, and to the colleagues of Manish Jain at 
Jawaharlal Nehru University and Ambedkhar University, Delhi. It was 
during this tour that we gained the interesting, if not unexpected, insight 
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that the discussions we held in Delhi were the most lively and productive 
of all, something perhaps not insignificant given that the most interesting 
debates in Cold War research tend to be those addressing the so-called 
Third World. Useful feedback was also given by students participating in 
international summer schools I organised in Georgia and Tajikistan. They 
proved the general rule that those new to the field sometimes find the 
most interesting patterns in material with which others may already be 
too familiar.
Finally, when the data has been collected, the results discussed and the 
papers written; that is, when a book is – from the authors’ point of view – 
more-or-less complete, it is then that the editing begins, and for this we 
are grateful to Wendy Anne Kopisch, who with linguistic subtlety and 
human tact ensured the texts were in a reader-friendly English without 
anyone feeling that they had failed to master this global language. Thanks 
also go to Tilly Nevin, who assisted Wendy during a summer internship, 
and to Meyrick Payne, who helped with the proof-reading. Finally, we 
extend our gratitude to Eleanor Christie and Rebecca Wyde at Palgrave 
Macmillan for their support, as well as to two anonymous reviewers, who 
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Practices
Barbara Christophe
Recalling the past has been described as an ‘unnatural act’, involving as it 
does a constant oscillation between two opposing but equally indispens-
able modes of defining the relation between times past and times present 
(Wineburg 1999). Similarities as well as differences are highlighted in 
one moment and rendered invisible in another. Complementing as much 
as constraining each other, these two approaches create familiarity and 
strangeness, proximity and distance in an almost paradoxical manner. 
Both have their own merits. While the vague idea of sharing a common 
identity with those who preceded us in time awakens our interest in the 
past, grasping the differences between the way we feel, think and act and 
the way people of former times did so enables us to understand the con-
tingency of our own perceptions of and performances in the world 
(Wineburg 1999, 490).
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What appears to be the normal if somewhat ambitious script for most 
of our encounters with the past turns into a rather complex matter when 
it comes to calibrating the relationship between the Cold War past and 
the post-Cold War present. We are faced with at least two challenges. On 
the one hand, we have competing definitions of the present moment as 
the indispensable starting point for our reconstructions of the past. On 
the other, we have multiple ways of establishing a link between what is 
now and what was then. Some observers perceived 9/11 as the trigger 
moment of a new fundamental clash, a ‘long war’ between the West and 
Islam, the new antagonist that has replaced the former East (Buzan 
2006). For others, Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 signalled a 
return to the familiar constellation of polarised conflict between East and 
West (Legvold 2014; Ciolan 2016). At the same time, various commen-
tators have repeatedly invoked the end of the Cold War since 1990. 
While the East-West rivalry was seen to have abated through a sweeping 
and glorious victory of the West in the 1990s, recent discourses herald 
the eclipse of the same West in the light of mounting tensions between 
Europe and the USA (Kimmage 2013; Wright 2017). Without doubt, 
current claims of an insurmountable abyss separating the days of the 
Cold War from our present times has gained in plausibility with the less- 
than- predictable policies of President Trump towards Russia. The com-
plex realities of today’s world in which the current leader of the USA 
ponders publicly about accepting Russia’s take-over of Crimea one 
moment while commanding air strikes in Syria and thus risking a mili-
tary confrontation with the same Russia the next (Rutland 2017), could 
not contrast more sharply with the ritualised and predictable opposition 
between the former superpowers that dominated international politics 
from 1947 to 1990.
Memory theory teaches us that present moments always leave their 
imprint on the many different and ultimately contingent ways in which 
the past can be reconstructed. The current situation of uncertainty and 
unpredictability therefore could not but provoke a controversy on how to 
make sense of the Cold War. Indeed, contrary to claims according to 
which the end of the East-West rivalry and the opening of Soviet archives 
would lead to a lessening of controversies (Nehring 2012), we observe a 
multiplication of debates. It is not only that traditionalist, revisionist and 
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post-revisionist frames, which either blame the USSR, the USA or both 
for having caused the conflict, still vie for hegemony (Lundestad 2014); 
the question as to whether the second half of the 20th century has been 
shaped more profoundly by the East-West or the North-South conflict 
has also triggered hot debate (Iriye 2013). On a more fundamental level, 
we even hear the argument that the USA and the USSR, both of which 
tried to change the outlook of the world according to their own images 
(Westad 2000; Engerman 2010; Duara 2011) shared several crucial fea-
tures despite the ritualised stand-off they were staging. Finally, historians 
are in dispute about the true nature of the Cold War. While some point 
to the ever-present fear of dying in a nuclear war as the defining moment 
(Nehring 2012), others identify the social welfare state as a by-product of 
the conflict (Kaelble 2011).
The authors of this book do not engage directly in these debates but 
rather aim to analyse empirically to what extent practices of remembering 
the Cold War in history textbooks and in the social space of the history 
classroom are informed by the various viewpoints and positions circulat-
ing in academic and public discourses. This agenda results from concep-
tual decisions taken on four levels.
First, approaching the Cold War from an angle informed by memory 
studies and raising the question of how its unavoidably selective and thus 
political image is produced nowadays, the volume simultaneously 
addresses – and moves beyond – recent trends in Cold War studies. While 
historians have shown an increased interest in the cultural dimension of 
the Cold War as a phenomenon of the past for some time, looking at the 
roles played by different media as well as networks of people and organ-
isations in reproducing the binary oppositions on which the conflict was 
based (Sanders 2000, Vowinckel et al. 2012), only scant and unsystem-
atic attention (Lowe/Joel 2012, Jarausch et al. 2017) has been paid to 
processes of negotiating its meaning in the present. At the same time, 
memory studies have been largely preoccupied with exploring the more 
settled memory of the Second World War or the Holocaust. According to 
the authors of this book, shifting the focus to a more contested issue like 
the Cold War makes it simultaneously more compelling and rewarding to 
investigate which of the manifold events of the past are referred to in 
concrete acts of remembering.
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Second, in dealing with practices of remembering the Cold War in 
their manifold forms and diverse facets, the authors of this book intend 
to bridge practice theory and memory studies. Although practice theory 
is a rather heterogeneous field stretching from classics like Giddens and 
Bourdieu to actor-network theories, two crucial ideas serve as a com-
mon denominator among various approaches. Practices are not only 
perceived to be a hinge between the situated actions of concrete indi-
viduals and the cultural structures that imbue these actions with a cer-
tain dose of predictability without fully determining them (Pentzold 
2015); they are also seen as being based on practical knowledge that 
usually remains implicit, thus allowing for a certain degree of vagueness 
and ambivalence (Reckwitz 2003). Applying these assumptions to the 
study of social processes of negotiating the meaning of the Cold War, we 
emphasise that individual acts of remembering are shaped by collectively 
shared patterns of ascribing meaning to selected facts of the past consid-
ered relevant to today’s memory. At the same time, however, we also 
admit that these patterns are embodied in usually rather polysemic texts, 
artefacts or performances (Sturken 1997, Sandage 1993), which do not 
have a life of their own beyond being reiterated, recollected and at times 
reshaped or reconfigured by concrete individuals (Olick/Robinson 1998, 
111; Feindt et al. 2014, 30). Instead of reifying the difference between 
individual and collective memory, which ultimately constitutes two ways 
of looking at the same thing, we focus on disentangling the many differ-
ent factors that play out in the concrete, situated acts of recalling the past 
that we call memory practices. We moreover construe these memory 
practices as activities that, to a certain extent, are a matter of sheer rou-
tine. We thus claim that our encounters with the past are not only shaped 
by conscious decisions regarding what to remember and what to forget; 
they are also driven by the silent work of common-sense assumptions 
and the binary oppositions these support. Conceiving of memory prac-
tices as based to a large degree on implicit knowledge, we thus attend to 
the messiness and ambivalence deemed characteristic of practices in gen-
eral (Goodnough 2008), and of practices of recalling the Cold War past 
in particular, given not only the disputes around that period but also the 




Third, all authors have chosen to analyse social practices of negotiating 
the meaning of the Cold War in the institutional field (Schudson 1992) 
of the school, focusing on textbooks, teachers and students. Observing 
memory practices through these analytical lenses comes with several 
advantages. History textbooks are a mass medium for the dissemination 
of officially approved images of history and, at the same time, mirrors of 
societal controversies surrounding sensitive issues (Klerides 2010; 
Macgilchrist 2015). They mingle and blend myriads of discursive threads 
which connect them with the wider social environment (Binnenkade 
2015). Situated at the boundaries between politics, history scholarship 
and pedagogy, they reflect curricular demands as well as scientific and 
pedagogic standards. They respond to market requirements and to politi-
cal debates. History teachers are members of a state elite specialised in 
conveying official interpretations, while, at the same time, each teacher 
carries a unique autobiographical memory (Christophe 2012; Umetbaeva 
2015). Like their students, they read newspapers and novels, watch films, 
browse the internet and talk with family and friends, thus bringing 
numerous mediated memories into the interactional space of the class-
room. As the addressees of contradictory expectations, pupils are required 
to reproduce interpretative knowledge and, at the same time, develop 
interpretative autonomy (Spär/Sperisen 2010). Furthermore, they are 
not only future citizens who are supposed to adopt officially sanctioned 
knowledge; they are also the offspring of families and social milieus with 
their own potentially diverging memories (Welzer/Moller/Tschuggnall 
2002). Textbook discourse, teacher-talk and classroom practice are thus 
firmly embedded in a wide range of social relations stretching far beyond 
them. The insights to be gained from their analysis can therefore be 
expected to be relevant for a broader social context. Being entangled in 
structural ambivalences, they can moreover be assumed to produce the 
ambivalence and contingency which practice theory is especially well 
equipped to address.
At the same time, a focus on the school proves illuminating when 
examining current trends in the field of memory research. Some of our 
authors respond to the increased interest in the generational transmission 
of memory (Palmberger 2016) by either analysing textbooks from a dia-
chronic perspective or by exploring how the meaning of the past is nego-
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tiated between teachers and students as members of different generations 
with particular common-sense assumptions and exposure to varying 
media discourses. Most of the contributions resonate well with the new 
focus within memory research on conflict and contestation (Schwartz 
2016). Some give special emphasis to ambivalences in textbooks in order 
to detect cracks and fissures in mnemonic hegemonies. Others approach 
the classroom as a social space where unresolved mnemonic disputes, 
often hidden behind vague phrases (Ryan 2011), are likely to bubble to 
the surface when students, as newcomers to their respective memory cul-
tures, have not yet fully internalised the social rules of navigating precari-
ous issues relating to the past.
Fourth, approaching the history classroom with a focus on memory 
practices, most authors move beyond analyses of learning and teaching 
practices. Whereas previous studies have been primarily interested in 
practices of history education, exploring which teaching strategies would 
be most effective in producing desired learning outcomes or asking how 
one can help students best master historical thinking (Wineburg 2001; 
Van Drie & Van Boxtel 2008), the majority of contributions to this vol-
ume look into memory practices in history education. The focus is not on 
history as a discipline, requiring certain ways of doing and saying, but 
rather on history education as a  setting in which we can closely 
observe how teachers and students ‘do memory’ (Macgilchrist et al. 2015) 
and engage with the past. Emphasis is given to decisions taken on the 
level of content rather than teaching or learning strategies. We want to 
know which facts attract the attention of teachers and students and which 
are ignored by them. We explore which interpretations are guarded and 
which are rejected or simply sidelined. Attending to all these choices, we 
are interested in the political (Sturken 2008, 74) and not in the didactic 
implications that follow from them. Approaching the history classroom 
from the memory practices angle and thus emphasising the role of 
implicit knowledge and routines in our dealings with the past, we also 
introduce new aspects into a debate that has so far been mainly focussed 
on historical consciousness (Seixas 2004). While this term seems to imply 
that teachers and students are as a rule highly reflective when they ‘do’ 
history, the contributions to this book show that doing history is essen-
tially not much different from doing memory. Neither can avoid taking a 
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stance, and neither can escape being informed by social discourses with 
all their common-sense assumptions and categorisations which are, as a 
rule, not objects of conscious reflection and are thus all the more powerful.
The volume is divided into three sections, which (i) look at interpreta-
tions of the Cold War offered in textbooks, (ii) draw on teachers’ under-
standing of textbooks and (iii) analyse how textbooks, teachers and 
students interact with one another in the setting of the history classroom. 
The chapters in the first section investigate to what extent narratives con-
veyed in educational media reproduce, destabilise or creatively appropri-
ate current discourses in historiography and politics. Taking into account 
the particular challenges faced by practices of remembering the Cold War 
in times of unstable political identities, most chapters also emphasise the 
ambivalences and tensions built into these narratives as well as the strate-
gies designed to deal with them. Based on interviews and observational 
data, the contributions to the second and third sections not only ask how 
teachers and students position themselves towards social discourses; they 
also explore how ways of remembering the Cold War can be informed by 
situational dynamics between interviewer and interviewee or by the 
expectations placed on teachers and students alike. Despite these varia-
tions in the breadth and depth of their empirical basis, and despite the 
peculiarity of the analytical questions they raise, all contributions share 
one crucial feature: All focus on rendering explicit what is often only 
implied in written texts or in verbal statements.
In terms of geographical scope, studies on textbooks, teacher-talk and 
classroom interaction in Germany, Sweden and Switzerland form the 
core of the book. These three countries not only happened to be at the 
focus of the international research projects on which the volume is based; 
all of them assumed diverging roles during the Cold War past. While 
Germany was divided into two states, each at the frontline of the Cold 
War and thus closely involved in the respective political and/or military 
alliances, Sweden and Switzerland demonstrated two varieties of neutral 
policy. In the case of Switzerland this followed a more pragmatic and 
calculated course, at the same time affirming western values (Wenger and 
Nuenlist 2008), while the Swedish variant followed the moral pledge for 
a ‘Third Way’ (Aselius 2005; Browning 2007). Against this backdrop, the 
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contributions to this volume explore how these different constellations of 
the past inform memory practices in the present.
Case studies focusing exclusively on textbooks further enrich the com-
parative angle. They treat the USA and Russia as the main protagonists of 
the conflict, as well as Poland and Belgium as countries located on differ-
ent sides of the iron curtain. They further analyse textbooks from China 
as the new aspiring hegemonic power, and Cold-War narratives from 
Chile and South Africa, both of which were part of the so-called former 
‘Third World’. To sum up, the chapters of this book provide rich descrip-
tions of specific acts of recalling the contested Cold War past in the social 
space of the school. Covering a broad range of cultural contexts and 
applying a diverse set of methodological strategies, they map the dividing 
lines in and between memory cultures in the crisis-driven and volatile age 
of our present in which mnemonic consensus is clearly an issue of the 
past – if indeed it has ever existed at all. The authors point to varying 
degrees of ambivalence, vagueness and contradictions in the inescapably 
political textbook narratives understood to be echoes of societal and aca-
demic controversies. Authors focussing on teachers and the history class-
room show how unresolved political issues create tensions and dilemmas 
in history education. They render visible how teachers struggle to handle 
these challenges by pretending that what they do is ‘just history’. 
Obfuscating the political that is inherent to all memory practices, they 
produce the illusion that the history in which they are engaged is all 
about addressing the past with a reflexive and disciplined approach.
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Textbook Memories of the Cold War: 
Introduction to Part One
Barbara Christophe
Making the case for history textbooks as valuable sources for memory 
practices (Christophe  and Schwedes 2018), appears to be rather like 
charging an open door. Textbook and memory research share many 
assumptions and raise similar questions. Both claim that reconstructions 
of the past are contingent on interests and beliefs in the present; both 
seek to unpack the – at times rather complex – relations between times 
past and times present. History textbooks, which have been cogently 
described as ‘weapons of mass instruction’ (Ingrao 2009), play a vital role 
in sustaining mnemonic hegemonies. Selecting what counts as relevant 
(school) knowledge from a vast plethora of historical facts, they take part 
in setting the limits of what can be legitimately said (Apple 2000). 
Powerfully reproducing and imposing on us the categorical distinctions 
we tend to draw in our mediated encounters with the past, they influence 
what can pass for common sense.
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At the same time, we can distinguish between two different approaches 
in textbook research. Some conceive of history textbooks as the ‘autobi-
ographies of nations’ (Jacobmeyer 1998), as powerful instruments for 
crafting a broad social consensus on how to make sense of the past. Other 
researchers argue that textbooks are objects of fierce struggle between 
competing political groups over the construction of a common-sense 
reality (Apple 2000). They point to the many cracks and fissures that 
enter textbook narratives in the course of attempts to merge different 
positions and to speak to different constituencies (Klerides 2010). Both 
camps agree, however, that history textbooks do not convey neutral 
knowledge, but rather participate in the construction of what Raymond 
Williams (1961) has called the ‘selective tradition’.
Although the arguments presented so far might appear as banal tru-
isms, they have in fact met with fierce criticism. It has been argued that 
textbooks are far too boring, confusing and misleading (Tyson-Bernstein 
1988) to shape the minds of students. Textbook stories are said to be too 
predictable to be interesting, focusing exclusively on challenges success-
fully mastered and hardships overcome (Loewen 2007). Studies on ‘text-
bookese’ (Crismore 1984) have shown how one proposition after the 
other is made without rendering visible who is speaking. Researchers 
have criticised textbook authors for tending to speak with an anonymous 
but highly authoritative voice, assuming the role of ‘truth giver’ 
(Crismore 1984, 292), or a ‘surveyor’ (Myskow 2017) of uncontested 
insights. They have pointed out that the reader is ascribed the rather pas-
sive and uncomfortable position of one who is to listen but not speak 
back as there is nobody to argue with (Coffin 2009). Finally, scholars 
claim that the discursive construction of ‘disinterested impartiality’ 
(Myskow 2017, 4) and the ‘appearance of neutrality’ (Coffin 2009, 396) 
clearly comes with the risk of losing the interest of the potential reader 
who is known to appreciate passionate authors taking stances (Commager 
1966). Although some authors (Klerides 2010; Gautschi 2010) have 
emphasised that textbooks have seen significant changes in recent years, 
especially when it comes to encouraging students to pass their own judge-
ments, they have also noticed that there is still room for further improve-
ment. If the chapters in this section nevertheless analyse history textbooks 
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as sources for the reconstruction of memory practices, they do so because 
they share two core assumptions, the validity of which is not affected by 
the compelling critique referred to above.
Firstly, even textbooks failing to persuade their readers of the proposi-
tions they make may be effective in normalising certain distinctions, sys-
tems of categorisation, and modes of structuring a story. As tiny subtleties 
usually pass unnoticed and enter our minds below the radar of conscious 
control, they may have the greatest impact on meaning-making 
(Christophe 2014). We thus – literally – have to take the textbook at its 
word (Ott 2014). Translating these considerations into carefully designed 
research strategies, the contributions to this section arrive at intrigu-
ing insights.
In her analysis of current Chinese textbooks, Lisa Dyson shows how 
meaning-making already takes place in the table of contents. Presenting 
the readers with three chapters on politics, economics, and culture, each of 
which spans the whole of the 20th century, the authors signal that they 
consider chronological turning-points in general, and the beginning and 
end of the Cold War in particular, less worthy of attention than the emer-
gence of a truly multi-polar world with China as one of its dominating poles.
Teresa Oteíza and Claudia Castro point out how textbooks from Chile 
focus exclusively on American fears and concerns when addressing the 
Cuban revolution or the electoral victory of Salvador Allende. The emo-
tions of other actors are not even mentioned; we learn nothing, for 
instance, about the hope felt by left-wing parties at these historic 
moments. As a result, the reader is powerfully instructed to empathise 
with the USA.
Linda Chisholm and David Fig explain how the predominant use of 
the passive voice in South African textbooks contributes to constructing 
the image of Africa and Africans as helpless victims of rival superpowers. 
However, they also point out that, conversely, the same textbooks com-
pletely ignore the influence of international factors on bringing down 
apartheid and ascribing agency exclusively to local resistance fighters.
Working on US-American textbooks, Eva Fischer also pays particular 
attention to micro-analysis. In one telling example she deconstructs a 
sentence stating that ‘although’ they were ‘also’ communist, Soviets were 
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influenced by security concerns. She renders visible how the conjunction 
‘although’ encompasses two simultaneous functions: On the one hand, it 
silently undermines the revisionist claim that the Soviets were fearful by 
implying that communists had no security concerns. On the other hand, 
it remains sufficiently vague about the precise relationship between being 
communist and having security concerns.
Focusing on current Swedish textbooks, Anders Persson describes in 
detail how students are instructed to judge Soviets critically and to iden-
tify with the Americans. While the former are portrayed as a faceless mass 
of people generally deprived of any agency, the latter are introduced as 
progressive and skilful individuals, as creative artists or inventive indus-
trialists who seize any opportunity to grow.
Joanna Wojdon demonstrates how Polish textbooks always describe 
the USA in a favourable light, either by omitting negative aspects like the 
so-called witch-hunt in the McCarthy era or by focusing on solutions 
found to problems such as racism without examining in detail the injus-
tices that were their root causes.
Karel Van Nieuwenhuyse elucidates how Belgian textbooks at times 
implicitly pass moral judgements by their choice of words. As an example 
he provides a close analysis of a sentence stating that the GDR was forced 
to become a Soviet ally while the FRG chose its attachment to the West. 
In addition, he unveils how textbook authors construct Western values as 
the natural standard by which to judge societies all over the world.
Secondly, history textbooks not only tell us which historical inter-
pretations enjoy dominance; in various ways they also provide us with 
insights into controversies. At times, ambivalence or non-coherence in 
texts points to what critical educationalist Michael Apple has called 
the ‘politics of incorporation’ (Apple 2000), which aims at stabilising 
hegemony by simultaneously giving space to and taming the voices of 
formerly excluded minorities. Elsewhere, vagueness caters to the need 
to avoid open conflict over unresolved issues of the past. Finally, in 
some cases significant discrepancies between textbooks published by 
different publishing houses remind us of unresolved societal disputes. 




Eva Fischer provides a detailed analysis of how American textbooks 
include revisionist approaches towards the Cold War by admitting, for 
example, that the USA pursued rather egoistic goals with its Marshall 
Plan. At the same time she points out that only watered-down versions of 
these arguments are incorporated in order to ensure that they would not 
destabilise the traditional positive self-image.
Writing on Russian textbooks, Alexander Khodnev reveals that their 
portrayals of the Cold War remain somewhat disparate. The four most 
widely used textbooks differ significantly, not only with regard to how 
much space they allocate to the so-called Third World or to cultural 
aspects; even when it comes to core issues such as the blame for the con-
flict we see a broad range of different positions. While some authors admit 
that there is no clear-cut answer to this question, others blame the iron fist 
brandished by the Americans at all opponents to their hegemonic plans.
Anders Persson points to significant differences in the portrayals of the 
USA offered by different Swedish textbooks. While most books describe 
the Western superpower in rather traditional terms as the epitome of 
freedom and success, as a country to which people migrated in pursuit of 
happiness, one mentions how women, the poor, slaves and natives were 
disenfranchised and how the Civil War between North and South claimed 
more victims than all other wars in which the USA has participated.
Karel van Nieuwenhuyse shows that Belgian textbooks differ with 
regard to the homogeneity they ascribe to the Eastern bloc. While some 
authors dedicate space to counter-voices only from within the Western 
camp, others focus on dissent in the Eastern camp as well.
Joanna Wojdon identifies tensions in portrayals of Winston Churchill 
in Polish textbooks. While Churchill is described as the first Western 
politician to notice the aggressiveness of the Soviet Union, he is also 
introduced as an outspoken critic of the transfer of German territories to 
Poland. However, as Wojdon argues, in the eyes of Polish textbook 
authors, Poland gained more from the end of cooperation between the 
Western powers and the USSR than it suffered from the same Western 
powers striking an alliance with the former war enemy Germany.
Markus Furrer reconstructs four powerful and potentially contradic-
tory images that dominate Swiss textbook narratives of the Cold War. 
Switzerland is portrayed (i) as overwhelmed by anti-communist hysteria, 
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(ii) as a potential victim of a nuclear war, (iii) as a social space in which 
the economy boomed and a democratic consociation took firm root, and 
(iv) as a society that suffered from the iron curtain.
Finally, textbooks lend themselves particularly well to international 
comparison. With the global expansion of the nation-state and the school 
as one of its core institutions, textbooks have literally travelled the world 
(Christophe 2014), performing more-or-less the same instructional func-
tions across spaces and places. The contributions to this section offer 
intriguing and at times surprising findings on similarities as well as differ-
ences between textbook narratives of the Cold War.
Whereas post-apartheid textbooks in South Africa seem to constitute 
the exception, portraying the USSR in a more favourable light, Chinese 
and Chilean textbook authors appear to agree on the insignificance of the 
Soviet Union, which is given only scant attention and moreover charac-
terised as a failing, and thus negligible, state and social system. In fact, 
Chinese textbooks, like some Russian and the majority of Polish text-
books, do not give much priority to the Cold War at all. Snippets of 
information on the conflict are scattered over several chapters, all of 
which span the whole period from 1945 to the present day under shift-
ing titles.
US-American and Russian textbooks resemble each other in one struc-
tural aspect. Both are ready to retract part of the blame they formerly 
placed on the ‘other’, the ideological rival during the Cold War, but stop 
short of criticising the national ‘self ’. Russian textbooks avoid the term 
‘occupation’, for instance, when they deal with Cold War relations 
between the USSR and Eastern Europe, and US textbooks never men-
tion capitalism as being behind the American interest in penetrating 
European markets with the help of the Marshall Plan.
With regard to the attribution of agency, textbooks from Poland and 
Sweden share one crucial aspect. Both feature active citizens only when 
writing about the extended West; in the extended East only politicians, 
primarily great white men, are presented as capable of having agency.
To sum up, the contributions to this section offer us intriguing insights 
into textbook discourses on the Cold War in different societies and, at the 
same time, present us with innovative methodological suggestions on 
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Manufacturing Coherence: How 
American Textbooks Incorporate 




In 2010, the Texan State Board of Education, conservative by majority, 
voted in favour of changing the social studies curriculum standards. As 
well as mandating changes that would downplay numerous socio- political 
issues, board members demanded a more positive representation of 
US-style capitalism as a ‘free enterprise system’ and a stronger emphasis 
on the Soviet Union’s aggressiveness during the Cold War. They viewed 
their actions as a fight ‘for … our nation’s future’ (McKinley 2010; NBC 
News 2010).1
Interpretations of the Cold War are interwoven with political and cul-
tural values, and attached to notions of national identity. While this is 
true of many countries and societies (see Lowe and Joel 2013) it is the 
US where the concepts of ‘freedom’, ‘progress’ and ‘exceptionalism’, in 
the sense of superiority, have fed most strongly into a national master 
narrative (Foner 1999; Barton and Levstik 2009, 166–182; Pease 2007; 
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Paul 2014). During the Cold War, the US represented itself as the leader 
of the free world and defender against an evil, backward Soviet Union 
(Pease 2007). Revisionist and post-revisionist interpretations of the Cold 
War have challenged this master narrative, yet alternative views have not 
provided any widely accepted frameworks for redefining American his-
tory and identity (ibid., 112).
The academic debates around the Cold War pose a special challenge to 
US history textbooks. A medium of particular socio-political concern 
(Höhne 2002; Klerides 2010), they are expected both to provide accurate 
information and to construct coherent, identity-providing national nar-
ratives (Schissler 2009, 203–226) that satisfy a diverse audience of school 
boards, schools, activists, and lobby groups. This chapter explores repre-
sentations of the contested era of the Cold War in major contemporary 
US history textbooks published between 2007 and 2012. I will focus on 
depictions of the origins of the conflict, an area of particular controversy. 
I restrict my investigation to textbooks for American history, which cover 
the Cold War in more detail than those on world history.
My first consideration was the extent to which contemporary textbooks 
have adopted alternative accounts. My first finding was that the representa-
tion of the origins of the Cold War in history textbooks by the three major 
US publishers Pearson, McGraw-Hill, and Holt McDougal/Houghton 
Mifflin Harcourt (American Textbook Council 2016) is anything but uni-
form. There are textbooks such as Glencoe/McGraw-Hill’s The American 
Journey (Appleby, Brinkley and McPherson  2007) for middle schools, 
which represents a purely traditionalist narrative. At the other end of the 
spectrum we find, for example, Pearson’s text-heavy, ‘advanced’2 high-school 
textbook The American People (Nash and Jeffrey 2009), which explicitly 
locates US history within an international context, provides extensive dis-
cussion of both the Soviet and the US stances in the Cold War, and also 
focuses on the Third World. A large number of textbooks, however, seem to 
have adopted a middle ground between  traditionalist and non-traditionalist 
interpretations, for example Glencoe/McGraw Hill’s The American Vision 
(Appleby et  al.  2007), Pearson’s America: Past and Present (Divine 
et  al.  2007), as well as Holt McDougal/Houghton Mifflin Harcourt’s 
United States History (2012) and The Americans (Danzer et al. 2012).
Given the dominance of this middle course, I will focus on two high- 
school textbooks that combine traditionalist and non-traditionalist views: 
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Glencoe/McGraw Hill’s The American Vision (Appleby et al. 2007) and 
Holt McDougal/Houghton Mifflin Harcourt’s The Americans (Danzer 
et  al. 2012). This specific focus allows me to encompass macro-textual 
strategies, broad argumentative patterns and linguistic realisations at 
micro-level (Martin and Wodak 2003, 1). By looking, for example, at 
sentence construction and word choice in context, I undertake what John 
Issitt has described as breaking down the elements of textbooks in order to 
refute the widely-held assumption of their bland neutrality and reveal how 
they ‘share in the production of a hegemony of ideas’ (Issitt 2004, 689). 
My analysis will also attend to methods of presentation, to the use of pri-
mary sources as well as exercises and graphs, and to what is not said (Issitt 
690). Analysing how the textbooks incorporate various interpretative pat-
terns and create ostensible common-sense assumptions (Baier, Christophe 
and Zehr 2014), I wish to explore the degree of public acceptance of 
alternative accounts of the Cold War as manifested in the textbooks as 
reflections of what society has deemed desirable for students to learn.
Joseph Moreau has demonstrated that US textbooks have integrated 
alternative narrative elements either by making them fit traditional narra-
tive structures, as was the case when African-American history was intro-
duced through the themes of ‘freedom’ and ‘progress’, or by physically 
separating them from the main text, as exemplified in sidebars containing 
Southern interpretations of the Civil War (Moreau 2003). I argue that 
these strategies are also central to the representation of divergent perspec-
tives on the Cold War and its major actors. In The American Vision, revi-
sionist and post-revisionist elements are incorporated, in a watered-down 
version, into the master narrative. In The Americans, the principle of phys-
ical distinction of alternative narratives makes it possible to relegate revi-
sionist interpretations to the background. At one point, however, as we 
will discuss, revisionist elements creep into the core narrative.
My findings give rise to multi-layered implications. The co-existence 
of multiple interpretative patterns supports the assumption that modern 
textbooks mirror debates rather than telling coherent stories (Lachmann 
and Mitchell 2014). At the same time, the textbooks reveal a reluctance 
to lend revisionist accounts of the Cold War the same credibility as tradi-
tionalist and post-revisionist interpretations and to renounce an unbro-
kenly positive national self-image. This indicates that non-traditionalist 
views have become acceptable and integrated only to a point where they 
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do not challenge the national master narrative too explicitly, which is in 
line with what Michael Apple (1990, 25–26) describes as ‘attempts at 
rebuilding hegemonic control’. As perspectives of less powerful groups are 
incorporated under the umbrella of hegemonic discourse, the dominance 
of that discourse in and through textbooks ‘is partly maintained […] 
through compromise and the process of “mentioning”’, which leaves the 
major ideological framework largely untouched.3 The fact that revisionist 
elements do enter the core narrative at certain points, however, indicates 
that ‘progressive echoes’ (ibid., 26) in textbooks are becoming louder.
 Traditionalist, Revisionist and Post-Revisionist 
Interpretations of Selected Cold War Events
According to traditionalist Western interpretations of the origins of the 
Cold War, a backward and aggressive Soviet Union was solely responsible 
for the outbreak of the conflict, whereas the supposedly progressive US 
was to be perceived as the defender of freedom and democracy.4 While 
the Soviet Union, according to this view, established puppet states in 
Eastern Europe and was intent on undermining liberal democracy, the 
US implemented a policy of containment to oppose Soviet expansion. 
According to liberal or orthodox arguments, the US had aspired to return 
to a position of isolationism after the Second World War, but in the face 
of the Soviet threat accepted the role of Western leader in a global strug-
gle against communist dictatorship. For traditionalists, the Marshall Plan 
and the formation of NATO, in which the US consolidated its new role, 
sprang from altruistic and defence-related motives. Bodies such as the 
UN are viewed as emphasising America’s will to international cooperation.
Revisionist interpretations, on the other hand, see the US as a capital-
ist aggressor provoking a weakened Soviet Union which longed for secu-
rity after the experience of war. The Soviet Union, according to this view, 
found itself in a position of defence against an expansionist US, which 
had long since begun to restrict Soviet influence (Lundestad 2014, 11). 
The Marshall Plan is considered part of an American expansionist agenda, 
primarily motivated by economic interests.5 Multilateral institutions are 
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viewed as means to increase American power (Kolko and Kolko 1972). 
Western rhetoric, including the metaphor of the Iron Curtain, is seen as 
having further contributed to the conflict (Williams and Appleman 
1972, 159–260; 269–270; Medhurst, Ivie and Wander 1997).
Post-revisionist views on the Cold War and its origins exist in diverse 
forms. Adopting revisionist arguments to varying degrees, post- revisionists 
focus on the role of (mis)perceptions and the diversity of motives. 
Pointing out how both superpowers contributed to the outbreak of the 
Cold War, they argue either that the conflict was inevitable and neither 
side can be held responsible, or that both sides are equally to blame 
(Lundestad 2014, 11–12).
 The American Vision (Appleby et al. 2007) 
and The Americans (Danzer et al. 2012)
Both these textbooks devote around 22 percent of their content to the 
Cold War,6 covering political as well as social and/or cultural aspects. 
While both have sections entitled ‘Origins of the Cold War’, however, 
they differ in their definitions of these ‘origins’: In The Americans, this 
section of eight pages includes, among other things, the formation of 
NATO and the Marshall Plan. In The American Vision, these two issues 
are discussed in the subsequent section ‘The Early Cold War Years’. The 
section on the ‘Origins of the Cold War’ is therefore only five pages long. 
As my analysis will show, the organisation of topics contributes to their 
interpretation.
 The Origins of the Cold War in The American 
Vision (Appleby et al. 2007)
The American Vision makes revisionist and post-revisionist perspectives 
on the beginnings of the Cold War compatible with the overall master 
narrative. It does so by rendering the latter the basis for selectivity: While 
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lending credibility to the idea that the Soviet Union was a victim moti-
vated by true convictions and fears, the chapter ‘Origins of the Cold War’ 
does not include the converse argument that the US was a capitalist 
aggressor. Instead, it combines the more lenient reassessment of the Soviet 
Union with a positive (traditionalist) self-image. This strategy partly relies 
on the organisation of topics: The chapter focuses on the general beliefs 
and concerns held by each side and on differences between the two. Many 
specific events, such as the Marshall Plan and the formation of NATO, 
are not covered before the chapter ‘The Early Cold War Years’, which 
recreates a traditionalist interpretative framework.
 (Post-)Revisionist and Traditionalist Elements 
in the Chapter ‘Origins of the Cold War’
The chapter ‘Origins of the Cold War’ begins by describing how the ‘clash 
of interests’ between the US and the Soviet Union after the Second World 
War ‘led to an era of confrontation and competition’ that ‘became known 
as the Cold War’ (778). A purely traditionalist account would continue to 
construct this clash as one between communist dictatorship and capitalist 
democracy. This textbook, however, contrasts ‘Soviet security concerns’ 
with ‘American economic concerns’ (779). These headings may raise 
expectations of a post-revisionist account in which both superpowers pur-
sued their self-interested preoccupations. The heading ‘Soviet Security 
Concerns’ is prone to a revisionist reading implying that the Soviet Union 
was weak. As we shall see, however, this expectation is only partly fulfilled.
The section under this heading represents the Soviet side of the con-
flict. It lends legitimacy to the Soviets’ suspicion of capitalist nations 
while simultaneously exonerating these nations of blame:
(1)7 As the war ended, Soviet leaders became concerned about security. (2) 
The Soviets wanted to keep Germany weak and make sure that the coun-
tries between Germany and the Soviet Union were under Soviet control. 
(3) Although security concerns influenced their thinking, Soviet leaders 
were also Communists. (4) They believed that communism was a superior 
economic system that would eventually replace capitalism and that the 
Soviet Union should encourage communism in other nations. (5) Soviet 
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leaders also accepted Lenin’s theory that capitalist countries eventually 
would try to destroy communism. (6) This made Soviet leaders suspicious 
of capitalist nations. (Appleby et al. 2007, 779)
Despite traditionalist elements, this passage contains several revisionist 
aspects: it explains ‘Soviet control’ over other countries in terms of the 
Soviet need for security (1-2), it represents the Soviet ambition of spread-
ing the communist system as based on true conviction (4), and it asserts 
that the Soviet Union felt threatened by capitalism (5). In addition, the 
text refrains from explicitly judging communism.
At the same time, the text avoids placing blame on the US. The issue 
of ‘Soviet security concerns’ leads to the implicit question as to why the 
Soviets mistrusted capitalist nations (6). The highly ambivalent (Baier, 
Christophe and Zehr 2014) sentence 3 is particularly relevant here: The 
conjunction ‘although’ can be read as creating a contradiction between 
being concerned about security and being communist, as if communists 
should not, or do not usually have, security concerns. The sentence, how-
ever, can also be interpreted as claiming that security concerns were not 
the sole factors behind Soviet thinking, but that communism was also of 
influence. The precise relationship between the two driving forces remains 
unclear: Did security concerns and communism go hand in hand or con-
tradict each other? Which was more important? By keeping this relation-
ship ambiguous, the text manages to represent the perceived capitalist 
threat as a merely theoretical construct: Because Soviet leaders ‘accepted 
Lenin’s theory that capitalist countries eventually would try to destroy 
communism’ (5), they were ‘made … suspicious of capitalist nations’ (6). 
While making an effort to rationalise Soviet thinking, the text thus pre-
cludes the idea that Soviet security concerns had anything to do with 
specific action on the part of the US.
The contrasting representation of the American perspective under the 
heading ‘American economic concerns’ complements the picture:
(7) While Soviet leaders focused on securing their borders, American 
leaders focused on economic problems. (8) Many American officials 
believed that the Depression had caused World War II. (9) Without it, 
Hitler would never have come to power, and Japan would not have wanted 
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to expand its empire. (10) American advisers also thought the Depression 
had been overly severe because countries cut back on trade. (11) They 
believed that when nations seal themselves off economically, it forces them 
to go to war to get the resources they need. (12) By 1945, President 
Roosevelt and his advisers were convinced that economic growth was the 
key to world peace. (13) They wanted to promote economic growth by 
increasing world trade. (14) Similar reasoning convinced American lead-
ers to promote democracy and free enterprise. (15) They believed that 
democratic government with protection for people’s rights made countries 
more stable and peaceful. (16) They also thought that the free enterprise 
system […] was the best route to prosperity. (Appleby et al. 2007, 779)
On the surface, the text places the US on an equal footing with the Soviet 
Union: In a manner similar to that of the previous passage, it explains 
what Americans ‘believed’ (8, 11, 15), ‘thought’ (10, 16) and were ‘con-
vinced’ of (12) without explicitly positioning itself towards their princi-
ples and conclusions. Both passages present the respective way of thinking 
as based on economic rather than moral considerations: The Soviets 
thought communism a ‘superior economic system’ that should therefore 
be ‘encourage[d]’ ‘in other nations’ (5). The Americans, who ‘believed 
that the Depression had caused World War II’ (8), promoted democracy 
not so much as a value in its own right but as part of an economically 
based solution to conflict. The passages consistently speak of ‘leaders’ (3, 
5, 6, 7, 14), ‘officials’ (8) or ‘advisers’ (10, 12) rather than of the people. 
Taken together, the paragraphs thus suggest that each superpower had 
reason to believe itself in the right and, consequently, to act as it did. In 
this sense, the text makes a strong post-revisionist statement.
It also, however, upholds the idea of American moral superiority. 
While raising the expectation of a revisionist or post-revisionist interpre-
tation, the heading ‘American economic concerns’ turns out to be ambig-
uous: These ‘concerns’ do not refer to matters of self-interest, but rather 
to more general problems of the time which the US was supposedly try-
ing to solve via an economic approach. The text thus plays with a revi-
sionist catchword explicated in an unexpected way. Given this 
reinterpretation of the concept ‘economic concerns’, sentence 7 in par-
ticular portrays the Americans in a more altruistic light than the Soviets.
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The chapter continues to present the relationship between the two 
sides in the same fashion: While upholding the idea of different perspec-
tives, each with its own legitimacy, the text depicts the US as more altru-
istic. Regarding the Potsdam Conference in 1945, for example, it asserts:
(17) Truman was now convinced that German industry was critical. (18) 
Unless Germany’s economy was allowed to revive, the rest of Europe would 
never recover, and the German people might turn to Communism out of 
desperation. (19) Stalin and his advisers were equally convinced that they 
needed reparations from Germany. (20) The war had devastated their 
economy […]. (21) Truman […] suggested that the Soviets take repara-
tions from their zone […]. (22) Stalin opposed this idea since the Soviet 
zone was mostly agricultural. (23) It could not have provided all of the 
reparations […]. (24) At Potsdam, Truman learned that the atomic bomb 
had been successfully tested, and he told Stalin about the test. (25) Stalin 
suspected Truman was trying to bully him into a deal and that the 
Americans were trying to limit reparations to keep the Soviets weak. 
(Appleby et al. 2007, 781)
Contrasting the opposing camps, this passage, on the one hand, depicts 
them as ‘equally convinced’ (19) of their concerns and positions, and 
provides reasons for both sides’ lines of argumentation (17–23). In the 
case of the Soviet Union, it does so by drawing again on the revisionist 
idea that the country was a victim of the Second World War (20, 25). 
Without judging either side, the passage also portrays the communica-
tion regarding the testing of the atomic bomb as an honest misunder-
standing (24–25), which is characteristic of a post-revisionist perspective. 
While the US appears to be primarily concerned with Europe’s well- 
being, however, Soviet interests seem egocentric, as they only relate to the 
payment of reparations to the Soviet Union.
As demonstrated, the text as a whole employs post-revisionist per-
spectives both in the equal apportioning of blame to each side and in the 
non-apportioning of guilt. It also adopts revisionist elements in point-
ing out the Soviet Union’s precarious position after the war. The accep-
tance of alternative views, however, seems to end where such views 
might question the idea of US altruism, as the direct comparison of 
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American with Soviet reasoning indicates. The notion that the Soviet 
Union was not purely egocentric consequently only occurs in parts of 
the chapter where the Soviet Union is not directly contrasted with the 
US. The reader is informed, for example, that Soviet troops ‘liberated 
Poland from German control’ in 1944 (779), and that the so-called sat-
ellite nations were ‘not under direct Soviet control’ (782).
The early Cold War largely appears as an inevitable conflict. ‘Over the 
next few years’, we are told, ‘arguments about reparations and economic 
policy in Germany increased tensions between the United States and the 
Soviet Union. These arguments became one of the major causes of the 
Cold War’ (780). Similarly, ‘the Potsdam conference marked yet another 
increase in tensions between the Soviets and the Americans, further pav-
ing the way for the Cold War’ (782). These post-revisionist assessments 
are possible because they do not generally contradict the notion of 
American moral superiority.
In one instance, the post-revisionist perspective creates a degree of 
tension with the concept of American altruism. Next to a half-page 
photograph of a little boy holding a pair of shoes donated through the 
American Red Cross we find the assertion that ‘[t]he fate of [German] 
refugees became enmeshed in the growing power struggle between the 
United States and the Soviet Union’ (780). This assessment mirrors a 
recent shift in historiographical debate about German victimhood 
(Kleßmann 2010). It implies that the superpowers cared more about 
their dispute as such than about countries and people, rendering them 
both egocentric. The information that the shoes were given to the boy 
by the American Red Cross, on the other hand, counters the sugges-
tion of blame assigned to the US by representing the Americans 
as caring.
Partly characterised by the absence of critique on US actions, the chap-
ter ‘Origins of the Cold War’ upholds central aspects of the American 
master narrative. I argue that the inclusion of non-traditionalist elements 
is also possible because subjects of debate whose alternative interpretation 
would necessarily cast the US in a less favourable light, such as the 




 Traditionalist Framework in the Chapter ‘The Early 
Cold War Years’
This chapter follows that on the ‘Origins of the Cold War’ and realigns 
the narrative to a traditionalist framework. It introduces ideas that clearly 
oppose the previous mode of representation and resumes and develops 
traditionalist elements from the previous chapter, thus creating a degree 
of narrative continuity.
A text box at the beginning summarises the main idea as follows: ‘As 
the Cold War began, the United States struggled to oppose Communist 
aggression in Europe and Asia through political, economic, and military 
measures’ (783). This traditionalist introduction places the US in a posi-
tion of defence while representing communism, and thus the Soviet 
Union, as the aggressor. While the previous chapter portrayed the devel-
oping conflict between the superpowers as inevitable, the Soviet Union 
now clearly becomes the scapegoat. Whereas the newly introduced notion 
of communist aggression is in conflict with the previously established 
concept of Soviet victimhood, the similarly new idea of the defensive US 
does not immediately contradict earlier depictions, as the overall image 
remains positive.
The chapter continues with paragraphs about major Cold War events, 
such as the Marshall Plan, the formation of NATO, and the Suez crisis. I 
will analyse the discussion of the Marshall Plan to illustrate the chapter’s 
mode of representation.
The passage begins with a description of the poverty, starvation and 
political chaos prevailing in Western Europe after the end of the war. It 
then explains how Secretary of State George C. Marshall proposed the 
Marshall Plan, ‘which would give European nations American aid to 
rebuild their economies’ and was ‘essential to containment’ (785). This is 
followed by Marshall’s famous assertion that the Plan was ‘not directed 
against any country or doctrine’ (ibid.). The core text continues:
(26) The Soviet Union and its satellite nations rejected the offer. (27) 
Instead, the Soviets developed their own economic program. (28) This 
action further separated Europe into competing regions. (29) The Marshall 
Plan pumped billions of dollars [sic] worth of supplies, machinery and 
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food into Western Europe. (30) Western Europe’s recovery weakened the 
appeal of communism and opened new markets for trade (Appleby et al. 
2007, 785).
Portraying the Americans as the saviours of Western Europe, this passage 
ties in with the positive image of the US. The revisionist view, according 
to which the Marshall Plan was primarily designed to serve US economic 
interests, is hinted at in the last part of sentence 30 but simultaneously at 
least partially refuted: The position of the statement at the very end of the 
paragraph allows a reading in which the opening of new markets is a 
consequence or side effect rather than a motive. Even if we were to inter-
pret it as a motive, the previously established idea that the US believed in 
global trade as a route to peace does not make its actions appear primar-
ily selfish.
The representation of the Soviet Union complements the traditionalist 
image. First, the text does not clarify why the Soviet Union ‘and its satel-
lite nations’ rejected the ostensibly generous offer (26). This is clearly in 
contrast with the previous chapter’s efforts to explain why accepting 
America’s offer to make reparations did not make sense from a Soviet 
perspective. Here it is claimed that the Soviets’ actions in developing their 
own economic program ‘further separated Europe into competing camps’ 
(27). In traditionalist fashion, the Soviet Union is thus blamed for the 
growing conflict.
A facilitating factor of this purely traditionalist representation of the 
Marshall Plan is its inclusion in the textbook chapter on the ‘Early Cold 
War Years’ rather than in the ‘Origins of the Cold War’. In light of the 
chapter’s scene-setting, which puts forward the claim that ‘the United 
States struggled to oppose Communist aggression in Europe and Asia’ 
(783), the Marshall Plan is effectively construed as a necessary measure 
for saving the world. Had it been treated in the chapter on the ‘Origins 
of the Cold War’, there may have been an implication that the Marshall 
Plan lay at, or was among, the roots of the conflict.
While The American Vision’s chapter on the ‘Origins of the Cold War’ 
includes revisionist and post-revisionist perspectives, particularly on the 
Soviet Union, the chapter ‘The Early Cold War Years’ leads the overall 
account back into a traditionalist narrative. Considered as a whole, the 
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two chapters thus draw an ambivalent picture of the Soviet Union while 
representing the US in a relatively coherent, positive way. A depiction of 
German refugees as the ultimate victims of the Cold War indicates how 
international historiographical discourse has also found its way into US 
textbook narratives. The purely traditionalist representation of crucial 
events such as the Marshall Plan is partly enabled by the chapters’ the-
matic structure and organisation.
 The Origins of the Cold War in Holt McDougal/
Houghton Mifflin Harcourt’s The Americans
Unlike The American Vision, the textbook The Americans covers all crucial 
events of the early Cold War in the chapter ‘The Origins of the Cold 
War’. My analysis will demonstrate how the chapter simultaneously 
includes and marginalises revisionist interpretations by employing the 
strategy of physical separation: The main text consists of a post-revisionist 
and a traditionalist part, while revisionist interpretations are relegated to 
side boxes and graphs. There is one instance, however, in which fissures 
appear in the core narrative and revisionist elements enter; ambigu-
ity ensues.
 The Post-Revisionist and Traditionalist Framework
The first half of the chapter’s core text is characterised by a post- revisionist 
framework. This begins on the first page; a personal story revolves around 
the encounter of US and Soviet soldiers at the Elbe River in Germany at 
the end of the Second World War. The section ends with the following 
assessment:
(31) The Soviet and U.S. soldiers believed that their encounter would serve 
as a symbol of peace. (32) Unfortunately, such hopes were soon dashed. 
(33) After World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union emerged 
as rival superpowers, each strong enough to greatly influence world events 
(Danzer et al. 2012, 808).
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This passage can be read as post-revisionist in a multiple sense. First, it 
puts the Soviet Union and the US grammatically and semantically in 
equal, or parallel, positions. Sentence 32 evaluates the end of hope for 
peace as negative but refrains from assigning guilt. The claim that the US 
and the Soviet Union ‘emerged’ as rival superpowers contributes to the 
idea of a dynamic of inevitability (33). The remainder of sentence 33 
contrastingly implies that the Soviet Union and the US are both to blame 
for the unfortunate outbreak of the Cold War, as ‘each’ superpower was 
‘strong enough to […] influence world events’.
On the next page, the text reinforces the idea that both sides were 
equally to blame for the Cold War and that their conflict formed a coun-
terpart to the concept of ‘peace’. After contrasting ‘Soviet communism’ 
with ‘the capitalist American system’ (809) and describing the mutual 
Soviet-American suspicion, it elaborates on the relationship between the 
superpowers, the concept of peace, and the UN:
(34) [H]opes for world peace were high at the end of the war. (35) The 
most visible symbol of these hopes was the United Nations (UN). (36) On 
April 25, 1945, the representatives of 50 nations met in San Francisco to 
establish this new peacekeeping body. […] (37) Ironically, even though the 
UN was intended to promote peace, it soon became an arena in which the 
two superpowers competed. (38) Both the United States and the Soviet 
Union used the UN as a forum to spread their influence over others 
(Danzer et al. 2012, 809).
The first part of this passage addresses the concepts of ‘hope’ and ‘peace’ 
in connection with the institution of the UN as such (34-36). Proceeding 
from this basis, the text constructs the United States and the Soviet Union 
as the combined destroyers of general hopes for peace, who misused the 
UN as a competitive ‘arena’ and as a ‘forum to spread their influence over 
others’ (37-38). Depicting both superpowers as egocentric and greedy for 
power, the text places equal blame on each.
In contrast, the second half of the chapter represents a largely tradi-
tionalist account of the origins of the Cold War. This is apparent in 
the individual portrayals of the superpowers and depictions that set them 
in relation to each other. One primary example is the representation 
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of America’s establishment of its containment policy. The text, while 
indirectly blaming the Soviet Union for the implementation of this pol-
icy, minimises American responsibility:
(39) Stalin installed communist governments in Albania, Bulgaria, 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Poland. (40) These countries 
became known as satellite nations, countries dominated by the Soviet 
Union. (41) In early 1946, Stalin gave a speech announcing that commu-
nism and capitalism were incompatible  – and that another war was 
inevitable.
(42) Faced with the Soviet threat, American officials decided it was time, in 
Truman’s words, to stop ‘babying the Soviets.’ (43) In February 1946, 
George F. Kennan, an American diplomat in Moscow, proposed a policy of 
containment. (44) By containment he meant taking measures to prevent any 
extension of communist rule in other countries. (45) This policy began to 
guide the Truman administration’s foreign policy (Danzer et al. 2012, 811).
These two paragraphs portray the superpowers in traditionalist Western 
terms. First, the Soviet Union is depicted as ‘dominat[ing]’ other countries 
(39-40). Using the metaphor of ‘satellite nations’ (40), the first paragraph 
upholds the idea of Eastern European puppet states that were entirely sub-
ject to the Soviet Union. Linking the paragraphs, the phrase ‘[f ]aced with 
the Soviet threat’ (42) interprets Stalin’s speech (41) as an immediate threat 
requiring a counter-reaction from the US.  While the Soviet Union is 
assigned the role of aggressor, the US becomes the defender who 
‘prevent[ed] any extension of communist rule’ (44). The image of a gener-
ally benign US receives further support from the text’s citation of the deci-
sion by American officials ‘to stop “babying the Soviets”’ (42). While 
marked as a quotation, this statement is not questioned and is thus depicted 
as describing the situation accurately. It suggests that the US had been 
disproportionately soft and patient in the past but had finally reached the 
end of its tether; that the Soviet Union, through its provocative behaviour, 
had exhausted its generous chances and that the US now intended to 
meet the Soviets on equal terms. The text obscures US responsibility and 
initiative not only in relation to the initial establishment of the policy of 
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containment, but also with reference to its further implementation: The 
final sentence, ‘[t]his policy began to guide the Truman administration’s 
foreign policy’ (45), constructs the policy itself as the active subject by 
which the Truman administration is passively led. Putting American gov-
ernment policy, and by extension the government itself, in the position of 
an object, this depiction implies that the US could not have changed the 
course of events. The text thus holds the Soviet Union responsible for the 
US policy of containment in the sense that its behaviour rendered it neces-
sary and inevitable.
The strategy of indirectly blaming the Soviet Union for the growing 
tensions is continued in the text’s depiction of the Iron Curtain, which 
follows on from the passage above. The insertion of a primary source 
plays a major role here:
(46) Europe was now divided into two political regions, a mostly demo-
cratic Western Europe and a communist Eastern Europe. (47) In March 
1946, Winston Churchill travelled to the United States and gave a speech 
that described the situation in Europe.
(48) A shadow has fallen upon the scenes so lately lighted by the Allied 
victory. … From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron 
curtain has descended across the Continent. Behind it lie all the capitals of 
the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. … all these famous cities 
and the populations around them lie in … the Soviet sphere, and all are 
subject in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very 
high and … increasing measure of control from Moscow.
(49) The phrase ‘iron curtain’ came to stand for the division of Europe. 
(50) When Stalin heard about the speech, he declared in no uncertain 
terms that Churchill’s words were a ‘call to war’ (Danzer et al. 2012, 811).
The text begins by constructing the difference between East and West 
traditionally in terms of ‘democracy’ versus ‘communism’ as mutually 
exclusive concepts (46). The traditionalist view is upheld in the citation 
of Churchill’s speech, which portrays the Soviet Union as a highly 
influential and controlling power (48). The contextualisation of the 
quotation further supports the construction of Soviet responsibility and 
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the concealing of Western acts of aggression. First, the speech by Churchill 
is said to have ‘described the situation in Europe’ rather than having con-
tributed to it (47). This idea is reinforced by the affirmation that ‘[t]he 
phrase “iron curtain” came to stand for the division of Europe’ (49), 
which implies endorsement of the phrase as a fitting term to describe the 
situation. Unlike Stalin’s speech in the section analysed above, which was 
represented as a ‘threat’ that provoked an American counter-reaction 
(41), Churchill’s speech does not appear to have intensified the conflict 
between East and West, but to have merely put it into words. The text 
thus deviates from the (post-)revisionist notion that the speech, and 
Western rhetoric in general, fuelled the conflict. Moreover, the quotation 
marks around the term ‘a call to war’ in sentence 50 indicate that Stalin’s 
interpretation of the speech as an act of aggression was subjective and 
inaccurate. At the same time, the phrase ‘in no uncertain terms’ rein-
forces the image of a hostile Soviet Union unwilling to compromise. By 
implying that Stalin, perhaps deliberately, misinterpreted Churchill’s 
words, the passage thus ultimately blames the Soviet Union for the out-
break of the Cold War.
The core text continues its traditionalist storyline in many ways. For 
instance, it describes the Truman Doctrine as ‘essential to keeping Soviet 
influence from spreading’ (812). In the section about the Berlin Airlift, a 
photograph of children looking up at an approaching aircraft covers half 
a page (813), reinforcing the concept of American heroism. In the follow-
ing section, I aim to demonstrate how the textbook systematically rele-
gates revisionist elements to the background. I will also analyse an 
instance in which they appear to become prominent.
 The Inclusion and Exclusion of Revisionist Views
I argue that the minimisation of revisionist views in the representation of 
the origins of the Cold War in The Americans takes place by three means: 
Either these views are rendered invisible, or they are kept separate from the 
core narration, or they are included in the core narration but weakened 
by means of ambiguity.
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 Rendering Revisionist Elements Invisible: 
The Representation of NATO
The representation of the formation of NATO is an example of the first 
form of minimisation: A revisionist primary source is adopted, but does 
not become visible as such, as it is embedded in a traditionalist story. The 
beginning of the relevant paragraph reads as follows:
(51) The Berlin blockade increased Western European fear of Soviet aggres-
sion. (52) As a result, ten Western European nations […] joined with the 
United States and Canada on April 4, 1949, to form a defensive military 
alliance called the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). (53) For 
the first time in its history, the United States had entered into a military 
alliance with other nations during peacetime. (54) The Cold War had 
ended any hope of a return to U.S. isolationism (Danzer et al. 2012, 814).
Next to the text, a cartoon by Edwin Marcus depicts the US, France, 
Britain, Canada, Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg as 
hats on a stand. The hats of the first three countries are large and at the 
bottom (the US being the lowest and largest), whereas the latter five are 
smaller and on top. The caption reads:
(55) This cartoon depicts the nations that signed the North Atlantic Pact, 
which created NATO in 1949. The nations, shown as hats, are arranged in 
a pyramid to show the bigger countries on the bottom supporting the 
smaller, weaker nations on top (Danzer et al. 2012, 814).
The traditionalist narrative in the core text is constructed on two levels. 
Depicting the creation of NATO as a ‘result’ of ‘Soviet aggression’ and 
thus as an act of ‘defense’ (51-52), the text places the Soviet Union in the 
role of the aggressor and the West in the role of the defender. Sentence 54 
further suggests that American involvement in world affairs was altruistic 
in general, as the US had actually hoped to ‘return’ to ‘isolationism’; this 
reading mirrors the so-called liberal or orthodox interpretation. 
Complementing the positive image of the US, the cartoon and its 
 description reinforce the concept of an altruistic West under US leader-
ship, which was ‘supporting […] smaller, weaker nations’ (55).
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Ironically, this editorial cartoon from 1949 was originally intended to 
criticise power relations within NATO; that is, its origins are rather revision-
ist. Its original caption – ‘Another pyramid party’ – is to be found only in the 
index of the textbook. Consulting the website of the Library of Congress, I 
found that the caption ‘refers to the parties held to promote pyramid invest-
ment clubs – gambling investment schemes then popular in New York’, and 
that the cartoon may ‘suggest that, as in the pyramid clubs, some members 
of NATO will profit far more than others’ (Library of Congress 2018). The 
textbook thus re-interprets a primary source critical of the US to render it 
compatible with a traditionalist perspective on the Cold War.
 Keeping the Revisionist Interpretation Separate 
from the Core Text: The Representation 
of the Marshall Plan
In the case of the Marshall Plan, revisionist views are not rendered invis-
ible altogether, but are kept separate from the core text. The main text 
introduces the topic via a detailed description of the horrific socio- 
economic situation in Western Europe after the World War, when ‘most 
factories had been bombed or looted’, while ‘[m]illions of people were 
living in refugee camps’, and a bitterly cold winter had caused starvation 
and water and fuel shortages (Danzer et al. 2012, 812). This description, 
which resembles that in The American Vision, provides the basis for a tra-
ditionalist account of American actions and their consequences:
(56) In June 1947, Secretary of State George Marshall proposed that the 
United States provide aid to all European nations that needed it, saying 
that this move was directed ‘not against any country or doctrine but against 
hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos.’ The Marshall Plan revived 
European hopes. Over the next four years, 16 countries received some 13 
billion dollars in aid. By 1952, Western Europe was flourishing (Danzer 
et al. 2012, 812).
The passage is accompanied by a photograph showing how American 
goods are loaded, presumably onto a ship, as well as a graph showing the 
amount of US aid, quantified in millions of dollars, that went to the 
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individual countries. These elements go to create a clear depiction of the 
US as an altruistic saviour. While the core text provides a traditionalist 
account, the revisionist view is relegated to literally sidelined – or margin-
alised – information, in a smaller font, headed ‘background’. In contrast 
to the main text, this section emphasises the Marshall Plan’s economic 
benefits to the US:
(57) The Marshall Plan also benefited the United States. (58) To supply 
Europe with goods, American farms and factories raised production levels. 
(59) As a result, the American economy continued its wartime boom.
Physically relegating this information to the ‘background’ allows the text 
to subtly include a revisionist element in the core narrative. The label 
‘background’ implies that the information is of secondary relevance.
 Weakening Revisionist Elements in the Core Narrative: 
The Representation of the Soviet Union
I will now look at the only instance, according to my reading, in which 
the main text incorporates revisionist views on the origins of the Cold 
War. It occurs in a short subsection headed ‘Tension Mounts’, which is 
located between the post-revisionist and the traditionalist parts of the 
core text. The technique of incorporating revisionist elements creates 
ambiguity, as these elements are interwoven with traditionalist ideas. This 
happens with respect to both the US and the Soviet Union:
(60) Stalin’s refusal to allow free elections in Poland convinced Truman that 
U.S. and Soviet aims were deeply at odds. (61) Truman’s goal in demand-
ing free elections was to spread democracy to nations that had been under 
Nazi rule. […] (62) Truman also felt that the United States had a large 
economic stake in spreading democracy and free trade across the globe. 
(63) U.S. industry boomed during the war, making the United States the 
economic leader of the world. (64) To continue growing, American 
 businesses wanted access to raw materials in Eastern Europe, and they 
wanted to be able to sell goods to Eastern European countries.
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(65) Soviets Tighten Their Grip on Eastern Europe. (66) The Soviet Union 
had also emerged from the war as a nation of enormous economic and 
military strength. (67) However, unlike the United States, the Soviet Union 
had suffered heavy devastation on its own soil. (68) Soviet deaths from the 
war have been estimated at 20 million, half of whom were civilians. (69) As 
a result, the Soviets felt justified in their claim to Eastern Europe. (70) By 
dominating this region, the Soviets felt they could stop future invasions 
from the west (Danzer et al. 2012, 810).
The first passage commences with a traditionalist representation of a 
freedom- loving US and an undemocratic Soviet Union (60–61). In sen-
tences 62 to 64, the positive image of the US is countered by arguments 
that, in revisionist fashion, emphasise America’s economic self-interests. 
The relationship between the concept of ‘democracy’ and economic ben-
efits is highly ambiguous here. While they stem from opposing perspec-
tives on the US, sentence 62 constructs them as essentially a single entity, 
or two sides of a coin. The text thus indicates that the spread of democ-
racy was related to US economic growth, but it does not explain the 
nature of this relationship. One possible reading is that democracy equals 
capitalism, which would again reinforce traditionalist arguments. While 
employing revisionist elements, the passage thus neglects to fully 
develop them.
In the second passage, a similar phenomenon can be observed with 
regard to the Soviet Union. On the one hand, the Soviet Union is depicted 
from a revisionist perspective as a victim of the Second World War, hav-
ing ‘suffered heavy devastation’ and lost millions of civilians (67). 
Emphasising that this condition was ‘unlike [that in] the United States’ 
(67), the text creates a contrast to Soviet ‘economic and military strength’ 
(66) and implies that the Soviet Union was no rival for the US on an equal 
footing. The text also gives reasons for the Soviets’ ‘claim to Eastern Europe’ 
(69) and, by mentioning potential ‘future invasions from the west’ (70), 
evokes the revisionist image of an aggressive West and a  defensive Soviet 
Union. At the same time, however, the text refrains from taking a clear 
position: The verb ‘felt’ (69, 70) emphasises the subjectivity of the Soviet 
view, implying that the latter might have wrongly believed that they 
could prevent invasions by claiming power over Eastern Europe. Whether 
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this error came about because they had chosen the wrong measures or 
because such a threat had not existed in the first place, remains unclear. 
At the end of the paragraph, the Soviet Union is back in its role as a 
‘dominating’ power (70). This also corresponds with the paragraph’s 
heading, ‘Soviets Tighten Their Grip on Eastern Europe’ (65), which is 
reminiscent of traditionalist catchphrases. Ambiguity thus helps here to 
conceal the contrast that emerges through the employment of revisionist 
elements intertwined with traditionalist ones.
The conflict, however, remains visible, and re-emerges in the exercises 
at the bottom of the page, which ask students to identify which aims 
‘involved economic growth of the United States’, and which ‘Soviet aims 
involved self-protection’ (810). This task is clearly in conflict with the 
traditionalist part of the book that follows it.
We have thus seen that the main text of The Americans’ chapter on ‘The 
Origins of the Cold War’ is divided into a post-revisionist part, covering 
general ideological differences and the formation of the UN, and a tradi-
tionalist part covering issues such as the Marshall Plan, the Truman 
Doctrine, the Berlin Airlift, and the formation of NATO. Revisionist 
elements can be found both in relation to the US and the Soviet Union. 
While some are rendered invisible or occur as separate background infor-
mation, others enter the core narrative but are kept ambivalent.
 Conclusion
My analysis has shown that two major US history textbooks apply to the 
Cold War some of the strategies of incorporation and separation that 
have been deployed for other controversial issues in American history 
textbooks in the past. Both textbooks examined here contain post- 
revisionist and traditionalist perspectives.
Their simultaneous use of various interpretative patterns mirrors aca-
demic debate, specifically a lack of consensus over Cold War history: We 
find, for example, traditionalist perspectives and elements of revisionist 
interpretations of the Marshall Plan, traditionalist, revisionist and post- 
revisionist views on American and Soviet goals, a post-revisionist 
account of the UN, a liberal-traditionalist view on the formation of 
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NATO accompanied by a revisionist cartoon, and revisionist headings 
for non- revisionist paragraphs, alongside frequent combinations of dif-
ferent forms of post-revisionism.
The textbooks do not, however, grant equal status to the various pat-
terns of interpretation. At the core of this seems to be a reluctance to 
openly criticise the US.  While both traditionalist and post-revisionist 
views are treated as valid frameworks for interpretation, there is a ten-
dency to employ post-revisionism in a way that conserves a positive 
national self-image. Meanwhile, revisionist perspectives are mitigated, 
pushed into the background, and/or omitted in direct comparisons 
between the US and the Soviet Union. While a purely negative image of 
the Soviet Union thus seems to be in decline, the positive image of the 
US still finds strong narrative support.
These findings argue against the assumption that questions of guilt and 
responsibility are no longer an important issue in current historiographi-
cal discourse, and that historiography has left behind the argumentative 
patterns of the Cold War era.8 The concept of the Cold War as a ‘good 
war’ that resulted in American triumph, a notion John Wiener (2012) 
describes as a failed project of conservative US memory politics, seems to 
have a stronger basis than generally assumed (cf. Schrecker 2004). While 
low visitor numbers at Cold War memorials and museums (Wiener 
2012) might suggest otherwise, history textbook narratives – and what 
they construe as common sense – make evident to this day the traces of 
‘American Cold War Culture’9 in historical discourse.
Individual instances of revisionist elements entering the core narrative 
in the textbook The Americans suggest that we are nonetheless dealing 
with a fragile, ever-shifting construct. Whereas some critics from the 
world of education bemoan increasingly incoherent storylines in US 
 history textbooks (see Ravitch 2004), we might regard the crumbling of 
the core master narrative as a sign of alternative perspectives becoming 
more accepted and thus of what Apple (1990, 26) might call a ‘victor[y] 
in the politics of official knowledge’. The instance of a discourse of 
German victimhood in The American Vision further proves that the 
internationalisation of academia has an impact on the way national his-
tory is told. As the role of the US in the twenty-first century is changing 
and US history is increasingly studied from inter- and transnational 
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perspectives, the long-term response of history textbooks to the associ-
ated challenges and necessary amendments to the traditional master nar-
rative remains to be observed.
Notes
1. The quotation cites a member of the conservative faction on the Texas 
State Board of Education.
2. The Advanced Placement (AP) Program was created by the American 
College Board and offers college-level courses to high-school students.
3. In the argument referenced here, Apple draws on Tyson-Bernstein (1988, 
18–19).
4. Here and in the following I refer to the useful summaries provided by 
Lundestad 2014, 8–34 and Byrd 2009, 88–90.
5. This line of argumentation can be found, for example, in Cox and 
Kennedy-Pipe 2005, 97–134.
6. In Appleby et al. 2007, this amounts to 234 of 1039 pages (excluding the 
appendix); in Danzer et al. 2012, the figure is 246 of 1123 pages.
7. The numbers in parentheses are added by the author for purposes of 
reader orientation.
8. This argument is brought forward, among others, by Jarausch, Ostermann 
and Etges (2017, 1–18; 4).
9. This term was coined by Stephen Whitfield (1991).
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4
Between Radical Shifts and Persistent 
Uncertainties: The Cold War in Russian 
History Textbooks
Alexander Khodnev
Remembering and teaching the Cold War proves a tough challenge to 
anyone working within the Russian context. Since 1991, hegemonic dis-
course on the question of who is to blame for the Cold War has experi-
enced three radical shifts. Whereas during the Soviet era the Americans 
had been portrayed as the main culprits, the first half of the 1990s wit-
nessed the emergence of a more critical attitude towards the USSR, 
increasingly perceived as aggressive. Despite a dominant trend towards a 
perspective on history and history teaching emphasising patriotic values, 
current historiography remains somewhat vague when it comes to the 
Cold War. Against the backdrop of these shifts and the uncertainties they 
foster, this chapter compares Cold War narratives in the four most widely 
used history textbooks in Russia. Focussing on how authors ascribe 
responsibility for the escalation of the conflict, on differences and simi-
larities between textbooks, and on inconsistencies within each textbook, 
I proceed in four steps: Firstly I summarise the curricular requirements 
A. Khodnev (*) 




and provide a brief overview of these textbooks, paying particular atten-
tion to the authors themselves and how each imposes their own structure 
upon the history of the Cold War. I then examine portraits of the USA 
and the USSR in narratives on the origins of the conflict, its main crises, 
and the history of decolonisation.
Marc Ferro stressed that images of history live in our hearts from child-
hood (Ferro 1992, 8). It is difficult to define the role of school history 
textbooks in the construction of these images, which can remain with us, 
if unquestioned, for the rest of our lives. In the last 25 years in Russia, the 
circumstances within which historical memories are constructed have 
altered, however, with the change in the global outlook after the dissolu-
tion of the Soviet Union in 1991. How the history of the Cold War is 
interpreted and taught plays a key role in prompting changes in how 
memory is constructed. The Soviet view, in the second half of the twen-
tieth century, was that its former ally, the United States, was responsible 
for causing the Cold War. Yet the term ‘New Thinking’, coined at the end 
of the 1980s, suggested both the consideration of universal values and the 
interdependence of countries, and many Soviet people began to adopt a 
more pro-Western euphoria. The turn of the twenty-first century saw 
Russia’s search to consolidate its identity and national interests in order to 
become a great power, a successor to the Soviet Union. This cultural envi-
ronment might have had, and may continue to have, a direct or, more 
often, indirect impact on Russian historiography and the teaching of 
Cold War history in schools.
 Reforms and State Educational Standards 
in History and Historiography
According to a long-established tradition, there are two main options 
for teaching history in the Russian school curriculum: either the course 
‘History of Russia’ or ‘World History’. The former is allocated more 
hours by the curriculum than the latter. This can be explained by the 
demands placed upon teachers by the Federal State Educational 
Standard (FSES), which makes its mission to educate future citizens of 
Russia and patriots. The teaching of history is complicated by the 
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introduction of two different educational standards, FSES-2004 and 
FSES-2010. The main difference between them is a concentric system, 
which recommends students study all history from grades 5 to 9, as a 
linear, uninterrupted course, and then the same periods again from 
grades 10 to 11, this time in greater depth. While FSES-2004 required 
twentieth-century history to be included in the curriculum for both 
grades 9 and 11, the new 2010 standard stipulates history be taught at 
grade 10 only. In the school year 2016/2017, the new standards for his-
tory teaching were used in grades 5 to 6, while the old standard from 
2004 was still applied to grades 7 and 11.
The debate on history teaching in schools became even more heated in 
2013, when the ‘Historical and Cultural Standard’ (Istoriko-Kulturny 
Standart) was issued by a group of educators and scholars. This document 
sought to instigate the discussion of the most disputed and controversial 
issues in history education between academic historians and the teaching 
community. Since the group was formed, the authors have also written 
school textbooks together. The ‘Historical and Cultural Standard’ 
includes a significant supplement, an ‘Exemplary List of Difficult 
Questions of Russian History’, with no less than 31 controversial issues, 
more than half of which pertain to the history of Russia in the twentieth 
century. Article 23 of the document declares that ‘assessing the role of the 
USSR in the outbreak of the Cold War’ is one of the most ‘difficult ques-
tions’ (Istoriko-Kulturny Standart 2013, 49), this conclusion being 
reached after some 25 years of intensive investigations into precisely 
this question.
The list of critical questions, complaints and suggestions from school 
teachers and specialists in the field of history teaching shows that teachers 
are concerned about the current disparity between teaching hours avail-
able within the school curriculum for Russian history as compared to 
World History, and also by the increasingly reduced hours allocated to 
the history of other countries. At congresses of history educators, teachers 
also spoke of their concerns about students developing neither a global 
outlook nor values which are important in an open and multicultural 
world. Ironically, the State Standard demands these qualities and stu-
dents must answer questions on the topic of multiculturalism during the 
Universal State Exam in History (Strelova 2013, 183).
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The first version of the ‘Historical and Cultural Standard’ comprised 
seven sections, each consisting of a short introduction, table of contents, a 
wordlist combining the basic concepts and terms of the section, personali-
ties, and a list of events set out chronologically. The distribution of material 
across these sections showed that Section 6, ‘Apogee and the Crisis of the 
Soviet System (1945-early 1980s)’, oddly includes only a small number of 
concepts and terms (with 45, it takes third place when the sections are 
ranked accordingly), the fewest mentions of names from all seven sections 
(with 32, it ranks second to last), and few events and dates (in sixth place, 
with only 47). Based on these indicators, the section ‘Formation and 
Evolution of the Soviet System’ is clearly in the lead, along with ‘The Great 
Patriotic War of 1941-1945’ (Akul’shin and Grebenkin 2013, 11). Further, 
the detailing of historical material and dates reaching back to the early cen-
turies of Russian history dramatically outweighs information provided on 
more recent periods. This increases yet more the difficulties involved in 
teaching the second half of the twentieth century and thus the Cold War.
A study of the Cold War by Russian historians in the 1990s took the 
question of responsibility for the conflict to a new level. In the Soviet 
period, the weight of responsibility for its origins was placed on the 
United States. American historiography, particularly the works of 
American revisionist and post-revisionist historians, influenced Russian 
as well as European historiography between 1980 and the end of the 
1990s (Zubok and Pechatnov 2003, 144), also inspiring the beginnings 
of Russian revisionist historiography. However, in Russia the revisionist 
interpretation was associated with historians who blamed the Russians 
rather than the American leaders for causing the Cold War, more often 
accusing Stalin and his close circle of being at fault for the increasing ten-
sion in relations with former allies between 1945 and 1946.
Another trend in Russian historiography in the 2000s concerns the 
transition from seeing the Cold War as a complex process to analysing its 
inherent contradictions on  both sides. This trend emphasises how the 
Kremlin lacked a clear plan for the post-war period, particularly regard-
ing a long-term strategy for developing relations with the United States. 
Because of this uncertainty, it is maintained, the USA saw a threat in the 
actions of the USSR and adopted a strategy of containing the Soviet 
Union’s power after the Second World War (ibid., 147-148).
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While the ‘Historical and Cultural Standard’ did not put an end to 
the debate on interpretations of the Cold War, it at least avoided exac-
erbating disputes between historians on key issues. Its wording almost 
completely avoids ideological assessments and its interpretations are 
reduced to a minimum. For example, the genesis of the Cold War is 
described in the following neutral expressions that record only histori-
cal facts and processes: ‘The Beginning of the Cold War’, ‘The Truman 
Doctrine’, ‘The Marshall Plan’ and ‘The Formation of a Divided World’ 
(Istoriko- Kulturny Standart 2013, 40). There are no set standards for 
World History.
 General Profile of the Texts
We chose four widely used textbooks for the study, for eleventh grade 
and the last year of secondary school, covering the history of the twen-
tieth and the beginning of the twenty-first century. The first textbook 
(Chubar’yan et  al. 2011) is the work of a team of famous Moscow 
historians: Alexander, scholar and expert on the foreign policy of 
Russia and the USSR, Alexander A.  Danilov, author of many text-
books on the history of Russia over the last 25 years in cooperation 
with a specialist in history teaching methods, and Lyudmila 
N. Aleksashkina, author of the methodological questions and exercises 
in the textbook. The authors of the second book are experts from St. 
Petersburg: Historian Oleg Yu. Plenkov is a specialist in German his-
tory with a focus on the National Socialist period, and Tatyana 
P. Andreevskaya is a well-known expert in pedagogical approaches to 
history. Oleg V. Volobuev, author of the third book, is a well-known 
textbook author working in Moscow, combining the talents of the 
researcher and the didactics expert. Nikita V.  Zagladin and Yuri 
A. Petrov, who wrote the fourth textbook, are well-known historians 
and, at the same time, have authored school textbooks for twenty years. 
Petrov is also  the Director of the Institute of Russian History of the 
Russian Academy of Sciences. These names are renowned among 
both  teachers and the wider Russian public in connection with the 
world of history and history teaching.
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There are differences in approach to the material in the textbooks for 
the Russian History course and its World History counterpart. In the 
textbook for World History by Oleg Plenkov, Tatyana Andreevskaya and 
Sergei Shevchenko, the Cold War occupies a large number of pages. The 
peculiarity of this text is that the authors pay more attention than other 
textbooks to confrontations on a global scale in ‘third world’ countries of 
Asia, Africa and Latin America during the Cold War period, perhaps due 
to the affiliation of the editor. Associating the ‘third world’ with Asia and 
Africa is a Russian tradition, and Myasnikov is a specialist on the history 
of China, one of the key countries in the ‘third world’ story of the twen-
tieth century told in Russian textbooks. For this reason it is understand-
able that some sections of the textbook describe the ‘establishment of the 
communist regime’ in China, the Korean War of 1950 to 1953, the con-
frontation of the two superpowers in Indochina, and other events related 
to this topic. The text emphasises the confrontation between powers on a 
global scale during the Cold War in all parts of the world. Key concepts 
are widely used: ‘The Third World’, ‘Global Opposition in Asia’, 
‘Decolonisation of Africa’ and ‘Authoritarianism and Democracy in Latin 
America’. However, the histories of Western and Eastern Europe, as well 
as of America, are allocated more space in the book than other parts of 
the world.
The textbook by Nikita V. Zagladin and Yuri A. Petrov, Istoriya (History), 
is intended for eleventh grade of secondary school. The text is designed to 
convey the history of Russia and the world in the twentieth and twenty-
first centuries, and so the authors include information about cultural issues 
and changes to economic life as well as significant international events. 
However, the text lacks accounts of everyday life. By volume, it is the 
largest of the texts selected for analysis. Cold War conflicts are dealt 
Table 4.1 Number of pages allocated to each topic
Volobuev Plenkov Zagladin Chubar’yan
Total: 70 (31%) 93 (28%) 80 (18%) 53 (18%)
National issues 11 (16%) 5 (5.4%) 41 (51%) 30 (57%)
International issues 50 (71.1%) 67 (72%) 20 (25%) 15 (28%)
Economy 0 13 (14%) 4 (5) 4 (7.5%)
Culture 6 (8.6%) 8 (8.6%) 12 (15) 4 (7.5%)
Everyday life 3 (4.3%) 0 3 (4%) 0
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with in paragraph 36. The authors emphasise the bipolar nature of the 
post-war world, with the USA’s growing power and the increased authority 
of the USSR, whose army dominated Eurasia. Soviet troops controlled 
much of Central and Eastern Europe, North Iran, Manchuria and North 
Korea (Zagladin and Petrov 2014, 267).
In the textbook authored primarily by Oleg V. Volobuev there is no 
specific chapter dedicated to the ‘Cold War’. Material on the history of 
the conflict is placed in Chapter 4: ‘The World in the Second Half of the 
Twentieth and the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century’, with two 
paragraphs of section 17, ‘Post-war Organization of the World: 
International Relations from 1945 to the Beginning of the 1970s’ (8 
pages) and section 18, ‘International Relations 1970s-1980s’ and ‘The 
End of the Cold War’ (9 pages). The history of the Cold War is ‘scattered’ 
within other paragraphs, such as on the ‘Social and Political Development 
of the West’, ‘Socialist Countries and Features of their Development’, 
and ‘Countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America in the Second Half of 
the Twentieth Century’. Aleksandr O.  Chubar’yan’s textbook, on the 
other hand, clearly seeks to reveal more about national Russian matters 
than global problems during the Cold War. Chubar’yan does, however, 
have a chapter dedicated to the Cold War story.
Ultimately, Russian history textbooks still bear the legacy of the Soviet 
era. The authors dedicate much space in the textbooks to political events 
at the expense of culture, economics and, especially, everyday life 
in the past.
 The Origins of the Cold War
In the textbook by Plenkov et al. the question of which country was to 
blame for the origins of the Cold War still goes unanswered. While 
earlier Soviet historians believed that it was the US that unleashed the 
conflict, the most objective view, according to these authors, is that of 
common responsibility of both the USSR and the US (Plenkov et al. 
2011, 136). Two reasons are given: the different interests of the United 
States and the Soviet Union, and the developing mistrust between the 
two countries.
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Oleg V. Volobuev’s text book states that the beginning of the Cold War 
is associated with the split of the world – primarily on the part of the 
USA – into warring blocs. In this version of post-war events, entitled 
‘Соединенные Штаты Америки вышли из Второй мировой войны 
самой сильной в экономическом и военном отношении державой. 
США, по словам президента Г. Трумана, способны были показать 
«железный кулак» всякому, кто воспротивился бы их мировому 
господству’, the USA withdrew from the Second World War as the 
most economically powerful entity and could therefore ‘show an iron fist’ 
to anyone who opposed their plans for world domination (Volobuev 
2012, 149). According to this interpretation, the USSR sought to ensure 
peace, restore its collapsed economy, and create a bloc of friendly states to 
secure its borders. In addition, the authors ascribe to Stalin the desire to 
achieve the traditional foreign policy goals of the Russian Empire, on the 
basis of increasing the power and authority of the USSR in the interna-
tional arena. The reasons for these goals are not explored by the text-
book authors.
Zagladin and Petrov’s textbook states that the Cold War was caused by 
a ‘clash of national state interests’, which was ‘aggravated by profound 
differences in economic and socio-political development in the dominant 
values’1 (Zagladin and Petrov 2014, 267). The authors implicitly suggest 
that both superpowers had their own reasons for the confrontation and 
are thus both guilty of rivalry. Equally, they argue that:
The prestige of the USSR has become stronger; its influence in the interna-
tional arena has increased. However, the Soviet leadership could not use all 
this to ensure the peaceful development of the country. The Soviet Union 
was involved in a ‘cold war’ with its former allies.2
The scholar A. O. Chubar’yan was a direct participant in most confer-
ences and projects that changed Russian historiographical approaches 
to the Cold War between 1990 and the 2000s. In Chapter 8 of Istoriya 
Rossii, Chubar’yan explains the beginning of the debates taking place 
at the end of the Second World War and the creation of a new world 
order, including the growing displeasure in Moscow at the ‘delay in 
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opening a second front’ against Germany. At the same time, he points 
out that the old ideological confrontation between the ‘socialist Soviet 
Union and the capitalist states lessened during the war’. The disagree-
ment between these powers concerned the fate of the countries of 
Eastern Europe. The leadership of the USSR wanted to see them 
‘socialist’, and the United States, Britain and France hoped to keep 
them under their own influence (Chubar’yan et al. 2011, 193). The 
fate of Germany was another source of tension. While in the Soviet 
zone a policy of supporting pro- communist forces was followed, in 
the Western zone of Germany ‘events developed in the opposite direc-
tion. The old political parties were restored’ (ibid. 2011, 194). This 
textbook portrayal is not fully correct, however: West German politi-
cal parties were not merely the old political parties restored, but were 
certainly at least re-conceived, especially those to the right of the mid-
dle. According to Chubar’yan, as of the end of 1945 there were clashes 
between allies who accused each other of failing to fulfil their obliga-
tions. While the question of responsibility, for him, is answered, as 
the guilt of both the USSR and the United States is clear, Chubar’yan 
points to certain events and actions which seemingly contradict each 
country’s foreign policy aims.
These different interpretations of the origin of the Cold War show that 
in all four textbooks the authors place the blame on both sides of the 
conflict. The traditional Soviet interpretation blames the United States. 
No texts criticise the Soviet Union regarding the events of the Cold War 
according to a revisionist line of interpretation which was popular in the 
1990s. These revisionist historians called for another interpretation, and 
thus a change in the Russian historiographical tradition, suggesting that 
the blame for the Cold War beginnings lay with the USSR. In Western 
historiography, on the contrary, the revisionism label is used when blame 
is placed on the USA. The coverage of the principal international and 
domestic events of the epoch is extensive. The textbooks pay a great deal 
of attention to various aspects of domestic and international politics, 
with very little information about everyday life. On the whole, it must be 
said that the history of the Cold War (1946-1989) is not the key era for 
fostering identity construction  in Russian school textbooks; this role 
rather falls to depictions of the ‘Great Patriotic War’ (1941–1945). 
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 Narratives of Cold War Crises
One might imagine that Cold War crises would be central to the general 
narrative about this global confrontation. The Cold War played out in 
such a way that the main participants, the USSR and the US, did not 
utilise direct military operations, which threatened the use of nuclear 
weapons. Superpowers had to demonstrate their strength and influence 
in crises through actions that substituted direct military activity and, as 
victory or defeat in such a crisis was nevertheless comparable in impor-
tance to a victory in a real military clash, the memory of the crises must, 
according to the logic of military history, endure. Russian historians 
Aleksandr S. Seniavskii and Elena S. Seniavskaya stress:
After a war has ended, it persists in the memory of many – its immediate 
participants, its contemporaries, and the direct offspring of those forced to 
experience the extremities of war. Where war is an event of significance to 
the social organism, its memory is preserved both in individual and in col-
lective consciousness and may be reinforced in the official (ideological, 
political, etc.) discourse across several post-war generations (Seniavskii and 
Seniavskaya 2010, 54).
The Cold War, it seems, did not leave a long and preserved collective 
memory. It was a war in which Russia was defeated. Russian textbooks 
show the events of the Cold War generally in a neutral style, without 
reinforcing the official ideological and political discourse, and their 
authors avoid thorough details and analysis. They even omit certain cri-
ses, treating these as insignificant.
Plenkov and colleagues state that the Cold War was accompanied by a 
series of regional conflicts, most caused by ideological struggle and geo-
political confrontation between the two superpowers USSR and USA. In 
160 conflicts between 1945 and 2000, 7.2 million soldiers were killed. 
According to the author, this is comparable to the number of victims of 
the First World War, which they place at 8.4 million (Plenkov et al. 2011, 
135). They also cover, in a short phrase, the uprising in Hungary in 1956, 
including a photograph of these events. At the same time we are told that 




The CSSR in 1968 is the first serious conflict to be mentioned in the 
textbook by Plenkov et al. Using the phrase ‘The Prague Spring’, the text-
book relates how a group of reformers, led by Alexander Dubček, set out 
to remodel socialism. In Moscow this was perceived as a threat to what 
the Soviets considered socialism. In August 1968, under the pretext of 
‘protecting socialism’ and ‘the integrity of the socialist community’, the 
troops of the Warsaw Pact entered Czechoslovakia: ‘The attempt of the 
population of Czechoslovakia to repel the invasion by success failed’ 
(ibid., 141).
On page 142 readers are informed about the Berlin crisis of 1948 and 
1949. Apparently the authors considered this crisis less serious than the 
Prague Spring, the Berlin crisis being referred to as ‘one of the first crises 
of the Cold War’. The authors present as its cause the attempt of the 
Western allies to carry out monetary reform in West Berlin. In the view 
of the leaders of the USSR, this step was considered a departure from the 
agreements concerning Berlin, and Moscow decided to organise a block-
ade of West Berlin. It is a story about the unsuccessful sanctions applied 
by the USSR against the population of Berlin. Western vehicles were not 
allowed to travel to West Berlin either by rail or by road. In order to com-
municate with the Western sectors of Berlin, the European countries 
established an effective airlift in which American and British aircraft suc-
cessfully supplied the population with food. The blockade ended within 
a year. According to the authors of this text, the USSR came out worse in 
this conflict, now publicly perceived in a negative light because of its 
actions. In geopolitical terms, the blockade led to the unification of the 
Western zones of occupation and to the creation of the Federal Republic 
of Germany, as well as the emergence of NATO in 1949 (ibid., 142).
This textbook displays noticeably new attitudes to Western science and 
includes newly accessed documents from archives. This is a more recent 
trend, indicating that Russian textbook authors are trying to include dif-
ferent historiographical approaches. For example, an excerpt from a book 
by modern American historian Kathrin Weathersby about the role of the 
USSR in the war in Korea is provided as a source (ibid., 163). The text-
book also utilises a clear method of avoiding a country-specific 
 presentation of material, which prevailed in Soviet times at the expense of 
muting any problematic aspects that might interrupt the master narra-
tive. The authors used the following headings: ‘Confrontation in the 
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Arab World and the Problem of Israel during the Cold War’, 
‘Decolonisation of Africa’, ‘Latin America between Authoritarianism and 
Democracy’, and other headings with which they organise the material 
on a problem- related basis. The end of the chapter sums up the history of 
the Cold War as follows:
• The Cold War has become an important factor in the developments of 
post-war decades,
• The events of the Cold War affected various nations,
• History had never before known an ideological confrontation of 
this kind,
• The confrontation of the Cold War was due to differences in the social 
systems of the West and the East and was almost inevitable,
• The peak of confrontation occurred in the first post-war decade, while 
the confrontation itself continued,
• Rivalry and different approaches to solving world problems remained 
between the United States and Russia after the end of the Cold War 
(ibid., 185).
Such rivalry the author considers ‘a natural process of political develop-
ment’, however, further claiming that ‘the rivalry relations will continue 
in the future, but it is not at all necessary that they should take the char-
acter of militant ideological confrontation, as in the days of the Cold 
War’ (ibid., 185).
Insurrections and conflicts against the domination of the USSR in the 
Eastern Bloc are not fully represented in this textbook. While there is 
information about the uprising in Hungary and the crises in the GDR, 
none is given about the Polish crises. Here again we see the features of the 
above-mentioned neutral style, which, of course, is associated with a 
common patriotic narrative: that the government of the USSR sought to 
protect the country’s security during the Cold War and avoided mistakes. 
Consequently, according to Plenkov et al., some details of the events of 
the Cold War can be omitted as it ended without victory for the 
Soviet Union.
In the textbook authored by Oleg Volobuev, in paragraph 15 of 
Chapter 4, ‘The World in the Second Half of the Twentieth to the 
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Beginning of the Twenty-first Century’, the authors examine the history 
of socialist countries and features of their development after the Second 
World War. In fact, this chapter tells the story of the Cold War. It is in 
this context that the main crises in this region are mentioned. The authors 
emphasise that divided Germany has more than once been an arena for 
serious conflicts. The first conflict examined by the authors is related to 
the events of 1948 and the Soviet blockade of the ‘transport routes lead-
ing from the Western zones of occupation to the Western sectors of 
Berlin’ (Volobuev 2012, 132). This conflict is explained by the fact that 
the stream of depreciated bank notes ‘flowed from the western zones into 
the Soviet zone because of the monetary reform’. In the Soviet zone there 
was the threat of economic chaos (ibid., 132). We can see in this interpre-
tation the desire of the authors to explain the blockade of West Berlin 
between 1948 and 1949 not as a political confrontation, but as a conflict 
that arose due to economic reasons.
The next crisis arose in the GDR in 1953. The authors state that, after 
Stalin’s death, disturbances began here that grew into an uprising against 
the pro-Soviet regime (ibid., 132). The authors again seek the cause of the 
crisis in the economic state of the GDR: ‘This was the Germans’ response 
to the decline in their standard of living’, while in the FRG, they state, 
thanks to the reforms, ‘the situation ha[d] improved’ (ibid., 132). The 
communist elite failed to suppress the opposition and Soviet troops 
entered Berlin. However, according to the authors, the GDR increasingly 
lost the competition with living standards in the FRG, and, in 1961, the 
border between West and East Berlin was closed. In August 1961 the 
Berlin Wall was built: ‘This construction became a symbol of the Cold 
War and the split of the German nation’ (ibid., 133).
Further on in the textbook, the authors analyse the crisis in Poland and 
the uprising in Hungary in 1956. In accordance with a long tradition, 
they are referred to as ‘events’, a common term used both in historiogra-
phy and many textbooks. The authors discuss the call of the Soviet leader 
Nikita S. Khrushchev to establish socialism in Eastern Europe in  accordance 
with national characteristics, a desire he expressed at the Twentieth 
Congress of the CPSU. Unexpectedly for the Soviet leadership, the con-
demnation of the old policy in Eastern Europe and Stalinism had out-
grown the denial of ‘socialist gains’ and communist ideology (ibid., 133). 
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In Poland, a general strike began, which, according to the authors, was 
suppressed thanks to the policies of Vladislav Gomulka. In 1956, Poland 
succeeded in repressing further Soviet control. In Hungary, the commu-
nist leadership was less able to overcome Stalinism, and the people began 
an uprising. In November 1956, the uprising in Hungary was suppressed 
with the help of Soviet troops. The head of the rebellious government, 
Imre Nagy, was executed, and power passed into the hands of János Kádár 
(Volobuev 2012, 133-134).
The textbook authors subsequently interpret in detail the events of 
1968  in Czechoslovakia. The general conclusion of this section differs 
significantly from earlier interpretations of the history of the socialist 
countries, the events being considered undoubtedly positive. The authors 
draw attention to the fact that, in the countries of Eastern Europe, com-
munist governments came to power with the support of the USSR. 
Despite some successes in the development of the economy, leadership 
policies for these socialist countries led to acute sociopolitical crises. The 
power of the communist governments in these countries was preserved 
only thanks to the intervention of the USSR (ibid., 136). This conclusion 
comes close to describing events accurately, but it does not say that these 
socialist countries were occupied by the Soviets.
According to the textbook by Zagladin and Petrov, the most serious 
issue developing in the late 1940s was the question of Germany’s place in 
Europe. Zagladin believes that each side in the Cold War fought for the 
resources and potential of Germany. This textbook provides brief infor-
mation about the Berlin crisis of 1948 to 1949, stressing that, despite the 
critical nature of the conflict and the willingness of both sides to move 
towards an open military confrontation, ‘the Berlin crisis was resolved 
peacefully, but the solution of the German question – the creation of a 
unified, neutral and democratic Germany – was frozen for many years’ 
(Zagladin and Petrov 2014, 270). This idea of an unresolved German 
‘question’ is common in recent Russian history textbooks.
The authors also analyse the main events of the Cold War in Asia. 
The text includes information about a clash in China, the victory of 
the CCP and the formation of the PRC, the war in Korea from 1950 
to 1953, and the Vietnam War. The authors call the Caribbean Crisis 
of 1962 ‘the most critical conflict of the Cold War’ (ibid., 273). The 
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settlement came about, according to the authors, ‘thanks to the 
restraint and prudence shown by President John F. Kennedy and the 
Soviet leader Nikita S.  Khrushchev. Soviet missiles that caused an 
aggravation were shipped from Cuba, the United States abolished the 
naval blockade of Cuba, and the USA promised to respect its sover-
eignty and to remove missiles from Turkey targeted at the USSR’ 
(ibid., 273). The Caribbean Crisis of 1962, known in the West as the 
Cuban Missile Crisis or the October Crisis, is present in all the history 
textbooks used. In the Plenkov et al. textbook the Cuban Missile Crisis 
and the increased danger of military confrontation it brought is 
explored over two pages (Plenkov et al. 2011, 220). Chubar’yan’s text-
book also treats the crisis, the authors arguing that the reason behind 
the behaviour of the Soviet leadership was to use Cuba to exacerbate 
issues in the USA: ‘The existence of a socialist Cuba pushed the Soviet 
leaders to use this country to create difficulties for the United States’3 
(Chubar’yan et al. 2011, 200).
Zagladin’s textbook examines in detail the events occurring in Eastern 
Europe, which was in the ‘orbit of the USSR’, during this period and 
mentions all serious conflicts and crises. Separate pages are devoted to the 
conflict between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the USSR in 
the 1960s (Zagladin and Petrov 2014, 280-283).
Chubar’yan’s textbook applies a chronological approach to the distri-
bution of historical facts. In Chapter 8, the principal stages of the his-
tory of the Cold War are delineated: the origin, the ‘split of Europe’, the 
crises of the Cold War between 1950 and 1960, and detente. The Berlin 
crisis of 1948 is portrayed as the main crisis during the post-war period, 
from which the authors explore the remaining events of the East-West 
conflict: the creation of Germany and the GDR, the emergence of 
NATO, the Warsaw Pact, and Comecon (CMEA) (Chubar’yan et  al. 
2011, 196). The authors of the text connect the causes of the Berlin 
crisis of 1948 with the closure of checkpoints leading to West Berlin by 
the Soviets. The authors neither mention monetary reform in West 
Germany, nor do they include the economic reasons for the crisis and 
monetary reform which are mentioned (again ‘neutrally’) in Plenkov’s 
and Volobiev’s textbooks. The closing of Berlin  checkpoints by the 
Soviets goes unexplained.
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In Chubary’yan’s text the author pays particular attention to the close 
relationship between foreign confrontation and the repressive domestic 
policy in the Soviet Union during the Cold War crisis. Anti-Western sen-
timent grew and accusations against citizens and artists who seemed to 
‘worship’ the West mounted. At the same time: ‘Similar processes related 
to the repression of dissidents, criticism of communism and the Soviet 
Union occurred in the United States and Western European countries4 
(ibid., 197).
According to the authors, the United States outstripped other coun-
tries in its reaction to anyone sympathetic towards the Soviet Union or 
communism in general, with anti-communist hysteria leading to a 
‘witch- hunt’. In the United States, even those merely suspected of sym-
pathy for the communists were persecuted (197). However, the term 
McCarthyism is not mentioned in the textbook. We find more details 
about McCarthyism in the Volobuev textbook, which argues that, dur-
ing the presidency of D. Eisenhower in the United States in the early 
1950s, rumours of a pro- Soviet communist conspiracy spread, fuelled by 
Soviet support for the American Communists and the success of Soviet 
intelligence. However, the ‘witch-hunt’ discredited the American politi-
cal system and Senator McCarthy’s commission was terminated in 1954 
(Volobuev 2012, 120).
The crises in Central and Eastern Europe  – Hungary in  1956, the 
aggravation of the situation in the district of Berlin, and the 
Czechoslovakian crisis of 1968 – are all covered in relative detail in this 
chapter of the textbook. However, a large amount of space is also allo-
cated to the ‘big’ crises of the Cold War, such as the Caribbean Crisis and 
the conflict in the Middle East (198-201). The authors suggest that 
events occurring between 1953 and 1955 went some way towards easing 
the conflict between the powers, thus referring to them as ‘the first 
detente’ of the Cold War era. After the death of Stalin in 1953, they 
claim, dialogue opened up between the opposing sides. As a result, an 
agreement was signed to end the war in Korea, the Berlin meeting was 
held in 1954, and in 1955 Soviet troops withdrew from Austria. However, 
the authors conclude this argument with the statement that the ‘first 




We can therefore see a broad selection of facts and arguments in these 
textbooks. For those in modern Russia who support one unified version 
of history and a single explanatory narrative for schoolchildren, recent 
textbooks will be disappointing. While the liberalisation of history, the 
emergence of new interpretations of the past, and discussions among his-
torians are all developments which can be easily reversed, it is to be hoped 
that open debate and multiple perspectives in the field of history educa-
tion cannot be completely suppressed; at least, that the memory of more 
liberal times will endure.
 Decolonisation and the Cold War in Russian 
Textbooks
The USSR pursued a policy of ‘proletarian solidarity’ with other coun-
tries striving for national liberation in the context of decolonisation. 
Vladislav Zubok argues that between 1950 and 1960 the Soviet people 
felt pride in the USSR’s foreign policy in this regard. For example, 
Khrushchev’s course toward internationalism and sympathy for the 
national liberation struggles of the peoples of Asia and Africa found sin-
cere and wide support among many people in the Soviet Union. Soviet 
people also sympathised with radical change in Egypt, Syria, Iraq and 
Algeria, as well as with the peoples of Asian countries such as India, 
Burma and Indonesia. At the same time, such a policy was consistent 
with optimistic and romantic sentiment in the educated ranks of Soviet 
society (Zubok 2011, 264).
The Cuban Revolution was particularly important for people in the 
USSR in the early 1960s. Cuba gave the Soviet people, it seems, hope 
that a real revolution could happen without major casualties. Thanks to 
Cuba, Soviet foreign policy received an injection of revolutionary roman-
ticism. In Soviet society, a craze for anything Cuban began, which 
endured even beyond the Caribbean Missile Crisis. When, in the spring 
of 1963, Fidel Castro paid a visit to the USSR, he was greeted everywhere 
by enthusiastic crowds (ibid., 264). All these processes affected the teach-
ing of history, with new scientific centres founded for the study of decol-
onisation and new pages written for textbooks (Khodnev 2014, 180-181).
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In the textbook by Plenkov and colleagues, a separate paragraph is 
devoted to the decolonisation of Africa. The very term ‘decolonisation’ is 
new in Russian school textbooks. Previously, to describe one of the most 
important processes of the twentieth century, the Marxist expressions ‘the 
collapse of the colonial system’ or ‘the destruction of colonial empires’ had 
been broadly employed in their Russian equivalents. The authors apply a 
socio-geographic approach when presenting the facts, choosing to arrange 
the material of the text not according to the problems of decolonisation, 
but in terms of geographical region: ‘Far East’, ‘Indochina’, ‘North’, 
‘Tropical’ and ‘South Africa’. The textbook reports that, for a short period 
at the turn of the 1950s and 1960s, several dozens of independent states 
appeared in Africa, although in 1945 only three remained: South Africa, 
Liberia and Egypt. By 1975, the last Portuguese colonies of Angola and 
Mozambique were granted independence (Plenkov et al. 2011, 163).
Without explaining the reasons for such rapid decolonisation, the text-
book lists the problems of the newly independent states in some detail. 
However, the influence of the Cold War remains the focus of the text, 
which emphasises that ‘the West supported some odious regimes in Africa 
because they opposed the spread of communist ideology’.5 The US guar-
anteed support for the dictators of these regimes, the textbook continues, 
acting not in the interests of the people but rather pursuing their own 
targets  as well as tribal and foreign interests (ibid., 164). At the same 
time, according to the authors, the USSR helped these young states to 
break free of any remaining dependence on the former metropolises. This 
prompted many young African countries to choose the Soviet model of 
development, whereupon they received aid from Moscow. Further on, 
the text explores the history of decolonisation in two specific countries: 
Ghana and Algeria. The choice is telling: Ghana was probably one of the 
first independent countries in Africa to declare socialist reforms, and a 
protracted anti-colonial war began in Algeria.
The textbook also covers the problems of the postcolonial era. The 
authors note that only a few of the African states (Botswana, Cameroon, 
Congo, Gabon and Kenya) ‘improved their standard of living’, and that 
28 of the 45 countries were among the most backward countries in the 
world in the UN classification (ibid.,168). Countries that chose a social-
ist model of development failed to achieve their goals. However, accord-
ing to the authors’ interpretation, the countries that chose the capitalist 
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market model also found that their elected path of development brought 
its own difficulties, particularly with high unemployment levels6 (ibid., 
168). It should be said that many of the assessments the authors make in 
this part of the paragraph are outdated and much is changing in modern 
Africa. It will not be easy to answer the question of the influence of the 
Cold War on decolonisation, since one of the main factors in the rapid 
completion of this process is not set out in the text of the paragraph, but 
in an additional passage from the work of the Norwegian anthropologist 
T. Eriksen (ibid., 172). Eriksen mentions that the Soviet Union and the 
United States, rivals in the Cold War, both supported the process of 
decolonisation. Perhaps the authors were hoping that students would 
think and discover this argument for themselves.
In Volobuev’s textbook, the main cause of decolonisation is the out-
come of the Second World War and the weakening of ties between the 
colonial possessions of Britain, the Netherlands, France and the metropo-
lises. According to the authors, after the war the peoples of Indochina, 
Burma and Indonesia resisted the return of former European masters 
(ibid., 137). The textbook also explores India’s independence under the 
questionable heading ‘Western Orientation in South Asia’ (ibid., 
 140- 139); the course of reform has actually changed several times in 
independent India. Another distinguishing feature of this textbook is its 
portrayal of the influence of Islam on Asia and Africa. The author of this 
part of the text finds reasons for the strengthening of Islam in processes 
of Westernisation and the establishment of Western (largely American) 
values and standards of life. For many, Islam constitutes a form of ‘protec-
tion’ from the Western influence. The author considers the Iranian revo-
lution the beginning of the spread of Islamism in 1979 (Volobuev 
2012, 141-142).
A small paragraph, 35, is devoted to ‘The Fall of the World Colonial 
System’ in Zagladin’s textbook. The main reasons given for the collapse of 
these colonial empires include the strengthening of the Soviet Union’s 
influence in the international arena, as desired by the USSR leadership, 
who even drew links between the liberation of the colonies and the disin-
tegration of NATO, which included the leading colonial powers (Zagladin 
and Petrov 2014, 261). Peoples struggling for national independence, it 
states, could also rely on China, where the revolution succeeded in 1949. 
The textbook also emphasises the role of the United Nations, which gave 
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international legal support for countries to decolonise (ibid., 261), evi-
denced with facts: Between 1958 and 1974, the USSR delivered arms to 
the value of 55 million dollars to Angola (ibid., 262). The same text 
claims that, despite its desire for allies in the Afro-Asian world, the USSR 
did not have sufficient opportunities to create modern industries in these 
newly liberated countries, disappointing both the leaders of the latter and 
the Soviet authorities (ibid., 264).
In the ‘academic’ textbook by Chubar’yan there is no specific section 
devoted to decolonisation, possibly because the book focuses on conflicts 
experienced by the USSR and Russia in the twentieth century: the con-
frontation between the USA and the USSR, and crises and conflicts in 
which the USSR participated. However, twentieth-century history is nei-
ther clear nor complete without this context, which renders this omission 
particularly troubling. For example, the authors state that the USSR 
intervened in the process of decolonisation relating to the conflict in the 
Middle East in 1956 by condemning the war against Egypt, in which 
Britain and France were participating. In the authors’ opinion, events in 
Egypt evidenced the desire of the peoples of Asia and Africa to rid 
 themselves of the pressure from their ex-colonisers. The Cold War con-
tinued, according to the authors, not least because the USSR and the 
USA sought to ‘spread the positions of socialism and capitalism in Asia, 
Africa and Latin America’ (Chubar’yan et al. 2011, 199).
This analysis shows that, while decolonisation was one of the most 
significant processes of twentieth-century history, this subject is over-
shadowed in the historical memory of many Russians. Modern textbook 
authors are not inclined to support the romanticism of the generation of 
the 1960s and to admire the feats of the peoples of Asia and Africa in 
crushing the colonial empires. The Soviet Union’s role in this process 
appears from the pages of the textbooks as contradictory and inconsis-
tent. Students can pose questions: if assistance was provided, why did it 
not lead ‘third world’ countries onto the road of progress? The texts con-
firm two features of the modern view of history in Russia: a lack of in- 
depth and complete scientific studies of decolonisation, and the tendency 
to build on the positive example of Russia’s history in the era of the Great 




In the case of Russia over the last 25 years, with changes in world outlook 
after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, ways of constructing 
historical memory have shifted at least three times. This cultural environ-
ment might have had a direct  – or, more often, indirect  – impact on 
Russian historiography and the teaching of history, particularly the Cold 
War at school. The multiple interpretations of the origins of the Cold 
War show that many authors actually place the blame for the conflict on 
both the United States and the Soviet Union. The traditional Soviet inter-
pretation of the origins of the Cold War, which lays the blame on the 
United States, is reproduced in one text. The revisionist school of thought 
in the Russian historiographical tradition instead locates responsibility 
for the beginning of the Cold War with the USSR. Yet in none of these 
textbooks can we see revisionist interpretations, which would criticise the 
Soviet Union as was popular in the 1990s.
While the textbooks pay attention to various aspects of domestic and 
international politics, there is very little information about daily life in any 
of the books. It seems that neither the authors nor the specialists in peda-
gogical approaches to history have a clear solution to the question of how 
to select content for modern school textbooks, what should be included in 
the Russian history course material, and what should be taught in the 
more general courses. We can also identify changes in the use of key ter-
minology: The modern Russian history textbooks categorically do not 
recognise the occupation of Eastern Europe by the USSR from 1945 to 
1989, and when describing the relations of the USSR with the countries 
of Eastern Europe, the terms ‘Support of Communists in Eastern Europe’, 
‘Support for the USSR’, ‘Soviet influence’ and ‘Deployment of Troops for 
the Defence of Socialism’ are used most frequently.
It is interesting to note another linguistic feature of educational litera-
ture on the history of the Cold War: In all teaching texts and in school 
curricula, the term ‘Cold War’ is written in inverted commas, probably 
an indirect comment on the geopolitical context in which the term was 
first coined by Bernard Baruch, advisor to the US president and Cold 
War enemy, in 1947, borrowing the phrase from George Orwell.
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In spite of the fact that the authors of these textbooks seek to write in 
neutral tones, a patriotic master narrative dominates in modern history 
textbooks in Russia. The new Federal State Educational Standards directly 
require schools to mould students into patriotic citizens through the 
teaching of history. At the same time, and especially in the context of the 
Cold War, it cannot be said that the authors of modern history textbooks 
in Russia avoid acute social issues altogether; indeed, they portray serious 
crises of the Cold War as well as errors made by the Soviet leadership. In 
addition, the ‘Historical and Cultural Standard’ has failed to bring about 
a consensus on the interpretation of the history of Russia in the twentieth 
century. While all textbooks are different, each is affected by the indi-
vidual authors who contribute to them, and their evaluations of Cold 
War events as well as their respective selection of facts vary greatly. 
However, the principle of including ready-made ‘lessons of the past’ in 
these textbooks remains. Ultimately, it must be said that portrayals of the 
Cold War are not paramount in the processes of identity construction 
engaged in by textbooks: The history of the ‘Great Patriotic War’ (1941- 
1945) is evidently considered more essential.
Notes
1. ‘Столкновение национально-государственных интересов 
усугублялось глубокими различиями в экономическом и 
общественно-политическом развитиии, в господствующих 
системах ценностей’
2. Укрепился авторитет СССР, возросло его влияние на 
международной арене. Однако советское руководство не смогло 
использовать все это для обеспечения мирного, спокойного 
развития страны. Советский Союз оказался вовлечен в “холодную 
войну” со своими бывшими союзниками (Zagladin and Petrov 2014, 
232).
3. ‘Существование социалистической Кубы подтолкнуло советских 
лидеров к тому, чтобы использовать эту страну для создания 
трудностей для США’ (Chubar’yan et al., 2011, 200)
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4. ‘Схожие процессы, связанные с репрессиями против 
инакомыслящих, критикой коммунизма и Советского Союза, 
происходили в США и странах Западной Европы’ (Chubar’yan 
et al., 2011, 197)
5. ‘Запад поддерживал в Африке некоторые одиозные режимы, 
поскольку те выступали против распространения коммунистической 
идеологии’ (Plenkov et al., 2011, 164).
6. ‘так как здесь сильно сказывался низкий уровень работников’
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In compiling a history textbook, the authors must—regardless of their 
own national context—make a multitude of decisions about how to 
interpret and present their content. The resulting accounts bear witness 
to how those particular authors interpret the world and their country’s 
place in it. In the case of how current Chinese textbooks portray the Cold 
War, textbook authors must take into account both China’s complicated 
past and its equally complicated present.
China held an unusual position during the Cold War. In 1949, the 
American-backed nationalist regime was ousted by the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP), who founded the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) and declared solidarity with the Soviet Union. A decade later, they 
were at odds with Moscow. After a period of enmity with both superpow-
ers, the USA and the USSR, Beijing achieved a working relationship with 
the countries of the Western camp (Chen 2001, 49–50; 2010, 182–183). 
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During the course of the Cold War, China oscillated between both camps, 
refusing to align with either, even as it was at odds with many of the non- 
aligned countries (Latham 2010, 266, 274–5; Yu 2013, 695). China’s 
shifting orientation during the Cold War had global weight in that at 
each stage it was, and was seen as, powerful enough to tip the balance 
between the two superpowers and profoundly influence the global stage, 
even if it could never independently shape the world to the same extent 
as the US and USSR (Chen 2001, 2–6). The authors of Chinese history 
textbooks must decide how to integrate China’s changing stance and sig-
nificant, if secondary, role in the Cold War into their narrative of 
the period.
They must also address the enormous changes China has been under-
going for the past several decades, including changes to its identity. With 
China’s ongoing economic growth, its social transformation, and its 
growing global influence, how to describe China as a whole is an open 
question. Is it socialist or capitalist? Do economic changes require a polit-
ical reimagining? Is the country a developing post-colonial country or a 
political and economic superpower? Is it outside or inside global struc-
tures of power? The answers to these questions are as numerous as the 
researchers seeking to answer them. What answers, then, do the compil-
ers of history textbooks give, considering the rich subject of the Cold War 
and China’s complicated history during the period? With China’s identity 
in flux, what do they say about the country, its future, and its place in the 
world when describing the past, and how do they integrate China’s rapid 
change into their narrative?
Writers of Chinese textbooks are hardly the only authors confronted 
with a complex background when creating a national text. That this his-
torical and social complexity is compounded with political demands is 
not unique to China, nor is it unexplored in the Chinese context; indeed, 
the influence of the Chinese government on textbooks, as through the 
‘patriotic education campaign’, is an area of study in its own right (Wang 
2012; Zhao 1998). As with textbooks the world over, the various pres-
sures on authors, the multiple national images they seek to convey, and 
the need to reconcile these with a complex history, lead to texts that 
combine multiple narratives, perspectives, and priorities, some of which 
are complimentary, and some of which are not. The result is compromise, 
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ambivalence, and contradiction, and the fault lines in the text speak to 
the goals that created them (Klerides 2010, 38–41).
Against the backdrop of these complicated influences, some of which 
reflect universal conditions and some of which are particular to the 
Chinese context, this chapter analyses how a set of history textbooks cur-
rently used in many Chinese classrooms narrates the Cold War (Ahn 
2009, 24–5; Li 2011, 140; Müller 2011, 48). Special emphasis is given to 
three interrelated aspects: how the textbook authors explain the origin of 
this conflict, how the Cold War past is linked to the post-Cold War pres-
ent, and what all this means for the image of the national Chinese Self 
that emerges from the textbook’s accounts. I will thus assess how Chinese 
textbook accounts compare with ongoing global debates and controver-
sies regarding the Cold War. Assuming that we can learn a great deal 
about the messages conveyed by the textbook from how the subject mat-
ter is structured and segmented, I begin by analysing the structure the 
textbook authors impose on the story of the Cold War. I attend particu-
larly to the decisions made by the authors to break down the historical 
narrative into separate units and chapters. Referring to current debates in 
global historiography, I also determine how much space is allocated to 
actors and events that can be categorized as relevant either for the conflict 
between East and West or for the conflict between North and South. In 
a second step, I then focus on how the narrative portrays the United 
States, the Soviet Union, the so-called ‘Third World’, and China as key 
actors of the conflict. How coherent or ambivalent are these portraits, 
and how do the authors address the tension that might arise from a com-
plicated history during which China not only changed its alliances but 
also its identity?
 Cold War Stories of the Cold War
Early in the Cold War, China was heavily influenced by the Soviet Union 
and adopted the orthodox Soviet interpretation of the conflict (Yu 2013, 
685–6). This interpretation attributed the Cold War to the expansionist 
global ambitions of the United States, and saw the Soviet Union as the 
leader of the peaceful, democratic camp that stood in opposition to the 
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imperialist capitalists led by the US (Hopkins 2007, 914–15). Mao con-
tributed the notion that between these two camps was an intermediate 
zone, including China, that neither superpower controlled but both 
hoped to influence. Later, after the Sino-Soviet split, Mao reorganised the 
globe into ‘three worlds’ (Chen 2010, 184; Yu 2013, 693–4). The Western 
idea of multiple ‘worlds’ during the Cold War divides the globe into capi-
talist, communist, and developing countries, the last being the ‘Third 
World’ (Tomlinson 2003, 307, 309–10). However, in the Chinese con-
text, the divisions are different. The USA and the USSR together make 
up the First World because of their power and imperialism, while the 
other capitalist countries belong to the Second World. All other countries 
belong to the third, with China as their leader in fighting against the 
oppression of the First World (Yu 2013, 683, 693, 696). In this new 
conception, the Soviet Union was as much an adversary as the United 
States, and development, rather than class struggle, defined the different 
sides of the Cold War (Chen 2010, 184–5).
Both these conceptions of the Cold War appeared in Chinese history 
textbooks of the era. Textbooks published immediately after the founding 
of the PRC reflect the Soviet influence, resulting in Eurocentric and 
Soviet-centric texts that pitted the United States against the Soviet Union 
(Martin 1990, 91–2; Yu 2013, 685–8). By the mid 1950s, however, Asia, 
Africa, and Latin America became more prominent, and the trend con-
tinued during the 1960s and 1970s as the Sino-Soviet split developed. 
During this time, textbooks came to portray the world as divided along 
the lines of the ‘three worlds’, allocating more space to the ‘Third World’ 
(Croizier 1990, 158–9; Yu 2013, 693, 696). In the late 1970s, after the 
beginning of Deng Xiaoping’s programme of reform and opening, text-
books once again shifted, placing less emphasis on class struggle, revolu-
tion, and ideology, and more on economics, reflecting the new goals of 
the state. At the same time, the ‘Third World’ began to merit less atten-
tion and textbooks focused more on the west (Croizier 1990, 167–8; 
Martin 1990, 102–3).
While textbook narratives reflected geopolitical divisions of the Cold 
War, for much of the period the Cold War itself was not actually included 
in the history. From the late 1950s to late 1970s, the political standards 
prescribed for textbooks changed faster than authors could revise the 
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books. At the same time, many events of recent history became extremely 
sensitive issues due to domestic political shifts and China’s tense relations 
with the Soviet Union and other formerly friendly countries. As a result, 
only the textbooks published prior to 1959 extended their narratives to 
the present. For much of the 1960s and 1970s, history ended with WWII 
or the Chinese Revolution (Croizier 1990, 161; Martin 1990, 28; Yu 
2013, 686, 693, 695–6). It was not until the late 1980s that the Cold 
War era was once again included in textbooks (Croizier 1990, 165–6).
 The Segmentation and Organisation 
of the Textbooks
The authors’ priorities and the themes they see in history shape how the 
content is organised into volumes, units, and chapters. Especially when 
we consider the relative amount of space allocated to different actors and 
themes, these divisions also show how the texts compare to other histo-
ries of the period.
The set of history textbooks I examine divide the course material into 
three volumes by subject rather than chronology or region. Each spans 
ancient history to the present day, and incorporates Chinese as well as 
world history. The first volume is dedicated to political history, the sec-
ond examines economic and social history, and the third covers the his-
tory of culture, thought, science, and technology. Overall, structuring the 
books by subject matter ensures that multiple aspects of history are exam-
ined, and that culture and economics find their place alongside political 
history. However, simply having one volume devoted to intellectual and 
cultural history and another to social change does not necessarily guaran-
tee sufficient coverage of culture and everyday life, as seen in Table 5.1. 
This table presents the distribution of textbook contents between various 
topics and time periods and shows that during the Cold War, the atten-
tion given to politics far outweighs that allocated to culture and everyday 
life. This shift occurs largely because the third volume dedicates two 
chapters to political theory in China. This content enumerates the ideas 
of China’s top leaders without delving into their content or impact on 
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society, focusing on elite politics rather than everyday life. This imbalance 
in general, and that the attention is centred on developments in state 
ideology in particular, underlines the textbooks’ interest in China’s politi-
cal institutions rather than its social transformations.
Within each textbook, the content is organised into eight multi-chap-
ter thematic units, again eschewing a purely chronological approach, and 
providing students with a framework for historical interpretation. Each 
unit deals with either Chinese history or world history, and in each case 
China’s experience during a given period is given first, foregrounding the 
Chinese experience. Meanwhile, the titles and chapter divisions of the 
thematic units begin to demonstrate how the textbooks interpret the 
Cold War as a less than definitive historical period. For example, the final 
unit of the politics textbook covers international history from the end of 
WWII to the present, and is titled ‘The Trend Towards Multipolarity in 
the Modern World Political Structure’. Of the three chapters of the unit, 
only the first deals with the tension between the US and the USSR that 
is usually portrayed as central to the Cold War. The second turns its 
attention to the emergence of ‘multipolarity’ through other countries’ 
efforts to resist both superpowers. The final chapter sees this trend con-
tinue at the turn of the 21st century (People’s Education Press 2011a, v) 
(All quotations from Chinese translated by the author). Combined, this 
method of segmenting content reveals that the bipolar rivalry of the Cold 
War was only one phase in a larger historical arc rather than a definitive 
Table 5.1 Table showing the share of the text devoted to domestic and interna-












329 pages 226 pages 71 pages 32 pages
Chinese History 59% 55% 67% 64%
World History 41% 45% 33% 36%
Politics and 
Political Ideology
40% 39% 49% 32%
Economic Policy 26% 24% 29% 36%
Culture and 
Everyday Life
33% 37% 22% 31%
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period in itself. The economics textbook builds on this perspective, and 
its final unit, which covers the same period of history, is named ‘The 
Trend towards Globalisation in the World Economy.’ One chapter deals 
with the post-war creation of institutions such as the World Bank and the 
IMF, while the other two address the growth of regional and global trade 
agreements that continue to develop to the present day (People’s 
Education Press 2011b, v). In the case of culture, not even WWII is a 
meaningful watershed; one unit covers global art and culture from the 
19th century on, and its chapters each address developments in a different 
artistic medium rather than being organized by time period (People’s 
Education Press 2011c, v). Clearly, the textbooks do not see the Cold 
War as a sealed, singular period, and while the large trends of history are 
certainly shaped by it, it is insufficient to determine them.
Meanwhile, the relative importance of the East vs. West and the North 
vs. South divides during the Cold War in the view of the textbook authors 
is reflected in how much space is allocated to each, detailed in Table 5.2. 
Here, I examined divisions and groupings as well as conflicts. The text-
books devote a considerable amount of space to developments and rela-
tions within the blocs, especially the Western bloc, rendering this 
distinction necessary.
These numbers suggest the relative importance of certain Cold War 
actors. Clearly, North versus South conflicts and the developing world in 
general are given little attention. Meanwhile, despite the preponderance 
of attention to East and West, a closer look shows that a relatively small 
amount is allotted to the USSR and the Eastern bloc. Of the interna-
tional coverage of the Cold War, 49 per cent concerns the Western bloc 
alone, while 22 per cent is about its Eastern counterpart. The remainder 
Table 5.2 Table showing the most salient divisions found in the international his-
tory of the Cold War. That is, a chapter on economic developments in capitalist 
countries after WWII would show a division of East vs. West, whereas the growth 
of the non-aligned movement would show a division of North vs. South
Overall Politics Economics Culture and Everyday Life*
East vs. West 94% 90% 100% 82%
North vs. South 6% 10% 0% 15%
*A brief passage about the development of film and television avoids drawing 
any divisions.
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deals with the two sides in conflict or divides the world into the global 
North and South. The chapter topics illuminate some of this discrepancy. 
Both the USSR and the capitalist world are allocated units on their 
respective economies in the 20th century, with one chapter of each deal-
ing with the economy after WWII. However, in the unit that explores 
globalisation, another two chapters are given to the international eco-
nomic institutions that arose in the West during the Cold War. One sin-
gle chapter on the Soviet Union claims to cover the economic history of 
the entire communist world (People’s Education Press 2011b, 88–91, 
98–101, 104–10). This imbalance is also seen in the chapters about 
China’s international relations during the Cold War, where 30 per cent of 
the eight pages of text are about China’s relations with the West, while 
only eight per cent are devoted to China’s dealings with the Eastern bloc. 
A further 26 per cent is devoted not to China’s interactions with any 
particular country or group of countries, but to general statements regard-
ing China’s principles, intents, and achievements in its international rela-
tions. When we turn our attention to the details of the narrative, we see 
that the relative absence of the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc becomes 
only more evident, the exact nature of Cold War divisions becomes more 
nuanced, and efforts to establish China’s identity continue to supersede 
any detailed discussion of its actions.
 The Narrative of the Cold War: Origins, 
Agency, Culpability, and Conflicts
The first description of the global Cold War in the history textbooks 
depicts a bilateral struggle between communist and capitalist camps 
marked by global tension and local wars. While no judgment is rendered 
there, American aggression towards other countries quickly becomes a 
theme, giving the United States the bulk of the blame for the Cold War 
(People’s Education Press 2011a, 108, 117–18). The rest of the Western 
world is both part of and oppressed by American efforts. Meanwhile, the 
Soviet Union seeks hegemony of its own, remaining, however, largely 
passive by comparison, or simply absent. While the ‘Third World’ is part 
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of the anti-hegemonic resistance, the little attention it receives focuses 
just as often on its good relations with China. Combined, these narratives 
result in the themes of hegemony and opposition that create the text-
books’ particular definition of the Cold War.
 The United States, Hegemony and Multipolarity
Throughout the Cold War, the behaviour of the United States is marked 
by a desire for global control, and in this desire lie the origins of the Cold 
War. Some blame for the Cold War is attributed to the other Western 
nations, as in describing Churchill’s 1946 ‘Iron Curtain’ speech as a ‘wan-
ton attack’ on the USSR (People’s Education Press 2011a, 118). However, 
the Western camp is always characterised as being led by the United 
States without specifying which other countries it encompasses, thus in 
no way mitigating American culpability (People’s Education Press 2011a, 
107, 109, 112, 118, 119). Likewise, while ‘contradictions’ between the 
two superpowers in matters of ‘social system and national interest’ are 
mentioned at the outset as causes of enmity between the US and the 
USSR, no further elaboration is offered. Instead, the Cold War is 
explained as growing from the United States’ desire to dominate the 
world and its need to overcome the USSR in order to achieve this goal 
(People’s Education Press 2011a, 118).
Once the Cold War has begun, it takes the form of the United States 
leading Western countries to ‘adopt all hostile behaviour short of armed 
attack’ towards the Soviet-led socialist countries (People’s Education 
Press 2011a, 119). NATO and the Marshall plan are further efforts to 
contain the Soviet Union (People’s Education Press 2011a, 119–21). 
Until Sino- American relations are normalised in the 1970s, the United 
States also directs a particular hostility towards the newly founded 
PRC. Because of the thematic arrangement of the textbook, it is in the 
context of this hostility that we first encounter the Cold War. The United 
States seeks to isolate the new country diplomatically and economically, 
interferes in its domestic politics, and occupies the Taiwan Straits, despite 
Chinese hopes for better relations. American involvement in both Korea 
and Vietnam is part of the pattern of American aggression in pursuit of 
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hegemony and, just as importantly, it allows the United States to directly 
threaten China. These threats are mentioned repeatedly, twice as an 
aspect of  Sino- American relations, and again as a reason for China’s 
weapons and nuclear programmes. By comparison, the actual wars in 
Korea and Vietnam only appear once (People’s Education Press 2011a, 
109–10, 112–14, 120–1, 2011c, 92, 95).
However, the textbooks make clear that the Cold War is something 
different than just a conflict initiated by the West against the East. The 
United States’ hegemonic ambitions are also part of its relations with 
other capitalist countries. The Marshall Plan’s purpose is to increase 
American control in Europe as much as to support economic recovery, 
and much the same can be said of the post-war Bretton Woods system 
(People’s Education Press 2011a, 119, 2011b, 104–5). This control does 
not go uncontested, and most of the agency seen from other Western 
countries is expressed through disagreements within the Western bloc. 
When France, Germany, and other European countries unify for their 
own security during the ‘American-Soviet Cold War’, it is not clear which 
superpower is the actual object of concern (People’s Education Press 
2011a, 122, 2011b, 107). By the 1960s and 1970s, Western European 
unity and economic strength leads them to ‘start shaking off American 
control’, and De Gaulle’s challenge to American leadership in Europe 
confirms the divisions emerging in the Western camp (People’s Education 
Press 2011a, 123). This pattern distances the Cold War narrative from 
that of a West-versus-East conflict, but rather than making the Cold War 
a North-versus-South conflict, it brings to mind the Chinese ‘three 
worlds’ theory with an emphasis on conflict between the First and 
Second Worlds.
According to these Chinese textbooks, American ambition also extends 
past the end of the Cold War. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
United States ‘attempts to dominate the world single-handedly’ and con-
tinues to stir up trouble abroad (People’s Education Press 2011a, 127). 
The Western countries continue to resist, as does a rising China and a 
renewed Russia. As a result, the trend towards a multipolar world contin-
ues its inevitable progress. However, because of American ambitions, 
revived conflicts, and international terrorism, the modern world remains 
an unsettled one. Indeed, compared to the Korean War or any other Cold 
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War event, NATO’s bombing campaign against Yugoslavia draws as 
much attention and even harsher criticism for the US.1 In this historical 
vision, the theme of hegemony continues to the present day, and the root 
cause of suffering during the Cold War does not end with the collapse of 
the USSR. The entire Cold War becomes just one more phase in the con-
stant shifts in power relations (People’s Education Press 2011a, 117, 
120–1, 127–9).
As much as the blame for the Cold War is attributed to the United 
States, there are times when the text is less damning. With regard to the 
division of Germany, the building of the Berlin Wall, and the Cuban mis-
sile crisis, the United States is given a comparatively neutral treatment 
(People’s Education Press 2011a, 120–1). However, the textbooks become 
decidedly positive when describing American popular culture and its eco-
nomic growth and technological change after WWII (People’s Education 
Press 2011b, 90, 2011c, 64, 116–18). While the United States’ interac-
tions with other countries are portrayed as exploitative, its internal devel-
opment, like that of other Western countries, is given a more positive 
depiction. Rock and roll is vibrant and exciting, while film and television 
make great strides to become new forms of art as well as signs of techno-
logical progress. The development of bebop contains the only, and some-
what oblique, reference to racism in the US in the entire set of textbooks, 
once a major theme used to illustrate the injustice of a Cold War adver-
sary (People’s Education Press 2011c, 116–18; Yu, 2013, 689, 692). And 
while modernist literature and art after WWII is described as reflecting 
the spiritual anguish felt in the West, this anguish is attributed to the 
experience of social change, two World Wars, and the Great Depression. 
The text seems sympathetic to the desire of artists and authors to explore 
these emotions (People’s Education Press 2011c, 107–8, 112–13). The 
discussion of Cold War-era culture is not connected to the Cold War 
itself; rather, it is about the everyday human experience and explains 
ongoing developments in the global cultural landscape. In this way, the 
textbook narrative does not present a uniform and unceasingly critical 
image of the United States during the Cold War, but instead shows shared 
cultural trends in the West. Moreover, the interest in developments in 
popular culture as an aspect of technological advancement is similar to 
that exhibited towards economic growth in general.
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In the realm of economic development, the image of the United States 
and the West is not simply disconnected from ideas of hegemonic strug-
gle in the political realm, but actually contradictory to them, and the two 
aspects must be resolved through selective emphasis and omission. While 
the creation of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and 
the Bretton Woods system in general is explained as a way for the United 
States to control other capitalist countries after WWII, the textbook 
treats the functioning of these organisations positively and credits them 
with promoting economic development. The authors do not fault the 
macroeconomic ideas these organisations embody; they only criticise 
them for being controlled by the United States (People’s Education Press 
2011b, 104–5). The Marshall Plan is depicted as a similar tool of control, 
while the rapid post-war recovery in Europe is seen as marvellous and 
independent of the Plan. As a whole, the post-war economic growth of 
the Western world is described as ‘a “golden age” of economic develop-
ment’ in which countries develop the welfare state and even ‘stagflation’ 
is overcome with grace (People’s Education Press 2011a, 119, 2011b, 
88–90). And while in a later chapter competition within the Western 
bloc extends into trade, the description here does little to disaggregate the 
western countries, except to highlight American science and technology, 
and the positive role of the service sector (People’s Education Press 2011b, 
89–90, 108). In the face of economic success, questions of hegemony and 
strife disappear. This shift in perspective suggests China’s recent emphasis 
on economic development. In the midst of the Cold War, the economic 
history of the West becomes a positive role model for China’s own devel-
opment. Meanwhile, the communist bloc is marred by economic failure, 
becoming a negative example, and in the political realm it offers no sym-
pathetic counterpoint to the United States.
 The Disappearing Soviet Union
Neither in its actions nor in the space allotted to it does the Soviet Union 
occupy a significant position in the textbooks’ account of the Cold War. 
It more often appears as a necessary counterpart to the United States or 
China rather than as an active player in its own right. The actions by the 
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Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries in the late 1940s and 
early 1950s, finalising the division of Europe, are, according to the text-
books, simply reactions to the United States’ efforts to contain commu-
nism (People’s Education Press 2011a, 119). While the USSR also appears 
in various world events, it is only to be overshadowed by other actors. The 
chapter dealing with the early diplomatic relations of the PRC describes 
the Soviet Union’s rapid recognition of the new Chinese regime and the 
treaty of friendship and alliance they sign. However, the portrayals of 
these events focus on how they allow the PRC to avoid diplomatic isola-
tion by the West rather than on the relationship between the two coun-
tries (People’s Education Press 2011a, 109). The same chapter also deals 
with the 1954 Geneva conference, which was convened to negotiate 
peace settlements for Korea and Indochina. The USSR attends but plays 
no active role. Rather, the conference is defined by obstructionist 
Americans and Zhou Enlai’s leadership (People’s Education Press 2011a, 
110). In fact, of all the major incidents that mark the Cold War, the 
USSR is only an active participant in the Cuban Missile Crisis, when it 
hopes that a missile installation might ‘change [its] unfavourable position 
in the balance of nuclear power’ and secure its strategic interests (People’s 
Education Press 2011a, 121). Even this description is fairly bland. The 
global influence or ambitions of the USSR appear negligible at best.
With so little space dedicated to Soviet actions and motivation, it 
would be unlikely for a reader to attribute much of the blame for the 
Cold War to the USSR. However, whenever the Soviet Union is men-
tioned in passing, it is clear that it, like the US, is in search of hegemony 
during the Cold War. Beginning in the 1950s, the newly independent 
countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America initiate the non-aligned 
movement to avoid both American and Soviet domination (People’s 
Education Press 2011a, 124). The bilateral contest for hegemony is 
 mentioned as a reason for the United States to seek better relations with 
China, and Brezhnev seeks to gain an advantage by developing Soviet 
heavy industry (People’s Education Press 2011a, 113, 2011b, 99). This 
desire for hegemony establishes that although the Soviet Union is not the 
primary villain of the Cold War period, it is not a model to be emulated 
either. It still contributes to the broader pattern of hegemonic struggles 
that are the cause of tensions during and after the Cold War.
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However, unlike the United States, the Soviet desire for hegemony is 
not extended towards its own camp, because its camp simply disappears. 
Of all the Eastern bloc countries, only the Soviet Union appears in the 
sections on economics, culture, and most aspects of international rela-
tions. Not only are the countries of the Eastern bloc absent from the 
discussion of economics and culture, but in the chapters on film and lit-
erature, all the examples from the Soviet Union predate World War II, 
before the Eastern bloc existed (People’s Education Press 2011c, 105, 
108, 117). Politically, the countries of the Warsaw Pact disappear between 
its founding in 1955 and the upheaval that marks its end. The sole excep-
tion is seen when the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) is 
founded with the support of the USSR, while any ongoing relationship 
between the two countries is not explored (People’s Education Press 
2011a, 120). The theme that the Soviet Union possesses a great power’s 
desire for hegemony does not overwhelm its general absence from 
the scene.
Another way in which the Soviet Union disappears from the Cold War 
is in the minimal attention given to the Sino-Soviet relationship. Aside 
from the 1950 Sino-Soviet treaty, there are signs of early cooperation 
between the two countries, although the textbooks do not engage in 
detailed discussion. For example, the Soviet experience influences early 
education policy, and until the Hundred Flowers campaign, China adopts 
Stalin’s dogmatic rejection of the theory of genetics (People’s Education 
Press 2011b, 66, 2011c, 96). However, the eventual disintegration of the 
Sino-Soviet relationship is explored even less. A decade after the split, 
while the threat the Soviet Union poses to China factors into improved 
Sino-American relations, there is no mention of any intermediate steps 
that led to the threat in the first place (People’s Education Press 2011a, 
113). Khrushchev’s 1956 speech criticising Stalin is presented in the 
 context of the economic reforms he was seeking to implement, a speech 
that, the textbooks claim, caused ‘huge reverberations inside and outside 
the Soviet Union’ (People’s Education Press 2011b, 98). What these 
reverberations were and whether or not China reacted to the speech 
remain unclear, however.
The clearest juxtaposition, if not explanation, of the changed relation-
ship appears in the chapter about China’s technological achievements. In 
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1957, the Soviets assist China’s weapons development by sending them 
missiles to serve as models. Elsewhere on the same page, students learn 
that China developed its own atomic bomb to ‘break the monopoly on 
nuclear weapons . . . held by the United States, the Soviet Union, and 
other countries’, suggesting that by 1964, the country saw a threat from 
both superpowers (People’s Education Press 2011a, 92). This double 
threat appears again in the end-of-chapter questions; the reasons behind 
it, however, are omitted. The making of the Sino-Soviet split, a subject 
other historians see as a major feature of China’s Cold War experience 
and one that fundamentally changed the conflict, disappears through the 
cracks in the narration while the authors place much more emphasis on 
American actions and the Sino-American relationship (Chen 2010, 
183–4; People’s Education Press 2011c, 92, 95; Z. Shen and Li 2011, 
xvii–xviii; Xia 2008, 104–5). The reason for this inconsistency is explained 
in part by the internal developments of the Soviet Union.
The economy of the Soviet Union is given a chapter that parallels that 
dedicated to the post-war economies of the capitalist world. Unlike the 
glowing account in its capitalist counterpart, however, the narrative in 
the Soviet chapter is of repeated attempts and repeated failures to reform 
a stagnant economy. Impatient with the uninterrupted economic decline, 
Gorbachev turns to political reforms, resulting in the dissolution of the 
USSR (People’s Education Press 2011a, 126, 2011b, 98–101). One effect 
of this failure is that the Soviet Union becomes less relevant than the 
United States for an understanding of the modern world, as the Soviet 
system no longer exists.
Instead, the Soviet experience is primarily useful in that it serves as a 
negative model for Chinese development, and as a contrast to the path 
charted by the CCP. The failures of the Soviet Union are rooted in its 
leaders’ shortsightedness and insufficiently ‘scientific’ understanding of 
the conditions they face (People’s Education Press 2011b, 99–100). By 
comparison, Chinese political theory is characterised as scientific and 
adapted to Chinese conditions, allowing for the country’s successful eco-
nomic growth (People’s Education Press 2011b, 56, 98–101, 2011c, 
83–4, 87–8). Even in failure, the Soviet Union serves as a foil for the 
actions of others.
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The portrayal of the end of the Cold War reflects another way in which 
the compilers of the history textbooks differ from many historians in 
identifying themes and questions about the Cold War. Instead of distrib-
uting credit for its peaceful end, they ask who should be blamed for the 
dissolution of the USSR. The depiction of the Soviet flag being lowered 
for the last time creates a mournful sense of domestic dislocation, and the 
entire period is described as one of upheaval and nationalist separatism. 
While Soviet economic troubles began with Stalin, ultimately the blame 
for the country’s collapse goes to Gorbachev’s decision to promote ‘so- 
called “democratisation” and “openness”’, causing his reforms ‘to go awry’ 
(People’s Education Press 2011a, 126, 2011b, 98–100). The reasons how 
and why the textbook authors frame the end of the Cold War in this way 
reveal yet more about the vision of the Cold War and the vision of China 
they present.
First, the end of the Cold War is not presented as a cause for relief, 
because in this presentation nothing fundamentally changes. Hegemonic 
ambitions and the tensions they create outlast the Cold War. Meanwhile, 
fears of nuclear weapons that others identify as a major source of Cold 
War anxiety go unmentioned (Gaddis 2005, 48–82; Walker 1995, 1658). 
The Chinese effort to develop nuclear weapons to defend itself against the 
USSR and the US constitutes one of only two sections in the textbook 
that describe nuclear weapons as having a place in the Cold War. The 
other instance is in the case of the Cuban Missile Crisis, which begins as 
a confrontation over nuclear missiles and nearly leads to war. However, in 
neither case does the textbook suggest that nuclear war might have dev-
astated the entire world (People’s Education Press 2011a, 121). There is 
no association between the end of the Cold War and a subsiding fear of 
nuclear annihilation, as no such fear, it appears, existed in the first place.
Second, China’s efforts to restore its territorial integrity are important 
enough to merit a chapter of their own, so the breakup of the Soviet 
Union is the actual source of anxiety. By contrast, the sole bright point in 
the turbulence in Eastern Europe is the reunification of Germany, where 
readers are shown images of people breaking down the Berlin Wall and 
celebrating in front of the Reichstag building (People’s Education Press 
2011a, 126). When reunification with Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan is 
a major goal the textbooks attribute to China, and combating separatism 
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in Xinjiang and Tibet is a major concern of the government, the breakup 
of the Soviet Union naturally becomes a cautionary tale of political 
liberalisation.
 A Hollowed Out ‘Third World’
The ‘Third World’ has been receiving increased attention in recent Cold 
War studies in the global North, and appears in the ‘three worlds’ theory 
put forward by Mao where it includes the same newly independent and 
developing countries (Suri 2011, 5). In the Chinese textbooks it receives 
some attention, with roles in the broader trends of multi-polarity and, to 
a degree, globalisation, but also as support and background for China’s 
Cold War accomplishments.
The texts explain the rise of the non-aligned movement among newly 
independent countries as part of the trend towards a multipolar world, 
with these countries banding together to oppose the imperialism and the 
hegemonic ambitions of both superpowers. Their resistance is part of the 
same reaction to hegemonic ambition shown by Western Europe. 
However, many aspects of the histories of these developing countries are 
thinly covered. The textbooks say that these countries came into being 
due to the development of national liberation movements and decoloni-
sation; specific struggles, however, are not explored. The Vietnam War is 
the only war of national liberation mentioned, and it is grouped with 
incidents such as the division of Germany and the Cuban Missile Crisis. 
Vietnamese resistance to French and American forces is described as 
‘heroic’, but otherwise the conflict is given only a single, brief paragraph 
(People’s Education Press 2011a, 121, 124). Whereas textbooks in years 
past emphasised anti-imperialist struggles in the Third World to the point 
of excluding all other aspects of those countries’ histories, that theme has 
dwindled as the textbook authors’ priorities have changed (Martin 
1990, 96–101).
Economically, the non-aligned movement has the stated goal of ‘estab-
lishing a new economic world order’, but no further details are given 
about their efforts or the economic conditions of developing countries in 
general, unlike the attention given to Soviet and capitalist development 
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(People’s Education Press 2011a, 124). Instead, within the discussion of 
globalisation, the challenges it poses to developing countries and to 
China are raised in general terms, but the text suggests that good decision- 
making and ‘reasonable countermeasures’ can allow countries to over-
come them and take advantage of the opportunities (People’s Education 
Press 2011b, 103, 111–13). As with the Bretton Woods system, the prin-
ciples of globalisation itself are not challenged. Instead, globalisation is 
presented as a positive historical trend that has been developing for cen-
turies (People’s Education Press 2011b, 103). In both the political and 
economic realms, actions that Third World countries take for their own 
purposes are hinted at in broad terms, but receive little elaboration.
Instead, newly independent and non-aligned countries most com-
monly appear as friends of China. They are presented as among the first 
with which China establishes diplomatic relations, and they are key to 
giving China’s seat in the United Nations to the mainland government 
(People’s Education Press 2011a, 109–10, 112–13). The Bandung 
Conference is portrayed as the first major meeting without representa-
tives from a colonial power, while the countries that convened it are not 
necessarily portrayed as the driving force behind its success, or even its 
near failure. After an outside imperialist plot helps create dissension 
among the attendees, Zhou Enlai plays the key role in rescuing the con-
ference from disputes and defeat (People’s Education Press 2011a, 
110–11). Incorporated into the chapter about the early foreign relations 
of the PRC, the episode serves as a diplomatic ‘coming-out party’ for 
China, with decolonised countries in attendance. Readers are also told 
that when the non-aligned movement took shape, China maintained 
good relations and cooperation with it and its members (People’s 
Education Press 2011a, 124). Despite this friendship, the textbooks 
refrain from identifying China as a member of the ‘Third World’. There 
is a hint of association when the Chinese author Lu Xun is listed as an 
anti-imperialist and nationalist writer alongside Rabindranath Tagore of 
India, Gabriel García Marquez of Columbia, and Wole Soyinka of 
Nigeria, but China’s Cold War era arts and literature are separated into 
their own chapter (People’s Education Press 2011c, 108). This separation 
is part of a broader effort by the authors to maintain distance between 
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China and all other factions during the Cold War, part of their process of 
constructing a specific identity for China.
 China and its Place in the Cold War
Several aspects of China’s national image and its place in the Cold War, as 
presented in these textbooks, have already been mentioned, hinting at the 
broader picture. In addition to China’s distance from all sides of the Cold 
War, there is its desire for friendly relations on all sides, the interest in 
national reunification, a focus on economic growth and technology, and 
a comparison to other socialist countries. Further elaboration on these 
themes is seen in the coverage of China’s foreign relations and domestic 
history during the Cold War. Overcoming potential incongruities, it cre-
ates an image of China that is independent, influential, and successful in 
pursuing its goals, yet also just, peaceful, and somewhat withdrawn in its 
relations with the world. China retains its socialist identity while priori-
tising stable institutions and market-driven economic growth.
 An Independent, Successful China
The textbook portrayals of China’s relationships with the West, the East, 
and the South during the Cold War suggest that it is not part of any side. 
Instead, the textbooks emphasise the degree to which China decided its 
own course. They make multiple explicit statements that, following the 
founding of the PRC, China was ‘independent and acted of its own ini-
tiative’ both domestically and in its foreign relations (People’s Education 
Press 2011a, 80, 107–9, 111). Invasions, unequal treaties, foreign spheres 
of influence, lost territories, and payment of indemnities were a major 
part of China’s experience in the hundred-plus years following the First 
Opium War in 1840. Both Sun Yat-sen and Mao Zedong characterised 
China as having been reduced to a ‘semi-colonial country’ during this 
period (Wang 2012, 47–69). Reiterating China’s autonomy demonstrates 
a break from this past and establishes the end of this ‘century of humilia-
tion’ as a major achievement of the CCP in establishing the PRC, a 
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 narrative found throughout official interpretations of history (Wang 
2012, 100–4). In a similar vein, the reunification of Hong Kong and 
Macao with the mainland and progress towards reconciliation with 
Taiwan are further successes of the PRC and party leadership (People’s 
Education Press 2011a, 93, 102–5, 2011c, 87).
In the wider world during the Cold War period, the textbook asserts 
China’s growing influence and newfound national stature. This influence 
appears in China’s participation in the conferences in Geneva in 1954 
and in Bandung in 1955, and is implied when the United States in inter-
ested in rapprochement. Otherwise, until China begins participating in 
UN activities in the 1980s, the effects of the influence suggested by the 
textbooks remain unclear (People’s Education Press 2011a, 108–14, 
124). China’s international influence is a marker of its national renewal, 
yet at the same time the text separates China from all factions and the 
conflicts of the period. This depicts China as a peaceful and upstanding 
nation, and avoids conflicts between China’s pursuit of its ideals and the 
pursuit of its interests, even though it renders the discussion of China’s 
international influence somewhat thin.
 Idealism and Interests
These interests and ideals include peace and non-aggression, opposition 
to hegemony and imperialism, national security, reunification with lost 
territories, and economic development at home and abroad. In general, 
the ideals and the interests are presented as mutually reinforcing. China’s 
early policy of supporting the socialist camp in foreign relations is imple-
mented to protect peace, independence, and the successes of the revolu-
tion. The country’s support of global peace and anti-hegemony are 
mentioned repeatedly. Meanwhile, China’s noble intentions in the pur-
suit of peace have the distinct pragmatic advantage of creating conditions 
beneficial for China’s development and increasing China’s international 
stature. In turn, both developments allow it to negotiate the return of 
Hong Kong and Macau from a position of strength and to regain its seat 
in the UN, major victories for China (People’s Education Press 2011a, 
81, 103, 107–15, 129, 2011c, 85). While the textbook’s evidence for 
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China’s influence is perforce rather slim as it seeks to maintain the moral 
image of China, its account of China’s successes does not suffer the 
same problem.
The account of the Korean War is careful to reinforce the image of a 
peaceful China that would only become involved in a war for justified 
self-defence. The description of the start of the war reads: ‘In 1950, the 
Korean War broke out. The “United Nations Army” led by the United 
States crossed the “38th parallel”, invading the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea and drawing near to the Sino-Korean border’ (People’s 
Education Press 2011a, 120). It makes immediate national defence the 
motivation for China’s involvement, and also obscures the North Korean 
invasion of the south. Eliding their ally’s role in starting the war helps 
preserve China’s wholesome intentions in joining it.
In a few instances, China could come across as less than perfectly 
peaceful, but the textbooks are able to justify China’s actions. The text-
book mentions that the People’s Liberation Army ended the shelling of 
Jinmen Island in 1979 as part of a new policy seeking peaceful reunifica-
tion with Taiwan, but when and why the shelling started is not men-
tioned. Moreover, Chinese people on both sides of the Taiwan straits so 
desire unity that these past military efforts to achieve it are quickly passed 
over (People’s Education Press 2011a, 104). Elsewhere, China’s weapons 
programme is discussed as part of its scientific achievements, casting the 
development of nuclear weapons and missiles as positive accomplish-
ments that increased the stature of the country. In this case, however, the 
text is aware of the potential conflict, asking students to consider two 
statements evaluating the development of nuclear weapons. One criti-
cises it on the grounds of China’s needs for economic development and 
‘love for peace’ while the other reconciles that love with weapons devel-
opment on the grounds of external security threats and a declared no 
first-strike policy (People’s Education Press 2011c, 95). On the contrary, 
it argues, China actually developed nuclear weapons to safeguard world 
peace. Neither statement casts doubt on China’s status as a peaceful coun-
try, and the main text itself pairs the development of nuclear weapons 
with building nuclear power plants (People’s Education Press 2011c, 92, 
95). In both these cases, as with the Korean War, military force is put in 
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the context of national unity and security, becoming part of the nation’s 
achievements rather than undermining China’s high ideals.
 China’s Socialism and Socialism beyond the Cold War
Despite the distance the text maintains between China and the Soviet 
Union or the socialist camp during the Cold War, it does claim a socialist 
identity for the PRC throughout. The victory of the communist revolu-
tion strengthens the global socialist cause. Mao launches the Cultural 
Revolution in an honest effort to find a Chinese path to socialist moder-
nity, an enterprise revitalised under Deng that continues to this day 
(People’s Education Press 2011a, 81, 98, 2011b, 54–7). Looking beyond 
labels, the text establishes that China is socialist in that it absorbs lessons 
from other socialist countries, avoiding their mistakes (People’s Education 
Press 2011b, 93, 2011c, 84, 88). And in setting up the contrast noted 
above between the leadership of the USSR and China, the textbook 
establishes a socialist yardstick for measuring Chinese success.
By this measure, it succeeds. The textbook states that with the dissolu-
tion of the Soviet Union, ‘the world wide socialist movement suffered a 
setback’, and that China’s reforms were challenged, but not defeated 
(People’s Education Press 2011b, 56). Later, the textbook reasserts that 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union has not halted efforts to build social-
ism elsewhere, and China’s efforts are clearly among these. These state-
ments establish that socialism remains relevant even after the breakup of 
the Soviet Union, further diminishing the degree to which the Cold War 
can be seen as a contest between Communism and capitalism, instead of 
the result of a particular set of hegemonic ambitions. However, the social-
ist identity that China carries with it into the present is a remarkably 
flexible one, adapting to the demands of economic development and dis-
carding the class struggle that had once been treated as central (People’s 
Education Press 2011b, 49, 54, 93). The textbooks exhibit this shift with 
an interest in development rather than revolution. With that comes posi-
tive coverage of capitalist economies, as well as a history that prioritises 
institutions and, despite claiming that the victory of the CCP was an 
inspiration to revolutionary struggles around the world, is deeply 
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 suspicious of revolutionary change in China (People’s Education Press 
2011a, 81).
 China’s Domestic Politics and the Minimising 
of Revolution
In fact, after 1949, the text celebrates only China’s institutions and eco-
nomic growth, depicting the country’s efforts at radical change as 
restricted to particular periods and as interruptions in China’s proper 
path. The early political history of the PRC is presented as the formation 
of China’s political bodies, including the People’s Political Consultative 
Congress, the National People’s Congress, its local counterparts, and the 
minority nationality autonomous areas. The official functions and genesis 
of each are explained, but without details of their practical implementa-
tion. Likewise, Mao Zedong and other CCP leaders are elected to high 
positions, but they are not shown making decisions, or trying to trans-
form China (People’s Education Press 2011a, 94–7). Economic changes 
happen through orderly reforms and are guided by impersonal Five Year 
Plans (People’s Education Press 2011b, 50–1). The chapter on Mao 
Zedong’s thought and theory is also interested in institutions and devel-
opment, with Mao’s real achievement lying in synthesising the collective 
wisdom of the party, and his theory’s achievement is in adapting Marxism 
to the needs of China (People’s Education Press 2011c, 83–5). Prior to 
the Cultural Revolution, there are no rapid political shifts, and prior to 
the Great Leap Forward, no radical change at all.
The Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution are presented as 
the two disruptions in China’s development. The Great Leap Forward is 
characterised by waste and chaos as ‘objective laws’ are ignored in a revo-
lutionary effort to develop the economy. As a result, China experiences 
‘the most severe economic difficulties since the founding of the country’ 
while no further details are provided (People’s Education Press 2011b, 
52). A few years later, the Cultural Revolution is presented as a catastro-
phe on multiple fronts, derailing education, attacking innocent scholars, 
officials, and party leaders, undermining social order, and throwing the 
economy into chaos. It is also presented largely in the passive voice, or as 
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a force of nature outside of human agency. With great pathos the text 
describes how it tramples the laws and constitution of the country and 
prevents the governing bodies from doing their work (People’s Education 
Press 2011a, 98, 101, 2011b, 48, 50–3, 2011c, 101). The Cultural 
Revolution is described as a ‘calamity’ or ‘great catastrophe’, compared to 
the ‘mistake’ of the Great Leap Forward (People’s Education Press 2011b, 
49, 52–3). While both disrupt the regular, well-ordered conduct of the 
economy, the Cultural Revolution disrupts all levels of Chinese society, 
and is an even greater revolutionary intrusion. Thus, it is a greater catas-
trophe in a history that looks to depict a narrative of steady progress and 
institution-building. Any support textbooks might have shown in the 
past for revolutionary ideology was removed several revisions ago (Müller 
2011, 41–6).
 Conclusions: Evaluating the Cold War
Drawing together the analysis above, we can take from it three main 
insights. First, from the perspective of Chinese textbook authors, the 
Cold War does not mark a significant turning point in the history of the 
twentieth century. Rather, it appears to be one of many phases in the 
emergence of a multipolar world. Second, the USA and the USSR are not 
predominantly described as representatives of opposing social systems 
and ideologies. They are instead shown as two powers pursuing hege-
monic ambitions, with the sole difference being that the Americans were 
much more successful than the Soviets in the long run. Finally, referring 
to the dominant narrative of the emerging multipolar world order, China 
is primarily portrayed as a successfully modernising power on the rise. 
We find hardly any traces of an old narrative that would portray China as 
the spokesperson of the ‘Third World’, the role of which is consistently 
marginalised. However, as the main narrative is about the emergence of a 
multipolar and thus simultaneously more just world, China’s rise appears 
to be not only in the interest of the nation but also in the interests of 
peace and stability for all.
The most important lesson to be drawn from my analysis of the 
Chinese textbook is that the Cold War is not seen as an ideological 
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 struggle between communism and capitalism but rather as a contest 
between superpowers seeking hegemony, as well as between them and the 
countries they attempt to control. There is little doubt that the United 
States bears the greatest responsibility for the Cold War, although the 
Soviet Union had hegemonic ambitions of its own. Likewise, there is 
little doubt that the Cold War was bad. The bipolar period was marked 
by global tension and local war. It interfered with humanity’s trend 
towards economic integration, and China faced threats from all sides.
However, the condemnation of the Cold War lacks the force one could 
expect. The bipolar order is an impediment to globalisation, but globali-
sation in half the world carries on regardless, accompanied by shining 
economic growth. Pursuit of hegemony, while portrayed negatively, is 
not restricted to the Cold War period, and the United States maintains its 
ambitions and continues its interventions to this day. We see the global 
tension but not the nuclear fears, and only the two paragraphs about 
Korea and Vietnam explain the local ‘hot’ wars that occurred. It is after 
the Cold War, when NATO bombs Yugoslavia, that violence becomes a 
clear tool for hegemonic ambition (People’s Education Press 2011a, 117, 
120–1, 127). And although China suffers threats during the Cold War, it 
takes reasonable measures to defend itself, pushing back the American 
challenge in Korea unscathed and rising above the turmoil of the period. 
Even the failure of communism in other countries during the Cold War 
cannot derail China’s economic growth and search for a socialist path to 
modernity. The larger theme of hegemonic ambition dominates the nega-
tive aspects of the Cold War, while the ongoing positive trends in his-
tory—increasing multi-polarity, globalisation, and the relevance of 
socialism—also existed during the era. The ways in which the Cold War 
is not essential to the periodisation of history reduce its sting.
How does this view towards the Cold War era compare to current 
debates in mainly Western historiography? The movement away from 
seeing the Cold War as a definitive period and the emphasis on globalisa-
tion brings to mind a thesis articulated most prominently by the  historian 
Akira Iriye who argues that the Cold War was only one and certainly not 
the most important aspect of history after WWII.  However, the text-
books barely engage with decolonisation and do not acknowledge the 
emergence of a global human and environmental rights discourse, all 
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trends Iriye sees as being highly significant for the history of the second 
half of the 20th century (Iriye 2013, 16–17, 22). In acknowledging but 
rejecting the idea of competition between East and West, and instead 
focusing on hegemony exerted by both the US and the USSR, the text-
book discourse seems to echo the ideas of the historian Prasenjit Duara. 
However, the Chinese textbooks devote more attention to American 
measures to dominate Western Europe and Japan, and those countries’ 
efforts to break free, than they do to the relations between the superpow-
ers and the developing world. In Duara’s account, the industrialised West 
became the United States’ willing ‘junior partner’, a pattern not seen here 
(Duara 2011, 461–4, 479). While the two views divide the world along 
similar lines of superpowers, industrialised allies, and developing coun-
tries, the tensions seen between them are different.
At the same time, the textbooks seem to display a fair amount of con-
tinuity with older interpretations. The emphasis on American ambition 
after WWII echoes the Soviet interpretation developed at the dawn of the 
Cold War, a connection not lost on at least one Chinese history teacher 
(C.  Shen 2013, 11). Meanwhile, portraying the USSR as imperialist 
alongside the United States, seeing differences between the US and its 
allies, and defining the Third World as standing opposed to the demands 
of the two superpowers continues the ‘three worlds’ theory China devel-
oped after the Sino-Soviet split. However, in the theory’s initial deploy-
ment, the struggle between the First and Third Worlds was seen as 
paramount, whereas the current textbooks instead explore the tensions 
between the First and Second and give precious little attention to the 
Third (Yu 2013, 693, 696). Perhaps this shift springs from the authors’ 
changed conception of China. With its economic development, integra-
tion into the world economy, and growing political influence, it bears 
more comparison to the Second World, which was always defined by 
being comparatively well developed, and second only to the superpowers 
in might (Chen 2010, 184–5). Thus, they place it alongside the European 
Union as a force for multi-polarity, and no longer feel that it resembles 
the post-colonial countries of the Third World. Granted, Chinese text-
books never gave much room for the Third World to speak for itself, 
substituting Chinese leadership in the anti-imperialist struggle even when 
the Third World merited significant attention (Martin 1990, 99–102; Yu 
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2013, 695). Now, however, that leadership is gone, even though China’s 
recovered independence and national development after 1949, which 
receive so much attention, form a quintessential post-colonial narrative. 
China’s particular Cold War experience led it to develop its own theories 
about the conflict, and these theories continue to be deployed in narrat-
ing that history, even as they are adapted in response to changing ideas 
about national identity and China’s place in the world.
As to the question of what national identity the authors convey, and 
how they convey it, China is shown as successful in asserting its indepen-
dence, regaining lost territories, and ensuring its security while uphold-
ing its ideals of promoting peace and opposing hegemony. Sometimes, 
these two aspects are made to align by arguing that China’s pursuit of 
security is in fact part of the pursuit of peace. For the Cold War period as 
a whole, China is shown as keeping a distance from all sides, ensuring its 
independence and anti-hegemonic credentials, but downplaying the 
interactions China had in a complicated era and rendering its influence 
superficial. China is resolutely socialist, focused on economic develop-
ment, and well governed by its institutions. The desirability of economic 
growth and technological advancement are great enough that for all the 
criticism the United States merits, its economic success is praised, and the 
international institutions it established to feed its ambition are never 
criticised in their own right. The benefits of economic growth go unques-
tioned, even though the authors must create narrative disconnects to do 
so. Meanwhile, to maintain the narrative of development and good gov-
ernment within China throughout the history of the PRC, the country’s 
efforts to revolutionise itself under Mao are presented as unfortunate 
interruptions, not a central goal (Chen 2001, 49–50, 72).
Moreover, because continuity and institutions, not disruption and 
revolution, are emphasised, the questions that might arise from China’s 
rapid development are softened. Yes, China’s growth is an economic mir-
acle, rapidly altering people’s lives and providing them with a bounty of 
goods, but the reforms do not require abandoning China’ socialist 
 identity. In a system that is socialist with Chinese characteristics, it is no 
contradiction to speak of a ‘socialist market economy’ (People’s Education 
Press 2011b, 56–7, 66–7). The authors disassociate China from the 
developing world and emphasise its influence, but because China also 
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opposes the desire for international control that seems to define super-
powers, the text sidesteps the question of whether China is an insider or 
outsider in matters of global power. As to whether economic change has 
made political change necessary, the answer is quite the opposite. Under 
Gorbachev, the Soviet Union implemented political changes, but only 
because economic changes had failed to take hold. The very success of 
China’s economy proves that political changes are unnecessary. The 
emphasis on institutions and discrediting of revolutionary politics in 
China does nothing to undermine this point.
The collapse of the Soviet Union as a warning for China is one way in 
which the history of the Cold War is used to inform the present. However, 
in looking for other ways in which connections are drawn between the 
Cold War past and the present, we see that they are all encompassing. The 
overarching themes that make the Cold War less central, less of a water-
shed event, also make the period enormously relevant to the present 
world. The connection is not one of cause and effect, but direct explana-
tion. All of the essential trends of the Cold War era, including its central 
conflict, continue to the present day. Explaining them explains the world.
Note
1. While the account of NATO involvement in Yugoslavia leaves out the 
bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, this event lends the conflict 
particular resonance in China (Wang, 2012, 171–178)
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as Representatives of ‘Us’ and ‘Them’: 
Contemporary Swedish School History 
Textbooks and their Portrayals 




Focusing on the textual representation of the two main characters of the 
Cold War, the USA and the USSR, this chapter presents an analysis of 
Cold War narratives provided by five contemporary Swedish school his-
tory textbooks. The aim is to examine how Americans and Russians are 
constructed as representatives of ‘us’ and ‘them’. Previous studies on 
Swedish history textbooks have often focused on the depiction of Sweden 
and Swedishness (e.g. Danielsson  Malmros 2012; Spjut 2014, 2018; 
Gustafsson 2017), pointing usually to the dominance of nationalist narra-
tives (see e.g. Nordgren 2006; Lozic 2010; Spjut 2014, 2018;  Persson 
2016) and claiming that most textbook narratives portray an unproblema-
tised ‘us’.
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Focusing on how Swedish textbooks depict Americans and Soviets as 
particular ‘others’ (Loftsdóttir 2010; Andersson 2010), I will also exam-
ine what kind of general assumptions about historical others inform these 
portrayals. My analysis will be based on some conceptual distinctions 
introduced by Hannah Arendt (1982) and Lisa Disch (1994, 1997). The 
presentation of my empirical results is thus preceded by a short overview 
of their main ideas, a brief summary of previous studies on the topic, and 
a general description of the textbooks analysed.
 Theoretical Framework
My theoretical approach draws on the assumption that school history 
provides an opportunity to promote personal growth by seeking to make 
use of history as a way of ‘visiting’ others (Arendt 1982, 1998; Persson 
2016). Essentially, this perspective derives from the conviction that his-
tory might support young people in their endeavour to be and become 
the world (Arendt 1998, Persson 2017). This perception highlights an 
existential potential embedded in history as a school subject (Persson and 
Thorp 2017; Persson 2017).
History didactics usually refers to the concept of historical empathy 
when attempting to capture the moral relationship between people in the 
past and a present user of history (Lévesque 2008). Most often this con-
cept has been employed by representatives of what might be called the 
tradition of historical thinking, in which historical empathy is normally 
construed as dependent on individual cognitive capacity. What is empha-
sised most of the time is thus the need to prevent presentism and the 
importance of contextualisation, of analytical distance and of scientific 
procedural competencies (see Blake 1998; Retz 2015).
From an Arendtian perspective, however, such demands, which high-
light the necessity to bracket off personal and contemporaneous experi-
ence, might be seen as constituting an unfair call for individuals to adopt a 
comfortable, distanced, touristic view of historical events. From Hannah 
Arendt’s point of view, it is not only such rational distance, but also the 
opportunity to involve yourself and your own human experiences that 
must be recognised when conveying narratives about the past (Arendt 
1982; Disch 1994, 154). The past is gone; we cannot revive it. However, as 
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humans, our being in the world is both constituted by a forgone past and 
by our present use of history. As present beings we thus exist in a historical 
and cultural weaving of human relations (Arendt 1998). Following Arendt, 
the study of history is thus not merely an activity where an isolated subject 
rationally inspects stories about the past as distanced objects. It is not even 
sufficient to consider how actors in the past might themselves have been 
operating with a rational understanding of history. A humanistic desire to 
recognise the motivation of other people, Arendt argues, requires not only 
an awareness of the other’s disparity; we should also try to recognise our-
selves as historical beings (Arendt 1998; ibid., 202–206).
Additionally, using the metaphor of ‘go[ing] visiting’ (1982, 43), Arendt 
also asserts the need for imagination when making judgments about other 
peoples’ actions. She thus stresses the obligation we have to construct stories 
by imagining how we would have experienced and handled a situation simi-
lar to that which others have endured (Arendt 1982; Disch 1994, 157; Disch 
1997, 136). In other words, as Disch puts it, ‘as a visitor you think your own 
thoughts but in the place of somebody else’ (1994, 159). Consequently, 
‘visiting’ the ‘other’ does not mean that we can fully embrace others’ experi-
ences. If we do not pay attention to the otherness of others, we insensitively 
make ourselves at home in what should be regarded as someone else’s house-
hold. Such a naïve attitude derives from the will to assimilate the experiences 
of another (which is impossible), according to Arendt (1982, 43) and Disch 
(1994, 161–162, 168; 1997, 136). Or, as Disch notes, ‘Arendt suggests that 
there is all the difference in the world between closing your eyes to the world, 
claiming to see through the eyes of someone else, and attempting to visit – 
see with your own eyes – someone else’s position’ (Disch 1994, 163).
Drawing on Arendt, Disch (1994, 1997) further distinguishes between 
recognising the circumstances of the other that will create distance, and 
visiting the perspectives of the other (Disch 1994, 154): ‘the work of the 
imagination when visiting is twofold. It distances me from the familiar 
and takes me to standpoints that are unfamiliar’ (ibid., 160).
Before this backdrop, my analysis of the portrayals of Soviets and 
Americans in Swedish textbooks will raise three questions: (i) Are the two 
main characters of the Cold War constructed as possible objects of iden-
tification and deprecation? (ii) Do the depictions of their acts and experi-
ences contain elements of recognition? (iii) Are these acts and experiences 
situated in a way to create a basis for understanding?
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I will proceed in three steps: First, I will investigate how the origin and 
the development of the Russian and American societies are narrated. 
Who are they and where do they come from? In what sense do the text-
book portrayals of Russians and Americans embrace different kinds of 
plurality? Second, I will explore the motives ascribed to the two peoples 
and their leaders: With what intentions are they assumed to act? In what 
way are their acts situated? Finally I will analyse what judgements are 
passed in terms of guilt: How, on what basis and from what location, 
does the textbook retroactively judge the people and the leaders of the 
USA and the USSR?
 Results from a Previous Study
Sweden is often described as a small nation highly reliant on its interna-
tional affairs. Until the independence of Finland one hundred years ago, 
Russia in the east and Denmark in the west have often been attributed 
great importance in traditional Swedish narratives. Consequently, since 
the second part of the 19th century it has seemed as if the narrative of a 
constantly threatened homeland has been rather unopposed in Swedish 
history textbooks (Persson 2016).
Regarding later post-war events, it seems the portrayal of a peaceful 
nation trapped between the eastern and western hemispheres correspond-
ingly includes a similar connotation (Danielsson Malmros 2012, 114). 
Unlike Denmark and Norway, Sweden has never formally been part of 
the NATO alliance. For some time, the self–image of a third way, a com-
promise between socialism and capitalism, remained a strong trend in 
public historical culture (Zander 1998). Nevertheless, previous research 
on Swedish history textbooks has shown that the depictions of the two 
superpowers changed notably during the Cold War period. Based on an 
analysis of almost five hundred textbooks in history, geography, and social 
sciences published between 1930 and 2004, Holmén (2006) shows that 
the picture of the Soviet Union was at its most positive right after World 
War II. During the late 1940s the previous description of the USSR as an 




However, already in the mid-1950s both political opinion and the 
textbooks were showing a much more condemning tone against the 
lack of democracy in the USSR. From Holmén’s (2006) perspective, 
this is mainly explained by a wish to ensure American support during a 
period when Swedish military capacity was weak. Similarly, he stresses 
how the reinforcement of the Swedish military force led to the more 
US-critical approach presented in textbooks of the 1960s. Holmén 
notes the most anti-American stance, however, in Swedish textbooks of 
the more radical 1970s. These contain descriptions of social problems 
and betrayed ideals, and their critique in these narratives appears 
directed particularly at portrayals of ‘underdogs’, such as Native 
Americans and the Vietnamese.
During the 1980s, criticism was directed both towards the USA and 
the USSR. However, after the collapse of the latter in 1991, distancing 
from the Russians increased. The Centrally Planned Economy (CPE) sys-
tem is described as a deficient alternative to the market economy and the 
undemocratic aspects of the USSR are given a prominent position in 
narratives published from the 1990s (Holmén 2006).
The present study was carried out more than a decade after Holmén 
wrote his thesis (2006). In the meantime, both the historical and 
Fig. 6.1 Swedish textbook depictions of the USA and the USSR  (Holmén 2006, 
237)
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political culture in Sweden and the educational system had undergone 
a considerable transformation. Far from the previous declaration of 
non-alignment and neutrality, several Swedish political parties nowa-
days argue for the necessity of Sweden joining NATO. At the same 
time, depictions of Russia in the public sphere and in mass media have 
become increasingly critical.
Simultaneously, since 2011 a major educational reform has been 
implemented within Swedish compulsory schooling. Regarding history, 
this policy change particularly includes a more detailed list of content 
knowledge, more national tests and a more explicit emphasis on disci-
plinary skills (Persson 2017, 7–11). Source criticism, the use of history, 
and other disciplinary concepts have thus permeated the new history cur-
riculum. Several Swedish history didactics scholars have described this 
latter tendency as a striving towards a more academic and analytically 
distanced approach to history education (e.g. Persson 2017, 18–20).
 Textbook Sample
Unlike many other countries, the Swedish government no longer has any 
control over the textbooks used in schools. Since 1991, textbook produc-
tion relies on private companies and the free market. I therefore chose the 
best-known titles (Utkik 2015; SO.S. 2015; PULS 2009; Levande Historia 
2012) from the three largest Swedish publishing houses (Gleerups, Liber 
and Natur & Kultur), as well as one textbook from a smaller publishing 
house, Sanoma: Prio (2016).
As we can see from the following graph, each book comprises between 
222 and 390 pages of text, of which between 42 and 99 pages are devoted 
to the period between 1945 and 1989 or 1991. In all textbooks the 
majority of the content deals with international relations during this era. 
In most cases the East-West conflict is given about the same amount of 
space as North-South tensions during the period in question.
Regarding descriptions of the Cold War as such, the five books exam-
ined comprise 17–28 pages. With no exceptions, those pages largely (82–
100 percent) deal with political and economic aspects of the conflict.
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Table 6.1 Table Showing an Overview of the Main Chronological, Geographical 

































PULS 2009 345 pp. 56 vs 18 pp. 76 vs 24% 31 vs 29% 82 vs 18%
Utkik 2015 343 pp. 62 vs 17 pp. 66 vs 34% 24 vs 6% 75 vs 25%
SO.S 2015 390 pp. 76 vs 18 pp. 83 vs 17% 14 vs 14% 95 vs 5%
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PULS 2009 345 pp. 25 pp. 7% 64 vs 36 % 100 vs 0 %
Utkik 2015 343 pp. 30 pp. 8% 83 vs 17% 90 vs 10%
SO.S 2015 392 pp. 17 pp. 4% 88 vs 12% 94 vs 6 %




435 pp 18 pp 4% 100 vs 0% 100 vs 0%
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 Results
 The Origins of the USSR and the Depiction 
of the Russian People
While some differences are visible in the five textbooks examined, the 
portrayals of the Russian people and the emergence and growth of the 
USSR as a society show some recurring patterns. The portrayal of the 
pre-revolutionary years most often begins with a description of the huge 
gap between the rich and the poor in Tsarist Russia. The injustice is 
often made clear by a description of the contrast in the living conditions 
of different social classes, or by noting that most people were hungry 
despite the fertile lands and abundance of natural resources (SO.S., 
246–247; PULS, 192; Levande Historia, 320–324). For example, 
Levande Historia repeatedly comments on Russian hunger, illiteracy and 
under-development:
Compared to Germany or France, Russia was undeveloped. Nine out of 
ten people lived in rural villages and subsisted on agriculture. Three out of 
four adults were illiterate. Crop failure and famine was common. […] 
Together with poultry, cows and pigs, [the Russian peasants] tried to 
endure the cold of winter, when snow drifted in through thin walls and 
cold moisture rose from the ground (Levande historia 320).1
Although these initial narratives might contain a great deal of sympathy 
towards starving and oppressed farmers, they also show obvious elements of 
othering. Instead of intrinsically seeking to grasp their situation, the textbook 
portrays the serfs as ‘malnourished, powerless and desperate’ (PULS, 192).2 
This illustrates a general and frequently used depiction of ordinary Russian 
people as subdued, cowed and passive. The main exception in this respect can 
equally be found in Levande historia, which describes starving peasants who, 
despite everything, turn against ‘those who took without giving anything 
back’ (322).3 Elsewhere, the only acts of the Russian people mentioned are 
related to violence. Accordingly, while readers are initially told that soldiers 
shouted at their officers (Levande historia, 324–325), they also learn that dur-
ing the Civil War ‘it was told that “the reds” shot all who had no calluses on 
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the palms of their hands’ (PULS, 197)4 and that Lenin himself ‘let his soldiers 
march into parliament to close it by force’ (SO.S., 248–249).5
The lack of narratives detailing positive motives for the creation of the 
USSR is also conspicuous when we consider how the birth and emer-
gence of the USSR as a society is portrayed in Swedish textbooks. The few 
Bolsheviks are described as unwanted. Yet people are also commonly 
described as incapable of preventing this minority from seizing power. 
Madness and terror ensue (Levande historia, 323–327; SO.S., 246–249; 
PULS, 194–195). In this book the frequency of words and phrases like 
‘rotting food’, ‘cold’, ‘starvation’, ‘strikes and demonstrations’ is high 
(323–324). The foundation of the USSR as a state is generally described 
as a project of malicious leaders in a mix of determination and chaos. The 
origins of the USSR are thus mired in terror, murder, intolerance and 
backwardness by the authors of these texts.
Similar patterns shape the depiction of the Stalinist era. In PULS Stalin is 
described as ‘a pathologically suspicious’ and ‘wary ruler’ (201)6, comparable 
only to Hitler and Mao. Yet even though he is obviously unpopular, Stalin 
is able to seize power ‘after a series of ugly tricks’ (PULS, 199).7 The story of 
Stalin’s rise to power is thus similar to that of the supposedly unwanted 
Bolsheviks. The Russian people do nothing to stop it; rather, as in Utkik, the 
reader learns of dying farmers, detention camps, executions, famine, raids 
and horror (218–219). Instead of describing the active resistance of the 
peasants, the narrative notes that anyone who refused to co-operate would 
find him- or herself in trouble (SO.S., 259). The only notable exception in 
this respect seems to be the inclusion of the fact that some peasants, despite 
everything, resisted the Soviet central power by slaughtering their livestock 
and destroying their tools (Levande historia, 329; PULS, 199).
In some cases the passivity of the Russian people is related to the Soviet 
system as such. Comparing the USSR to Nazi Germany, some of the 
textbooks claim, for instance, that the Soviet communists ‘wanted to 
make every man think in a new way. Anyone who did not fully support 
the party would be seen as an enemy without the right to live’ (SO.S., 
257).8 The Russian people are once again described primarily as power-
less and oppressed sufferers. People suffered from the cold in dark apart-
ments (Levande historia, 329), starving and dying in tens of millions, and 
yet only seldom seem to resist. Rather, the Russian people are said to 
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be afraid (Utkik, 219) and forced to betray their friends and family 
(SO.S., 260).9 The most detailed descriptions of Stalin’s reign of terror 
can be found in Levande historia, which devotes a large amount of space 
to describing life in the prison camps of the Gulag:
In the camps political prisoners were incarcerated together with criminals. 
Prisoners could be raped, murdered, forced to work themselves to death, or 
die from hunger or disease. It took strength, skill and luck to survive. […] 
The feeling that no one, absolutely no one, was safe created enormous sus-
picion and fear that permeated all of society. Anyone could be a spy. It was 
easy to turn in someone you did not like, a neighbour whose room you 
wanted – many families were forced to share apartments – a rival, or a girl 
who refused to have sex (Levande historia, 331).10
However, the lack of opposition on the part of the Russian people is not 
only explained by the climate of fear. Even if both Chrustjev and 
Gorbachev are described as reformists in some ways (PULS, 305–307; 
Utkik, 266; SO.S., 376–377; Prio, 76, 187; Levande historia, 383, 389, 
393–392), the inefficiency and bureaucracy of the communist system, 
these textbooks repeatedly claim, served to pacify its citizens:
The Soviet Union could manufacture nuclear weapons that threatened the 
whole world, but not enough food, clothes and homes for their own people. 
There were plenty of natural resources in the Soviet Union: gold, oil, coal, 
iron and much more. Communists exploited nature to access these riches. 
Then they could afford to equip the world’s strongest army. But large parts of 
the country were poisoned by environmental degradation (SO.S., 374).11
In PULS (306)12 it is noted that ‘no one dared or wanted to take individual 
initiative’. Furthermore, in the textbooks stressing the environmental pol-
lution, corruption and the inefficient and impassive system in the USSR, 
the citizens are often portrayed as unreceptive collaborators. In SO.S., the 
ordinary people are even implicitly described as drunkards and thieves:
The new leaders who came to power in the 1950s and 1960s decided that 
more food, clothes, homes, cars and televisions would be produced, which 
people needed. Then one of the Soviet Union’s major weaknesses was 
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exposed: ordinary people were forbidden to own businesses and try to 
become wealthy. In the Soviet Union, it was the state that owned all com-
panies. And it did not matter if a company went badly, the state paid the 
workers’ wages anyway. Therefore, many employees did not feel they 
needed to make an effort. It was common for people to get drunk at work, 
or not go there at all. When the state owned the companies there were 
many who did not feel responsible. People stole goods and sold them. The 
factories and agriculture became worse the more time passed. […] Those 
who dared to complain were sentenced to punishment or locked away in 
mental hospitals. But those who worked for the party did well. They could 
travel abroad, and shop in special stores with foreign goods. There you 
could find all the things that ordinary people lacked (SO.S., 112).13
This allusion to Russian consumption is no exception. Utkik is the only 
textbook which does not mention this. PULS claims that the peasants’ 
savings were ‘often […] spent on vodka’ (192)14 and that ‘humour and 
vodka were the people’s only consolation’ (306).15 Beyond stressing that 
Russians often drank at work, SO.S. also claims that ‘in the shops there 
was almost nothing to buy except vodka’ (SO.S., 11).16 While the narra-
tives on the USA and Western Europe include prominent cultural fig-
ures, inventors and industrialists, virtually none of their Soviet 
counterparts appear in narratives on the USSR. Not only the Soviet sys-
tem but also the overall picture of the Russians thus becomes distanced.
The portrayal of the Russians’ miserable existence is only challenged in 
Utkik, in which descriptions of ordinary Russian people are consistently 
more varied. Describing Russia during the revolution, the narrative states 
how hungry, poor and war-weary people were actively united in the rebel-
lion against the rich. Furthermore, this textbook is the only one to remind 
us that, one hundred years ago, Russia already had electricity, trams, 
schools and cinemas (Utkik, 209–10). Elsewhere, however, we are pre-
sented with a truncated portrayal of an unattractive political and eco-
nomic system and a people apparently incapable of understanding their 
own agency. Or, as claimed under the headline ‘Communism: Threat or 
Liberation?’ in PULS (284), these textbooks argue that people in the East 
‘had never learned about democracy’.17 It was due to this lack of knowl-
edge, it is claimed, that the people tolerated the lack of freedom imposed 
upon them by the communist system.
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 Soviet Leaders’ Motives during the Cold War
If only reconsidering the outbreak of the conflict, most of the textbooks 
analysed describe the Soviet leaders as playing the most active and aggres-
sive part (Prio, 63–66; PULS, 285; Utkik, 256; SO.S., 337), blaming 
them for their support of communist dictatorships in the whole of 
Eastern Europe. Only Levande historia (377) explicitly mentions that cer-
tain acts of the USSR were motivated by fear of new aggression from the 
West and an interest in creating a buffer zone for protection. Still, the 
same textbook contains phrasing that signals Soviet malice and aggression:
In 1948 the USSR blocked the Western allies’ zones of Berlin in an attempt 
to starve them and seize power. The Western allies – the USA, Great Britain 
and France – responded by having a stream of aeroplanes, an aerial bridge, 
fly in groceries and other goods. Stalin had to comply and the blockade 
ended after eleven months. The relationship between the USSR and the 
USA was at a record low. The American journalist Walter Lippman made 
the conflict known as the Cold War (Levande historia, 378).18
In some cases the textbooks seem to argue that it was the Soviet desire for 
expansion that led to the Cold War. One textbook even claims that ‘Stalin 
wanted to turn the Soviet Union into the world’s strongest country’ 
(SO.S., 258).19 Most authors of these textbooks consider it important to 
include the consequences of these ambitions for other people. For 
instance, PULS (284) states: ‘After 1948, almost all of Eastern Europe 
was ruled from Moscow. […] The borders were strictly guarded. Those 
who tried to escape were shot or locked up in prison’.20 Although the 
textbook touches upon Eastern European resistance in 1989, these text-
books generally contain very few stories of resistance by Soviet citizens.
 The Judgement of the USSR during the Cold War
When it comes to blame for the Cold War, the textbooks analysed varied 
somewhat with the different phases of the conflict. Portrayals of the 
1960s often include a positive approach to the USA’s actions internation-
ally, arguing that the USA acted in response to Soviet aggression. In Utkik 
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we learn how the USSR was forced to make great sacrifices during World 
War II, while the USA was not (254). Still the textbook argues that the 
policies of the USSR in Eastern Europe marked the beginning of the 
conflict: ‘The Cold War began when the USSR introduced communism 
in Eastern Europe’ (254).21
The USSR is typically described as playing the most active role, thus 
appearing as the guilty party when it comes to the escalation of the con-
flict (PULS, 286, 288–289; Prio, 63–66; Levande Historia, 378; Utkik, 
253–256). In most of these cases, the Berlin blockade is typically pre-
sented as the single event that increased tensions between East and West. 
The textbooks also emphasise how the Soviet government made use of 
other countries in Eastern Europe, implicitly suggesting that it was greed 
driving its actions. While the American Marshall Aid Program is pre-
sented as a welcome contribution of supplies and economic support in 
the West, the reparations that the Soviets demanded from their European 
neighbours are portrayed as an extensive outflow of goods from Eastern 
Europe to the USSR (PULS, 286–287; Prio, 64–66; Levande Historia, 
380, SO.S., 304–305).
The textbooks level heavy criticism at the USSR for its actions in 
Eastern Europe. Levande historia states that Eastern Bloc leaders built the 
Berlin Wall in order to prevent people seeking freedom, and that they 
also, without any apparent explanation, built threatening rocket bases on 
Cuba (383–384). In many cases we are told how the people of Eastern 
Europe, despite their ‘isolation’, knew that their counterparts in Western 
democracies were much better off and in some cases tried to protest 
against Soviet oppression (PULS, 288–89; Utkik, 257; SO.S., 178; Prio, 
76). These aspirations came to nothing; instead we learn how Soviet tanks 
repeatedly quashed the ‘Eastern European people’s hopes for freedom’ 
(SO.S., 178).22
This moral judgement of the USSR is also prominent in the textbook 
portrayals of what finally happened in Eastern Europe in 1989. SO.S., 
states that this was the ‘year of freedom and democratic revolution for 
Eastern Europe’23 (SO.S., 378), and in PULS (310) we are told how stat-
ues of Lenin, Stalin and other despised dictators in Eastern Europe were 
torn down. However, many of the textbooks omit the collapse of the 
USSR (PULS, 307; Prio, 78–83; Levande Historia, 391–39; Utkik, 276–
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278). On the phenomenon that countries like Bulgaria and Albania soon 
re-elected communist leaders, the textbook explains: ‘the communist 
politicians managed to retain power because there were not enough peo-
ple in these countries who knew how democracy really worked’ 
(SO.S., 379).24
 The Origins of the USA and the American People
The textbooks portrayals of the birth and progress of the USA as a nation 
and the Americans as a people are much more complex than those of the 
USSR and the Russians. However, the description of the conditions of 
Native Americans is worrying; they are continually referred to as ‘indi-
aner’ (Indians), and descriptions of African-American history and 
 people are equally concerning (Levande Historia, 276–277; Utkik, 122–
123; SO.S., 228–234). In PULS, it is explicitly mentioned that the 
Europeans took the land from people that already ‘had’ it (203), and the 
treatment of the Native Americans is even associated with ethnic 
cleansing (208).
In addition, however, the narrative of the birth and rise of the USA 
within these textbooks is (with the exception of the more particular nar-
rative in Utkik) mainly one of freedom, progress and success (SO.S., 228, 
235–236; PULS, 205–206, 211–212; Levande historia, 202–203, 278–
281). In several cases this achievement is often attributed to European 
immigrants. In contrast to Russians, Americans are frequently depicted 
as a people of innovative and diligent entrepreneurs. There are numerous 
examples of young, creative and strong people who are prepared to work 
hard (PULS, 206, 211; Levande historia, 267–269). Under the headline 
‘The USA became a superpower’ one textbook explicitly claims that it 
was skilful young immigrants who made the economic success of the 
American nation possible (PULS, 209). In several cases comparisons are 
also explicitly made with Karl-Oskar and Kristina, two (heroic) protago-
nists of a well-known Swedish novel about emigration to the USA (e.g., 
PULS, 206; Utkik, 180). In PULS it is claimed, for instance, that 
European immigrants ‘often were farmers, poor but hard working, like 
Karl-Oskar and Kristina’ (206).25
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Furthermore, the USA is depicted as the country of opportunity. It is 
said to offer most of its immigrants the right to vote, as well as religious 
freedom and a chance to earn much higher wages (PULS, 211–212; 
Utkik, 180–181; SO.S., 215–217). Almost nothing, however, is men-
tioned about the individuals who failed or struggled to survive. Equally, 
the association these textbooks make between the American people and 
freedom extends to the creation of the nation as well. The struggle against 
Britain is referred to as a war of freedom. Levande historia even claims 
that the various states unanimously begged to become a part of the new 
attractive union (271). Similarly, Utkik mentions the right to life, free-
dom and the pursuit of happiness as the foundation of the newly liber-
ated nation (121). While the origin of the USSR is mainly associated 
with chaos, violence and oppression in the textbooks analysed, the birth 
of the USA is related to freedom and the Declaration of Independence 
and Human Rights. For instance, beneath the headline ‘How the USA 
was born’, the authors of PULS explain the origin of the country by refer-
ring back to the Declaration of 1776. With references to its claims that 
‘all people are created equal’, ‘all power is based on the people’ and that 
‘all laws must be approved by the people’s representatives’ (PULS, 205)26, 
this text explains that the USA came to be regarded as the land of free-
dom on earth (for white people). In SO.S. the USA is even claimed to be 
the most democratic country in the world (227).
Likewise, when portraying the events of the early twentieth century, 
the narrative of economic and industrial success is highly prominent in 
these textbooks. Levande historia even argues that it was the absence of 
tollgates and taxes that caused an increased production of both agricul-
tural and industrial goods: ‘The United States became the country where 
the factories produced the most goods in the world. Lots of people found 
work and earned good money’ (278–281).27
Accordingly and in most cases, descriptions of the Civil War and the 
roles of the North and the South in the conflict appear as unfortunate 
parentheses in the main success story. Here too, however, Utkik offers a 
more multifaceted description. It not only states that some loyalists were 
against the idea of the USA; it also ascertains that women, the poor, slaves 
and natives were not allowed to vote (Utkik, 122–123). This textbook is 
the only one to accentuate how the Civil War claimed more victims than 
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all other wars in which the USA has participated since. Furthermore, the 
authors mention that the gap between the North and South remains vis-
ible  today (Utkik, 161–162; PULS, 210). Utkik is also unique in the 
sense that it is the only textbook to deliver criticism: It asks whether the 
USA was really ‘a country of the future’ for everyone? (167)28 or ‘did 
everyone in the United States enjoy the “roaring twenties”?’ (229).29
The other textbooks, however, seem to express a deep admiration for 
what the Americans achieved before the beginning of the Cold War. While 
these texts do not mention Russian or Soviet culture, there are frequent 
mentions of American jazz music, Hollywood (in one case described as the 
‘Factory of Dreams’), Walt Disney, Mickey Mouse, Donald Duck, Charlie 
Chaplin, and Duke Ellington (e.g., PULS, 213–214; SO.S., 234). 
Furthermore, the text presents the success story of American industry dur-
ing the early twentieth century, with electricity, cars, vacuum cleaners, 
radio and electric stoves (PULS, 213–214; Utkik, 215; SO.S., 254). PULS 
uses the heading ‘The land of the future’ when it highlights the inventor 
and ‘genius’ Thomas Edison (211). Thanks to him, students learn, we now 
have both the light bulb and the steam power plant. Henry Ford is not only 
mentioned in relation to the invention of the assembly line principle; he is 
also associated with increased worker salaries (SO.S., 236). Furthermore, 
these texts also show how – in the aftermath of the catastrophic stock mar-
ket crash of 1929 – the American president cared for his people by intro-
ducing the New Deal (SO.S., 255–256).
In contrast, the narrative of post-war USA is generally more complex. 
Here the majority of the textbooks expose social issues such as subversive 
youth culture, racism, and the Civil Rights Movement. In the narratives 
of the 1960s, the economic gap between American citizens is described as 
a problem (PULS, 216, 298–304; Levande historia 418–425, 232–234; 
SO.S., 311–316; Prio, 72–75). Three of the textbooks mention 
McCarthyist policies against left-wing opponents (PULS, 298–302; Prio, 
70; Levande Historia, 424), one book even describing McCarthyism as ‘a 
hysterical witch hunt’ (298).30 Doubts are raised regarding democracy in 
the USA, claiming that the rich and their lobby organisations always 
sponsor the elected president (PULS, 304).
Unlike the critique of the Soviet system, criticism of the USA in the 
post-war period is mitigated by examples of how the American people 
chose to fight social injustices and problems. The Civil Rights Movement, 
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the Vietnam Movement, the Green Environmental Movement, the Youth 
Movement and the Women’s Liberation Movement are all invoked to 
exemplify this. The American people are thus ascribed agency and 
American society is described as something in which citizens can take an 
active part, bringing about change (e.g., Utkik, 273–274; SO.S., 311–
314; PULS, 301; Prio, 72, 75; Levande historia, 418–425).
 USA Leaders’ Motives during the Cold War
American policy is described in comparatively benevolent terms. Once 
again, Utkik offers the most detailed description, fostering identification 
with the individuals affected, such as its portrayal of the benefits of the 
Marshall Plan with a short story about a young German boy named 
Dieter and his struggle to survive after the Second World War (253). The 
Marshall Plan is described as the starting point for the rebuilding of 
Western Europe. And in SO.S. we read that ‘from the ruins of the war, a 
new Western Europe emerged, richer than ever’ (304).31
However, the motives of the Americans during the Cold War are not 
only depicted in terms of magnanimous generosity:
In 1947, the United States government came up with an aid programme 
for war–torn Europe. The so-called Marshall Aid meant that Western 
European countries received almost $13 billion from the United States. 
The Americans wanted to bolster the European economy so that Europeans 
could afford to buy items from the United States. In addition, the 
Americans were afraid that poverty would encourage Western Europeans 
to vote for communist parties (SO.S., 304).32
If the USSR is allegedly driven by a mad leader and an ideological 
determination to expand, the USA is generally associated with two other 
motives. Firstly, its motives are often related to a wish to prevent the 
expansion of communism in the world. Levande Historia specifies that it 
was Mao’s victory in China in 1949 that originally motivated Truman to 
establish his well-known doctrine (377–378).
More often, however, American intervention into world politics is 
related to economic motives, a pattern already visible in explanations as 
to why the USA entered the First World War. While described as securing 
6 Americans and Russians as Representatives of ‘Us’ and ‘Them… 
124
the victory of France and Great Britain and making ‘the world safe for 
democracy’ (EPOK, 224), the book EPOK also suggests that the ‘real 
reason’ is to be found in American concerns for export income (226). 
Likewise, Levande historia claims that the USA entered the war in order 
to guarantee future payments from European credit holders (311).
Economic motives seem to be even more explicitly articulated in the 
later sections of the textbook, describing later periods. PULS, for instance, 
argues that American ‘economic interests are more important than the 
defence of the ideological ideals of democracy’ (329).33 Similarly, Utkik 
maintains that it was the defence of the free market and of American 
domestic corporations that dictated the international agenda of the USA 
during the Cold War (254).
This kind of reasoning appears most frequently where the textbooks dis-
cuss occasions on which the USA have interfered in less developed countries. 
Utkik claims that economic motives drove the USA to oppose development 
in Cuba after Castro’s rise to power (267), and SO.S. describes Americans as 
‘worried’ following Castro’s success, primarily in the light of the interests of 
American corporations; attempts to overthrow Castro’s regime thus ensued 
(SO.S., 359). Similarly, the textbook authors explain American interference 
in South America with the note that ‘big American companies own a lot in 
South America’ (SO.S., 365).34 In some cases the textbooks explicitly state 
that the USA supported not only non-socialist but also non-democratic 
regimes: ‘In country after country power was seized by USA-supported mili-
tary regimes’ (SO.S., 365).35 PULS even states that the American leaders 
regarded Latin America as its ‘dairy cow’ (329).36
 Judgements of the USA during the Cold War
The textbooks portray the USA as a more-or-less reluctant participant in 
the Cold War, mostly describing American action around the beginning 
of the conflict as reactive in the sense that they felt compelled to act upon 
Soviet aggression (PULS, 216; SO.S., 281; Levande historia, 358). Not 
even when the textbooks treat the aftermath of the American interven-
tion and deployment of the nuclear bomb in Japan do we sense any cri-
tique in the narrative. The traditional narrative of how the nuclear bombs, 
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despite everything, saved lives is prominent in the majority of the text-
books. Levande historia, for instance, describes the situation thus:
On 6th August, US planes released a nuclear bomb over the Japanese city 
of Hiroshima. 80,000 were killed immediately, 70,000 were injured, and 
the entire city was turned into ashes. Three days later, an atomic bomb was 
also released over Nagasaki City. This was the only time that nuclear bombs 
have been used in warfare. Japan surrendered. World War II was over 
(Levande historia, 365).37
In SO.S. the authors even, more or less explicitly, blame Japanese suicide 
pilots, the latter having forced the Americans to deploy the nuclear bomb 
(SO.S., 283). Otherwise, the event is described in an equally laconic and 
declarative manner as in the example above:
At a quarter to nine on the morning of 6th August, 1945, the first atomic 
bomb was released over the Japanese city of Hiroshima. Three days later, an 
even more powerful bomb was released over Nagasaki. In only a few min-
utes 80,000 people died. The next day, Japan was ready to give up. World 
War II was over (SO.S., 283).
When dealing with later phases of the Cold War, most textbooks take a 
more critical stance towards American international policies. The 
American involvement in Vietnam receives the most negative portrayal. 
According to PULS, the USA tried to diminish ‘the influence of the 
Soviet Union in the world’ and therefore intervened in Vietnam (293). In 
a way similar to how the American treatment of Native Americans is 
described, the textbooks explicitly take sides with the Vietnamese. It is 
claimed that the war in South-East Asia cost the USA its hero status and 
popularity among young people throughout the world (PULS, 292–294; 
Levande historia, 386; Prio, 71–73; SO.S., 311, 340–342; Utkik, 270–
273). The Vietnam War ‘destroyed the good reputation of the USA in the 
world’ and made the American people realise that they had ‘gone bad’ 
(SO.S., 342).38 Similarly, Utkik (270) depicts how the USA cancelled 
democratic elections in South Vietnam and dropped more than three 
times as many bombs as they released during the whole of World War 
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II. We are told of napalm and 2.5 million casualties. The textbook also 
states how Americans committed atrocities against civilians and ‘some-
times burned hamlets randomly’ (Utkik, 271).39 In SO.S. we are told that 
American fire bombs destroyed Vietnamese peasant villages, resulting in 
violent protests in the USA (SO.S., 342): ‘For many, the United States’ 
war in Vietnam became a symbol of how the rich world tried to crush a 
poor people that only wanted to live independently’ (SO.S., 311).40
As has been noted above, most of the textbooks also devote a great deal 
of attention to the domestic problems of the USA.  The treatment of 
African Americans, the large economic injustices, and the recession of the 
1970s are often described in a critical manner (e.g. PULS, 216; 298–304; 
Levande historia, 418–425; 232–234; SO.S. 311–316; Prio, 72–75). The 
struggle of the African-American community is given most space in 
Levande historia. Here six pages are devoted to describing Rosa Parks and 
the bus boycott of Alabama in 1955, the murder of Emmet Till, the 
church burnings in Montgomery, the brutal police attack against the 
peaceful demonstration in Birmingham of 1963 and the murder of 
Medger Evers later in the same year (418–423). In many cases this is 
contrasted with a more positive development of the domestic situation in 
the USA from the 1980s onwards. PULS tells us that ‘the American econ-
omy improved’ and that African Americans were able  to prosper and 
‘work their way up in society’.41
 Discussion
The purpose of this article has been to examine how Swedish textbooks 
construe Americans and Russians as representatives of ‘us’ and ‘them’. 
The results that this study has yielded unveil insight as to how Russians 
and Americans are framed as objects of identification. By taking as my 
point of departure Lisa Disch’s conceptualisation of Hannah Arendt’s call 
to ‘pay a visit’, I furthermore intend to discuss how these two actors are 
textually treated as representatives of ‘us and ‘them’. In what respect do 
the depictions contain elements of recognition, and to what extent do 
they express the will to situate and understand the acts and experiences of 
these two historical players?
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Regarding the portrayals of the Russian people and the Soviet Union, 
it seems reasonable to claim that readers of these Swedish history text-
books are offered limited opportunities to ‘pay visits’ in the Arendtian 
sense. To begin with, the character of the Russian people is repeatedly 
described as inexplicably passive. Most things seem to ‘just happen’. No 
one likes the Bolsheviks, and no one wants Stalin in power, yet these enti-
ties seize power nevertheless. The situation appears terrifying and chaotic, 
but still the Russian people do not take action. Instead they are described 
as rendered passive and oppressed by the system.
Another problematic aspect is that the Russian people often appear as 
a homogeneous group. A great deal of what is said about the Russian 
person as a human being is therefore foreign and odd. Russians are 
described as people who are drunk at work, seeking solace in vodka. Their 
actions often seem motivated by malevolence and betrayal. In one case, 
Swedish textbook readers learn that a Russian man who was denied sex 
by a girl could take revenge by turning her in to the Secret Police.
Portrayals of Americans and of the USA appear to be strikingly different. 
Although there are also narratives of terrible oppression of Native Americans 
and African Americans, we also repeatedly hear stories about active, young 
and industrious immigrants. By references to famous brands such as Ford 
and Disney, well-known cultural figures such as Chaplin and Mickey 
Mouse, and great inventions such as the light bulb and the automobile, 
there should be opportunities for recognition on the part of the readers.
Furthermore, there are variations in how critical elements in the his-
tory of the USA and the USSR are presented in the textbooks studied. 
While an explicitly critical stance is taken in regard to the American 
atrocities towards African-American citizens and civilian Vietnamese, 
these are also connected to portrayals of how other Americans protest and 
try to bring about change. The Russian people, on the other hand, are 
portrayed as inexplicably passive objects, derived of agency, rendering the 
American people all the more active, reasonable and individually 
differentiated.
A similar difference can also be noted when the textbooks set out to 
explain the motives behind the actions of American and Soviet leaders dur-
ing the Cold War. The USSR appears not only as the most active party in 
the escalation of the conflict; the motives of the Soviet leaders are rarely 
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given any rational explanation. Apart from Stalin’s hunger for more power, 
the reader is merely given declarative examples of how Soviet troops quash 
freedom-longing peoples’ efforts towards democracy. In comparison, the 
actions of the USA appear considerably more rational in the sense that they 
act according to economic incentives and a logical ambition to limit the 
ideological influence of the USSR in other parts of the world.
Drawing on Arendt (1982, 1998) and asking to what extent the read-
ers of these textbooks are given the opportunity to relate to these two 
historical actors, we can ascertain that whenever it comes to the Russians 
the voice of the textbook narrative is conspicuously often that of the dis-
tant beholder or tourist. The challenges that Russian people face seem to 
have very little in common with the situations ‘we’ (Swedish students) 
usually face. Generally speaking and beyond the particular case of the 
Russians, the distance is greatest when the textbook narratives implicitly 
indicate a moral assessment. The reader is always invited to identify with 
the victims of Soviet or American deeds. On the contrary, the acts of the 
perpetrator are rarely ever contextualised.
The perspective of the victim can in many ways be ethically appealing 
in a school context. The risk of this approach is, however, that it may 
promote a use of history where we from the vantage point of our 
safe contemporary world, like judging spectators, contemplate historical 
wrongdoings. We make no attempts at ‘visiting’, and the history of 
human atrocities thereby becomes a mere declarative description of 
someone else’s morally condemnable acts. In the worst case scenario, the 
school subject of history may in this way become an activity that obstructs 
our younger generations from raising critical existential questions about 
what it means to be human.
Notes
1. ‘Jämfört med Tyskland eller Frankrike var Ryssland outvecklat. Nio av 
tio människor bodde i byar på landet och levde av jordbruk. Tre av fyra 
vuxna var analfabeter. Missväxt och hunger var vanliga. [...] Tillsammans 
med höns, kor och svin försökte de [ryska bönderna] uthärda vinter-
kylan, när snön drev in genom tunna väggar och den kalla fukten steg 
från jordgolven’ (Levande historia, 320).
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2. ‘[Bönderna] […] blev undernärda, kraftlösa och förtvivlade’ (PULS, 
192).
3. ‘[…] mot dem som tog utan att ge något tillbaka’ (Levande historia, 
322).
4. ‘Det sägs att “de röda” sköt alla som inte hade valkar i händerna’ under 
inbördeskriget (PULS, 197).
5. ‘Han [Lenin] lät sina soldater stövla in och stänga det nyvalda riksdagen 
med våld. Politiker som folket valt kastades ut, och Lenin blev Rysslands 
diktator’ (SO.S., 248).
6. ‘[Stalin]’s sjukligt misstänksam’, ‘likt Hitler slug envåldshärskare’ (PULS, 
201).
7. ‘[Stalin] […] lyckades efter en rad fula knep’.
8. ‘De [det kommunistiska Sovjetunionen och det nazistiska Tyskland] 
ville få varenda människa att tänka på ett helt nytt sätt. Alla som inte helt 
och hållet ville stödja partiet skulle ses som fiender, utan rätt att leva’ 
(SO.S., 257).
9. ‘[…] i den hemliga polisens tortyrkammare drevs oskylda människor att 
peka ut sina bästa vänner som förrädare och fiender till Sovjetunionen. 
Barn angav sina föräldrar, till och med Stalins släktingar greps’ (SO.S., 
260).
10. ‘I lägren blandades politiska fångar med grovt kriminella. Fångar kunde 
våldtas, mördas arbeta sig till döds eller dö av hunger och sjukdomar. 
Det krävdes såväl styrka som list och tur för att överleva [...] Känslan av 
att ingen, absolut ingen, gick säker skapade en enorm misstänksamhet 
och rädsla som genomsyrade hela samhället. Vem som helst kunde vara 
angivare. Det var lätt att ange någon man ogillade, en granne vars rum 
man ville åt  – manga familjer tvingades nämligen dela lägenhet  – en 
svartsjukerival eller en flicka som vägrat ha sex’ (Levande historia, 331).
11. ‘Sovjet kunde tillverka kärnvapen som hotade hela världen, men inte 
tillräckligt med mat, kläder och bostäder å sitt eget folk. Det fanns gott 
om naturtillgångar i Sovjetunionen: guld, olja, kol, järn och mycket 
annat. Kommunisterna skövlade naturen för att komma åt dessa rikedo-
mar. Så fick de råd att utrusta världens starkaste armé. Men stora delar av 
landet förgiftades av miljöförstöring’ (SO.S., 110).
12. ‘Ingen vågade eller ville ta egna initiativ’ (PULS, 306).
13. ‘De nya ledarna som kom till makten under 1950- och 60-talen bestämde 
att det skulle produceras mer mat, kläder, bostäder, bilar och tv-appa-
rater. Sånt som människor behövde. Då visade sig en av Sovjetunionen 
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stora svagheter: För vanliga människor var det förbjudet att äga företag 
och försöka bli rik. I Sovjetunionen var det staten som ägde alla företag. 
Och det spelade ingen roll om ett företag gick dåligt, staten betalade 
arbetarnas löner ändå. Därför brydde sig många anställda inte om att 
anstränga sig. Det var vanligt att folk var fulla på jobbet, inte gick dit alls. 
När staten ägde företagen fanns det många som inte kände ansvar. Folk 
stal varor och sålde dem. Fabrikerna och jordbruken fungerade allt sämre 
ju längre tiden gick. [...] De som vågade klaga dömdes till straffarbete, 
eller låstes in på mentalsjukhus. Fast de som arbetade åt partiet hade det 
bra. De kunde få resa utomlands, och handla i speciella butiker med 
utländska varor. Där fanns allt som vanligt folk saknade’ (SO.S., 
374–375).
14. ‘[…] ofta gick bondens sista pengar till vodka’ (PULS, 192).
15. ‘[…] humorn och vodkan var folket tröst och säkerhetsventil’ (PULS, 
306).
16. ‘[…] i affärerna fanns det nästan ingenting att köpa, förutom vodka’ 
(SO.S., 259).
17. [I stora delar av Östeuropa] ‘Där hade man aldrig fått lära sig demokrati 
i västerländsk mening’ (PULS, 284).
18. ‘År 1948 blockerade Sovjetunionen västmakternas delar av Berlin för att 
försöka svälta ut området och sedan ta över. Västmakterna  – USA, 
Storbritannien och Frankrike – svarade med att låta en ström av plan, en 
luftbro, flyga in livsmedel och andra varor. Stalin måste vika sig och 
blockaden hävdes efter elva månader. Nu var förhållandet mellan 
Sovjetunionen och USA bottenfruset. Konflikten blev genom den ameri-
kanske journalisten Walter Lippman känd som Det kalla kriget’ (Levande 
historia, 378).
19. ‘Stalin ville göra Sovjet till världens starkaste land’ (SO.S., 10).
20. ‘Efter 1948 styrdes nästan hela Östeuropa från Moskva “gränserna bev-
akades stenhårt”, de som försökte fly stoppades eller sköts i flykten’ 
(PULS, 284).
21. ‘[…] sedan Sovjetunionen hade infört kommunismen i Östeuropa bör-
jade det kalla kriget’.
22. ‘[…] varje gång östeuropeiska folkens frihetsdrömmar av sovjetiska 
stridsvagnar’ (SO.S., 378).




24. ‘Att kommunistpolitikerna lyckades behålla makten berodde på att det 
inte fanns tillräckligt många människor i dessa länder som visste hur 
demokrati fungerade’ (SO.S., 379).
‘Ofta var de bönder, fattiga men arbetsamma som Karls Oskar och 
Kristina’.
‘Så föddes USA’, ‘[…] alla människor är skapade jämlika’, ‘[…] all 
makt utgå från folket, alla lagar ska godkännas av folkets 
representanter’.
‘Ofta var de bönder, fattiga men arbetsamma som Karls Oskar och 
Kristina’.
‘Så föddes USA’, ‘[…] alla människor är skapade jämlika’, ‘[…] all 
makt utgå från folket, alla lagar ska godkännas av folkets 
representanter’.
‘USA blev det land där fabrikerna tillverkade mest varor i hela världen. 
Massor av människor fick arbete och tjänade pengar’.
‘Var verkligen USA framtidslandet för alla?’ (Utkik, 167).
‘Tyckte alla i USA att det var det glada 20-talet?’ (Utkik, 229).
‘[…] ur krigets ruiner växer ett nytt Västeuropa fram, rikare än någon-
sin’ (SO.S., 304).
‘År 1947 kom USAs regering med ett hjälpprogram för det krigshär-
jade Europa. Den så kallade Marshallhjälpen innebar att Västeuropas 
länder fick nästan 13 miljarder dollar av USA. Amerikanerna ville få fart 
på Europas ekonomi, så att européerna skulle få råd att köpa saker från 
USA. Dessutom var amerikanerna rädda för att fattigdomen skulle göra 
att västeuropéerna började rösta på kommunistiska partier’ (SO.S., 304).
‘Ekonomiska intressen står över ideal om demokratins befriare’, ‘skylt 
på hot från kommunismen’ (PULS, 329).
‘Stora amerikanska företag äger mycket i Sydamerika’ (SO.S., 365).
‘[…] även om de var diktatorer. I land efter land togs makten över av 
USA-stödda militärregimer’ (SO.S., 365).
‘USAs mjölkko’.
‘Den 6 augusti sprängdes en atombomb över den japanska staden 
Hiroshima. 80000 dödades omedelbart, 70000 skadades och hela staden 
lades i aska. Tre dagar senare sprängdes ytterligare en atombomb över 
staden Nagasaki. Det är första och hitintills enda gången atombomber 
har använts i krig. Japan kapitulerade utan villkor. Andra världskriget var 
slut’ (Levande Historia, 365).
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‘Kvart i nio på morgonen den 6 augusti 1945 släpptes den första 
atombomben över den japanska staden Hiroshima. På några minuter 
dog 80000 människor. Tre dagar senare släpptes en ännu kraftigare 
bomb över staden Nagasaki. Dagen därpå var Japan berett att ge upp. 
Det andra världskriget var slut’ (SO.S., 283).
[Vietnamkriget] ‘[…] förstörde mycket av USAs goda rykte i världen’ 
[...] [det amerikanska folket tvingades inse att det egna landet] ‘hamnat 
på den “onda” sidan’ (SO.S., 342).
‘För många unga människor blev USAs krig i Vietnam en symbol för 
hur den rika världen försökte krossa ett fattigt folk som bara ville leva på 
sitt eget sätt’ (SO.S., 311).
‘[…] förbättrades den amerikanska ekonomin’ [och de svarta lyckades 
utbilda sig och kunde] ‘[…] arbeta sig upp i samhället’.
25. ‘Ofta var de bönder, fattiga men arbetsamma som Karls Oskar och 
Kristina’.
26. ‘Så föddes USA’, ‘[…] alla människor är skapade jämlika’, ‘[…] all makt 
utgå från folket, alla lagar ska godkännas av folkets representanter’.
27. ‘USA blev det land där fabrikerna tillverkade mest varor i hela världen. 
Massor av människor fick arbete och tjänade pengar’.
28. ‘Var verkligen USA framtidslandet för alla?’ (Utkik, 167).
29. ‘Tyckte alla i USA att det var det glada 20-talet?’ (Utkik, 229).
30. ‘en hysterisk häxjakt’ (PULS, 298).
31. ‘[…] ur krigets ruiner växer ett nytt Västeuropa fram, rikare än någonsin’ 
(SO.S., 304).
32. ‘År 1947 kom USAs regering med ett hjälpprogram för det krigshärjade 
Europa. Den så kallade Marshallhjälpen innebar att Västeuropas länder 
fick nästan 13 miljarder dollar av USA. Amerikanerna ville få fart på 
Europas ekonomi, så att européerna skulle få råd att köpa saker från 
USA. Dessutom var amerikanerna rädda för att fattigdomen skulle göra 
att västeuropéerna började rösta på kommunistiska partier’ (SO.S., 304).
33. ‘Ekonomiska intressen står över ideal om demokratins befriare’, ‘skylt på 
hot från kommunismen” (PULS, 329).
34. ‘Stora amerikanska företag äger mycket i Sydamerika’ (SO.S., 365).
35. ‘[…] även om de var diktatorer. I land efter land togs makten över av 
USA-stödda militärregimer’ (SO.S., 365).
36. ‘USAs mjölkko’.
37. ‘Den 6 augusti sprängdes en atombomb över den japanska staden 
Hiroshima. 80000 dödades omedelbart, 70000 skadades och hela staden 
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lades i aska. Tre dagar senare sprängdes ytterligare en atombomb över 
staden Nagasaki. Det är första och hitintills enda gången atombomber 
har använts i krig. Japan kapitulerade utan villkor. Andra världskriget var 
slut’ (Levande historia, 365).
38. [Vietnamkriget] ‘…förstörde mycket av USAs goda rykte i världen [...] 
[det amerikanska folket tvingades inse att det egna landet] hamnat på 
den “onda” sidan’ (SO.S., 342).
39. ‘Eftersom man hade svårt att skilja på “fiender” och “vänner” brände 
man ibland byar på måfå’ (Utkik, 271).
40. ‘För många unga människor blev USAs krig i Vietnam en symbol för hur 
den rika världen försökte krossa ett fattigt folk som bara ville leva på sitt 
eget sätt’ (SO.S., 311).
41. ‘[…]  förbättrades den amerikanska ekonomin [och de svarta lyckades 
utbilda sig och kunde]’ […] arbeta sig upp i samhället’.
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7
Images and Imaginings of the Cold 
War – with a Focus on the Swiss View
Markus Furrer
 Introduction
When remembering the Cold War it would be unusual to think immedi-
ately of the complex historical period between 1947 and 1991 with all its 
political entanglements and interdependencies. Rather, ideas associated 
with this period tend to be images of the atomic mushroom cloud, James 
Bond-esque chases, the border fortifications of the Iron Curtain, the 
Kremlin in Moscow, the scowling expressions of Soviet heads of state, 
parades and victory marches, scenarios from the Vietnam War or from 
mass demonstrations against the new arms resolution. These visual worlds 
vary strongly depending on the social origin of the individual and the 
generation to which the individual belongs. One’s own experience and 
knowledge acquired early on about the period overlap with impressions 
from items one has read, seen and/or heard at a later stage.
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The main argument of this chapter is that people think about the Cold 
War in terms of images, which vary according to the individual or 
 collectives to which an individual belongs, as well as to age group. But as 
a politico-ideological, economic, technological, scientific and socio- 
cultural conflict, which deeply marked the everyday lives of individuals 
and collectives (Stöver 2007, 309–313), this event especially encourages 
visual thinking. Some of the images associated with the Cold War are 
widespread, such as the image of the Berlin Wall, which holds a dual 
significance as a symbol of both the division of Germany in 1961 and its 
reunification in 1989. ‘The Fall of the Wall’ simultaneously evokes an 
image and serves to abbreviate the narrative. Indeed the term ‘Cold War’ 
as coined by American journalist Herbert Swope1 around 1947 implies in 
itself a lively pictorial imagining around a cold confrontation. The Cold 
War was a ‘war of cultures’, against the background of which entertain-
ment was used as a weapon on both sides in West and East (Stöver 2007, 
269). Contemporary media presented apocalyptic visions, which created 
historical imagery. The doomsday clock, for instance, suggesting a count-
down, stood metaphorically for a world inches away from the abyss.
Images of history are widely used in textbooks. Here they appear as 
fundamental interpretations in the authors' texts as well as in the illustra-
tions, conjuring up an imagined history in readers’ minds. This approach 
is inspired by Walter Benjamin's philosophy of history, which has visual 
thinking at its core (Weigel 1997; Buchbinder 2002, 15, 75) and con-
ceives of history as essentially reduced to a set of images (Benjamin 1980; 
Buchbinder 2002, 75–84). In this sense, history is always a construct, 
constituted in the present moment. For Benjamin, this means that we are 
loading a past devoid of meaning with the ‘here and now’ (Benjamin 
1980, 701). In other words, past and present intermingle in historical 
narration. As building blocks of history, images are removed from their 
original contexts and lent meaning and significance in and by the pres-
ent. Accordingly, how images might be manipulated and, consequently, 
how ‘true’ or ‘false’ the interpretations we make based on them are is of 
less concern here than the loading of historical images with relevance in 
and knowledge from the present (Furrer 2004, 104).
This is examined and exemplified in this chapter using the example of 
Swiss history textbooks and their representations of the Cold War. The 
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question arises as to how the conflict is portrayed in the post-Cold War 
phase, noting that Switzerland is a special case in this context, being a 
Western and neutral country in which anti-communism was rampant. 
The Cold War ultimately led to Swiss neutrality being accepted, some-
times even appreciated, in both East and West. Switzerland decided, with 
a certain reluctance, to abstain from arming itself with nuclear weapons 
and rather focus on civil defence. No other country in the world invested 
so much in the construction of bunkers or civil defence facilities. Historians 
speak of ‘total defence in a threatened small state’ (Tanner 1988, 59); 
indeed, during the Cold War decades, Swiss society was considered to be 
in a ‘state of emergency’ (Albrecht et al. 1988), which rendered the end of 
the conflict a dramatic event for the Swiss self-image. Within society itself, 
enemy concepts had to be questioned, and the neutral small state had to 
reorient itself in terms of foreign policy. This new point of departure also 
influenced the image of the Cold War as presented in textbooks.
This chapter will thus focus on such images in textbooks. History text-
books are particularly important sources since they convey an officially 
sanctioned version of history (depending on their country of origin) and 
thus evoke specific historical images in order to be accepted and recog-
nised. Dominant interpretations of the past find their way either intention-
ally or unwittingly into textbooks. But their authors also seek to reproduce 
official historical images, derived from research and embedded in memory 
culture (Furrer 2016, 280). The textbooks analysed in this chapter are 
aimed mainly at the secondary levels I and II in Switzerland; they were all 
produced and published after the Cold War and therefore reflect on the 
period before ‘the Fall of the Wall’ from a position of hindsight.
Historical images, especially when deployed in history textbooks, often 
allow authors to make interpretations on a macroscale by pairing the writ-
ten text with illustrations or photographs. The historical image underly-
ing the narrative becomes clearer, particularly in school history textbooks, 
which provide an overview of the period (Furrer, 117). As, however, they 
do not become historical images until they are accepted in the mind of 
the reader, their contours can also only be grasped through an analysis of 
textbook narratives. Whereas historians and social scientists explain the 
line of thought their narratives follow through the introduction of differ-
ent theories and well-formulated arguments, when  considering historical 
imagery in textbooks we must accept that we are mostly dealing 
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with abbreviations (Rüsen 2008, 19) or narrative reductions. Such reduc-
tions are highly symbolic and allow readers to imagine a kind of historical 
painting (Furrer 2013, 221).
In the first section of this chapter, I examine theoretical approaches 
towards historical imagery. I then explore these approaches with particu-
lar reference to how the Cold War is taught in Swiss schools. Consequently, 
using examples from Swiss history textbooks, I demonstrate how such 
historical imagery manifests itself at the level of history teaching. The 
questions the chapter aims to answer always relate to changes in visual 
thinking and the symbolic potential of different images, particularly 
focussing on the imagery which recurs when textbooks treat the immedi-
ate post-war phase of the Cold War.
 Theoretical Considerations on Historical 
Imagery
The term ‘image’ encompasses both an internal (image) as well as an 
external (picture) visual impression, so that both aspects are reflected in a 
single term (Boehm 2007, 11). This conceptual doubling illustrates how 
closely connected the visual imagination is to the form of expression and 
the perception of the physical image. It is thus mainly in the surplus of 
meaning which the image – painted or also only imagined – creates that 
it achieves its effect. Furthermore, since what is referred to as the ‘iconic 
turn’, scholars have also realised that knowledge becomes accessible not 
merely through language (Bachmann-Medick 2009, 351), but is rather 
shaped and produced by underlying images – a kind of visual thinking. 
Images actually stand for the dimension of ‘showing’ and are inherently 
strongly suggestive. Such image-active movements of thought can lead to 
the visual acts through which we create myths (Bachmann-Medick 
2009, 352).
If imagery creates narratives, then the reverse is also true: Narratives 
create actual visual worlds in our imagination by providing each individ-
ual with abstract, internal historical images. These are often employed in 
our everyday use of language in order to refer back to memory culture and 
to different interpretations of historical processes. This theory focusses on 
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the visual potency of language, which here becomes actual metaphorol-
ogy, to use Hans Blumenberg’s term (Boehm 2007, 44).
As historical images are thus always subject to trends and linked to the 
politics of history (Furrer 2013, 222), political debate focusses on the 
promises that narratives make to mobilise political forces and catalyse 
change. Thinking in images allows for the reduction of ambivalence in 
narratives, rendering superfluous fundamental justifications by reducing 
alternatives and thus easing decision-making (Rödder 2015, 298). 
Individuals interpret these images and search for meaning, even if this 
contradicts an accepted logic and evidence, in order to distinguish 
between fact and fiction (Hobsbawm 2002, 296).
Just as it is accessible through imagery in the present, the conflict was 
accessible for an audience in the forties through images and even image 
series, which both the movies and the spread of television in the fifties 
rendered possible. Thus, the Vietnam War became a ‘living room war’ 
(Paul 2004, 314). For the first time, mass media carried both a ‘hot’ 
proxy war and the Cold War into people’s homes and, consequently, the 
general public in the US criticised American involvement in the conflict. 
The images transmitted on television were too horrible to not have some 
sort of effect on the ordinary individual.
 Switzerland during and after the Cold War
According to Buomberger (2017, 20), the world was gradually slipping 
into the Cold War and for the Swiss people this meant an almost seamless 
transition from fearing National Socialism and Fascism to fearing the 
perceived threat of communism. The Cold War united Swiss society, cre-
ating a closed protective community which had not existed during the 
Second World War. The (marginal) Swiss communist party came under 
suspicion. Historians have argued that fierce anti-communist sentiment 
in Switzerland was barely less pronounced than in the McCarthyist US 
and that the Swiss could actually fall back on a longer tradition of anti- 
communism (Caillat et al. 2009). This policy lasted for the entirety of the 
Cold War period, even if there was a decline in the ‘structure-forming’ 
power derived from the East-West contrast (Ritzer 2015, 23). The feeling 
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that war was imminent, and could ignite at any moment like a spark in a 
powder keg, was widespread in Switzerland. The early post-war period 
was in particular marked by two basic characteristics – the Swiss people’s 
paralysing fear of the atomic bomb as well as the hope of better living 
conditions and a shared optimism about the progress of the country.
Historians also suggest that these hopes and fears in Switzerland were 
fed by the triangular relationship between consumption, the Cold War 
and consensus (Leimgruber 1992, 18–23). The economic boom made 
distribution issues and thus political consensus-building much easier. At 
the Swiss national exhibition, ‘Expo’, in Lausanne in 1964 the question 
as to how the country could survive in the event of a nuclear war was 
prominent. The exhibition suggested methods such as the ‘concrete 
hedgehog’ which demonstrated the people’s readiness to defend them-
selves. In the entrance area, the organisers of the exhibition displayed 
steel plates perforated by gunfire to show the destructiveness of war, 
juxtaposed with the ‘fortress Switzerland’ which suggested safety and 
security. A permanent readiness to defend oneself was therefore encour-
aged, as the exhibition sought to demonstrate that the small state was 
able to survive on its own (Furrer, 250). Intellectuals during this period 
were aware of the image of a ‘neurotic hedgehog’ (Künzli 1964), and the 
writer Max Frisch and historian von Salis, among others, complained 
about the narrow-mindedness of society and its ‘totalitarian tendencies’ 
(Furrer, 249). Switzerland built bunkers and, with the Hungarian crises 
in 1956, fortification-enhancement in Switzerland thrived all the more. 
No European country possessed more artillery guns (Auf der Maur 
2017, 99).
When analysing the Cold War it is important to both distinguish 
between ‘structure-forming’ dynamics and forms of expression as well as to 
look at their interactions. Obviously the political elite relied on the image 
of the Soviet Union as an enemy because it allowed them to practice a pas-
sive foreign policy in the shadow of the Western Alliance and simultane-
ously to pursue apparent autonomy through its domestic policy (Furrer, 
249). Switzerland was a stowaway of NATO, as Joëlle Kuntz aptly puts it 
(2014, 14). For Jakob Tanner, the Cold War consolidated the Swiss 
myth of sovereignty (2015, 305), which resonated with the Swiss public 
 M. Furrer
143
and, in foreign policy terms, allowed the country to integrate itself into the 
Western sphere in economic (if not political) terms. Anti-communist sen-
timent had a strong impact in Switzerland: The bourgeois and the reli-
gious, amongst others, saw the core values of Western civilisation as 
endangered. The Cold War and anti-communism thus created cohesion 
within a country which, as historians have pointed out, struggled with 
severe social tensions (Buomberger 2017, 22), as the majority of people 
suddenly shared a similar world view, one which distanced Switzerland 
from the perceived threat by demonising an external and internal enemy. 
The East-West dualism turned out to be very adaptable, incorporating clas-
sical constructs from the modern and pre-modern age which systematically 
included or excluded certain groups of people (Imhof et al. 1996, 177). In 
Switzerland, for instance, anti-Slavism was on the rise, demonstrating how 
the issue of race was treated in the country, and, on an ideological level, 
communism was often associated with images of a Marxist antichrist. At 
the same time, images of freedom and folklore bolstered Swiss nationalism, 
fuelling exclusion of the ‘other’. Such cultural codes created meaning and 
reinforced the effectiveness of anti- communist feeling in the country 
(Imhof et al. 1996, 177), turning it into a ‘creed’ (Buomberger 2017, 40 ff.).
Although the Cold War was not seen as a linear progression of events 
in Switzerland, this global conflict intensely and permanently impacted 
upon foreign and domestic policy: ‘The Cold War created the optimum 
conditions for the merging of nation and state’ (Furrer 1998, 110), ren-
dering the end of the conflict all the more disruptive in this regard. 
Switzerland now had to fundamentally reorient its worldview (Furrer, 
126) and thus confront its own history. Tanner and Weigel point out that 
each society views history in a way which it both deserves and can bear. 
History even becomes a causal factor in crisis-ridden phases of reorgan-
isation as the interpretation of the past can either engender change or 
consolidate already existing structures and beliefs (Tanner and Weigel 
2002, 20).
Central to this discourse was the question of whether Swiss neutrality, 
seen as a highly valuable state policy, should be maintained after the Cold 
War. It had only been temporarily rejected by the Communist Workers’ 
Party in the first few post-war years, and all political camps considered it 
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useful when making foreign policy decisions. Essentially, the Cold War 
shaped Switzerland’s self-conception as a country in which neutrality was 
highly (perhaps excessively) valued. The East-West divide led to a higher 
value being placed on the role and function of neutral states, services 
certainly employed by the Soviet Union, amongst others. In Switzerland, 
neutrality was never associated with a neutrality of political conviction 
but rather with a maxim of state foreign policy. It is not, therefore, sur-
prising that by the end of this global conflict questions as to the future 
political orientation of the country, including the issue of neutrality, were 
being raised.
Soon two camps had emerged: For one side the fixation on neutrality 
blocked future foreign policy actions, adding to an already negative image 
of an isolated, self-interested and introverted small state. Critics attacked 
Swiss ‘neutral morality’ during the Cold War (Furrer, 119f.), especially 
political abstinence and, at the same time, its intensive economic integra-
tion (Furrer, 126). Fearing that such a stance would prevent the develop-
ment of an open-minded country, this group demanded nothing less 
than a redefinition of neutrality (Kreis 2004, 367–368). However, some 
argued that the value of neutrality as a strategy had been proven during 
the Cold War: Switzerland’s exceptional position rendered it both capable 
of and also a beneficiary of a neutral stance, as a small state thus able to 
make full use of its sovereignty. In the context of the debate about 
Switzerland’s position towards Europe (and the European Union) and the 
world (e.g., towards the UN, of which Switzerland became a member in 
2002), this dispute over the value of neutrality was virulent. However, 
with new international and European crises from 2008 onwards the 
vehemence of the dispute has decreased.
 Historical Imagery in Swiss History Textbooks
History textbooks that have been reprinted in new editions or published 
for the first time since the end of the Cold War were thus presented with 
the essential challenge of how to present this conflict. Significant differ-
ences become apparent when comparing them with books from the Cold 
War era: The latter mostly relied on a traditional interpretation of 
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the Cold War, with imagery of a threatening Eastern superpower with its 
military machine. Arguments put forward in these textbooks were based 
on competing narratives about systems and ideologies, entirely in regards 
to ideas of progress. As a so-called ‘neutral’ state, Switzerland is generally 
not directly included in these narratives. The Cold War was thus consid-
ered an external event (Furrer 2016, 285). An exception occurs in the 
context of events between 1989 and 1991 – and only then in new narra-
tives. These narratives are equally underpinned by pictorial thinking, for 
which there are a number of reasons: On the one hand, they have only 
limited space available for their depictions of the past, not always suffi-
cient for an accurate historical analysis. On the other, the selection of 
content about the past takes place from the perspective of the present, 
charging these contents with the ‘now’ in the sense described by Walter 
Benjamin. In history didactics, the term ‘orientation towards the present’ 
is widely used for this purpose, in this context primarily in the sense of 
‘context of meaning’ (Pandel 2013, 333).
This analysis focuses on representations of Switzerland during the Cold 
War. While textbooks from the Cold War period hardly ever directly 
associate Switzerland with the conflict, since the end of the bipolar divide 
it has increasingly been portrayed as a country with a society that was also 
involved. Until the end of the Cold War, Switzerland appeared as a coun-
try practically untouched by the ‘Age of Catastrophe’ (Hobsbawm 1994, 
21), in a position to contemplate the world and Europe from the ‘balcon 
sur l’Europe’ (Pierre Béguin). For students in school, this had the peculiar 
effect that history generally took place outside the country (Furrer et al. 
2008, 11). It was not until new history textbooks came out in the 1990s 
that Switzerland and its society were linked to the Cold War, primarily 
via anti-communism, which at the time was widespread and vehement in 
Switzerland. Yet here too we find exceptions to the rule: Histoire générale 
contains no reference to Switzerland at all over some 20 pages on the 
Cold War (Histoire Générale 1999, 964–984). The end of ideological 
antagonism brought with it a self-critical glance back at mechanisms of 
exclusion, defamation and setbacks within society, images of anti- 
communist propaganda being among the most prominent. There are, 
however, also other pictorial references. Why is it specifically images we 
are examining here? Why and how do textbooks in particular convey 
7 Images and Imaginings of the Cold War – with a Focus… 
146
these? In many cases, complex historical facts are ‘reduced’, conveyed in 
a simple and mono-causal, yet highly memorable, fashion. Examining 
the pictorial character of these references illustrates how such portrayals 
are both highly selective and also target-group orientated, of only limited 
analytical value since the thought processes employed by historical 
research are barely recognisable. Images, as such, are highly conducive to 
the eclectic nature of many textbook portrayals. As Hans-Jürgen Pandel 
has put it, textbook texts tend to be enumerative rather than narrative 
(Pandel 2005, 37), and new teaching materials in particular tend to thus 
convey a selection of brief impressions of history.
If we analyse textbooks published between the 1990s and the present 
day, we are seeking, via images, fundamental interpretations underlying 
narratives on Switzerland in the Cold War. Four particular references link 
Switzerland and its society to the conflict: first, the image of anti- 
communist and hysterical Switzerland mentioned above, to be found in 
almost all teaching materials currently available. Threatening images also 
involve Switzerland in international conflicts, particularly via a wide-
spread triangular constellation of Switzerland and its society caught 
between economic boom, concordance democracy and the Cold War is 
particularly widespread. The image of the division and reunification of 
the continent, including Switzerland, is also used. While, at first glance, 
these images appear to have been selected at random, they are under-
pinned by time-bound discourses that guide the textbooks.
 The Image of ‘Hysterical Switzerland’
The textbook Die Schweiz und ihre Geschichte (Switzerland and its 
History), designed as supplementary material for upper secondary 
level, deals with ‘The Cold War in Switzerland?’ (note the question 
mark). A page and a half long, the section traces the inner-societal 
mood, characterised by a mentality of seclusion and distance: 
‘Switzerland came across as a spectator at a football match, fully com-
mitted to the team from the stands, but under no circumstances will-
ing to enter the playing field’ (Die Schweiz und ihre Geschichte 2005, 
170, all textbook translations by the author). This simile contains two 
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essential aspects: the neutral attitude towards the outside world and 
the anti-communism within Switzerland, directed particularly against 
the Soviet-friendly Swiss ‘Partei der Arbeit’ (=Communist Party), 
and – according to critical contemporaries of the time (Jean Rudolf 
von Salis) was taking on ‚hysterical proportions‘. The texts are supple-
mented by two images, a portrait of a Swiss communist, Edgar Woog 
(1898–1973), who described himself as a ‘proud Muscovite’, and a 
campaign placard of black rats nibbling on the white Swiss cross 
against a red background. The latter is from the mid-1960s, and was 
carried by the ‘campaign against trade with the East’.1 The textbook 
Menschen in Zeit und Raum (People through Time and Space) another 
example, dedicates a double page to the topic of Switzerland in the 
Cold War: the ‘Cold War within the Country’ is portrayed using the 
example of the 1956 Hungarian Uprising, which led to a large move-
ment in Switzerland calling for solidarity with the insurgents and the 
refugees, yet also to anti- communist sentiment. One photograph, for 
instance, shows refugees dangerously crossing a small river marking 
the boundary between Hungary and Austria. Another photograph 
depicts a vigil held in Berne after the suppression of the uprising, dem-
onstrating and lighting candles in solidarity (Menschen in Zeit und 
Raum 2005, 128–129). This strong involvement of Switzerland in the 
Cold War via anti-communism can be found today in almost all text-
books, including Gesellschaften im Wandel (Societies in Transition). 
The Cold War created a ‘climate of fear’ (2017, 102/03).
These references can be explained particularly well by the discourses 
and developments in Switzerland after the Cold War. The end of the 
conflict brought about a ‘Jahrhundertskandal’ (scandal of the century), 
when it became apparent in 1990 that the federal police had been regis-
tering anything that appeared ‘un-Swiss’ for fear of subversive tenden-
cies. Some 900 000 people and organisations had been subject to 
surveillance. Intellectuals, such as the writer Max Frisch, who were 
themselves affected, wrote of a ‘state gone bad’ and dramatist and painter 
Friedrich Dürrenmatt coined the image of ‘Switzerland as a prison in 
which the prisoners were also the guards. It was perhaps this scandal that 
opened the people’s eyes to the arbitrary nature of the surveillance and 
also the problematic nature of the anti-communist obsession (Tanner 
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2015, 471). Anti-communism thus becomes a metanarrative for 
Switzerland in the Cold War. The textbook Gesellschaften im Wandel fea-
tures a colour photograph of a 1990 demonstration in Berne against 
‘snooping Switzerland’ (Schnüffelstaat) with protesters carrying a banner 
with the slogan: ‘Sniff around  at your own arses’ (schnüffeln = spy/
snoop/sniff, Gesellschaften im Wandel 2017, 103).
 The Nuclear Threat: A Paradoxical Image
Another memorable image derives from the perception of a specific 
threat from the 1980s. In Weltgeschichte im Bild (World History in 
Pictures, 1990, 54–65), the idea of nuclear threat and imminent war is 
predominant and conveyed through imagery and photographs. In the 
chapter Welt zwischen Ost und West (The World between East and West), 
the topic is introduced by a quote from Arthur Koestler’s book of 1978, 
Janus: A Summing Up: ‘Since the day when the first atomic bomb out-
shone the sun over Hiroshima, mankind as a whole has had to live with 
the prospect of its extinction as a species’. (Weltgeschichte im Bild 1990, 
54). The events then mentioned in the textbook all follow on from the 
presentation of this particular threat. One of the pictures shows an 
American missile silo; in another we can see the building site for launch-
ing pads in Cuba, photographed by reconnaissance aircrafts (Weltgeschichte 
im Bild 1990, 56 and 58). The Vietnam War is directly connected with 
the Cold War in this textbook, which focusses on the ‘face of the war’ as 
it also uses photography (Weltgeschichte im Bild 1990, 69). In the final 
chapter on the topic, explanations of the peace movement and ‘peace as 
a goal’ follow with an excursus on the law of nations. The textbook refers 
to the peace movement which gained strength in Switzerland in the 
1980s, although it never found the same resonance as it did in the 
Federal Republic of Germany, against the background of the NATO 
Double- Track Decision, which triggered new arms dynamics and discus-
sions. However, the textbook consistently focusses on the perceived 
threat to Switzerland, as well as emphasising proposed solutions to the 
conflict, such as the peace movement. This textbook is the only one with 
such a succinct approach to this area of focus. Other textbooks pub-
lished between 1990 and 2000 hardly mention the nuclear threat at all 
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(e.g. Menschen in Zeit und Raum 2005, 116–131). It is striking how 
casually images of threatening scenarios are presented in other textbooks 
(e.g. Histoire générale 1994, Weltgeschichte 1993). This is particularly true 
of material on the Cold War, which generally ignores the threat of war 
against Switzerland. Alternatively, a kind of controllability is suggested, 
such as via the image of the American SDI Program (Strategic Defense 
Initiative), which illustrates how ‘attacking intercontinental missiles’ can 
be intercepted and safely destroyed using space satellites (Weltgeschichte 
1993, 290). Although the current textbook Gesellschaften im Wandel 
(2017, 99) does refer in more detail to the threat posed by nuclear weap-
ons, the threat itself remains an abstract one. A colour photograph shows 
the mushroom cloud over Nagasaki; however, there is no discussion of 
the dangers to which humankind was exposed.
While this can be explained, it is also paradoxical. While only a few 
years after the end of the bipolar conflict the feeling of an immediate 
nuclear threat was on the wane, it is paradoxical that, even during the 
Cold War, despite a widespread perception of the threat, it is rarely 
addressed in teaching materials. On the contrary, a nuclear clash is even 
considered non-life threatening thanks to the Swiss army and civil 
defence. In the midst of the Cold War, this was a message of serenity and 
assurance, also conveyed in the form of images, as in the voluminous 
popular science work by Peter Dürrenmat, which presents a full-page 
black and white photograph of four fighter jets flying in formation in 
front of a Swiss Alpine backdrop (Schweizer Geschichte 1963, 705). The 
paradoxical way in which fear was addressed only became of interest to 
historiography at a later stage. Thomas Buomberger recalls a society in 
the hedgehog position, sheltered in underground civil defence bunkers, 
ready to defend itself and prepared for emergencies, indignant for and 
helpful towards the Hungarian rebels and refugees, but also at the mercy 
of a hysterical surveillance state (Buomberger, 2017). Buomberger thus 
presents visual worlds from the perspective of the present which had, in 
fact, already been shaped by imagery from the period. For example, the 
public were exposed to contemporary photographs of the above- 
mentioned ‘concrete hedgehog’ at the Expo in Lausanne, of the defence 
minister in a military aircraft (showing the readiness of the small state for 
war) and the Swiss population organising aid packages for the insurgents 
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in Hungary in 1956. Others showed protest marches against trade with 
the East after the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961, the defence 
shelters and, at the end of the Cold War in 1989/90, the demonstrations 
against state surveillance (the latter also targeted the army, which some 
wished to slaughter symbolically as a ‘holy cow’).
 Switzerland in the Cold War between Boom 
and Concordance Democracy
No other Swiss textbook for lower secondary school is so strongly devoted 
to the subject of the Cold War, which runs as a guiding theme through 
the entire fourth volume of Durch Geschichte zur Gegenwart (1991). This 
book (To the Present via the Past) explains world affairs and the history 
of Switzerland, and provides interesting insights as to how Switzerland is 
embedded within the Cold War context, bringing together internal and 
external perceptions. The Cold War era is directly associated with the 
‘Swiss economic miracle’ and the continued development of Swiss con-
sensus and the concordance system, which in 1959 led to an all-party 
government that remained in its original constellation until 2003 (Durch 
Geschichte zur Gegenwart 1991, 69–73). This connection between the 
Cold War and the concordance system is also made by other textbooks. 
While it is a widespread idea, it has a highly associative effect, particularly 
where only few areas of overlap are apparent. In the Swiss history text-
book Schweizer Geschichte (History of Switzerland, 2008, 94–98), the 
Cold War is presented within a Swiss context using a double-page black 
and white photograph of demonstrators from 1956, pushing forwards in 
front of the Soviet embassy in Berne, monitored and held back by Swiss 
law enforcement in 1950s uniforms. The image conveyed is one of an 
active anti-communist Swiss population protesting during the Cold War 
and calling for the expulsion of the Russians from Hungary: ‘Down with 
the USSR!’ (Schweizer Geschichte 2008, 94). This depiction is then 
 followed in the textbook by mention of the Swiss concordance system. 
The Cold War thus becomes a kind of ‘sub-chapter’ of ‘The Concordance 
System’ (Schweizer Geschichte 2008, 96). The textbooks thus suggest a 
triangular association between ‘concordance, consumerism and the Cold 
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War’, very much in line with the vivid formula given prominence at the 
end of the conflict in the context of a ‘special case’ as presented in anni-
versary publications and exhibitions: a Switzerland between Réduit (the 
Swiss term for the National Redoubt, Alpine fortifications put in place 
during the Second World War) and Europe (see Leimgruber 1992, 23).
 The Image of Division and Reunification 
of the Continent
The textbook Menschen in Zeit und Raum dedicates several pages to the 
Cold War, presented as Welten im Kalten Krieg (Worlds in the Cold War, 
Menschen in Zeit und Raum 2005, 108–133). The narrative is no longer 
one of competition but instead one of separation (Furrer 216, 287), 
which allows for two kinds of pictorial representation. On the inside 
front cover of this textbook, a family contemplates the remains of the 
Berlin wall (Menschen in Zeit und Raum 2005, 108/09). The idea of sepa-
ration, ‘An iron curtain falls’ (Menschen in Zeit und Raum 2005, 117), 
recurs through imagery, becoming a major theme and means of interpre-
tation in the narrative.
The image of a now-reunified Europe, divided after the Second World 
War, also embodies a meta-narrative for the Cold War in this textbook. 
Switzerland is also indirectly involved: solidarity with the Hungarians 
during the 1956 uprising is discussed in relation to Switzerland, and 
‘everyday life in Communist Hungary’ is documented over a double page 
(Menschen in Zeit und Raum 2005, 120/21). The textbook Gesellschaften 
im Wandel (2017, 100/01) features two fictional stories about young peo-
ple in East and West Berlin, who in an interview describe the everyday 
lives of young people in the two systems with the theme ‘Two Worlds – 
One Friendship’. The image materials used all show the East: people 
queuing for bananas in front of a grocery store in 1985, and boys from 
the Freie Deutsche Jugend organisation, in action cleaning a water ditch. 
The division and reunification were highly significant European events, 
with direct relevance for the metaphor of the ‘European house’, given 
current status in the second half of the 1980s through the politics and 
rhetoric of Soviet party Secretary-General Mikhail Gorbachov (Kreis 
2012, 577).
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History textbooks mostly pick up on historico-cultural interpretations 
directly. Retrospective points of view of the Cold War are incorporated 
into their narratives and offer different methods of interpreting history. 
Since looking at history inevitably means connecting the past with the 
challenges of the future (Jeismann 2008, 34), these views find their way 
into textbooks and even popular science.
 Conclusion
Overall, it becomes apparent that the Cold War, to use the discourse of 
memory culture, is both remembered and perceived on the basis of visual 
thinking. This is particularly the case when references to the present are 
made. The Cold War is an epoch which survives in the deep structures of 
current political and social life (Greiner 2013, 9). It is precisely because 
the Cold War now has such a strong effect on the present that it contin-
ues to be intensely remembered and thus achieves a specific significance 
in memory culture, one that – as demonstrated in this chapter – is firmly 
informed by visual thinking. While such image-based conceptions may 
tend to be judgmental and emotive, they are also highly selective and lack 
analytical potential (Furrer 2013, 222), rather serving to provide simple 
arguments.
The image-based approaches have taken the example of current Swiss 
history textbooks portraying Switzerland during the Cold War era. If we 
analyse textbooks from this period, it becomes clear how Switzerland can 
be woven into international events with only a few points of contact: the 
anti-communist hysteria and the idea of a country caught between con-
sumption, consensus and the Cold War. Both these images are widely 
used, in almost all textbooks from the 1990s. Conceptions of threat also 
feature in retrospective portrayals, as does the image of the divided and – 
after 1989 – reunified continent. While these images are to be found in 
specific textbooks, all textbooks have clearly grown from current dis-
courses and challenges. They offer highly selective portrayals with which 
to grasp and interpret the complex events of the Cold War era.
History teaching is faced with challenges in dealing with such a soci-
etally as well as politically loaded era of contemporary history. As the 
 M. Furrer
153
references to visual thinking exemplify, clear tendencies can be recognised 
in society and politics but also in teaching ‘lessons’ from history, raising 
the ‘moral index finger’. Yet rarely do these authors point out how the 
past continues to impact the present, or highlight the potential of histori-
cal events, a deficit related to the function and use of history in society. 
The British-Australian historian Christopher Clark said in an interview 
that history was no schoolmaster but rather resembled the Oracle of 
Delphi. Indeed, image conceptions do appear to resemble an oracle, par-
ticularly in relation to the Cold War, a period remembered primarily in 
pictorial terms. As history now provides the only learning material at our 
disposal, it is important to ensure that not only educated elites have access 
to this knowledge by deconstructing the flood of images, analysing them 
as history with a specific purpose, and at the same time remaining aware 
of the complex structures of historical processes.
Notes
1. The term ‘Cold War’ had already been used by George Orwell in an essay 
of 1945 to describe the confrontation of the superpowers. The journalist 
Herbert Swope introduced the term in a speech he wrote for the American 
political advisor Bernard Baruch in 1947. The term was then popularised 
by the American journalist Walter Lippmann.
2. The Swiss Reconnaissance Service (Schweizerische Aufklärungsdienst, SAD) 
was founded in Zurich in 1947 when the onset of the Cold War appeared 
imminent. It became the most important organisation of the anti-com-
munist Geistige Landesverteidigung (Spiritual National Defence). The 
activities of the SAD reached their peak at the beginning of the 1960s 
with campaigns against trade with the East as well as sport-related and 
cultural activities with communist states.
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Between Non-human and Individual 
Agents: The Attribution of Agency 
in Chapters on the Cold War in Flemish 
History Textbooks
Karel Van Nieuwenhuyse
‘Yes we can!’ was the chant American presidential candidate Barack 
Obama used during his campaign of 2008, referring to the power of 
ordinary people to shape society and determine its direction. These words 
indicated that ordinary citizens are not just the passive playthings of 
anonymous power structures or higher powers within the Washington 
bureaucracy. In short, the chant, which has since become legendary, 
revealed the agency of ordinary people. Agency can be defined as ‘the 
ability to act on decisions in order to bring about desired goals (whether 
those involve changing aspects of society or conserving them)’ (Barton 
2012, 132). The concept of agency is very important when thinking 
about society, be it in the present or past. Key questions historians ask 
about past societies are: Who has agency in society? Who co-determines 
the course of society? Who can make a difference in society? Who has the 
ability to bring about change over time? How do social, institutional and 
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cultural structures interact with the agency of individuals and/or groups? 
Over the past two centuries, historians have come up with different 
answers to these pressing questions (Seixas 2012).
Some historians have located agency especially in the hands of ‘great 
men’. Thomas Carlyle’s lectures On Heroes, Hero-Worship and the Heroic 
in History (1841) provide us with classic examples of this tendency. Other 
historians, at least in the positivist tradition, have searched for historical 
patterns and pointed to non-human actors, structures and comprehensive 
systems as agents of change or continuity, such as nations, international 
alliances, religious denominations or ideological systems, or they have 
focussed on ordinary people and/or on groups previously considered rela-
tively powerless. Some scholars have also cast doubt on the notion of 
agency. The philosopher Charles Taylor (1989), for instance, relates 
agency to the era of modernity and the rise of individualism: In his opin-
ion, agency cannot be a transhistorical category but rather constitutes a 
particular analytical lens for a particular time (modernity). Poststructuralists 
question the concept of agency altogether, since they consider individuals 
to be ‘constructs mediated by and/or grounded on a social discourse 
beyond (way beyond) individual control’ (Alcoff 1994, 103).
A pertinent and interesting critique of historians who attribute agency 
to nations and point to agents like ‘the United States’, ‘the Germans’ or 
‘the Russians’ has been formulated by Tara Zahra, who writes about 
transnational and comparative approaches to the history of modern 
(Central and Eastern) Europe (2010). Zahra opposes the automatic 
assignment of membership within a national community and reproaches 
many scholars for not questioning the resonance of nationalist claims and 
‘imagined communities’. In this respect, she proposes the concept of 
‘national indifference’, referring to (groups of ) people expressing a com-
plete indifference towards (belonging to) the nation. She argues:
Even as historians assert that national groups are imagined communities, 
they have continued to write the history of Eastern Europe in particular 
with national groups in starring roles, analysing relations between ‘the 
Czechs’, ‘the Germans’, ‘the Poles’, ‘the Slovenes’, as though these collec-
tives were self-evident entities. [...] It may be time, in short, to move 
beyond imagined communities and to consider the history of individuals 
who stood outside or on the margins of those communities. (Zahra 2010, 97)
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Zahra emphasises the danger of using terms like ‘the Americans’, terms 
which suggest that individuals have to belong to groups and that national 
groups in particular are coherent social agents, opposing the homogenisa-
tion of national groups and the erasure of individual agency.
In history education, questions about and reflections on agency are also 
very important, not only for the students’ understanding of (the course 
of ) history, but also because of their pedagogical implications: Scholars 
are convinced that history education can aid pupils in developing active 
citizenship because it fosters agency and encourages students to see that 
the present is not merely determined by the past, but, on the contrary, 
that change and alternatives are possible, rendering civic engagement 
worthwhile (Harris 2011; Wilschut 2012; Wilschut et al. 2013). In this 
respect, however, Peck, Poyntz and Seixas argue that the focus of agency 
should actually be on ordinary people, so students can understand that ‘if 
ordinary people participated actively in making the world in the past, 
then too, ordinary people in the present have an important potential for 
effecting historical change’ (2011, 256). Barton agrees with this line of 
reasoning (2012). He argues that in order to be better prepared to think 
about their own role in present and future society, students need exposure 
to a wide range of historical actors, much wider than has traditionally 
been found in the school subject of history. At the same time, students 
need to consider the societal factors that enabled or constrained individ-
ual and group actions, as well as the diversity of perspectives and behav-
iours of people in the past. In line with Zahra’s argument (2010), another 
reason to pay attention to a wide range of historical actors in history edu-
cation is that this can help students consider and build their own identi-
ties. If agency is mostly attributed to nations and national groups, it seems 
as if a national identity is inescapable, as if students themselves do not 
have the agency or liberty to construct and define their own identities.
The attribution of agency also relates to the specific historical represen-
tation of the Cold War that history textbooks pass on to young people. 
This determines which groups are considered the main protagonists and 
which are rather portrayed as passive participants who do not play active 
roles in the conflict. In this respect, it is always important to examine how 
the role and agency of one’s own country is represented, as well as the 
extent to which this agency is portrayed in a positive way; these aspects 
can be connected to the identity-building aims of history education.
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The concept of agency in history education, and specifically how it is 
approached in textbooks and by teachers in their daily classroom prac-
tice, has not been examined thoroughly (Seixas 2012). Research into how 
history is approached in secondary schools, according to the demands of 
the curriculum, and into the textbooks used shows that a ‘social science’ 
vision of history as a discipline often prevails: Textbooks pay particular 
attention to non-human actors, large social processes and structures 
rather than to individuals and ordinary people (Erdmann and Hasberg 
2011). This seems to indicate that structural entities possess greater 
capacity for agency than any individual does. As a result, students often 
attribute (non-human) agency to societal institutions (nations, interna-
tional alliances and religious denominations) or ideas and movements 
(such as communism, capitalism and nationalism), assigning them 
human characteristics (Clark 2013; Ibid. 2014; Ibid. et  al. 2011). 
Students consequently do not fully understand the role of agency in his-
tory; nor do they construct a balanced account of the relationship between 
these structural forces and the actors in historical events or fully grasp the 
role individuals and ordinary people can play in society.
This chapter focusses on the concept of agency as taught in history les-
sons in secondary schools in Flanders, whilst analysing chapters about the 
Cold War – meaning the state of political and military tension after the 
Second World War between the Soviet Union and its satellite states (the 
Eastern bloc) and the United States and its allies (the Western bloc) – in 
four history textbooks. Questions guiding my research and analysis are as 
follows: (1) To whom is agency ascribed and who remains a passive par-
ticipant, i.e. is agency attributed especially to structures, institutions, 
nations, elite persons and/or ordinary men and women? Are the text-
books’ ‘own’ country and population, Belgium and Belgians, attributed 
agency? And in attributing agency, do the textbook authors reflect on the 
concept of agency? (2) Who is held responsible for the Cold War? Whose 
responsibility is amplified and whose is mitigated? In this respect, with 
which historiographical school do the authors of each of these textbooks 
align themselves? (3) Do the textbooks pass moral judgment on agents 
and/or actions taken during the Cold War? Whose actions are constructed 
as being reasonable or necessary? What attitudes do the authors of these 
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textbooks adopt towards the Western and Eastern blocs? It is difficult, 
perhaps impossible, to discern moral judgment; often the line between 
historical description and moral judgment is rather thin. Is describing 
Stalin as a dictator, for instance, depicting his leadership accurately or 
casting him in a negative light? The same question applies to the example 
of American ‘interference’ in Latin America, which will be addressed in 
more detail in the following.
The analysis examines the four textbooks from a comparative perspec-
tive, with a particular interest in the level of coherence within each text-
book. The chapter first sketches the research context and methodology 
before presenting the findings.
 Research Context and Methodology
In 1989, power in regards to education in Belgium was formally trans-
ferred from the national, federal level to the three Belgian ‘communities’: 
the Dutch (Flemish), French and (very small) German communities. In 
1990, a new secondary-school curriculum was introduced in Flanders, 
the northern, Dutch-speaking part of Belgium. This curriculum is still 
used. The Flemish government set final objectives or standards for teach-
ing history, delineating the minimum attainment targets that history stu-
dents should achieve. In defining these standards, a deliberate choice was 
made not to present an extensive enumeration of the historical knowl-
edge that students would be required to learn (Flemish Ministry of 
Education and Training, 2000a; ibid. 2000b). The history curriculum 
primarily aims to develop critical thinking skills and attitudes, namely 
historical consciousness. Flemish history education is characterised by a 
very structural approach to the past, based on the social sciences (Wils 
2009): It searches for large, underlying patterns in the past. It is no coin-
cidence that the standards, for instance, (implicitly) refer to Fernand 
Braudel’s ideas about history. They address what Braudel calls ‘medium- 
term’ or cyclical history, focussing on empires, civilisations, the economy, 
and social groupings (1949). This approach to studying the past results in 
large, abstract narratives in which there is little room for the individual’s 
own narrative, thoughts and actions.
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An important goal of history education is the construction of a histori-
cal frame of reference in students’ minds. The main frame of reference in 
Flemish history education is Western (especially Western European), 
although students are explicitly encouraged to frame historical phenom-
ena in a broader, worldwide context. The standards require, for instance, 
that in each of the three stages of teaching history at secondary level, the 
history of at least one non-Western society is addressed. Nevertheless, the 
history curriculum remains oriented towards the West, suggesting that 
this is the most important focus of history and emphasising Europe and 
the Western World’s slow but steady rise towards human rights, democ-
racy and freedom (Van Nieuwenhuyse and Wils 2015).
The ways in which history education is given shape by actual classroom 
practice, however, is not only determined or influenced by standards; 
textbooks also play a role. It is important to note that the government 
does not regulate the production and distribution of textbooks in 
Flanders. Therefore, publishers have great freedom when it comes to 
designing their history textbooks, although they claim to base them on 
the curricular standards. Indeed, similar to the standards, the underlying 
narrative in Flemish history textbooks is a Western-oriented, liberal nar-
rative of progress, as Bert Vanhulle has shown (2005; 2009).
This research examines the chapters on Cold War history in all Flemish 
history textbooks for general secondary school education for the twelfth 
grade, since this is when students study the post-war period. More spe-
cifically, my analysis looks at the textbooks Historia 6 (De Deygere et al. 
2009), Storia 6 (Bekers et al. 2009), Passages: Na de Tweede Wereldoorlog 
(Draye et al. 2010), henceforth: Passages, and Pionier 6 (Smeulders et al. 
2014).Given the relatively small market for secondary school history 
textbooks, the profit and investment margins for these works are gener-
ally not very broad. This means that the authors of most textbooks are 
not professional (academic) historians; instead, textbooks are usually 
written by history teachers who take on the task on top of their teaching 
duties. Another consequence is that new textbooks often build on pre-
ceding versions and seldom start with a clean slate. This applies to Historia 
6 and Storia 6, two textbooks written by secondary school history teach-
ers. Passages and Pionier 6 are both entirely new. Whilst Pionier is also 
written by secondary school history teachers, Passages is the only history 
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textbook in Flanders written and supervised by academic cultural histo-
rians; indeed, the explicit goal of the editing team was to contextualise 
the textbook account within academic historiography.
This study applied both a qualitative narrative content analysis and a 
discourse analysis to the textbooks. The narrative content analysis entailed 
examining the representation of the Cold War as embedded in the text-
book narrative as a whole, because only as part of a whole does a specific 
section take on significance (Vanhulle, 2009). In order to analyse the con-
cept of agency in each of the textbook chapters on the Cold War, I designed 
a coding scheme of categories of (human and non-human) agents, starting 
from a grounded theory approach, which relied on close reading and data 
analysis rather than theoretical frameworks. A distinction was made 
between actors who were attributed agency and entities assigned to a more 
passive role. I chose ‘utterances’ as the unit of analysis, defined as ‘a phrase 
or a sentence that included a mention of a historical agent, or a pronoun 
referring to one’ (Peck et al. 2011, 262). One utterance could consist of 
consecutive sentences if they were all about the same historical agent or 
entity. Searching for specific representations of the main agents and actors 
of the Cold War (and their presumed responsibilities), the discourse anal-
ysis focussed on the verbs used to describe the actions of both Soviets and 
Americans, as well as on keywords used about them.
 Research Results
 General (Descriptive) Findings
The Cold War is addressed in history textbooks for the twelfth grade, 
which deal with the post-war period. This means that, according to the 
textbook authors, the Cold War only began after the end of the Second 
World War. Historians, however, disagree on when the Cold War com-
menced. While many refer to the years between 1945 and 1947 as the 
start, others, such as the French historian André Fontaine or the Belgian 
historian Yvan Vanden Berghe, refer to points as early as the Russian 
Revolution of 1917 (2006; 2008). The textbooks Historia and Storia 
seem to implicitly reference this historiographical debate, since they both 
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begin paragraphs on ‘The Origin of the Cold War’ with reference to 
1917. At the same time, in the general introductions, the authors of both 
textbooks state that after the Second World War, relations between the 
United States and the Soviet Union worsened, resulting in an ideological 
battle and the beginning of the Cold War.
The four twelfth-grade textbooks under study arrange their content 
differently. While Historia and Pionier start from a chronological division 
into two main periods – 1945 to 1989 or 1991 (the period of ‘the Cold 
War’, with capitals) and 1989 and 1991 to present – Storia and Passages 
apply a thematic division. The former uses a rather straightforward, con-
crete, content-based division, starting with a chapter on the Cold War 
and subsequently proceeding to other themes such as European history, 
Belgian history, evolutions in science and technology, and different world 
views. The latter identifies five more abstract themes: ‘war’, ‘labour’, ‘peo-
ple and nation’, ‘nature’, ‘the individual’. All the textbooks start with 
political issues, then proceed to economics and end with socio-cultural 
issues. Political and economic themes occupy the lion’s share of the text-
book content: 91 per cent of all content in Historia and Pionier, 74 per 
cent in Storia and 60 per cent in Passages. Socio-cultural themes are thus 
addressed in much less detail, with almost no attention paid to the daily 
lives of ordinary people. These findings confirm what previous studies 
have shown about current, structurally informed approaches to the past, 
with influence from the social sciences, in Flemish history education, 
focusing on large structures rather than individuals. The international 
(especially Western) orientation of these textbooks is reflected when we 
compare the number of pages devoted to national and international 
issues. In each, just 13 per cent to 23 per cent of the whole is reserved for 
national, Belgian history. While Historia and Pionier focus especially on 
the East-West gap, Passages and Storia pay equal attention to both the 
East-West and the North-South divide. Differences among the textbooks 
also arise regarding the weight given to the two main time periods in the 
post-war era, namely 1945 to 1989 or 1991 and 1989 or 1991 to the 
present. While Storia and Passages (85 per cent of all content) and, to a 
lesser extent, Pionier (68 per cent of all content) mainly focus on the 




The Cold War itself is also addressed on a different scale in the four text-
books, as the table shows. In general, the Cold War does not receive the 
most attention. While it is considered an important issue, it is nevertheless 
merely one among many others, such as the European unification process, 
the federalisation of Belgium, decolonisation, the Israeli- Palestinian con-
flict, environmental problems, and cultural changes in the West after 1945. 
All four textbooks deal with the Cold War in a purely international context. 
The ramifications of the Cold War in Belgium are not addressed. A telling 
example in this respect is the historical source included in the textbook 
Storia, which is an excerpt from the Belgian communist newspaper De 
Rode Vaan, from 4 July 1948, with the following headline: ‘Spaak Signs the 
Bilateral Agreement that Surrenders Belgium to the Americans’ (40). The 
article refers to the agreement that Paul-Henri Spaak, the Belgian minister 
for foreign affairs, signed regarding the conditions for Belgium to receive 
Marshall aid. The only question accompanying the source is: ‘Has the 
Marshall Plan been received in a positive way everywhere in Europe? 
Discuss the reasons for your answer’. The question shows that the source 
has not been included to highlight the impact of the Cold War on specifi-
cally Belgium, such as the political tensions it caused between different 
parties. Instead, the focus is on Western Europe, illustrating a very Western 
and (Western) European orientation of history education in Flanders. This 
approach to the past is also reflected in the chapters on the Cold War: The 
accounts focus especially on political and economic aspects, placing far less 
to (almost) no emphasis on culture, especially everyday life.
Table 8.1 Overview of the Main Chronological, Geographical and Content- 
related Points of Focus in Four Textbooks
Total 
number of 

































Historia 205 pp. (A4) 51% vs. 49% 87% vs. 13% 71% vs. 29% 91% vs. 9%
Passages 140 pp. (A4) 89% vs. 11% 86% vs. 14% 42% vs. 48% 60% vs. 40%
Pionier 345 pp. (B5) 68% vs. 32% 77% vs. 23% 75% vs. 25% 91% vs. 9%
Storia 173 pp. (A4) 85% vs. 15% 82% vs. 18% 48% vs. 52% 74% vs. 26%
8 Between Non-human and Individual Agents: The Attribution… 
168
An exception in this respect is the textbook Passages – not coincidentally 
written by academic cultural historians. The authors of Passages, and to a 
lesser extent those of Pionier, do address the influence of the Cold War on 
ordinary people, by including testimonies about how their lives were 
affected, for instance, or photographs of a nuclear attack drill in an American 
school in 1951. Passages also argues that the Cold War was fought not only 
on a political and economic level but also on a cultural level. Its authors 
elaborate, for instance, on how the Cold War affected sports and space policies.
Despite some differences, the main political and economic account of 
the Cold War is largely the same in all four textbooks. For the period from 
the 1940s to the 1950s, all textbooks address the origins of the Cold War, 
the American containment policy (related to the Truman Doctrine of 1947 
and the Marshall Plan of 1947 to 1952), the establishment of Comecon 
(1949), the division of Europe and the Berlin Blockade (1948–49), the 
Korean War (1950–53), the establishment of the military alliances NATO 
(1949) and Warsaw Pact (1955), the temporary détente and co-existence 
policy of the 1950s, as well as the 1950s uprisings in the Eastern Bloc, at 
least in the GDR in 1953 and Hungary in 1956. The Polish uprising of 
1956 is mentioned only in Historia and Pionier. Only Pionier mentions 
McCarthy and his ‘witch hunt’ in the United States in the early 1950s. The 
existence of Gulags in the Soviet Union is not mentioned in any of these 
four twelfth-grade textbooks. This is striking because all four corresponding 
textbooks for the eleventh grade, which cover material from around 1750 
to 1945 and thus also the inter-war period, do include the Soviet Gulags.
Table 8.2 The Treatment of the Cold War in the Four Textbooks
Total 
number of 
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Historia 205 pp. (A4) 14 pp. 7% 100% vs. 0% 100% vs. 0%
Passages 140 pp. (A4) 14 pp. 10% 100% vs. 0% 64% vs. 36%
Pionier 345 pp. (B5) 47 pp. 14% 100% vs. 0% 87% vs. 13%
Storia 173 pp. (A4) 17 pp. 10% 100% vs. 0% 100% vs. 0%
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All textbooks, however, address the building of the Berlin Wall (1961), 
the Sino-Soviet split (1961), the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), the thaw 
under Khrushchev, the escalation of the Vietnam War (1965 to 1973), 
the uprisings in the Eastern Bloc (1960s to 1970s), especially in 
Czechoslovakia (1968), American interference in Latin America, Asia 
and sub-Saharan Africa (1950s to 1980s), the Brezhnev Doctrine, the 
Ostpolitik of Willy Brandt and the SALT (1971 to 1972) and the Helsinki 
agreements (1975). Again, small differences emerge. Historia, for instance, 
does not mention that the removal of nuclear missiles from Turkey by the 
United States and NATO was part of the deal between Khrushchev and 
Kennedy in order for the latter to secure the withdrawal of Soviet nuclear 
missiles from Cuba. Passages is the only textbook to mention that the 
American nuclear missiles in Italy were also included in this deal. A 
marked difference arises from Storia’s account of American interference 
in different parts of the world from the 1950s onwards. While the three 
other textbooks clearly address this topic and provide one or more exam-
ples (from Iran, El Salvador, Chile or Guatemala), Storia hardly mentions 
American interference. In their accounts of the Cold War during the 
1980s, all textbooks touch on the renewed confrontation policy, the arms 
race and the MAD doctrine, new uprisings (especially in Poland in 1980), 
the war in Afghanistan, the new détente (with Gorbachev), the fall of the 
Berlin Wall, the end of communism in Eastern Europe and the implosion 
of the Soviet Union.
Two other important phenomena and developments from the Cold 
War period (1945 or 1947 to 1989 or 1991), the European unification 
process and the expansion of the welfare state, are dealt with in all text-
books in a specific and separate (sub)chapter. The Israeli-Palestinian con-
flict and other developments in the Middle East are only partly framed 
within the Cold War context; they are also connected to global democ-
racy, emancipation and decolonisation and, therefore, to the North- 
South divide as well. Decolonisation itself is addressed in a separate 
chapter, only tangentially connected to the Cold War context. The 
accounts on decolonisation in all four textbooks are rather general; they 
don’t elaborate on one case in depth although some specific attention is 
paid to the decolonisation of India, the Congo, the Dutch East Indies 
and Ethiopia.
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 The Attribution of Agency throughout the Cold War
Three categories of agency and agents can be discerned in the four text-
books examined. In the first and most common category, non-human 
agency prevails. The textbook authors situate agency in the Cold War first 
and foremost in the hands of the United States and the Soviet Union 
rather than to people, factions, groups or institutions within each of the 
countries (such as secret intelligence agencies such as the KGB or CIA, 
the military-industrial complex or hawks in government circles). 
Sometimes the terms ‘United States’ and ‘Soviet Union’ seem inter-
changeable with ‘capitalism’ and ‘communism’, respectively, also 
 non- human actors. Historia, for instance, states: ‘In the opinion of the 
United States, communism on the march had to be contained’ (25).
The second category does include human agency, here attributed, if 
much less frequently, to individuals from both camps in the Cold War. 
Above all, the agents are ‘great’, white men, notably the leaders of the 
United States and the Soviet Union, such as Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, 
Reagan, Stalin, Khrushchev and Gorbachev. Passages and Storia differ to a 
certain extent, because they also attribute agency to other individuals, 
either to the leaders of other countries (such as Tito, Castro or Thatcher) or 
opposition leaders (such as Lech Walesa). The roles of ordinary people are 
not mentioned. In this second category, there seems to be little difference 
in the amount of emphasis placed on human agency within both blocs.
Three of the four textbooks also attribute agency beyond the two super-
powers and ‘great men’. With the exception of Historia, all mention certain 
countries and groups as active agents. They mention countries belonging to 
one of the two camps and ‘Third World’ countries, as well as groups such 
as labourers, intellectuals, students (sometimes mentioned together, their 
actions characterised as protest movements), public opinion, the people, 
the army or political parties. Although these are mostly mentioned as pas-
sive entities, they are nevertheless attributed some agency in the context of 
certain events, especially towards the end of the Cold War. ‘The people’, for 
instance, along with the protest movements of students and labourers, are 
ascribed an important role in the fall of communism in Eastern Europe at 
the end of the 1980s and in the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. In 
some cases, the stress is placed on ‘multi-staged’ agency: Only when 
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approved by a superpower could a country or group start to roll out a cer-
tain policy. Passages, for example, writes that the vassal states of Eastern 
Europe dealt with their internal affairs themselves from the mid-1980s 
onwards once this had been approved by Gorbachev. Storia mentions that 
the communist political parties in Eastern Europe applied a specific strat-
egy in order to seize power, but were nevertheless subject to the orders of 
the Soviet Union. Again, the authors of the four textbooks vary just as 
much for the Eastern as for the Western bloc in this third category.
In view of these three categories of agents and agency, to what extent do 
the twelfth-grade history textbooks represent the superpowers as homoge-
neous entities, and how much weight do they give to alternative voices? 
While Historia does not pay much attention to opposition within each of 
the power blocs, Passages, Pionier and Storia do. Passages states: ‘Both power 
blocs were less homogeneous than they seemed at first sight’ (14-15). The 
textbook explains, for instance, that different opinions existed within each 
bloc on how to deal with the opponents of the other bloc. When describing 
the détente after the Cuban Missile Crisis in the early 1960s, Storia states 
that not everyone in the United States was happy with this new policy (35). 
Pionier mentions that the people on both sides of the Iron Curtain disliked 
the new arms race at the beginning of the 1980s and organised several 
protests (94). Counter-voices, nevertheless, are introduced mostly in the 
(primary) sources accompanying the learning texts. While Passages presents 
counter voices within both camps (for instance, a Catholic priest receiving 
someone’s confession at the shipyard of Gdansk or people in New York 
demonstrating against the arms race in 1961, 15), Pionier solely focusses 
on counter-voices within the Western camp. Storia, by contrast, does the 
opposite and offers only alternative voices from the Eastern bloc (46-48).
In examining the agency attributed by the textbook authors, it is 
important to analyse not only who is attributed agency but also who is 
not and even to analyse which groups are silenced in their accounts. All 
four textbooks’ accounts of the Cold War are characterised by an abstract 
approach. The actual ordinary individual is almost completely ignored. In 
rare exceptions to this rule, he/she can be seen in a visual primary source 
included in the textbook, either as a passive victim of a proxy war (such as 
Kim Phuc in the iconic photograph showing the consequences of bom-
barding a Vietnamese village) or as a protester against the arms race. 
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Women are also completely silenced by these textbooks. Only in the 
learning text of one book, Passages, is one woman mentioned and attrib-
uted agency: Margaret Thatcher. Storia mentions the role of Mr and Mrs 
Ceaușescu in Romania (yet focusses on the husband’s role) and Pionier 
notes the alleged role of Mr and Mrs Rosenberg in the espionage scandal 
in the United States in the 1940s and early 1950s. Neither Belgium nor 
any Belgians are mentioned in any textbook, and thus they are not 
 attributed any agency. When considered in comparison with an interna-
tional perspective, this might seem surprising; in the Flemish context, 
however, it reflects established trends. Once again, the textbooks illustrate 
the very (Western) European orientation of Flemish history education 
and the absence of attention to the learners’ ‘own’ specific national past.
Textbook authors, furthermore, do not explicitly reflect on the con-
cept of agency in the Cold War. They do not clearly address, for 
instance, to what extent ordinary people as a group and ordinary indi-
viduals were or were not passive playthings in the hands of superpow-
ers. Nor do they instigate explicit reflection about how much agency 
the countries of a certain camp had vis-à-vis the superpower above 
them or raise questions about the relations between the people and the 
upper class or even within the upper class. The concept of agency itself, 
with all its complexities, remains below the surface of the text-
books’ accounts.
 Attribution of Agency and Responsibility 
for the Outbreak (and Continuation) of the Cold War
Another issue only implicitly touched upon by some of the textbooks is 
the question of responsibility for the Cold War. Since the 1950s, histori-
ans have sharply disagreed in this area. Soviet historiography, under cen-
tral control, argued that responsibility lay with the West, while in the 
United States the ‘orthodox’ school blamed the Soviet Union and its 
expansion into Eastern Europe. In the 1960s and 1970s, however, revi-
sionist scholars in the West started to challenge the widely accepted 
‘orthodox’ view and considered the United States largely responsible for 
the Cold War. From the 1970s onwards, a third, post-revisionist school 
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emerged among historians, which saw the Cold War as the result of pre-
dictable tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union, pow-
ers which had been suspicious of one another for many decades (Westad 
2000; Vanden Berghe 2008).
First it should be stressed that none of the textbooks analysed here pay 
much attention to the origins of the Cold War. Each of the Flemish his-
tory textbooks spends only one to two paragraphs (half a page to one 
page) on this subject. Of the four textbooks, only two explicitly deal with 
the question of responsibility for the outbreak and continuation of the 
Cold War. While Pionier raises the question of whether or not it is pos-
sible to identify a culprit, Storia refers to the existing historiographical 
debate, stating:
To date, historians still discuss whether or not the fear of communist 
expansion was justified, and to what extent Western leaders were honest in 
their statements. The orthodox school passes responsibility for the Cold 
War entirely onto the Soviet Union and its aggressive post-war politics. The 
United States, it says, did nothing but react appropriately and rightly. 
Revisionist historians, by contrast, argue that the Americans demonised 
the Soviet Union in order to justify their own aggressive and imperialist 
politics. (34)
Strangely enough, the post-revisionist school is not mentioned.
Throughout their accounts of the origin of the Cold War, all four text-
books take on a post-revisionist stance. They all refer to ideological and 
geopolitical tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union, as 
well as to the imperialist aspirations of both superpowers. Its continua-
tion is explained as action and reaction. In other words, both the United 
States and the Soviet Union are ascribed responsibility, to an equal extent, 
for the origin (and continuation) of the Cold War. A discourse analysis 
affirms this finding. For instance, the textbook authors do not use specific 
verbs or adjectives to implicitly place blame on one of the two actors. 
Furthermore, the actors responsible for the outbreak of the Cold War are 
clearly identified as those with non-human agency. The textbooks’ authors 
all identify the United States and the Soviet Union as the responsible par-
ties. Only once in all four textbooks are Truman and Stalin explicitly 
mentioned. In all other cases, the agents are the two superpowers.
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Only a few other actors are mentioned in relation to the origins and 
continuation of the Cold War, such as the national communist parties in 
Eastern Europe who held some power after the Second World War or the 
Western European countries who asked the Americans to help them work 
against Soviet expansionism. Nevertheless, according to the textbook 
authors, a ‘multi-staged’ agency was at work. First and foremost, 
 responsibility was in the hands of the two superpowers; other actors could 
only (re)act with Soviet or American permission.
 Moral Judgment on Agents and/or Actions during the 
Cold War
A further question is whether – and to what extent – any attribution of 
responsibility by the textbooks goes hand in hand with passing moral 
judgment on agents and/or actions during the Cold War. This question is 
not easy to answer. How should we assess statements like ‘puppet regimes’ 
to describe Eastern European governments, or the phrase ‘witch hunt’ to 
describe McCarthy’s persecution of communists, the emphasis on the 
‘expensive’ arms race or the statement (on MAD policies) that ‘Both par-
ties still went on developing ever stronger weapons’? On the one hand, 
these statements seem to impart moral judgments; on the other, however, 
they could simply be considered descriptive.
When analysing all of the chapters on the Cold War from these text-
books, we can see that the authors approach this conflict, its agents and 
events, for the most part in a distant, neutral tone without explicit judge-
ment. A discourse analysis reveals no relevant results regarding specific 
wording. Stalin, for instance, is always mentioned by name only, without 
loaded adjectives. The textbooks sometimes ascribe him an authoritarian 
attitude (‘Stalin demanded [...]’); however, the same phrasing can also be 
found in descriptions of Kennedy’s actions during the Cuban Missile 
Crisis. Only in Historia is there one instance of clear moral judgment: In 
an in-depth study on the nuclear arms race during the Cold War, the 
author states that, with the disarmament agreements of the 1980s, ‘a turn 
for the better’ occurred (107). In Storia, Soviet policies are more readily 
criticised than American policies. Soviet interference into Eastern 
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European countries’ internal affairs receives ample attention, for exam-
ple, while American interference is hardly mentioned. Yet, for the most 
part, the authors of this textbook maintain a distance from the narrative; 
they do not show either sympathy or antipathy towards any actors in 
the Cold War.
Three of the textbooks nevertheless adhere to and lean on a framework 
of Western values and standards, albeit in a scattered and implicit way. 
Freedom and respect for human rights are considered important values in 
these textbooks, and they are portrayed as lacking in the communist bloc 
according to Historia, Pionier and Storia. Historia states that the GDR 
was forced to become a Soviet ally, while the FRG chose Westbildung. The 
right to self-determination and freedom of speech and religion is pre-
sented as hugely important in Storia. Pionier elaborates on Pope John 
XXIII’s plea, in his encyclical Pacem in Terris from 1963, which calls for 
greater respect for human rights, freedom of religion, and dialogue. 
Consequently, both Soviet and American policies during that period are 
critically judged based on these (presumably) characteristic Western val-
ues. The judgment falls in favour of American policy, although Pionier 
also critically comments on it. Western values serve as the standard by 
which to judge different societies. Only Passages avoids a biased perspec-
tive altogether.
 Conclusion and Discussion
Taking a comparative perspective, I analysed four Flemish twelfth-grade 
history textbooks in order to examine which groups or people are ascribed 
agency and responsibility for either causing or continuing the Cold War, 
as well as to understand to what extent the textbooks pass moral judg-
ment. The textbooks often attribute agency to three different categories 
of people or entities: (1) The first and most prominent category con-
cerned non-human agency situated in the hands of the United States and 
the Soviet Union, (2) the second category consisted of individuals, (3) a 
rather small third category consisted of certain countries, groups and ‘the 
people’ as active agents. In Historia, this third category received hardly 
any attention. The agency of ordinary people, women and Belgium itself 
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were also mostly overlooked in all four textbooks. With the exception of 
Historia, all the textbooks recognised that both power blocs were non- 
homogeneous entities and that counter voices existed on both sides. 
Responsibility for the Cold War was unanimously dealt with in a post- 
revisionist manner, with the focus on ideological and geopolitical  tensions 
between the United States and the Soviet Union and their imperialist 
aspirations. The analysis found that explicit moral judgment did not 
appear in the textbook accounts, but three of the four works nevertheless 
adhered to a framework of Western values and standards. Only Passages 
consistently maintained its distance from this framework.
Despite the differences between these textbooks, an important similar-
ity emerged in terms of their approach to (agency in) the Cold War, 
which can be characterised as structural and informed by the social sci-
ences. How should this attribution of agency be judged in light of the 
importance history education scholars ascribe to the representation of 
agency in (1) fostering students’ complex understanding of history, (2) 
encouraging young people to take up societal and civic commitment and 
(3) contributing to young people’s identity building?
Explaining past events and historical change or continuity with the 
necessary complexity is a very difficult matter. Analysing agency on dif-
ferent structural, collective and individual levels, however, allows us to 
have a deeper and more nuanced historical understanding of (the roles of 
various agents in) past events and developments. To a certain extent, the 
textbook authors discussed here rise to the challenge posed by such com-
plexity. While they attribute agency to states or to ‘great men’, they gener-
ally pay little attention to the role of other agents. Furthermore, a 
reflection on the concept of agency itself is absent from the texts. This is 
a missed opportunity to guide students to reflect on the agents of change 
in history, as well as the balance between structures, collectives and indi-
viduals in creating historical change.
The authors of these four textbooks certainly illustrate the significance and 
effectiveness of collective action. According to them, it led to the fall of com-
munism in Poland (the role of Solidarnosc in particular), the fall of the Berlin 
Wall and the fall of communism in general in Eastern Europe. The textbook 
authors also clearly show that, while collective action does not immediately 
produce change, it can yield results in the longer term. The elision of the 
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importance of individual agency could have an impact on a young person’s 
understanding of how this, too, could lead to historical change.
The emphasis on non-human agents like ‘the Soviet Union’ or ‘the 
United States’ in these textbooks might give students the idea, as Zahra 
points out, that a national identity is inescapable and they do not have 
the agency or liberty to construct and define their own identities (2010). 
An important suggestion in this respect, referring to Rogers Brubaker 
(2004, 12), is to analyse ‘groupness’ as an ‘event’ rather than analysing 
‘nations’ or ‘states’ as historical actors (Zahra 2010, 97). This alerts stu-
dents to the possibility that ‘groupness’ may not occur and reveals that 
national groups are never completely homogeneous, provoking reflec-
tions on agency on the structural, group and individual level.
Homogenisation gives rise to another problem, also related to identity 
building. In the four textbooks, the different blocs involved in the Cold 
War are mainly represented in a homogeneous way, even though some 
attention is paid to counter voices. Such a representation, combined with 
an implicit adherence to Western values and standards, carries certain 
risks. An ‘us-versus-them’ contrast can emerge between ‘the West’ and 
‘the Rest’, with accompanying feelings of Western superiority. Western 
values and standards are judged positively and represented as being better 
than those of others, as previous research among Flemish students sug-
gests (Van Nieuwenhuyse and Wils 2015). Furthermore, psychological 
research (in particular research into social identity theory) shows that 
homogenising the ‘in-group’ goes hand in hand with enlarging differ-
ences vis-à-vis ‘out-groups’, exaggerating the positive characteristics of 
the ‘in-group’ and stressing the weaknesses or shortcomings of the ‘out- 
group’ (Ford and Tonander 1998), encouraging exclusion.
It would thus be beneficial to combine the current approach (abstract, 
structural, with an emphasis on theory from the social sciences), which leads 
to a macro-historical perspective and an emphasis on non-human agents 
(which is certainly still valuable), with a micro-perspective focussing on the 
agency of ordinary individuals; this would allow for deeper and more 
nuanced macro-historical representations. Moreover, such a combination 
can support efforts to teach students to break through ‘philosophical think-
ing’ and achieve ‘ironic thinking’ (Egan 1997). According to the Canadian 
educationalist Kieran Egan, 16- to 18-year-old learners are ‘philosophical 
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thinkers’: They focus on and are especially interested in ‘the real truth’ as a 
coherent system that can explain the world and reality in its entirety (1997, 
104-136). Attractive systems are, for instance, religion or Marxism, which 
describe the world through a coherent yet strict logic but risk turning young 
people into rigid and authoritarian thinkers. ‘Ironic thinking’, Egan contin-
ues, can precisely remedy this by showing that there are always exceptions 
and nuance, by pointing to the unique instead of the general and by reveal-
ing the complexity of historical events and developments that cannot be 
understood through one simple frame (1997, 137-171). Such ironic think-
ing, which also includes self- conscious reflection about language use in his-
tory, contributes not only to better historical understanding but also to civic 
engagement and identity building. It differentiates between structures, shat-
ters homogenisation and highlights the importance of individual and collec-
tive action on the part of ordinary people.
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The Cold War and the Polish Question
Joanna Wojdon
Poland appeared to be on the ‘wrong’ side of the Iron Curtain. While its 
communist government was imposed by the Soviet Union in 1944, the 
Polish people supported the Western world. They expressed this opinion 
in the referendum of 1946 and parliamentary elections of 1947, both of 
which were falsified in order to prove popular acceptance of the regime 
(Paczkowski 2010, 182). The anti-communist guerrilla movement was 
active until the 1950s despite the severe persecution suffered by its sup-
porters. Communist propaganda was used in an attempt to make the 
Polish people identify with the Soviet bloc, and school education became 
one of the Soviet Union’s main tools. School textbooks from the period 
1948—1989 left no doubt that the United States and Great Britain were 
to blame for initiating the Cold War (Wojdon 2017). However, two fac-
tors among many testify to both the durability of Polish ties to Western 
democracy and Poland’s distance from Soviet ideology: the authority of 
the Catholic Church in the country and the massive numbers enrolled in 
the Solidarity trade union of 1980 to 1981.
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The same findings apply to the historiography of the Cold War. 
Although officially Polish historiography adopted Marxism as its theo-
retical basis during the General Congress of the Polish Historians in 
1948 in Wrocław, and this survived as an interpretative framework until 
the collapse of the communist regime, some Polish historians, in Poland 
and in the diaspora, participated in, or at least were aware of, historio-
graphical debates in the West (Stobiecki 2007; idem 2005). The flow of 
information from the West into Poland was constantly increasing with 
the relaxation of the passport policy of the Warsaw regime, but also due 
to, for example, the book distribution programme initiated by the CIA in 
the late 1970s (Reisch 2013, 23ff.). Foreign radio broadcasts (such as 
Radio Free Europe) and the independent publishing movement (beyond 
the control of the censorship office) broadened the audience for those 
alternative historical narratives. At the end of the 1980s, in larger cities, 
unofficial history textbooks for secondary school were illegally published 
and distributed as supplementary materials among pupils. However, the 
state struggled to the very end to hold its official monopoly on historical 
interpretation, by means of both school curricula and the system of text-
book approval, which permitted only one textbook for each subject and 
grade (Wojdon 2015, 185).
 Textbooks
A reinterpretation of the Cold War was one of the first changes intro-
duced in school history textbooks after the collapse of the communist 
regime in 1989. Already the first textbook of 1990 (the structure of which 
did not change if compared to the pre-1989 edition) stated that ‘the con-
cept of the “Cold War”’ is closely related with the attempts to stop the 
Soviet expansionism undertaken by the Western powers’ (Pankowicz 
1990, 195). Soviet plans for international expansion were presented in 
detail in these textbooks, and the authors argue that Winston Churchill’s 
speech in Fulton in 1947 ‘made the world realise the communist danger’ 
(ibid.), although it didn’t start the Cold War (an interpretation which can 
be found in textbooks under communist control (Szcześniak 1984, 
335– 336)); instead, it announced that the Cold War had begun. The speech 
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definitely ended the co-operation between the Western Powers and the 
Soviet Union – co-operation which had made it possible for the Soviet 
Union to continue its occupation of Polish territories after 1939, to sub-
jugate Poland and to impose the communist system in East-Central 
Europe. A pupil might infer from the text that Churchill brought to an 
end the blindness of the West regarding Soviet policies and practices and 
that it was the Soviet Union which had started the Cold War by violating 
Western values, such as human rights or democracy; it just took Western 
leaders time to notice and articulate it.
The textbook adds, only in a final sentence, that Churchill also ‘ques-
tioned our [Poland’s] entitlement to the Recovered Territories1 and the 
rightness of the decision of the big powers [USSR, USA, Great Britain] 
to resettle the German population from the territories of Poland, 
Czechoslovakia and Hungary’ (Pankowicz 1990, 195). Altogether, how-
ever, it seems as if Poland profited more from the end of the co-operation 
between Stalin and the Western powers than it suffered from the Western 
support for German revisionism. This idea was never explicitly expressed 
in any textbook, but apparently it remained behind all post-1989 
narratives.
The Western interpretation of the Cold War has prevailed in Polish 
school history textbooks, regardless of the changes in the system (and 
structure) of education and in school curricula. In the school year 2016 
to 2017, post-Second World War history was taught in the sixth (last) 
grade of primary school and in the first grade of upper secondary school 
as a compulsory subject. In the third grade of secondary school it was 
optional and taught to those who chose to major in humanities. The first 
grade of upper secondary school therefore provided the last and most 
developed interpretation of the past to all schoolchildren. The aim of this 
chapter is to deconstruct the prevailing model of teaching the Cold War 
to the young generation of Poles as of 2016 and 2017 and to understand 
the main historiographical concepts of this conflict (traditionalist, revi-
sionist and post-revisionist) which impact its teaching. Since a large-scale 
survey of the teaching practices of history teachers in Poland in 2014 
proved that the textbook was their primary teaching tool, I start with a 
content analysis of four textbooks aimed at students in the first grade of 
secondary school and issued by the leading Polish publishers (Stola 2012; 
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Roszak and Kłaczkow 2012; Brzozowski and Szczepański 2012; Dolecki 
et al. 2012). The conclusions drawn from this analysis are then compared 
with those drawn from observing a lesson in a secondary school in 
Wrocław, which provides an example of real school practice. The method 
of approaching the Cold War within this classroom serves as a case study, 
illustrating a more general vision of the discipline of history as taught in 
Polish schools.
To begin my analysis, I look at the amount of space devoted to the Cold 
War and its various components within each textbook, including political 
(domestic and international), economic, social and cultural aspects. I then 
proceed to look at the interpretation of the Cold War superpowers and 
their allies (extended East and extended West) within each textbook, the 
focus on (and silencing of ) particular phenomena, issues of agency and 
the roles of individuals on both sides of the Iron Curtain. The similarities 
and differences between individual textbooks are singled out.
The differences may be due to design of individual textbooks (where 
the publisher often has a decisive voice), to space allotted for various ele-
ments (texts, images, tasks, comments) and, to a lesser extent, to the 
political views of the authors2 or to the historiographical schools they 
belong (for example, Dariusz Stola is both a historian and a sociologist, 
so he pays more attention to social processes and everyday life than other 
historians might). On the other hand, the similarities between textbooks 
are not the result of political pressure or the political affiliation of their 
authors. Textbooks in Poland are approved by the Ministry of Education, 
but the approval is based on reviews by experts in history, teaching his-
tory and the Polish language, nominated by academic and professional 
societies. Publishers are free to propose as many books as they wish and 
there is no limit on the number of textbooks available on the market. The 
teachers then choose textbooks for their pupils3.
The findings from this analysis are then discussed against the historio-
graphical models of the traditionalist, revisionist and post-revisionist 
interpretations of the Cold War. It should be noted, though, that in 
Poland the ‘revisionist’ model, which attributes negative moral values to 
the Western powers involved in the Cold War, preceded, in fact, the tra-
ditionalist Western interpretation (accusing the Soviet bloc); thus, it is 
hard to call it ‘revisionist’. Moreover, revisionism is virtually non-existent 
 J. Wojdon
187
in the current narratives taught in schools and appears only in primary 
sources originating from the Soviet bloc during the Cold War era. This is 
why in this text it is referred to as the Soviet (rather than revisionist) 
interpretation of the Cold War.
Elements of these models and the issues raised in textbooks were then 
observed during an introductory lesson on the topic of the Cold War in 
one of the secondary schools in Wrocław on March 14, 2016. As the 
teacher mentioned during one of the lessons on Cold War that followed, 
she was a university student between 1982 and 1987, which means that 
the final stage of the Cold War constitutes a part of her personal experi-
ence. One should keep in mind, however, that the atmosphere at the 
history department in Wrocław in the 1980s was far from the expecta-
tions of the communist regime, despite initial hardships under martial 
law. As my older colleagues from the department recollect it, Samizdat 
literature proliferated and clandestine organizations reached students 
with their programmes and activities.
 Textbook Analysis – Structure
The Cold War is not emphasised through the structuring of school text-
books. Only one textbook (by Dariusz Stola) has a separate section 
 entitled ‘The Cold War: Europe and the world in 1945–1989’, which 
covers the whole period both in Poland and abroad.
The authors of another textbook, Brzozowski and Szczepański, start the 
post-Second World War chapter with a retrospective, going back to the 
conferences of the Big Three in Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam, followed by a 
series of international events (the San Francisco conference of 1945 
included). This leads up to the Berlin crisis of 1948 and the formation of the 
state of Israel. Only then is there an eleven-page-long chapter entitled ‘The 
Beginning of the Cold War – The Split between East and West’ (171–181). 
The chapter starts with a description of Stalin’s policies, Churchill’s 
speech in Fulton, the Truman Doctrine, the arms race and the two military 
blocs: NATO and the Warsaw Pact. It then discusses the Sovietisation of the 
Soviet bloc on the one hand and the European integration within the 
Western bloc on the other, with a clear aim to juxtapose the two processes. 
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Another chapter mentioning the Cold War is entitled ‘The Cold War and 
the Main World Military Conflicts in 1945–1989’ and includes the wars in 
Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, Afghanistan, the Cuban Missile Crisis and the 
attempts at ‘peaceful coexistence’ (197–205). The end of the Cold War 
serves as an introduction to the post-1989 world, only after the post-war 
section has been summarised.
The third textbook, by Dolecki et  al., only has a short section (one 
page) dealing with ‘The Beginning of the Cold War’ in the chapter 
‘Europe After WWII’, and it is not clear at all from this book when the 
Cold War ended. Moreover, Polish issues are presented as completely 
separate from the rest of world history4. As a result, having discussed the 
collapse of the Soviet bloc and even the problems facing the modern 
world, the textbook narrative jumps back to 1944 and the communist 
takeover in Poland.
The fourth book analysed in this chapter, by Roszak and Kłaczkow, 
does not have any chapter or subchapter mentioning the ‘Cold War’. It 
introduces the term only in a summary of the section which deals with 
the organisation of world politics after the Second World War and begins 
with the Potsdam conference and founding of the UN in San Francisco. 
The chapter then discusses the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan and 
the OEEC, and it also mentions the independence of India and the 
beginning of the war in Indochina.
Segmenting the story of the Cold War diminishes its significance. 
Only in the textbook by Stola is it presented as a monumental event 
which shaped the world after the Second World War. In other books, the 
Cold War is mentioned alongside many other events which occurred dur-
ing the same the period. There is thus little room left for any in-depth 
analysis of the Cold War and even less space in which to discuss its vary-
ing interpretations. The textbooks do not even mention that there are any 
historiographical debates on the Cold War. Despite the differences in 
structure, each textbook devotes about a hundred pages to the Cold War 
period and all the textbooks present a similar overall vision of the con-
flict, depicting the West in a positive light and taking a critical approach 
towards the Soviet Union and the communist regimes, which generally 
corresponds with the classical Western model of interpretation (Table 9.1).
 J. Wojdon
189
Political history dominates without any doubt. In some textbooks less 
than ten pages are devoted to culture or everyday life in the Cold War 
period and as little to the economic issues. Altogether, all non-political 
issues occupy less than or around twenty per cent of space, with the excep-
tion of the book by Stola, where economic factors are considered along-
side the political ones and discussions of everyday life and cultural issues 
are also integrated into the main narrative. The authors of two other text-
books (Roszak and Kłaczkow; Brzozowski and Szczepański) chose to pres-
ent non-political topics (such as Stalinist propaganda, post- 1968 popular 
culture, the space race, everyday life in the West or in the USA between 
the 1950s and 1970s, the Catholic Church after the Second World War) 
in ‘infographics’, occupying one or two pages. These topics are illustrated 
with photographs and visually separated from the rest of the chapter. The 
textbook by Dolecki et al. mentions these topics at the end of the chapter 
on ‘The World after WWII: The Rivalry between the USA and USSR’ 
which also deals with military conflicts, decolonisation and even global 
terrorism (on one short page which treats the subjects of both the Red 
Army Faction and Al-Qaida). This domination of textbooks by political 
history has further implications for the image of both sides of the conflict, 
as shown below. It is also a feature of traditionalist historiography.
Moving to the geographical aspects of textbook analysis, the history of 
the Eastern bloc is covered in more detail than American actions or 
decolonisation. The anti-regime protests in Poland in 1956, 1968, 1970, 
1976, 1980, 1981 and 1988 are obviously dealt with in detail, but the 
Table 9.1 Table Showing Number of Pages devoted to the Cold War and its Various 
Aspects in Polish Secondary School Textbooks. The results for each textbook do 









Total: 98 124 117 112
National issues 43 (44%) 55 (44%) 56 (48%) 58 (52%)
International issues 55 (56%) 69 (56%) 61 (52%) 54 (48%)
Economy 18 (18%) 9 (7%) 6 (5%) 13 (12%)
Culture 10 (10%) 7 (6%) 8 (7%) 4 (3%)
Everyday life 17 (17%) 4 (3%) 10 (9%) 3 (3%)
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1953 uprising in Berlin, the Hungarian uprising of 1956 and the Prague 
Spring of 1968 are also mentioned, with a seemingly sympathetic 
approach in all the textbooks, and these topics are accompanied by pho-
tographs. The Soviet Gulag is not discussed in the Cold War section since 
the Soviet system of labour camps is discussed in the chapters of the 
textbooks devoted to the inter-war years. The post-Stalinist ‘thaw’ is 
addressed, also in regard to Poland, although not all the books use this 
term, even if they present in detail political changes in the Soviet bloc, 
such as the struggle for power in the Kremlin, the new Soviet leadership 
under Khrushchev, his criticism towards Stalin and the hopes of coun-
tries of the Soviet bloc which were epitomised in the uprisings in Berlin, 
Budapest and the social protests in Poland.
The United States enjoy much less attention, especially regarding their 
non-European policies. American internal affairs are usually only briefly 
mentioned. All the analysed textbooks touch on the subject of the Civil 
Rights Movement, although sometimes only in a few sentences. The 
book by Dolecki et al. is the briefest. The sentence ‘In the United States 
people refused, en masse, military service in Vietnam’ is followed by: 
‘Apart from the peaceful movement of Pastor Martin Luther King, who 
fought for equal rights for coloured members of society, the movement of 
Black Panthers was also founded – the leftist groups of African-American 
fighters who physically fought for equal rights for the black population’ 
(289–290)5. This statement ends the chapter. There is no real discussion 
of the problems faced by African Americans. The textbook takes the tra-
ditional WASP’s perspective. Other textbooks concentrate on the positive 
results of the movement led by Martin Luther King, who eventually con-
vinced the US administration to promote non-discriminatory practices 
(Roszak and Kłaczkow 2012, 304; Stola 2012, 132). Thus, the textbooks 
emphasise how different countries overcame difficulties rather than the 
difficulties themselves. The narrative emphasises the political rather than 
the social or cultural. The depiction in these textbooks strengthens the 
positive image of the United States as a democratic country capable of 
solving its own problems.
Senator McCarthy does not appear in any of these textbooks. The ‘red 
scare’ is represented instead by the trial and execution of Ethel and Julius 
Rosenberg, Americans accused of espionage for the Soviet Union and of 
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leaking information about the atomic bomb to the Soviet Union, thus 
significantly speeding up the Soviet nuclear programme.
The emphasis on the Rosenbergs instead of McCarthy corresponds 
with a traditionalist approach to the Cold War. The treatment of the arms 
race, the space race and the ‘hot’ conflicts of the Cold War period within 
these textbooks leans towards post-revisionism as the rivalry between the 
superpowers is presented without any moral judgments about either side 
involved in the conflict.
In the textbook by Stola the space race is mentioned as yet another 
aspect of the arms race (141). In the textbook by Dolecki et al. both are 
summarised on the same page (287). The portrayal of Yuri Gagarin, the 
first man in space, varies between the textbooks. In some he is presented 
just as a pilot, and his words about saving the beauty of the Earth instead 
of destroying it are cited (Roszak and Kłaczkow, 294), but Dolecki et al. 
claim that his communist views, alongside other skills, made him the first 
man in space. The textbook written by Roszak and Kłaczkow mentions 
Gagarin only briefly but devotes a special insert of two pages to give a 
detailed account of the moon landing (320–321). The American space 
programme thus looks more attractive (also thanks to the large pictures 
in full colour) than its Soviet counterpart, even if no explicit comments 
are made on this topic.
The Cuban Missile Crisis is discussed in all the textbooks, though in one 
only in a caption accompanying a picture of the US delegate to the UN 
presenting the photographs of Soviet missiles in Cuba in October 1962 
(Dolecki et al., 285). Both the picture from the UN and the aerial photo 
of Cuba are printed in the book, alongside a tiny portrait of Fidel Castro 
as ‘the leader of the communist Cuba in 1959–2008’. The caption also says:
The Cuban crisis could have led to the outbreak of a nuclear war. As a 
response to the Soviet action, the USA announced the blockade of the 
island and preparations for the invasion of Cuba and for war with the 
Soviet Union. Khrushchev gave up and withdrew the nuclear weapons 
from Cuba. The USA gave up attempts to overthrow Fidel Castro.
The reasons for the Korean War are traced back to the dual occupation of 
Korea by the American and Soviet armies and the free elections which were 
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to be held across the whole country yet never actually happened. The mili-
tary conflict was initiated by the North, supported by the Soviet Union 
and China, while the South was liberated by the United Nations forces led 
by the Americans. It is emphasised that the two superpowers supported 
opposing sides of the conflict but did not openly fight with one another. 
As the war progressed, the United States refrained from using nuclear 
weapons against China in order to prevent the war turning into a world-
wide conflict. Stalin’s death is presented as a factor facilitating peace nego-
tiations in 1953. The division of Korea into two states, with the totalitarian 
communist regime in the North founded by Kim Il-Sung, still continues 
today. Personal stories from the war are never included in these narratives; 
it is a purely political event in all the textbooks (Stola, 172–173; Brzozowski, 
197–199; Dolecki et al., 278–279; Roszak and Kłaczkow, 278–279).
In the case of Vietnam, the anti-war protests and controversies in 
America are usually mentioned in the context of the student movement 
of 1968, hippies, and ‘Flower Power’ (and therefore as events which were 
not very serious), while US military intervention is justified by the doc-
trine of containment aimed at preventing the worldwide spread of com-
munism (Stola, Dolecki et al.) or by the invitation from the government 
of South Vietnam (Roszak and Kłaczkow). Some textbooks emphasise 
the role of the media in adding to the negative perception of the war by 
the American public and repeat that the USA lost the war at home 
(Brzozowski and Szczepański, 201–203; Dolecki et  al., 282). The 
 disastrous results of communist rule in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia 
usually follow, with an emphasis placed on the atrocities of the Khmer 
Rouge in Cambodia; for instance, the text is paired with illustrations of 
rows of skulls, victims of the regime (Stola, 175; Roszak and Kłaczkow, 
280; Brzozowski, 201–203). The textbook by Andrzej Brzozowski also 
mentions the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979, calling it the 
‘Soviet Vietnam’ (203–205). In the textbook by Dolecki et al. numerous 
other ‘hot’ conflicts are mentioned, but only in the form of a table with 
dates, parties involved and the numbers of victims in each conflict (286). 
Thus, these wars become statistics, with no human faces.
Decolonisation is also rarely explored in any detail, probably because it 
has no direct connections to Polish affairs: Poland never was a colony and 
never had any colonies, at least in any ‘traditional’, straightforward sense.6 
 J. Wojdon
193
This may be one reason why this topic is treated rather marginally 
(Techmańska 2014). The issues of colonisation and decolonisation have little 
impact on the image of the West in Poland. The history textbooks both cor-
roborate and continue this opinion. In the books by Roszak and Kłaczkow 
and Stola, decolonisation is discussed in separate chapters (281–286, 
177–181, respectively). Some textbooks give a more general overview of the 
process and see it as a result of the Second World War and the weakened 
position of colonial powers, of Japan’s foreign policy which supported anti-
colonialism, of the role of the UN (in which former colonies played an 
increasing role), of the USSR (with its anti-imperialist rhetoric) and the USA 
(a former colony itself ) (Dolecki et al., 282; Stola, 177). Only Brzozowski 
and Szczepański mention the colonised peoples who wanted independence 
playing an active role in prompting the process and the tensions arising from 
the unwillingness of the colonialists and local elites to change the colonial 
status quo, which sometimes resulted in military conflicts (193).
As a rule, African colonies are just laid out in chronological order 
according to the year they gained independence (with an emphasis placed 
on the year 1960, ‘the year of Africa’) and sometimes the war in Algeria is 
mentioned. The book by Brzozowski and Szczepański only mentions the 
war in brackets: ‘(e.g. the civil war in Algeria lasted for a few years and 
ended in 1962 when the French left the colony)’, while the textbook by 
Stola devotes a whole paragraph to this conflict. For Stola, Algeria serves 
as an example of an African colony with a large white population (about 
one fifth of all inhabitants) who opposed decolonisation. The author 
stresses the cruelties of the war, the death of almost half a million people 
and the sufferings of the civilian population. He appreciates the role of 
General de Gaulle, who came to an agreement with the National 
Liberation Front.
The apartheid system in South Africa is also sometimes part of the 
discussion of post-war Africa and the problems caused by a difficult co- 
existence of the white and black populations. India is discussed only in 
relation to Mahatma Gandhi and his successful policies, the text often 
accompanied by his portrait. The decolonisation of Indochina is usually 
mentioned in the context of the war in Vietnam.
The narratives on decolonisation in these textbooks generally sound as 
if the authors were dealing with some very distant (in space and time) 
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affairs. They usually conclude with the presentation of difficulties experi-
enced by the decolonised countries and their peoples, such as deteriorat-
ing living conditions, declining health statistics, poverty, military conflicts 
and corruption. It looks as if decolonisation brought more problems than 
it solved, even though the textbooks also explicitly state that the overall 
results were positive. The terms ‘The Third World’ and ‘neo-colonialism’ 
are sometimes introduced.
Such an interpretation of the processes of colonisation and decolonisa-
tion leads into a traditionalist interpretation of the Cold War. Silencing 
the colonialists’ abuses and marginalising colonial issues helps to main-
tain an idealised image of the West. The dominant narrative about the 
situation in Western Europe in all textbooks is one which stresses the 
development of a consumer society and European integration. Both 
changes are presented in the most positive light, bringing wellbeing and 
overall happiness to the people. However, only the textbook by Stola uses 
the term ‘welfare state’. It is briefly characterised in the chapter ‘The 
Golden Age of the West’ (132–139).
The textbooks all note the sexual liberation of the Western world, the 
spread of feminism and the acceptance of new family models, and all 
these topics are treated in the context of modernisation and freedom, not 
as posing a danger to traditional values. The Second Vatican council and 
other changes within the Catholic Church are often presented as a 
response to those challenges but no criticism is attributed to either pro-
cess. Some textbooks or individual chapters are openly enthusiastic about 
the West, and, in general, they all present a very positive image of the 
‘Free World’ during the Cold War.
Contrary to that within the European community, the textbooks argue 
that co-operation within the Soviet bloc was only superficial, forced by 
the Kremlin. The term Sovietisation is used in this context. Economic 
difficulties, lack of freedom and other daily hardships behind the Iron 
Curtain are stressed (with special emphasis put on Poland).
Since the textbook narratives deal predominantly with political issues, 
politicians are the main actors, individually or collectively. The list of indi-
viduals presented in the textbooks is rather short (probably a result of the 
tendency not to overload school education with names and dates). Actors 
are usually mentioned by surname: ‘Churchill said’, ‘Churchill proclaimed’ 
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(Brzozowski, 171), ‘Churchill publicly stated’ (Stola, 124), ‘President 
Harry Truman proclaimed’ (Stola, 124) (but also ‘Truman stated’  – 
Kłaczkow, 224), ‘Marshall presented’ (Roszak and Kłaczkow, 225; Dolecki 
et al., 259), ‘Stalin introduced the regimes’ (Roszak and Kłaczkow, 224), 
‘Stalin took care’ (Dolecki et al., 258) or ‘denounced the West’ (Brzozowski, 
171). More often than not there is no human actor and the states or nations 
are the subjects in the sentences: ‘the Americans offered’ (Stola, 124), ‘the 
countries benefited’ (Dolecki et al., 259, ‘NATO expanded’ (Stola, 126), 
‘the Soviet Union rejected’ (Stola, 124), ‘blocked’ (Stola, 125), ‘decided’ 
(Roszak and Kłaczkow, 249), ‘avoided’ (Brzozowski, 171), or ‘annulled 
treaties of alliance’ (Brzozowski, 173). In the textbook by Roszak, the 
Soviet bloc is represented only by political leaders, while in the Western 
bloc the textbook refers to the general public. The (lack of ) agency of the 
citizens of the Soviet bloc is thus reflected in the textbook’s presentation.
There are hardly any negative words associated with the United States 
and Western world in the context of the Cold War. For example, even 
when Brzozowski and Szczepański present a section on the life in the 
United States in the 1950s through the 1970s (just one page), which 
deals with the American problems (the ‘Red Scare’ and FBI, racial dis-
crimination and Martin Luther King, Watergate), it turns out that a solu-
tion was found for each issue, and the words are printed in bold such as 
‘the real leader of the West’, ‘economic potential’, ‘cultural pattern’. Terms 
such as ‘Golden age’, ‘American dream’, ‘democracy’ and ‘integration’ 
also help to build on the positive image of the West. The attitude towards 
Soviet activities is usually more critical.
Let us compare two sentences from the textbook by Roszak and 
Kłaczkow. The first sentence reads:
In 1944–1948 Stalin imposed communist regimes in Poland, East 
Germany, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania and Yugoslavia 
[Czechoslovakia is mentioned later]. (224)
The second sentence states that:
In June 1947 American Secretary of State George Marshall presented a 
plan of economic assistance for ruined Europe. (225)
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The first sentence is very short, in the form of a military order (‘Stalin 
imposed regimes’), while the second uses analytical descriptions of 
American policies (‘presented a plan of economic assistance’) and objects 
(‘ruined Europe’) which emphasise the significance of the USA’s role and 
their respect for Europe. Similarly, Stalin is just called Stalin while 
Marshall is referred to as ‘American Secretary of State George Marshall’. 
‘Imposed’ and ‘regimes’ are the words with negative connotations here, 
whilst ‘assistance’ carries positive connotations. The verb ‘imposing’ 
paints the Soviet Union in a negative light, a power to which the people 
of Poland and other countries are just passive victims. ‘Presenting the 
plan’ is only an offer to ‘ruined Europe’ which can be accepted or 
rejected – the agency is, thus, split between the participants.
The American assistance offered to Europe within the framework of 
the Marshall Plan is often emphasised in the Polish textbooks. Western 
European countries were ‘systematically reconstructed’ and managed to 
‘co-operate [...] as partners’. The refusal of Poland to participate in the 
Marshall Plan under Soviet pressure is (rightfully) presented as proof of 
Soviet dominance.
 Conclusion
In narratives on the outbreak of the Cold War the traditionalist interpre-
tation prevails. The Soviet Union is presented as a power with expansion-
ist aims, aims the Western countries decided to work against, which led 
to the Cold War. The image of the USSR within these textbooks contrasts 
with the presentation of the positive role of the United States who sup-
ported the countries and nations threatened by the Soviets. A task in the 
textbook by Brzozowski and Szczepański asks pupils to ‘Explain the 
methods the Western countries used to oppose the expansion of 
Communism in the world after World War II’ (181).
Roszak and Kłaczkow mention the rivalry between the two blocs in 
their textbook, in which post-revisionist arguments can be seen, as well 
as in the presentation of the area of ideology and propaganda. The text-
book by Stola traces the origin of the Cold War back to the debates over 
Soviet policy in Central Europe, which he argues was more brutal than 
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the Western allies could tolerate. But he generally characterises the 
Cold War simply as a rivalry of the superpowers, without mentioning 
ideological issues. The superpowers each had their own interests and 
ambitions, and their clash was a decisive factor in the triggering 
the Cold War.
 Lesson Observation
In the introductory lesson on the topic of the Cold War in the first grade 
of an upper secondary school in Wrocław, observed on 14 March 2016, I 
noted a post-revisionist approach towards the topic, with some inclina-
tion towards a traditional Western interpretation of the conflict.
The pupils were using the textbook by Dolecki et  al. (2012), albeit 
only sporadically in the course of the lesson, which is not common prac-
tice at Polish schools (Choińska-Mika et al. 2014, 227), but in this case 
fully justified since the book does not address the origins of the Cold War 
satisfactorily. It approaches the topic from a traditionalist stand point and 
emphasises the actions of the Soviet Union which led to the Cold War, as 
the USA reacted to these actions. The textbook also discusses Soviet 
expansion in Eastern Europe, the growing influence of communist par-
ties in France and Italy as a result of the Soviet influence, Soviet finances, 
the Greek civil war (as the only ‘hot’ conflict in Europe at that time, 
which was generally divided by the ‘Iron Curtain’) and the American 
doctrine of containment as a reaction to those circumstances.
The pupils had been asked to familiarise themselves with the Cold War 
chapter as their homework before the lesson and were expected to discuss 
the reading in the classroom. The teacher did not explicitly question the 
textbook narrative, but she used a totally different structure of the topic 
and introduced some elements of post-revisionist and even revisionist 
interpretation, but without ever naming any of them or mentioning the 
very existence of divergent historiographical interpretations. Thus, the 
textbook was only used to provide pupils (at least those who did their 
homework) with some background knowledge.
The topic was formulated as ‘The Cold War – Its Origin, Characteristics, 
Problems’. Three main points of discussion were dictated by the teacher 
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at the very beginning of the lesson: ‘1) The Origin of the Cold War; 2) 
Features and Stages of the Cold War; 3) Bipolar Image of the World and 
Selected International Conflicts of the Cold War Period’.
The discussion started with the definition of the term ‘bipolar’, as 
understood by the pupils, as young people and as prospective scientists 
(reference to physics was made). The students agreed that bipolar meant 
divided. Then the teacher addressed some basic facts about the sides of the 
conflict (USA and USSR, but also Great Britain, NATO and the Warsaw 
Pact), its duration (from 1946 to 1989), and the reason why it is referred 
to as ‘cold’. The definition of the Cold War was then decided on and writ-
ten down by the students in their notebooks. They wrote that the Cold 
War was a conflict between the capitalist (Western) world and the socialist 
countries allied with the Soviet Union (in the following lesson this defini-
tion was re-formulated and the Cold War was defined as the conflict 
between the United States and Russia of a psychological rather than mili-
tary nature). As no moral judgments were attributed to either side of the 
conflict, the teacher’s definition of the Cold War can be regarded as post-
revisionist. However, as we will see, in the course of the lesson the extended 
East was presented in a much more critical way than the extended West.
This can be seen in the very first tasks, when the students received two 
primary sources (text excerpts) in order to familiarise themselves with 
two views on the origins of the Cold War. The first one was authored in 
1948 by Julia Brystygierowa, a high-ranking officer in the Ministry of 
Public Security of the People’s Poland (quoted in Sobańska-Bondaruk 
and Bogusław Lenard 1998)7. The other excerpt was taken from the 
speech of Winston Churchill in Fulton, Missouri, on the Iron Curtain. 
The pupils’ task was to ‘compare the origins of the Cold War as presented 
by the authors […] Underline, what elements of the origins of the con-
flict the authors point to’. The texts and the questions were prepared by 
the teacher. They did not come from the pupils’ textbooks but instead 
from the selection of sources for secondary school use, published in 
the 1990s.
Each of the sources was analysed separately, students beginning with 
Churchill’s speech. The teacher asked: ‘What reasons for breaking the co- 
operation between the USA and USSR does Churchill see?’ Pupils 
referred rather to their textbook than to the source, despite a few attempts 
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by the teacher to re-focus them on Churchill’s speech. They concentrated 
on questioning the Polish-German border, the resettlement of the 
German population from Poland and also cited a fragment about ‘very 
small [parties] in all these Eastern States of Europe, [that] have been 
raised to pre-eminence and power far beyond their numbers and are seek-
ing everywhere to obtain totalitarian control’. They did not assign any 
moral judgment to the speech or to the speaker but simply reworded the 
document. It thus became an ‘objective’, credible source of information 
about the origins of the conflict rather than about the views of Churchill. 
The role of this text was further confirmed in the next task, which was to 
‘draw the Iron Curtain’ according to Churchill on a map displayed on the 
whiteboard and to note down the countries behind the Iron Curtain.
At this moment the teacher started filling in a scheme of the Cold War 
with the Soviet bloc on the left and the Western countries on the right 
(geographically, I would prefer if the sides were changed), labelled as 
‘USSR and the socialist countries’ and ‘USA and the capitalist countries’. 
The names of the military blocs followed, then the political systems 
(police control versus democracy and planned economy versus private 
property). The question over Germany’s place regarding the Iron Curtain 
was also raised. After a short discussion and quotations from Churchill 
on the expanding Soviet influence on Germany, the students placed the 
name of the country on the line that represented the curtain.
Answering the question ‘And what does Brystygierowa see?’, pupils 
interpreted the second text as a propagandist statement accusing the 
United Sates of being to blame for the nuclear threat posed to the whole 
world. The teacher chose individual students who then quoted the sen-
tences in which Brystygierowa named the countries particularly endan-
gered by the United States (the Soviet Union and the ‘countries of people’s 
democracy’). This time attention was paid to the nature of the speech 
(propaganda) and the goals of the speaker rather than to the realities 
described. Brystygierowa was not regarded as a trustworthy speaker but as 
a propagandist and manipulator.
A series of questions and answers about the Fulton speech followed: 
‘What is the goal of the Cold War according to Churchill?’ (broadening the 
influence of the Western powers in the world), ‘What should the West do?’ 
(keep working together and abide by the principles of the Atlantic Charter), 
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‘In which way? What will contain the Russians?’ (only strength). The pupils 
were asked to evidence their replies by quoting from the speech.
A more general question over whether poverty was the reason for social 
unrest (‘When do you think radical movements proliferate?’) opened the 
last section of the lesson in which the teacher very briefly mentioned the 
post-war economic crisis and the Marshall Plan. Then she asked pupils to 
note down ‘The origins of the Cold War. Point one: The expansion of the 
influences of the Soviet Union and the USA. Point two. The post-war 
economic crisis’, statements in which no judgements are made, but 
instead the parallel developments on both sides of the ‘Iron Curtain’ are 
highlighted, as in a post-revisionist approach.
The last lesson task was to pick up labels with various issues related 
to the Cold War and place them on the scheme on the whiteboard in 
order to show whether they referred to one or both sides of the conflict. 
The teacher proposed the different labels and six pupils were appointed 
to complete this task. The pupils chose the arms race, military actions 
and intelligence or spying as the common features. Posing a threat to 
one’s own society was a label given to the Soviet bloc while the pupils 
thought that the West particularly felt fear at the prospect of nuclear 
weapons being used. The pupils were asked to justify their choices. They 
mostly referred to the textbook or to their general knowledge (which 
they derived from spy movies, for instance) and gave examples of cer-
tain activities (such as instances of military conflicts in which both sides 
participated or statistics about weapon production). The classroom dis-
cussion did not result in any of the labels being moved to another place. 
Thus, the pupils agreed with the teacher’s seeming preference for a post-
revisionist interpretation of the Cold War (since they argued that most 
aspects developed simultaneously in the East and in the West), although 
this opinion was combined with more of a critical attitude towards the 
East than to the West (since the pupils pointed out that the Soviets 
persecuted their citizens and posed a nuclear threat to the rest of 
the world).
The teacher only added media warfare (as a common feature) and pro-
paganda (attributed to the Soviet bloc), which corresponded with the 
general picture discussed above. So did a short excerpt from the opening 
speech of Jan Nowak-Jeziorański, the director of the Polish Section of 
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Radio Free Europe appointed in 1952, which the teacher played to the 
pupils. Nowak-Jeziorański promised that the Section would present the 
facts, regardless of their political beliefs. The teacher also played a short 
propaganda film made in Poland in order to depict Radio Free Europe in 
a more negative light, presenting the views of both sides involved in the 
conflict. The teacher again wanted the pupils to identify the differences 
between these two messages. However, they looked tired and were busy 
packing their bags (the bell rang at the end of the Nowak’s speech), and 
so they were not able to comment on the recordings.
As a homework task, the pupils were asked to explain the terms of the 
Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan and to interpret a poster presenting 
the Marshall Plan as a dairy cow (Fig. 9.1). The teacher did not introduce 
the poster in any way, and she neither mentioned that the cartoon 
approaches the Cold War from the perspective of someone in the East 
nor did she explain why she had chosen this particular image. Indeed, it 
did not correspond with the narrative of the Cold War presented thus far 
during the lesson.
Fig. 9.1 A poster presenting the Marshall Plan as a dairy cow (Source: Izdebscy et al. 
2015, 53)
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In the course of searching for the image myself, I found a test on the 
post-war world published by a teacher-training centre in Gorzów 
Wielkopolski (Test z historii). The test juxtaposes our poster with another 
one depicting the Marshall plan as a scaffold placed near a tall building 
with various European flags that form the wall-tiles. Apart from asking 
students about the symbols in and meanings of the two pictures, the test 
has also a question about the origin of each of the posters: It asks which one 
was created in the West and which one in the East (apart from the general 
messages of each poster, we can see that the poster with the cow on it has a 
caption in Czech ‘Zàp. Evropa’). A similar task can be found in the 2012 
state exam (matura): ‘Explain the reasons for varying interpretations of the 
economic plan in the two iconographic sources’. This time the provenance 
of each source was clearly identified. The two sources also referred to the 
Marshall Plan, and one source came from the Western bloc, the other from 
the East: One was a (West) German poster from 1948 and the other was a 
cartoon drawn by Boris Yefimov, a Soviet, in 1951. Thus, the idea behind 
the task was not new or particularly original: The task has been used before 
to try to open up a new perspective on the Marshall Plan, perhaps quite a 
different perspective from the one primarily discussed during the lesson. 
Unfortunately, I was not able to see how the pupils interpreted the poster.8
The teacher might have intended this homework task to encourage the 
students to see views on the Cold War from both sides of the conflict, an 
attempt she’d made in showing both Brystygierowa’s speech and the film 
on RFE to the pupils, which would bring their interpretation of the Cold 
War closer to a post-revisionist model (which seemed to be the teacher’s 
own preferred model). It was difficult, however, for her to avoid a tradi-
tionalist Western approach when teaching the conflict, especially when it 
also corresponded with the history textbook her pupils were using and 
also with their general knowledge and beliefs. The main drawback of both 
the lesson and the textbooks I have analysed is, in my opinion, that there 
is still a lack of any debate on divergent historiographical  interpretations 
of the Cold War. The discussion, if any, seems to relate only to the opin-
ions presented in primary sources, whether from the East or West.
The selection of primary sources was supposedly intended to present 
the beliefs of those on both sides of the conflict, but as a matter of fact all 
of these sources seemed to show the Soviet bloc in a negative light, 
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emphasising that the messages from the East could be seen as propaganda 
and lies and that the actions of the Soviets threatened both their own citi-
zens and the people in the West. At the same time, no arguments which 
might seriously undermine an idealised image of the West were brought 
to pupils’ attention, either by the authors of the textbook or by the teacher 
herself. The last cartoon, used in the homework task, could question 
these ideas, but could also be interpreted as yet another manipulative act 
on the part of the communist regime.
Using the case study of how the Cold War is taught in Poland, we can 
see that both teachers and textbooks emphasise a classical, positivist 
vision of history as a ‘scientific reconstruction’ of the past. Even if text-
books vary in their interpretations of the events, they seem to ignore 
alternative interpretations and omit any historiographical debates. Even 
if a teacher designs her lesson herself, does not strictly follow any text-
book and uses various primary sources, she wants to teach her students 
‘what happened’, not ‘what do historians say’ happened.
Notes
1. The term ‘Recovered Territories’ referred in the communist propaganda to 
the pre-war eastern and northern provinces of Germany (mostly Silesia 
and Pomerania) that the Big Three decided to give Poland after the Second 
World War. The word ‘Recovered’ stressed their ties with Poland in the 
early Middle Ages when the Polish state had been formed (10th-13th 
century).
2. This was more the case in the previous generation of textbooks, published 
at the end of the twentieth and beginning of the twenty-first century 
when some authors tended to justify the communist rule in Poland and 
provided interpretations typical for the post-communist discourse.
3. In some grades of primary school textbooks are sponsored by the state but 
teachers still choose the books from the set approved by the Ministry 
(eventually, in a few years, all primary school pupils should get their text-
books for free). In secondary school pupils (parents) pay for textbooks 
themselves.
4. In Poland, national and international history is combined in one subject 
and in one textbook, but individual sections and chapters usually deal 
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either with Polish or international affairs. The Cold War issues are split 
almost equally between Polish and international affairs.
5. ‘[…] lewicowych bojówek Afroamerykanów, wzywający do fizycznej walki 
o równouprawnie-nie czarnej społeczności Stanów Zjednoczonych’ 
(Dolecki et al. 2012, 289–290).
6. Grzegorz Chomicki presented the Polish Galicia (Austrian partition of 
Poland in the 19th century) as a colony of the Austro-Hungarian Empire 
in his conference paper ‘Galicia in the 19th century in Colonial and Post-
colonial Perspective’, at the Annual Conference of the International 
Society For History Didactics (ISHD) on Colonialism, Decolonization and 
Post-colonial Historical Perspectives  - Challenges for History Didactics and 
History Teaching in a Globalizing World (Tutzing, Germany, 2013). Some 
historians claim that Poland ‘colonised’ Ukrainian and Belarussian territo-
ries east of its borders in the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries.
7. ‘Recently, great changes have occurred in the political system both on the 
international and national level. The changes were caused by a fierce 
attack of the American imperialism which desires to submit the peoples of 
Europe, Asia and the whole world to the power of dollar and to enslave 
them economically and politically. The attack is aimed in the first place at 
the Soviet Union and the countries of people’s democracy. The American 
imperialists started their attack from an attempt to threaten the world 
with the “nuclear war”. Then they proposed the so-called Marshall Plan 
that cynically tries to turn Europe into an American colony.
Further steps of the plan to subjugate Europe include crushing the 
struggle of the French people with the help and under pressure of the 
American capitalists, founding and subordinating Benelux, assembling 
the Western Union, preserving the fascist power in Germany with the 
former hitlerites in charge who act under command and according to the 
imperialist interests. Organising of the anti-Soviet military bloc becomes 
more and more apparent and unmasked’. The text comes from the selec-
tion of sources for teaching history: Sobańska-Bondaruk and Bogusław 
Lenard 1998, 383–385, trans. JW).
8. The task and the caricature of the Marshall Plan cow can be found on one 
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The Cold War in South African History 
Textbooks
Linda Chisholm and David Fig
A remarkable feature of the Cold War is its coincidence with the period 
of apartheid in South Africa, in which it played an important role. This is 
evident in school textbooks, where it is a major topic in the most recent 
years of history. But while there is a growing body of work on the Cold 
War in Africa, there is a very small literature on its manifestation in South 
Africa and, with one exception, nothing on how school textbooks may 
have reinforced or challenged its main precepts.
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Historians of the Cold War have shown that the new wave of ‘Third 
World’ revolutions during the 1960s was central to the history of 
global conflict engendered by the Cold War (Halliday 1986; Westad 
2007, 2017). Moscow and Washington keenly observed the moment 
of the formation of decolonisation movements after World War I and 
after the ending of formal colonisation, supported competing inter-
ests and parties. Although both were rhetorically opposed to colonial-
ism, and held up different models of development for emulation, in 
practice their interventions constituted ‘a continuation of colonialism 
through slightly different means’ (Westad 2007, 5). Westad’s work is 
helpful in showing that their approaches were both rooted in the same 
concept of modernity that was shared by previous generations of 
Europeans. Both believed in change and development as the solution 
to inherited colonial problems. Each promised the expansion of free-
doms through different means. This literature also highlights the role 
of anti-colonial elites, buying into different models for various rea-
sons including strategic and economic considerations and a sense of 
ideological closeness to the chosen ally. In the context of widespread 
poverty and inequality, as well as colonial states whose purposes were 
ill-suited to the visions of their new incumbents for emancipation 
and freedom from economic and social want, the correctness of the 
chosen path was legitimated both morally and politically (Westad 
2007, 387).
Within the last decade, a number of studies have emerged casting 
new light on the Cold War in South Africa. These have been written 
from the perspective of the relationships forged between South Africa 
and its respective liberation movements with Eastern and Western 
powers in the struggle for democracy (Baines and Vale 2008; see for 
example Filatova and Davidson 2013; Houston 2008; Ndlovu 2008; 
Schleicher 2008; Shubin 2008b, 2008a; South African Democracy 
Education Trust (SADET) 2008; Wellmer 2008). They provide valu-
able insight into the nature, complexity and depth of the multi-faceted 
international relationships forged during this period by both the state 
and South African liberation movements in the struggle against apart-
heid. They also highlight the varied initiatives both to support and 
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contest apartheid that developed outside South Africa. But how con-
temporary generations are being introduced to this momentous his-
tory has not been adequately explored, pointing to the need for more 
substantial research in this area. One exception, by Halsall and 
Wassermann, focuses exclusively on the place of Russia in the South 
African curriculum, arguing that little has changed in its treatment 
over time, except in so far as the fear exemplified in the apartheid-era 
textbooks is not evident in their latter-day successors (Halsall & 
Wassermann 2018, 50).
But how has the representation of the Cold War changed since 1994? 
In order to answer this question it is necessary in the first instance briefly 
to consider differences in the final year history curriculum during the 
late-apartheid period and after 1994. In the post-apartheid period the 
curriculum has been revised three times; however, these changes have not 
substantively altered the emphasis on the Cold War in the final year of 
schooling. Although textbooks of the first two iterations of post- apartheid 
curriculum revision could be considered (see for example Bottaro, Visser 
and Worden 2007; Friedman et al. 2007), those textbooks selected for 
closer analysis here are top of the list of provincial textbook purchases 
following the most recent curriculum revision (South Africa, Department 
of Basic Education 2019, 27–28). This means that they are among the 
most used textbooks in schools nationally. Two history textbooks for the 
final year of secondary schooling were selected. After a brief comparison 
of the two textbooks, this chapter will hone in on one of them (Fernandez 
et al. 2013; Pillay, Sikhakhane and West 2013). The approach taken here 
is principally descriptive, pointing out the main interpretational tenden-
cies and omissions.
Our chapter traces the treatment of the Cold War in South African 
textbooks, showing how this has changed. It argues that the most signifi-
cant change since the apartheid period is that the convergence of anti- 
communism with black liberation movements has given way to a 
friendlier approach towards movements for decolonisation and the East 
than was previously evident. In this regard, they broadly ‘autobiogra-
phise’ South Africa’s changing positioning in international relations 
(Christophe and Halder 2018).
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 Curriculum continuities and changes 
pre- and post-1994
As Kallaway has pointed out, the Cold War has been a subject in both the 
pre-1994 as well as the post-1994 senior secondary school curriculum in 
the final year of schooling. Kallaway, however, is less concerned with rep-
resentations of the Cold War in textbooks than with the logic, coherence, 
chronological sequencing and ‘presentism’ of the curriculum, arguing for 
example that failure to provide ‘a comprehensive background to European 
and World History’ leaves students ill-equipped to understand the com-
plexities of the Cold War (Kallaway 2012, 48). Given that textbooks 
present the official curriculum in elaborated form, it is useful to juxtapose 
the 1980 and 2012 syllabi and curricula relating to the Cold War, as they 
inform the textbook representations examined in this chapter.
An important difference is that whereas in the pre-1994 curriculum the 
focus of the Cold War is within a primarily European international context, 
the post-1994 curriculum interlaces this history with the history of racism 
and resistance to racial segregation, African history and South African his-
tory. In as much as South Africa saw itself as part of the Western alliance 
against communism, its curricular representation of this history reflected 
this positioning. In a context where the victors of a post- 1994 settlement 
had actively sought alliances with the East to promote a democratic dissolu-
tion and resolution of South Africa’s racial state, the curriculum reflects this 
more complex positioning of the Cold War within the context of South 
Africa’s struggle for democracy and an end to racism and racial segregation.
While the more detailed specifications in the post-1994 curriculum 
accord more space and content to the role of liberation movements and 
their choices in the Cold War, the curriculum nonetheless specifies a 
treatment of the Cold War as being
characterised by conflict through proxy wars, the manipulation of more vul-
nerable states through extensive military and financial aid, espionage, propa-
ganda, and rivalry over technological space and nuclear races, and sport. 
Besides periods of tense crisis in this bi-polar world, the Cold War deeply 
affected the newly independent countries in Africa and the  liberation strug-
gles in southern Africa from the 1960s until the 1990s, when the USSR was 
dismantled (South Africa, Department of Basic Education 2011, 25).
 L. Chisholm and D. Fig
211
The curriculum requires that ‘blame for the Cold War’ be taught and 
learnt through the presentation of different interpretations and differing 
points of view (ibid., 25). China, Cuba and Vietnam are given as case 
studies. The following section on ‘Independent Africa’ calls for compari-
sons to be drawn between the experiences of the Congo as ‘a tool of the 
Cold War’ whose legacy lives on into the present and the African social-
ism of Tanzania. The kinds of states and leaders that emerged are speci-
fied. This section ends with the way Africa became drawn into the Cold 
War, using Angola as an example. Here the USSR, USA, Cuba, China 
and South Africa became involved militarily (ibid., 27). The curriculum 
requires study of the denouement of the Angolan War in the context of 
the ending of the Cold War and implications for international and 
regional relationships. How then do textbooks represent this version of 
history, that gives more weight to the Cold War in Africa and its relation-
ship to decolonisation than earlier versions had done?
 Representations of the Cold War in Post- 
apartheid Textbooks
Apartheid curricula and textbooks reflected a Cold War mentality in 
which the South African state was in alliance with the West. Some key 
points can be made about interpretations in post-apartheid curricula and 
textbooks. Firstly, these explicitly include the African dimension and 
explore  the connection between the Cold War and decolonisation. 
Secondly, whereas the ‘baddie’ in the apartheid textbooks was commu-
nism, in the post-apartheid period it is the superpowers combined. While 
the diversity of initiatives undertaken in the US to both support and con-
test apartheid tends to be glossed over, a more sympathetic picture is pre-
sented in the new textbooks of the USSR as a friend and ally of liberation 
movements. Thirdly, however, and in the main, a Great Man theory of 
history prevails in the treatment of African liberation movements. Fourthly, 
while the active voice is dominant throughout the texts, it is consistently 
used when referring to the actions of superpowers and inconsistently in 
relation to African liberation movements. The curriculum and both the 
textbooks analysed seldom elaborate on why African liberation move-
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ments may have chosen one side or the other. When this occurs, it is in the 
context of a dependency analysis: ‘Since African countries were in a state 
of development, they would have been tempted to accept military and 
economic assistance from the developed world’ (Pillay et al. 2013, 116).
But there are also differences both between and within textbooks. The 
textbooks selected and analysed follow the curriculum quite closely. In 
the section on the reasons for involvement of the USA, USSR, Cuba, 
China and South Africa in Angola, concepts of indirect rule, non- 
alignment, neo-colonialism and proxy war are highlighted in one text-
book, while the other emphasises key terms such as proxy, faction, pawn 
and zero-sum game (Fernandez et al. 2013, 123–124; Pillay et al. 2013, 
116–117). Independent African states are sometimes presented as victims 
rather than active agents. Thus, Fernandez et al. tell students that they ‘will 
examine how the superpowers, namely the USA and USSR, used the 
newly-independent African states for their own selfish reasons’. African 
agency is portrayed relative to the role Africans see themselves as playing 
on the international stage (Fernandez et al. 2013, 77). Cuba, too, is seen 
not as acting on its own behalf, and sometimes in conflict with the USSR, 
as Westad shows, but as ‘intervening on behalf of the communist super-
powers’ (Fernandez et al. 2013, 123). The colonial dimension of the Cold 
War is suggested in the statement that ‘the granting of independence to 
African countries opened up the African continent to the USA and 
USSR’ with the aim of ‘securing control over the resources, territory and 
people’. Moreover: ‘Often a country […] existed as an extension of that 
superpower’ (Fernandez et  al. 2013, 124). In Angola, the People’s 
Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popular de Libertação 
de Angola, MPLA) ‘was kept alive’ by the support of the USSR (Fernandez 
et  al. 2013, 128), while the anti-communist National Front (Frente 
Nacional de Libertação de Angola, FNLA) had attracted the help of the 
USA and of the People’s Republic of China, and the National Union for 
the Total Independence of Angola (União Nacional para a Independência 
Total de Angola, UNITA) had received aid from the Chinese and South 
Africans. How Cuba came to be involved is blurred in the sentence that 
‘by 1963 Angolans were receiving training from Cubans’ (Fernandez 
et  al. 2013, 137). Combined with the Great Man Theory of history 
employed, the relationship between leaders and followers is not examined 
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nor are the reasons for political choices made, and the subtleties of 
engagement and conflict among alliance partners are ignored. The text-
book thus adds to African history but also simplifies it.
Pillay et al. combine the Great Man Theory of history with a narrative 
of heroic resistance. The Congo is also presented, as prescribed by the 
curriculum, as a tool of the Cold War and there is quantitatively more 
information on the superpowers than on the perspectives and approaches 
of MPLA, FNLA and UNITA (Pillay et al. 2013). Generally written in 
the active voice, there is a lapse when explaining how ‘Tanzania came to 
be subjected to a one-party state’ (Pillay et al. 2013, 131). However, this 
textbook does reveal subtleties of interpretation not present in Fernandez 
et  al. It acknowledges, for example, that for several reasons ‘Southern 
Africa was never a high priority on the agenda of the Soviet Union’, thus 
also showing the shift in emphasis from the anti-communist narrative of 
the apartheid period to one more sensitive and alert to new historiogra-
phies on South Africa’s historical relationship with Russia and the Soviet 
Union (Filatova 2008; Pillay et al. 2013, 378; Shubin 2008a).
Although the curriculum provides the general framework within which 
the textbooks are written, the textbook representations tend firstly to 
show some differences, such as for example in the treatment by Fernandez 
et al. of apartheid South Africa as independent from the Cold War, and 
the degree of subtlety and complexity of relationships between actors, but 
also some commonalities in their positioning of African liberation move-
ments. Here too, however, the picture is not unambiguous. While the 
curriculum provides more information about African history and involve-
ment in the Cold War, the approach is limited by the overwhelming 
emphasis on the role of leaders as great men representing differences of 
approach, and by the positioning of African liberation movements, not as 
actively choosing and shaping their involvements on the basis of assumed 
ideological or other commonalities, but as being tools and instruments of 
others. When Africans are presented as agents of their own history, as in 
the case of South Africa’s struggle for democracy, the Cold War is invisible.
A closer examination of one of these textbooks is useful in illustrating 
the overall narrative and representation of the roles of the USA, USSR and 
South Africa during the Cold War (Pillay et al. 2013). The textbook begins 
and ends with this specific conflict. South Africa’s involvement in the Cold 
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War is only really brought in at the end, suggesting that Africa somehow 
stood outside the conflict. The first section, on the ‘Origins of the Cold 
War’, describes the Cold War in terms of the relationship between the 
USA and USSR before and after the Second World War. Their ideological 
differences are seen as key. Thus, ‘historians hold different viewpoints and 
interpretations about the origins of the Cold War, but […] due to ideo-
logical differences between the two superpowers tension and a mutual 
distrust became known as the ‘Cold War’ (Pillay et al. 2013, 2). The politi-
cal and economic organisation of the two societies around the two very 
different ideals of democracy and capitalism are also described. Reasons 
for the Soviet mistrust of the West and the West’s mistrust of the USSR are 
presented. The wartime conferences of Teheran (1943), Yalta (1945) and 
Potsdam (1945) trace the agreements between the ‘Big Three’. In a section 
on the creation of ‘Spheres of Interest’, the nature and reasons for ‘the 
installation of Soviet-friendly regimes in satellite states’ is explored, the 
reaction of the West is described, and the USA’s subsequent policy of con-
tainment via the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan are spelt out. Events 
in Greece, Turkey and Iran ‘prompted the USA into taking action to com-
bat the spread of communism. The USA feared that the Eastern 
Mediterranean would also fall under communist control. They therefore 
adopted a policy of containment’. Consequences of the Marshall Plan and 
responses to it in both the USA and USSR (the formation of Cominform 
and Comecon) are underscored, including the debate in the USA Congress 
on the matter as well as sources relating to the Truman doctrine and 
Marshall Plan. The Berlin blockade and Western responses to it and the 
continuation of Berlin as a focal point of the Cold War are sketched. 
Kennedy’s speech on 26 June 1963 is presented as a source for analysis. 
The formation of NATO and the Warsaw Pact are considered. Following 
a section on the Cuban Missile Crisis the book asks who was to blame for 
the Cold War and answers this question in terms of three dominant per-
spectives: the orthodox view, revisionist/new left perspectives and post-
revisionist stances. The ‘orthodox view’ sees it as a result of Soviet 
aggression, the revisionists ‘placed the blame for the start of the Cold War 
on the USA, rather than the Soviet Union’, while the post-revisionists 
‘tried to show that both sides had their faults’ (Pillay et al. 2013, 32). The 
extension of the Cold War into China and Vietnam is detailed.
 L. Chisholm and D. Fig
215
Between this section on the origins of the Cold War and the final section 
on the end of the conflict and the new world order, the textbook deals with 
comparative case studies of the rise of independent Africa (Congo and 
Tanzania), civil society protests from the 1950s to the 1970s (women’s lib-
eration, feminism and the US civil rights movement), civil resistance in 
South Africa from the 1970s to the 1980s, and the coming of democracy 
to South Africa with the processes of coming to terms with the past that this 
entailed. Within the section on independent Africa, the impact of internal 
and external factors in the form of the challenge of ethnicity, the Cold War 
and neo-colonialism are explored, as are the roles of the USSR, USA, Cuba, 
China and South Africa. Thus, ‘during the Cold War both the USA and 
USSR attempted to increase their influence in Africa […] The USA and 
USSR challenged and threatened each other for political influence, trade 
and military bases in Africa, for example in Angola’ (Pillay et al. 2013, 117).
The USA’s involvement in Angola is presented as being ‘to secure vital 
raw materials and to prevent the spread of communism’ whereas the 
USSR ‘realised that African countries were interested in projects for devel-
opment and hence they concluded trading agreements, gave technical 
assistance and provided capital for investment and weapons’ (Pillay et al. 
2013, 118). A box of quotations on the reasons for the interest of the USA 
and USSR in Africa points overwhelmingly to ‘selfish’ reasons ‘to preserve 
their own interests’ and gain access to Africa’s raw materials. ‘Kissinger’, 
one quotation runs, ‘saw the countries and regions of the Third World in 
Africa only against the problem of maintaining an American-Soviet bal-
ance of power’ (Pillay et al. 2013, 119). In the Angola case-study, reasons 
for the involvement of the USSR, USA, Cuba, China and South Africa 
are also provided: details are given about the USSR’s military support of 
the MPLA (later to become the ruling party), while the USA’s covert sup-
port of the rival UNITA is presented as being suspicious of ‘nationalist 
movements with a socialist orientation’. Reagan’s prioritisation of Africa 
when he became president in 1981 was to allow the US ‘to serve as an 
intermediary between Angola and South Africa on the issue of Namibian 
independence’ (Pillay et al. 2013, 127). South Africa’s interest in Angola 
is situated squarely within its own perception of the USSR as a hostile 
power that threatened the region and South Africa’s own control over 
Namibia. South Africa thus became involved in the Angolan War ‘because 
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of the threat posed to South West Africa by the MPLA’s rapid expansion’ 
(Pillay et  al. 2013, 128). The devastation of the region by this multi-
power influence is counterposed by a photograph of Princess Diana com-
forting landmine victims (129). The section ends with quotations from a 
smiling Nelson Mandela, the hand of Fidel Castro resting on his shoulder, 
about the significance of the battle of Cuito Canavale, which the South 
Africans lost, for the struggle for Southern African liberation (Pillay et al. 
2013, 130). This battle, fought in Angola in 1988, was decisive in shifting 
the balance of forces in the region in favour of the Angolan army, aided by 
Cuba, the Soviet Union and East Germany and against UNITA, sup-
ported by the South African Defence Force.
In the following section on Civil Society Protests from the 1950s to 
the 1960s, the role of women’s liberation and feminist movements in 
industrialised countries and in South Africa, as well as the US Civil Rights 
Movement and a case study of the Black Panther movement are high-
lighted. The section ends with an overview of ‘The Progress Made Towards 
Racial Equality’, with photographs of Barack Obama, Oprah Winfrey 
and Muhammad Ali shown to ‘bear testimony to how the Civil Rights 
Movement has enabled some African Americans to be successful’ (Pillay 
et al. 2013, 200). The next section on ‘Civil Resistance in South Africa’ is 
contextualised in terms of the ‘Total Onslaught’ South Africa saw itself as 
facing mainly due to communist intervention, and the ‘Total Strategy’ 
embarked upon as official policy to attempt to control resistance. The 
anti-apartheid struggle inside and outside South Africa is dealt with by 
reference to the rise and role of opposition underground, in prison and in 
exile, and the role and legacy of the Black Consciousness movement in 
South African politics. No explicit links are drawn with the Civil Rights 
and Black Panther movements in the United States; nor are the range of 
anti-apartheid initiatives in the USA referred to later on (for this history 
see Grant 2017). The crisis of apartheid in the 1980s details the role of 
internal resistance to attempted reforms of the system during the 1980s, 
highlighting the role of the growing trade union movement and emer-
gence of new forms of civic mobilisation as well as the international anti- 
apartheid movement and its sports, consumer and cultural campaign, 
and boycotts. Neither the USA nor the USSR play a part in this story. 
Although there is substantial evidence of the role played by the West in 
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the process, they and other international players are similarly absent from 
the account of the negotiations, lasting from 1990 to 1994, when demo-
cratic elections were held. Their role is only brought in right at the end, 
in a separate section on the end of the Cold War.
The end of the conflict is explicitly brought into play in the final section 
of the textbook. The specific relationship of the Cold War to South Africa 
is brought out firstly in South African propaganda that the country was a 
‘stable, civilised and indispensable member of the “free world” that 
opposed international communism’ (Pillay et al. 2013, 377), and secondly 
in the support given by the Soviet Union and especially East Germany to 
the African National Congress (ANC). However, it also makes clear that 
Nelson Mandela and Oliver Tambo were not communists, despite their 
close relationship with the South African Communist Party (Pillay et al. 
2013, 378). The narrative points to the role of international economic 
pressure and specifically the US Congress in imposing limited sanctions 
against South Africa. But there is no reference to the wider anti-apartheid 
campaigns in the USA. Africa is presented as having become ‘caught up in 
the Cold War confrontation between the USA and the Soviet Union’. 
More detail is provided of the Cold War in southern Africa during the 
1980s and the involvement of the USSR and USA in Angola, which 
became ‘a sideshow of the Cold War’ (Pillay et al. 2013, 383). The USA 
assured UNITA, ‘to contain the spread of communism around the world 
and because the Angolan government was perceived to be communist’, of 
its support ‘in its attempt to overthrow the regime’ (Pillay et  al. 2013, 
383). Source activities are again provided on the battle of Cuito Canavale, 
including quotations from Ronnie Kasrils, a high- ranking former mem-
ber of Umkhonto we Sizwe, the military wing of the ANC, and by the US 
Secretary of State for Africa, Chester Crocker. The collapse of the Soviet 
Union and fall of the Berlin Wall ensured, according to the textbook, that 
‘the ANC could no longer rely on Soviet support, and the NP could no 
longer pretend to be a bulwark against the spread of communism in Africa’ 
(Pillay et al. 2013, 387). In the context of the rise of a new world order, in 
which the multilateral institutions of the World Bank, IMF and WTO 
play an important role in a new ‘global apartheid’, the textbook highlights 
the role of Greenpeace and the potential of the BRIC countries as ‘emerg-
ing economies and different forms of capitalism’ (Pillay et al., 2013, 404).
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 Conclusion
While previous studies have paid considerable attention to representa-
tions of the history of apartheid in South Africa, both in history text-
books of the apartheid period and in more recent material, less attention 
has been paid to ‘international history’ and the links between interna-
tional, African and South African history. Ironically, to place the impor-
tance of South Africa’s role in the Cold War in some context, in his recent 
world history of the Cold War, even Westad devotes only a few cursory 
paragraphs to South Africa in a work of 700 pages (Westad, 2017). This 
chapter has attempted to address this imbalance and focus on a hitherto- 
neglected area of the analysis of South African history textbooks. The 
anti-communist bias of earlier apartheid textbooks has been replaced by, 
it has been argued, a friendlier approach towards the Soviet Union, while 
the role of the USA has by contrast been over-simplified in so far as the 
spectrum of actions and campaigns to illustrate US domestic contesta-
tion over apartheid is arguably inadequately represented. In addition, the 
portrayals of Africa and Africans has changed. Although granted greater 
prominence than before, and despite being made much more central to 
the unfolding history of the time, Africa and Africans are contradictorily 
seen, on the one hand, as passive victims of the superpowers and, on the 
other, as fighters for freedom, imbued with agency and initiative.
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The Cold War had a significant political and social impact in the Southern 
Cone between the 1950s and the 1980s. As has been documented by his-
torians, during those years almost all Latin American countries underwent 
military dictatorships that drastically changed the social, economic and 
political development of each society and shaped their history until the 
present (Franco & Levín 2007; Loveman 2001; Lira 2013; Hiner 2009; 
Stern 2006). The military dictatorships committed severe human rights 
violations in the region, which were even strengthened with the establish-
ment of a state terror that was orchestrated among several national repres-
sion and intelligence organisations with the collaboration of the United 
States’ CIA. This repressive coalition, in which Chilean, Argentinian, 
Brazilian, Paraguayan and Uruguayan military dictatorships were involved, 
was called the ‘Condor Operation’ (Loveman 2001). As a consequence of 
these dictatorships in the region, Latin American  countries share national 
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memories of a traumatic past of human rights violations. This recent past 
has been historicised and recontextualised in different ways in local history 
textbooks and with diverse levels of hegemony regarding the competing 
official and alternative memories that circulate in each society.1
In the particular case of Chile, a violent coup d’état that overthrew the 
socialist government of Salvador Allende in 1973 signalled the beginning of 
17 years of dictatorship led by General Augusto Pinochet (1973–1990). For 
the Chilean historical process and for all Latin American countries, the his-
tory of the Cold War has been a history of economic and political depen-
dence on ‘the North’. As Harmer stresses in relation to Allende’s socialist 
Popular Unit and to Latin America as a whole, the division of the world was 
not between East and West, as was the case for many European countries, 
but rather between the global North and the global South (Harmer 2011).
As the Cold War has permeated the recent Latin American past, we believe 
that it is relevant to study the way by which the memory of this period is 
negotiated in Chilean official history textbooks, particularly how those texts 
address the period of dictatorships in Latin America and the role that the 
United States played in this process. In Chile, the traumatic recent past of a 
coup d’état and the human rights violations committed by Augusto Pinochet’s 
military dictatorship is still a space of competing collective memories. The 
memories that coexist in Chile and that give value and explanation to a pain-
ful past can be conceptualised as key emblematic memories, as Stern (2006) 
has proposed. In this manner, for different sectors of Chilean society the 
events that began on the 11th September are remembered as (i) a ‘salvation’ 
from a supposed Marxist dictatorship; (ii) as a ‘rupture’ of a democratic 
period; (iii) as a ‘closed box’ of a past that should be forgotten; and (iv) as a 
memory of ‘persecution and awakening’ (Stern 2006).
This chapter pays special attention to the historical actors, events and 
processes identified in the textbook discourse and how they are evaluated 
in the construction of a historical recount of a conflictive matter  regarding 
the recent past of the region, a past that is still open to debate. Its does so 
via a discourse analysis anchored in a social, ideological and socio- semiotic 
perspective.
History textbooks as ‘official semiotic products’ offer a valuable space in 
which to understand how a society decides to remember and teach the 
national and international past to new generations. In Chile, the Ministry of 
Education holds a contest every year, in which the main textbook publishers 
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compete to improve upon on the official history textbook to be distributed 
for free in more than 90 per cent of schools ‘co-existing’ in the Chilean edu-
cational system; that is, schools that are subsidised or partly subsidised by the 
government. Consequently, in the Chilean context, the history textbook is an 
important pedagogical resource that is widely used by teachers and students 
in classes (Manghi & Badilla 2015; Oteíza & Pinuer 2016; Oteíza et  al. 
2015, 2018; Oteíza 2018).
For this particular chapter we analyse the latest 11th-grade history text-
book published, since this is the grade level in which, in accordance with 
the national history curriculum, the recent national past is taught. The two 
units of the national history curriculum considered in this analysis are: 
“The Period of Structural Transformations: Chile in the Sixties and 
Seventies” and “The Breakdown of Democracy and the Military 
Dictatorship” (MINEDUC 2015).2 The next section presents a brief 
account of how Chilean history textbooks have evolved in relation to the 
construction and legitimation of the national past in the last two decades. 
The third section explores the discursive analytical framework in which this 
work is based, followed by an analysis and discussion of the Chilean official 
history textbook and how it negotiates memories of the Cold War in the 
fourth section. The last section addresses the official construction of social 
processes of remembering and teaching recent past in the Chilean context.
 History textbooks in Chile: Between the 
Dynamics of Social Change and the Official 
Voice of the State
Official Chilean history textbooks constitute a privileged space in which 
social memories are constructed and negotiated (Oteíza & Achugar 2018). 
These are part of a social practice that is realised discursively, for the most 
part using verbal and visual semiotic resources. Chilean history textbooks 
have been characterised by a discourse of denunciation, commemoration 
and victimisation based on evidence primarily collected in the official 
reports promoted by post-dictatorial state policies regarding human rights 
violations committed during Pinochet’s dictatorship (Oteíza 2006, 2014).
The educational reform in Chile (1999), during the period of democratic 
transition after Pinochet’s dictatorship (1973–1990), had a significant impact 
11 Dictatorship and the Cold War in Official Chilean History… 
224
on the transformation of the history curriculum in the country (Reyes et al. 
2013; Rubio 2013). As Osandón (2013) and Oteíza (2006) point out, the 
change in the curriculum can be seen in official textbooks, not only with 
regard to the topics addressed in relation to recent national history, for exam-
ple the sensitive topic of human rights violations, but also in the methodol-
ogy. The latter promotes a more autonomous exploration by students, 
requiring them to work with a variety of primary and secondary sources. 
Before the main educational reform of 1999, the national history of Chile 
ended with the promulgation of a national junta in 1973. The coup d’état 
and the human rights violations committed by Augusto Pinochet’s dictator-
ship were not included as historical content in the curriculum, thus remain-
ing absent from the official history textbooks published before 2000.
In Chile, the textbook market is conditioned by a supply and demand 
monopolised by the Ministry of Education, the latter being the largest 
customer and the authority deciding printing policies and price. While no 
educational establishment is actually required by law to buy and use the 
textbooks that the Ministry approves and distributes, the fact that these are 
distributed free of charge to more than 90 per cent of the  country’s educa-
tional establishments fundamentally determines their use (Oteíza 2006).3
The history curriculum, as well as history textbooks, have been influ-
enced by the dynamics of social change regarding recent memoires of 
human rights violations in Chile. The publications known as the ‘Rettig 
Report’, produced and promoted by the Chilean Government’s National 
Commission of Truth and Reconciliation (1991) and the ‘Valech Report’ 
by the National Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture 
(2004 and 2011) have had a significant impact on how Chilean history 
textbooks portray the dictatorship and human rights violations commit-
ted by organs of state repression (Oteíza 2014). Secondary level history 
textbooks published in 2012 and 2013, for example, explicitly state that 
the ‘terror campaign’ against leftist parties in the country was supported 
economically by the United States through the CIA. Additionally, after a 
strong dispute between left-wing and right-wing political actors, the term 
‘dictatorship’ was accepted as a valid label for what had previously been 
called the ‘military government’ (Oteíza & Achugar 2018). The critical 
changes to social and political processes in Chile and their impact on the 
national history curriculum and thus official history textbooks are repre-
sented in the following table.4
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 Sociosemiotic and ideological discourse 
analysis: valuing the historical experience
We conducted a discourse analysis of history textbooks taking into con-
sideration the lexical and grammatical resources that authors use to nego-
tiate interpersonal and ideational meanings. We paid special attention to 
the ways in which historical actors, events, processes and situations are 
constructed in the textbook analysed. As we have pointed out in previous 
work (Oteíza & Pinuer 2012), the discourse of history, as a social science 
that seeks to comprehend the complexity of human societies from a 
 diachronic point of view, can be seen through the key domains of causal-
ity, temporo-spatial dimension and evidentiality.
In the analysis of history discourses, these dimensions are relevant to 
how individual and collective historical actors build historical events and 
processes in a certain time and space in the past. In the following dia-
gram, therefore, we illustrate how the ‘actoral axis’ is combined with the 
‘processual axis’ in this discourse.
Our analysis employs the appraisal system, developed as part of the 
discourse-semantic level of Systemic Functional Linguistics theory 
(Martin & White 2005; Oteíza & Pinuer 2012) for the analysis of the 
historical participants, events and processes that history textbooks deploy 
to negotiate the memory of the Cold War in the Chilean and Latin 
American recent past.
The disputes over recent national memories are ideological battles. 
Appraisal is a suitable theoretical resource that helps us to understand 
the evaluative character of memories as selective processes of remember-
ing and forgetting, by which a society constructs more or less hegemonic 
positionings regarding the recent national and regional past of trau-
matic dictatorships (Stern 2006; Lira 2013; Jelin 2002; Ricoeur 2010; 
Wertsch 2002).
The appraisal system provides a comprehensive and descriptive 
 systematisation of the linguistic resources authors can use to construct 
the value of social experience (Martin & White 2005). Consequently, 
this analysis contributes to our understanding of the patterns of inter-
personal meanings that build, in this case, a historical experience as a 
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text unfolds. These interpersonal negotiations of meaning work in a 
cumulative manner in a discourse creating determinate value positions 
between writers and readers.
The appraisal system organises interpersonal meanings into three 
main semantic areas: attitude, graduation and engagement (Martin 
& White 2005). The area of attitude deals with feelings considered as 
systems of meaning socially organised as emotions (affect), ethics or 
morality (judgement) and aesthetic values (appreciation). These evalua-
tions of attitude can be built with a positive or negative charge, which 
can also be portrayed as inscribed (explicit) or evoked (implicit) instances 
in the discourse. The organisation of these types of evaluations with 
regard to the discourse entities appraised is shown in Table 11.2.
The region of meaning of affect considers the possibility of feelings that 
an emoter directs towards or expresses in reaction to some specific emo-
tional trigger that can be present or past. Feelings can also involve inten-
tion, rather than reaction, in relation to a stimulus that is irrealis rather 
than realis (Oteíza 2017a). Thus, affect can be classified as in/security, dis/
satisfaction or un/happiness, but also as dis/inclination as desire or fear, 
when the stimulus is irrealis, as in ‘the triumph of the Cuban revolution 
was considered by the United States as a threat to their interests’.5
The semantic domain of judgement pertains to the institutionalisation 
of feelings in terms of proposals or norms about how people should or 
should not behave. According to Martin and White (2005) this area of 
meaning can be divided into social esteem, which comprises admiration 
and criticism regarding values of normality, capacity and tenacity; and of 
social sanction, which involves praise and condemnation regarding values 
of veracity and propriety. An instance of an evoked positive social esteem 
pertaining to the capacity of president Salvador Allende, for example, can 
be seen in: ‘Salvador Allende’s rise to power, leader of the Chilean left …’6.
Table 11.2 Attitudinal meanings in relation to entities appraised in the field of 
history
Discourse entity appraised Meanings of attitude
Historical actors judgement
affect
Historical events, situations and processes appreciation
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The evaluative space of graduation refers to the fact that expressions 
of attitude can be intensified or weakened, and in doing so, can construct 
different levels of alignment with the value positions deployed in the text 
(Martin & White 2005). The area or subsystem of engagement is con-
sidered in the framework to explore the source of attitudes; that is, to 
identify whether the text is relying mainly on the author’s voice, con-
structing a monoglossic orientation or a ‘single voiced’ text that presents 
facts and ideas as taken-for-granted, and thus closing down the dialogic 
space; or if the authorial voice actually recognises alternative positions 
creating an heteroglossic space regarding specific evaluations.
For the discourse analysis we follow the main categories of affect and 
judgement proposed by Martin and White (2005) to examine the differ-
ent regions of attitude in the discourse. Nevertheless, we incorporate 
the appreciation analytical categories offered by Oteíza and Pinuer (2012) 
and Oteíza (2017a, b) to better understand how historical events, situa-
tions and processes are evaluated in the history textbook. The categories 
of power, impact, integrity and conflict allow us to explain in a more ade-
quate manner how the specific ideational meanings, as shown in 
Figure 11.1 and constructed by the authors in the historical account, are 
Fig. 11.1 Representation of actors, events, processes and situations in historical 
discourses
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valued in the discourse. These four categories in combination and with 
different levels of negative or positive value polarity can build discourses 
of historical legitimation or delegitimation, as is briefly explained and 
illustrated by the following paragraphs.
The category of conflict deals with the manifestation of a social, politi-
cal and/or economic tension that can be expressed with different grades 
of radicalism along a cline, such as in the inscribed and graduated  negative 
evaluation of high conflict of the diplomatic relations between the mili-
tary junta and the United States during Pinochet’s dictatorship: 
‘Diplomatic relations became especially tense when the military junta 
reaffirmed its willingness to establish a long-term authoritarian regime’. 
The category of power is associated with the action and influence of pow-
erful and dominant groups (Oteíza & Pinuer 2012; Oteíza 2017a, b). We 
can appreciate the realisation of this meaning as a high economic, mili-
tary and political power enforced by the United States’ intervention in 
Latin America, for example: ‘In addition to the enormous amount of 
resources that this country assigned to operations of sabotage and politi-
cal propaganda, the dictatorships were promoted by military men 
trained in the US’.
Integrity refers to moral or ethical evaluations. An example of this cat-
egory is the evoked positive evaluation of integrity of the historical event 
of Allende’s election to the presidency: ‘Salvador Allende’s rise to power, 
leader of the Chilean left, through a democratic election…”. The last 
category of impact deals with the importance and social value that authors 
attribute to historical events, processes or situations in the discourse, such 
as the positive appreciation of impact regarding socialism evoked in: 
‘many political organisations in the region saw socialism as a possibility 
to achieve economic growth and social development’. These four cate-
gories of appreciation are shown in Figure 11.2:
We have briefly presented the framework of appraisal as an analytical 
tool that allows us to explore how ideological positionings are constructed in 
a particular discursive practice through the identification of the entities 
appraised, of who or what is constructed in the discourse as a source of evalu-
ation, and the type of evaluation: judgement, affect, appreciation. We consider 
evaluation as a set of values and beliefs that to a certain extent inform social 
practices, semiotically mediated. Many of these discursive practices circulate 
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as naturalisations promoted by the interests of hegemonic and powerful 
groups. In this manner, ‘ideologies constitute spaces of unequal distribution 
of semiotic resources of a community, as well as the reproduction of hege-
monic and counter-hegemonic discourses’ (Oteíza 2017b: 146).
In the next section we present a discursive analysis of two units of the 
11th grade official history textbook published in Chile by the Ministry of 
Education in 2017, paying special attention to how the historical process 
of the Cold War is negotiated by authors in this pedagogical recontextu-
alisation of the national and Latin American recent past.
 From a Polarised Vision of East and West 
to an Inter-America polarisation
The selected fragments of the history textbooks analysed were part of the 
history units entitled: ‘the period of structural transformations: Chile in 
the sixties and the seventies’ and ‘the breakdown of democracy and the 
military dictatorship’. The proposed general learning outcome stated in 
Fig. 11.2 System of appreciaton for analysing events, processes and situations 
(Oteíza and Pinuer 2012; Oteíza 2017a)
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the Chilean curricula establishes the development of the two necessary 
skills for analysing and valuing different points of view regarding the 
recent national past: a) to critically analyse and compare different politi-
cal views and historiographical interpretations of the past that led to the 
crisis of 1973 and the democratic breakdown, and b) to characterise the 
main features of the coup and the military dictatorship in Chile, includ-
ing the systematic violation of human rights, the political violence, and 
the suppression of the rule of law (MINEDUC 2015:38).
The United States’ longstanding relationship with Latin 
America as disrupted by the Cuban Revolution (1959) and 
the rise to power of left-wing Salvador Allende (1970)
The unit entitled ‘the period of structural transformations’, covers 
national Chilean history and how it is shaped in the local and global 
contexts between the 1950s and the 1980s.
The main text can be classified as a history genre in which participants, 
processes and events are organised in a chronological manner and in terms 
of a simple construction of causality. The principal participants included 
and evaluated with more prominence in this unit are the United States, 
Latin America, Cuba and world geopolitical blocs. The historical events 
and processes highlighted are the Cuban Revolution of 1959, the Cold 
War, and the propagation of communist and Marxist ideology in the region.
As mentioned above, the United States is clearly depicted as the main 
protagonist of this historical account. The ‘country from the north’ is the 
participant who thinks, desires, influences and worries about Latin America. 
The United States clearly represents here a powerful country that has both 
the power and the means to decide and act politically, economically and 
militarily across the region. It receives a positive appraisal with appreciation 
of great power throughout the unit. The Soviet Union is presented in a 
secondary role, siding with the Cuban Revolution and Fidel Castro, both 
representative of the threat or of the risk of the spread of Marxist ideology 
in the region. The Cuban Revolution plays an important role in the con-
struction of the historical argument, as will be shown in the examples 
below. At the end of the unit, the United States is portrayed as partially 
responsible for the installation of the dictatorships in Latin America and for 
the brutal human rights violations that characterised these regimes.
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Example 1:
In the context of the Cold War, the United States intensified the ties that 
traditionally made it closer to Latin America through the establishment 
of mechanisms of mutual cooperation, economic intervention and 
military support. (SM 2017: 147)
En el contexto de la Guerra Fría, Estados Unidos intensificó los víncu-
los que tradicionalmente lo estrechaban con América Latina, a través del 
establecimiento de mecanismos de cooperación mutua, intervención 
económica y apoyo militar.
As Example 1 shows, the relationship between the United States and Latin 
America is portrayed positively as countries that have collaborated with each 
other ‘traditionally’ and that have ‘intensified’ their ties in the context of the 
Cold War. Later in the text authors reinforce this idea of ‘mutual’ coopera-
tion in which Latin America participates. However, this positive appraisal of 
judgment of capacity that is attributed to the United States from a mono-
glossic orientation renders the relationship between the two regions uneven, 
since it is the United States that has the power ‘to intervene’ economically in 
Latin America and give military support. Latin America as a historical par-
ticipant in this narrative possesses less economic and military power and is 
on the receiving end of this ‘support’ from ‘the country of the north’.
The text then emphasises how the liberal and right-wing government 
of Jorge Alessandri and Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei were part of 
this process; the close relationship with the United States underwent sev-
eral important economic and social reforms. At the same time, the text 
states that the United States perceived the rise to power of socialist 
Salvador Allende, presented as part of this period of changes under the 
Cold War, as a threat by the United States, as illustrated in Example 2:
Example 2:
The rise to power of Salvador Allende, leader of the Chilean left, through 
a democratic election, was interpreted by the United States as a threat. 
(SM 2017: 147)
La llegada al gobierno de Salvador Allende, líder de la izquierda 
chilena, mediante una elección democrática, fue interpretada por 
Estados Unidos como una amenaza.
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Interestingly enough, the fact that Allende was elected president of Chile 
has an evoked positive appraisal of integrity, ‘through a democratic elec-
tion’, a fact not mentioned regarding the other two previously elected right-
wing and centre presidents of the period, suggesting that democratic 
integrity is an implicit given to the two previously mentioned presidents. 
Allende, as ‘leader of the Chilean left’, is presented as an active participant 
evaluated with a positive judgment of political capacity. However, as a 
‘threat’, Allende is evaluated with an inscribed negative appraisal of affect as 
fear by the United States, a participant portrayed by authors with the active 
role of being able to give opinions and to express concern in the discourse.
The Cold War is presented, as is often the case, as a polarisation in 
which ‘global geopolitical blocs of support and rejection’ sided with the 
United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In this con-
text, Latin America is portrayed as being influenced by the United States 
and by having a long-standing mutual relationship of cooperation. 
However, Salvador Allende is constructed as the source of a fear that 
compromises the social and political order in the region. Later in the text, 
the Cuban Revolution is evoked as a new economic and social opportu-
nity for the development of the region (Example 3):
Example 3:
However, after the triumph of the Cuban revolution in 1959, many 
political organisations in the region saw socialism as an opportunity to 
achieve economic growth and social development. (SM 2017: 150)
No obstante, tras el triunfo de la revolución cubana en 1959, muchas 
organizaciones políticas de la región vieron en el socialismo una posibili-
dad para lograr el crecimiento económico y el desarrollo social.
All multilateral treaties between the United States and their allies in 
the region of Latin America7 and, most of all, the economic influence of 
the United States over the region, were therefore in danger. The Cuban 
revolution implicated a new way of managing the economic and social 
growth that this ‘Third World’ needed in order to overcome poverty and 
its situation as underdeveloped countries. This idea is not stated outright 
in Example 3 but rather implied with the use of a counter-expectative 
conjunction ‘however’, which signals a dialogic contraction.
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The authors of the history unit also stress the ‘mutual assistance’ 
between the United States and Latin America. This relationship is pre-
sented with a positive evaluation of appreciation that is highly graduated 
by scope in time and space. It is also presented as a given situation in the 
region ‘since the nineteenth century’, and ‘traditionally’ by ‘all’ countries 
in Latin America that signed the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal 
Assistance and the Organization of American States (SM 2017, 150–151).
In the next section, the textbook authors address the Cuban revolution 
and its ideological positioning. Fidel Castro, as the leader of the ‘insurrec-
tional movement’ and of the Cuban ‘rebel army’, is portrayed with positive 
evaluations of capacity in the discourse, and as a leader who took action to 
expropriate ‘important companies, especially American ones’. This brief 
mention of Castro’s political and economic action in Cuba is interrupted 
by the depiction of the political alliances in the region and the apprehen-
sion that these reforms caused in the United States, as shown in Example 4:
Example 4:
As a result of these measures and the progressive contact between Fidel 
Castro and the local Communist Party, relations between Cuba and the 
Soviet Union become stronger. On the other hand, the government of 
the United States, increasingly concerned about the course of the Cuban 
situation, considered overthrowing the newly installed regime. In 
December 1961, Fidel Castro declared his adhesion to Marxism, which 
ultimately defined the Cuban situation within the global context. (SM 
2017: 151)
Como consecuencia de estas medidas y del progresivo contacto entre 
Fidel Castro y el Partido Comunista local, las relaciones entre Cuba y la 
Unión Soviética se estrecharon. Por contraparte, el gobierno de Estados 
Unidos, cada vez más preocupado por el rumbo de la situación cubana, 
consideró derribar al régimen recién instalado. En diciembre de 1961, 
Fidel Castro declaró su adhesión al marxismo, lo que terminó por definir 
la situación cubana dentro del contexto global.
As we perceive in Example 4, the text continues to portray the social 
and political power and influence exerted by the Cuban revolution in the 
region from a monoglossic authorial positioning, constructing a simple 
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causality for the tightening of the relationship between the Soviet Union 
and Cuba (‘as a result of these measures’). In Example 5, the authors 
change the monoglossic orientation to a heteroglossic one, introducing a 
negative evaluation and of appreciation giving voice to many parties and 
movements of the left regarding liberal democracy promoted by the 
north. Nevertheless, in addition to this positive appreciation of power 
and impact of the Cuban Revolution (‘triumph’), the authors imply a 
negative appreciation of integrity towards these parties and movements, 
due to the risk that an ‘armed way’ represents to the rest of the region:
Example 5:
The triumph of the revolution in a territory so close to the United States 
and in a regional context of profound economic, social and political 
changes was exemplary for many parties and movements of the left, 
which declared their aversion to liberal democracy and leaned towards 
the armed way of access to power. (SM 2017: 151)
El triunfo de la revolución en un territorio tan cercano a Estados 
Unidos y en un contexto regional de profundos cambios económicos, 
sociales y políticos, resultó ejemplar para muchos partidos y movimien-
tos de izquierda, los que declararon su aversión a la democracia liberal y 
se inclinaron por la vía armada de acceso al poder.
The Cuban Revolution is constructed as a ‘threat’ to what the United 
States ‘desire’ for the Latin American region. In Example 5 the authors 
present the only instance in which the parties and movements of the left 
have a voice in the discourse, expressing their ‘aversion’ to the liberal 
democracy promoted by the United States with an inscribed appraisal of 
negative affect of unhappiness. As in previous instances in the discourse, 
the voice of the United States is the most prominent historical participant 
with the power to decide what is best for the region and, consequently, a 
participant ‘thinking’ and ‘expressing its concern’ in the following pages 
of the text. In sum, the primary historical processes in the region empha-
sised here stress that the Soviet Union has an ally in Latin America and 
that the United States considers this a ‘threat to their interests’, seeking to 
‘prevent the triumph’ of socialism on the continent, as shown in the fol-
lowing Example 6:
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Example 6:
The triumph of the Cuban revolution (1959) implied the establishment 
of the first allied government of the Soviet Union in America, which the 
United States considered a threat to their interests, promoting from that 
moment two strategies to prevent the triumph of socialism on the rest of 
the continent: a regional pact, the Alliance for Progress, and the establish-
ment of the National Security Doctrine. (SM 2017: 152)
El triunfo de la revolución cubana (1959) implicó el establecimiento 
del primer gobierno aliado de la Unión Soviética en América, lo que 
Estados Unidos consideró una amenaza para sus intereses, impulsando a 
partir de ese momento, dos estrategias para impedir el triunfo del social-
ismo en el resto del continente: un pacto regional, la Alianza para el 
Progreso, y el establecimiento de la Doctrina de Seguridad Nacional.
The socialist and communist ideologies are evaluated with a high nega-
tive appreciation of political and social power throughout the discourse, 
but most of all with an inscribed and strong negative evaluation of affect- 
as fear that justifies the United States’ military intervention in the region: 
‘with the aim of stopping the advance of communism in the context of 
the Cold War’ and ‘to move away the ghosts of communism”.
 Dictatorships in the Southern Cone: The Intervention 
of the United States and the Overthrow of democratic 
governments
The Unit entitled ‘The Military Dictatorship’ covers the process of ‘break-
down of constitutional order’ from the coup d’état in September 1973 to 
the return to democracy at the end of the 1980s. The processes of military 
dictatorship and the recovery of democracy in Chile are presented here 
locally as part of a series of dictatorships in Latin America, and globally 
as politically, economically and socially influenced by the United States. 
The main participants included and evaluated in the discourse are, there-
fore, the United States and the different administrations of the period, 
the dictatorial regimes in Latin America, the Chilean military junta and, 
to a lesser extent, the Chilean Intelligence Agency (DINA), and the 
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groups that were opposed to the regime. The historical events and pro-
cesses highlighted in the text are the rise of dictatorships in the Southern 
Cone, the violation of human rights, and the return to democracy. As in 
the previous unit, the United States is presented as an actor whose point 
of view is fundamental for understanding the historical development of 
Latin America. The feelings, opinions and interests of ‘the country of the 
north’ are central in this narrative.
At the beginning of the unit, the Latin American dictatorial regimes 
established in the second half of the 1960s and in the 1970s are charac-
terised in a negative manner in terms of their lack of integrity. In addi-
tion, the discourse expresses the power these repressive regimes exerted 
over the populations of their countries and, primarily, over opposition 
groups, as shown in Example 7:
Example 7:
Most of these military regimes exhibited common characteristics, derived 
from their ascription to similar ideological trends, which sought to sup-
press reforms that would have led, according to them, to internal chaos, 
for which it was necessary to eliminate any kind of opposition. (SM 
2017: 204)
La mayoría de estos regímenes militares presentaron características 
comunes, derivadas de su adscripción a similares corrientes ideológicas, 
que pretendían suprimir aquellas reformas que habrían llevado, según 
ellos, al caos interno, para lo cual era necesario eliminar cualquier tipo 
de oposición.
The discourse presents evoked appreciations about the negative integ-
rity of the military regimes in Latin America, as well as their high power, 
presenting first their will to ‘suppress’ the reforms and then to ‘eliminate’ 
all forms of opposition. This negative evaluation is reinforced by quanti-
fication, extending that appraisal to ‘most’ of these regimes. On the other 
hand, the political and social situation of Latin American countries before 
the dictatorships is evaluated in an equally negative way, as conflictive. 
Such evaluation is sourced in the ideological standpoint of the regimes, 
according to which there was an ‘internal chaos’ provoked by an opposi-
tion that therefore had to be eliminated.
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The characteristics shared by Latin American dictatorial regimes are 
later described using a technical lexis that informs about a series of his-
torical processes, such as ‘suppression of the Rule of Law’, ‘prohibition of 
political parties’, ‘use of censorship and political violence’ and ‘systematic 
human rights violations’ (SM 2017: 204–205).
Despite the predominantly positive representation of the United States 
in these two historical units analysed, the role the US played in the advent 
of dictatorships in Latin America is also portrayed in a negative manner 
in terms of its integrity, as in the following example:
Example 8:
Most of these [dictatorships], in principle, were supported and, at times, 
economically sustained by the United States. In addition to the enor-
mous amount of resources that this country assigned to operations of 
sabotage and political propaganda, the dictatorships were promoted by 
military men trained in the U.S. Army School of the Americas, and by 
the introduction of the National Security Doctrine. (SM 2017: 204)
La mayoría de estas [dictaduras], en principio, fueron apoyadas y, en 
ocasiones, sustentadas económicamente por Estados Unidos. Además de 
la enorme cantidad de recursos que este país destinó a operaciones de 
sabotaje y propaganda política, las dictaduras fueron propiciadas por 
militares formados en la Escuela de las Américas y por la introducción de 
la Doctrina de Seguridad Nacional.
The intervention of the United States is not only presented negatively 
by means of a judgment of impropriety carried out by the instances of 
‘sabotage’ and ‘political propaganda’, but also highly reinforced, since this 
country assigned an ‘enormous amount’ of resources to supporting ‘most 
of these’ dictatorships. At the same time, the support the Unites States 
gives to the dictatorships expresses the power this country has to inter-
vene in the political destinies of Latin American countries.
In the Chilean case, as we have seen, the US’s intervention is presented 
as a consequence of the constant concerns and threats perceived by the 
latter, first regarding the Cuban revolution and then in relation to 
Salvador Allende’s rise to power as the first democratically elected socialist 
government:
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Example 9:
Avoiding the emergence in Latin America of ‘another Cuba’ led the 
United States to intervene in Chile through its intelligence agencies. At 
least since 1963 it tried to impede the election of Allende, an issue that 
worsened from 1970 until the military coup in 1973. (SM 2017: 205)
Evitar que surgiera en Latinoamérica "otra Cuba" llevó a Estados 
Unidos a intervenir en Chile a través de sus organismos de inteligencia. 
Al menos desde 1963 intentaba evitar la elección de Allende, cuestión 
que se agudizó desde 1970 hasta el golpe militar en 1973.
In Example 9, the actions taken by the United States ‘to intervene’ and 
‘to impede’ express a negative evaluation of the integrity of this country. 
The volition of the United States is expressed by means of the verb ‘tried’, 
which is intensified as an issue that ‘worsened’ over time.
As the insecurity felt by the United States is presented as the main motive 
for its intervention, this historical account assumes a heteroglossic discur-
sive orientation, presenting the US’s perspective on the political situation 
of Latin America. In this vision, the Allende government is directly linked 
with the Cuban Revolution, which epitomises the presence of socialism in 
the region, read as a menace by the United States. The USSR does not 
appear as a participant in this historical interpretation, nor are the affects or 
opinions of the Chilean and Cuban governments presented (e.g. concerns 
about the US intervention or hopes regarding the socialist project).
The construction of the United States as the main agent in this inter-
pretation of the Cold War period, as well as its representation as the sole 
emoter of the affections expressed (‘concern’, ‘threat’) can be particularly 
observed when the international relations of the Chilean regime are 
addressed in the text. In this regard, the affects attributed to the United 
States and the evaluations of judgements applied to it vary according to 
the specific US government in power. First, relationships are presented as 
positive but not entirely satisfactory for the United States during Nixon’s 
administration, that received the military coup in Chile ‘with moderate 
approval’. The relations then appear as conflictive due to the assassination 
of former chancellor Orlando Letelier and his secretary Ronni Moitt 
while on US territory (1976). The distance between the governments is 
constructed as intensified in the discourse during the Kennedy era and its 
change in human rights policy, as Example 10 shows:
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Example 10:
Diplomatic relations became especially tense when the military Junta 
reaffirmed its willingness to establish a long-term authoritarian regime. 
One of the most critical points was the murder in Washington of former 
chancellor Orlando Letelier and his secretary Ronni Moitt in September 
1976, in which DINA agents were involved. This was a clear violation 
of US’s security (SM 2017: 229).
Las relaciones diplomáticas se volvieron especialmente tensas cuando 
la junta militar reafirmó su voluntad de establecer un régimen autori-
tario de largo plazo. Uno de los puntos más críticos fue el asesinato en 
Washington del ex canciller Orlando Letelier y su secretaria Ronni Moitt 
en septiembre de 1976, en el que estuvieron involucrados agentes de la 
DINA, y que constituyó una clara violación a la seguridad estadounidense.
The worsening of relations is expressed in the discourse by means of 
resources of appreciation that express a high conflict level, reinforced by 
intensification: ‘especially tense’, ‘one of the most critical points’. The 
historical event that explains this situation (the assassination of Orlando 
Letelier and Ronni Moitt) is presented as ‘a clear violation of US secu-
rity’, which evokes a negative affect of insecurity whose emoter is, as in 
earlier instances in the discourse, the United States. This ‘violation’ 
(sharpened by the presence of the adjective ‘clear’), also inscribes a nega-
tive evaluation about the integrity of the Chilean regime, represented by 
‘the military Junta’ as a historical actor. The same negative evaluation is 
manifested in ‘authoritarian regime’, ‘murder’ and ‘were involved’, 
instances in which agents of DINA8 are also evaluated. As a result, a con-
trast is presented between the United States and the Chilean regime in 
which the latter is evaluated negatively. Such contrast is even more evi-
dent when the text presents the Jimmy Carter government’s policy with 
regard to human rights violations, as it is shown in Example 11:
Example 11:
During the government of Democrat Jimmy Carter, an international 
policy was applied that privileged the respect of Human Rights […] 
While diplomatic relations improved during Ronald Reagan administra-
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tion, the pressures to initiate the transition to democracy continued, 
especially after the crisis of 1982 and the social outbreak that it pro-
voked, which caused the State Department to opt for supporting the 
democratic opposition, extending that policy to the entire Southern 
Cone. (SM 2017: 229)
Bajo la presidencia del demócrata Jimmy Carter se aplicó una política 
internacional que privilegió el respeto a los Derechos Humanos […] Si 
bien las relaciones diplomáticas mejoraron con el gobierno de Ronald 
Reagan, las presiones para iniciar la transición hacia la democracia con-
tinuaron, especialmente a partir de la crisis de 1982 y el estallido social 
que provocó, lo que hizo que el Departamento de Estado apostara por 
apoyar a la oposición democrática, política que se extendió a todo 
el Cono Sur.
The international policy of the United States is presented through the 
measures taken by the Carter administration, in turn interpreted as a 
continuation of the Kennedy Amendment. This allows for the construc-
tion of a positive evaluation of the United States by means of an inscribed 
judgement regarding its integrity: ‘privileged the respect of Human Rights’.
A contrast is then established between the relations with the Chilean 
regime before and after the Carter administration (manifested in the 
adversative conjunction ‘while’). The United States began to put pressure 
on the Chilean regime and, over time, decided to support the democratic 
opposition. These instances inscribe a positive judgement on the capacity 
of the United States to intervene (‘pressures’), as well as an affect of incli-
nation (‘opted’) that expresses the will of this country to take measures 
regarding the politics of Chile. Such a will is not only a desire but an 
actual capability to decide the political fates of Latin American countries, 
with regard to both the rise and fall of democratic governments and dic-
tatorial regimes. The fact that the US intervention towards the recovery 
of democracy is explained based on the complex social situation in Chile 
(‘crisis’) and the ‘social outbreak’ that this caused, contributes to the con-
struction of a positive depicture of the international policy of the United 
States in the region.
The main evaluative prosodies of the analysis are presented in the fol-
lowing Figures:
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 Final Remarks
History textbooks and their negotiation in the classroom play a funda-
mental role in the process of constructing social memories. In history 
textbooks authors have a tendency to portray dominant narratives that 
Fig. 11.3 Evaluative prosody of power and conflict of main historical entities
Fig. 11.4 Evaluative prosody of fear from a temporal perspective
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express different ideological positions about the past. This is particularly 
evident in the reconstruction of recent national pasts, in which different 
contesting memories coexist. The historical period known as the Cold 
War has thus had an immense impact on the memory cultures of the 
countries involved, according to their position in the struggle and their 
political and social particularities.
This chapter has explored how the memory of the Cold War is cur-
rently negotiated in official Chilean history textbooks. We carried out a 
discourse analysis with the purpose of identifying how and which his-
torical actors, events and processes are included and evaluated in the 
text. In the case of Latin America, these memories have been shaped by 
its geopolitical situation as a region traditionally influenced by the 
United States and by the series of dictatorships and human rights viola-
tions that most Latin American countries underwent in the 1970s 
and 1980s.
As demonstrated in the analysis, the Cold War in Latin America was 
experienced as a struggle between North and South rather than East 
and West. In the historical account presented by the history textbook 
 analysed, the longstanding relations of cooperation and support between 
Latin America and the United States were disrupted by the Cuban 
Revolution and subsequently the election of socialist Salvador Allende in 
Chile, both interpreted by ‘the country of the north’ as a threat as they 
instantiated Marxist ideology in the region.
The historical construction throughout the discourse of a negative 
appraisal of affect as fear, provoked by the presence of Marxism, allows 
authors to explain and justify the measures the United States imposed 
on Latin America: the actions taken to undermine the Cuban regime, 
the attempts to prevent Allende’s election, the political, economic and 
 military support given to right-wing dictatorships across the conti-
nent, and finally the steps taken to return to democracy. At the same 
time, the United States is imbued with a positive appraisal of integrity, 
since its actions sought to maintain the security and stability of 
the region.
While in this historical -recount authors assign an agentive and promi-
nent role to the United States, other historical actors are less represented 
in the discourse. The Soviet Union hardly appears in the text; and when 
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it does, its inclusion is always contingent to its relationship with the 
Cuban Revolution as the primary counterpart of the United States in the 
ideological dispute over the Southern Cone. Fidel Castro plays a more 
active role in the narrative; however, his actions and the process of the 
Cuban Revolution are presented in the context of a highly conflictive 
situation and as a result of the poverty-stricken conditions in which most 
of the Cuban population lived. In the Chilean case, there are few men-
tions of actors such as right-wing parties, which in fact played a key role 
in establishing and supporting the military dictatorship. The opinions, 
feelings or visions of left-wing groups and parties are given even less con-
sideration in the text.
In sum, with the discourse analysis of the actors, events and pro-
cesses presented in this historical account, it is possible to appreciate 
how the memory of the Cold War in Latin America is constructed as a 
situation of political, economic and social dependency on the United 
States, with Chile as part of this extended process. This historical 
 narrative of fear and conflict contributes to an interpretation of the 
recent Chilean traumatic past in which the dictatorship is mainly pre-
sented as the result of this dependency, blurring or minimising the role 
other actors played in the process. This historical positioning of an 
official textbook reflects a series of discussions and debates in which 
the Chilean society has participated over the last decades regarding the 
search for causes, responsibilities and explanations. The study of his-
tory textbooks, as official semiotic products that play a key role in the 
negotiation of memories in Chilean schools, helps us to comprehend 
those social debates, and in doing so identify which memories have 
become ‘encapsulated’ meanings and which memories are still open to 
debate in Chile and in other Latin American countries that have expe-
rienced a violent past.
Notes
1. This chapter presents findings from research grant FONDECYT 1170331 
(National Funds for Science and Technology Development, Chile).
2. For studies related to history class interactions regarding the recent 
national pasts of dictatorships and the transmission of social and  analytical 
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memories to new generations in the Latin American context see Achugar 
(2016) for the Uruguayan context, and Oteíza et al. (2015 and 2018) for 
the Chilean context.
3. Publishers dominating the production of school textbooks in Chile over 
the last decade are Santillana, Zig-Zag, SM and MN.
4. Information based on previous research on Chilean History Textbooks 
(Oteíza 2006, 2014).
5. Notation for the examples: Words in bold signal inscribed or explicit 
appraisals; words in bold and italics for evoked or implicit appraisals; 
words underlined signal graduation of the explicit or implicit appraisals.
6. All translations from Spanish by the author.
7. Alliance for Progress, Doctrine of National Security, Inter-American 
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR), Organization of American States 
(OEA).
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Teachers’ Memories and the Cold War: 
Introduction to Part II
Robert Thorp and Barbara Christophe
The texts in this section of the volume address the complex and interest-
ing question of how history teachers’ personal memories and experiences 
of the past interact with their perceptions of historical events and a 
broader historical culture. Generally speaking, there are three different 
elements at play here that alone and combined provide a rich and chal-
lenging field for research into memory practices and history education.
History itself is a vague notion with various connotations. Academic 
history, often regarded as the gold standard in history education, is com-
monly separated from the past and memory through its focus on critical 
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methodological inquiry (Lévesque 2008; Parkes 2011; Wilschut 2012; 
Wineburg 2001). In this sense, academic history presupposes distance 
towards the past since it asks us to disregard what we cannot ground in 
reliable sources from it; history is regarded as the reconstruction of past 
events. Questions of truth, methodology and reliability become central 
here. Still, history also plays a central and fundamental role in the every-
day perceptions we have of ourselves, of our communities and of the 
world at large. Accordingly, questions of identity and worldview become 
pivotal. It is thus not only methodological rigor and academic procedure, 
but also cultural aspects that heavily affect how we approach the past and 
history itself, as the three texts in this section will show.
History, academic and public alike, can thus be argued to share one 
crucial feature with memory. Both are culturally contingent, both cater 
to who we are and to what we perceive as meaningful at a very basic level. 
In this sense, all of us, including academic historians and professionally 
trained history teachers, can be seen as performing memory practices; 
that is, culturally informed ways of remembering, perceiving and making 
sense of the past and of history. This means that we never encounter or 
approach history from a neutral point of view and that history and our 
perceptions thereof are always contextually contingent.
With this view, you could argue that a kind of cultural self-awareness 
becomes central to how we approach and make sense of history, rather 
than whether we apply a critical methodology to the sources from the 
past that we have at hand. However, and this is rather crucial, much of 
what we know about history may be implicit and more or less taken for 
granted and therefore difficult to scrutinize critically, an aspect high-
lighted by the notion of memory practices. In this sense, history could 
be perceived as entangled between serious academic study, personal 
memories, and broader cultural and ideological aspects of the past 
(Thorp 2016).
If we take these aspects into account it can be argued that history edu-
cation becomes a rather complex enterprise. History teachers are indi-
viduals, each with a personal relationship with history, who at the same 
time have been trained to approach this history with distance and scru-
tiny. Furthermore, history teachers are expected to comply with curricu-
lar demands and to further what could be called ideological aims whenever 
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they carry out their teaching. This can prove to be a rather challenging 
task as teachers have to navigate between what may be conflicting con-
cerns in their profession. In addition, history carries a normative load 
through which we position ourselves ideologically, which may prove to 
be a further challenge when teaching (Persson 2017; Persson and Thorp 
2017). In line with new trends in memory research, recent work in his-
tory education has highlighted these entanglements. Studies have shown 
how cultural contingencies affect history education and feed into how 
teachers and students perceive history at a very basic level (Boutonnet 
2013; Persson 2017; Persson and Thorp 2017; Porat 2004; Thorp 2016; 
Wineburg, Mosborg, Porat and Duncan 2007; Zanazanian 2012). The 
three texts in this section should be regarded as a further exploration of 
this field.
 Three Case Studies
Barbara Christophe’s contribution to this section focuses on how teachers 
respond to ambivalence as a characteristic feature of postmodern mem-
ory cultures, the traces of which we can even find in current history text-
books. Providing a microanalysis of a textbook quotation on the origin of 
the Cold War from a German textbook, she shows how ambivalence is 
created by blending elements from rival traditions of explaining the con-
flict. Comparing how teachers from Germany and Switzerland read and 
assess this ambivalent and therefore rather typical quotation she arrives at 
three conclusions. First of all, teachers not only understand the same lines 
rather differently; they also judge them from different positions. Whereas 
Swiss teachers argue mostly in line with the traditionalist concept of a 
morally superior USA and a dictatorial Soviet Union, German teachers 
are much more divided among themselves, with some adhering to revi-
sionist, others to traditionalist interpretations. Furthermore, especially 
among German teachers leaning towards revisionist positions, we find 
clear differences between those trained in former East Germany and those 
trained on the west side of the Wall. While West German teachers tend 
to express moral criticism of the USA, their East German counterparts 
criticise moralising views on history and normalise Soviet expansionism. 
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Finally, every teacher perceives his or her own interpretation of the text-
book account to be the only legitimate one, thus contributing to what 
Christophe calls the ‘illusion of hegemony’, the assertion that there is one 
legitimate way of explaining the Cold War. Discussing her empirical 
findings in the light of competing theoretical considerations about the 
social function of ambivalence, Christophe argues that a productive 
engagement with ambivalence as discussed in memory studies is ham-
pered by this illusion of hegemony.
Eva Fischer’s text further explores the complex interplay and entangle-
ment between teachers’ personal experiences and professional role and 
focuses on how a teacher from the former GDR deals with textbook nar-
rations about the Cold War. Guided by the question as to how people 
with twofold horizons of experience perceive current discourses on mem-
ory culture and how they position themselves towards those discourses, 
Fischer explicitly focuses on a person who, born in 1956, is old enough 
to have worked in the GDR and young enough to have continued her 
profession in reunited Germany. With recourse to methodological instru-
ments developed by James Wertsch, Fischer analyses the stances taken by 
the teacher in three differently structured situational contexts: during a 
biographical narrative interview, a guided interview, and two video- 
recorded history lessons. She identifies four recurring narrative patterns 
mobilised by the teacher in order to build a bridge between the old nar-
ratives she grew up with in the GDR and the new narratives she feels she 
should use in her teaching today. The teacher (i) constructs parallels 
between family-related and national experiences, (ii) describes members 
of her family, despite their closeness to the GDR regime, as victims of 
national separation, (iii) narrates encounters between East and West as 
stories of reconciliation, and (iv) describes the West as slowly catching up 
with a morally superior East. The tensions and contradictions between 
these four narrative patterns are managed by a narrative and argumenta-
tive style which creates ambivalence and avoids the assignment of respon-
sibility for certain actions. Fischer concludes that this teacher, who tries 
to narrate the story of her life in the GDR in accordance with what she 
perceives to be the dominant Western narrative as a sad story of separa-
tion and victimisation, enacts a kind of tacit resistance to the same 
Western narrative of the Cold War in class by pointing, for example, to 
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the moral superiority the political East enjoyed – in her eyes – over the 
political West.
Nadine Ritzer’s study of how the broader cultural understanding of 
two key events of the Cold War, the Prague spring of 1968 and the 
Vietnam War, has evolved in Switzerland relies upon contemporary 
teaching journals of the period, older and modern history textbooks, and 
interviews with teachers. She thus does two things at the same time: She 
examines the subject from a position of present-day memory politics and 
she employs a diachronic perspective, enabling her to study discursive 
shifts. Ritzer’s study arrives at a number of interesting results. She dem-
onstrates that Swiss political neutrality has always leaned ideologically 
towards the West and that, despite several approaches showing signs of 
differentiation, a fundamental anti-communist consensus continues to 
ensure that bipolar frames of interpretation dominate textbooks. She 
shows that the textbooks studied do not delve deeper into the transna-
tional significance of the year 1968, despite the fact that even contempo-
rary witnesses point out that neither the Prague Spring nor the Vietnam 
War could be solely explained in terms of East-West opposition. 
Interestingly, the study reveals that, although the same books are gener-
ally critical of the role of the USA in the war, most of them implicitly 
legitimize atrocities such as the My Lai Massacre by explaining them with 
reference to the domino effect or the guerrilla tactics of the Vietcong. 
Ritzer also illustrates how the Vietnam War is regularly used in Swiss 
textbooks as an example of a proxy war between capitalism and commu-
nism, whilst omitting the North-South themes accentuated by recent 
research. Finally she elucidates how teachers regularly deviate from the 
textbooks’ interpretation, for instance by categorising the Vietnam War 
as a ‘third-world problem’.
 Concluding Comments
Taken together, the three contributions in this section stress the impor-
tance of broader cultural, societal and situational aspects as key to under-
standing the complexities and challenges that go along with history 
education as one field where we can observe the unfolding of memory 
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practices. The Cold War topic is shown to be heavily entangled between 
individuals’ memories, ideological concerns, personal preferences, and 
broader social concerns. At the same time, the three authors render visi-
ble that culturally shared narratives as conveyed in textbooks, for instance, 
determine memory practices of individuals to different extents. As we 
have seen, teachers can chose to reproduce, to reject or to appropriate 
them with creativity. Furthermore, their choices can vary in differently 
structured situations.
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Remembering the Cold War in Germany 
and Switzerland
Barbara Christophe
Umberto Eco once wrote, ‘A text yearns for someone to help it function’ 
(1998, 64). To him, texts are cloths woven from signs and gaps between 
signs. They call on us as readers to fill in these gaps. At the same time, they 
provide us with all of the clues we need in order to perform this task. 
Metaphorically speaking, Eco sees a text as a kind of roadmap showing us 
where, in the maze-like library of our cultural knowledge, we find the ele-
ments implied but not explicitly mentioned in the textual structure we are 
trying to make sense of. But what happens if these assumptions do not work? 
How do we, as readers, perform our guesswork when confronted with a text 
that gives us contradictory clues? How do we deal with ambivalent accounts?
According to insight from memory research, in the plural and frag-
mented societies of our time we are increasingly faced with ambivalent 
representations of the past (Ryan 2011). Taking this observation as a 
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starting point, I will explore empirically how people coming from 
 different memory cultures – and thus presumably equipped with differ-
ent cultural knowledge – engage with ambivalent historical narratives. 
The goal is to provide solid ground for a theoretical reflection on the 
functions that ambivalent representations of the past can assume. Answers 
given so far oscillate between the claim that ambivalence helps to stabilise 
hegemonic narratives by avoiding open conflict (Beattie 2008) and the 
argument that it may support the emergence of spaces for more complex 
perspectives (Sturken 1997). Positioning myself somewhere between 
these poles, I will argue that ambivalent accounts invite readers to pro-
duce rather diverse readings, but at the same time they create the illusion 
of hegemony, encouraging the assumption that there is only one privi-
leged reading.
This argument is based on insights gained from interviews with history 
teachers from Germany and Switzerland, who were asked to reflect on a 
textbook quotation about the origin of the Cold War that I read as rather 
ambivalent. My thematic focus on the Cold War follows from the 
assumption that this historical period is a likely candidate for ambivalent 
portrayal, due to still-unresolved contestations and recent discursive 
shifts. History teachers interest me in their double function as members 
of memory cultures and as professionals specialised in conveying state- 
approved patterns of interpretation; they thus occupy a central role in the 
transmission of memories. Before presenting and discussing my empiri-
cal data, I will look into the diverging functions ascribed to ambivalence 
in different academic debates. I will moreover provide a rough sketch of 
the competing arguments made by historians about the origins and causes 
of the Cold War. Finally, I will share my own thoughts on the textbook 
quotation that the teachers were invited to comment on.
 Ambivalence, History, Memory and History 
Teaching
Ambivalence is touched upon in four different academic debates, and in 
each one scholars arrive at a different conclusion concerning its value.
 B. Christophe
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 Ambivalence and the Debate about History 
and Memory
For Peter Novick (1999, 4), ambivalence is a typical feature of historical 
accounts. For him historians are likely to develop complex and ambiva-
lent stories as they are disciplined enough to resist the temptation to 
focus only on historical facts that would fit best into preformed narra-
tives. His image of the historian prone to painting pictures in many 
shades of grey owes a great deal to a counter-image of memory in which 
narratives of the past are manipulated in order to serve present needs. 
Ambivalence thus plays a crucial role in drawing a clear-cut line between 
memory and history.
 Ambivalence and Hegemony in Discourse Theory
In discourse theory ambivalence is closely connected with political proj-
ects of hegemony (Reckwitz 2006). Borrowing Gramsci’s definition, I 
understand the concept of hegemony to describe the ability of a ruling 
group to rule by consent, consent itself being the result of attempts by 
rulers to impose their interpretation of reality as the natural state of affairs 
upon the ruled. Vagueness can become an important tool in this attempt 
to rule, because it allows a variety of social actors with different agendas 
to rally behind the same concepts, for example freedom or democracy. 
Vagueness – alternatively we could speak of ambivalence – is thus deemed 
crucial for securing hegemony (Butler 2005, 33).
 Ambivalence and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA)
In Critical Discourse Analysis, ambivalence is understood as something 
that can emerge from the interplay between two features considered com-
mon to all texts (Fairclough 1989). Firstly, texts leave open gaps: Neither 
the relationship between the text and the world, nor the relationship 
between different parts of the text, can be fully spelled out. As a result, 
texts require readers to mobilise cultural knowledge, and thus their 
understanding of usual cultural constructions, in order to fill in these 
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gaps. This knowledge, which is presupposed but not explicitly referred to 
by the text (understood as ‘situated discourse’), derives from meta- 
discourses, which constitute particular ways of representing the world. 
Secondly, texts are seen as being inherently inter-textual themselves, an 
assemblage of bits and pieces from other texts, each of which may have 
been shaped by different meta-discourses. Studies show that intertextual-
ity easily leads to ambivalence (Janks 1997), especially in a historical con-
text characterized by discursive shifts when texts are expected to reflect 
dominant discourses both before and after certain changes.
 Ambivalence and the Memory of Contested Pasts
In the field of memory studies, Marita Sturken has explored the effects of 
ambivalence most carefully (1997, 44–84). Taking a close look at the 
practices of remembering enacted by different people at the Vietnam 
Veterans’ Memorial in Washington, Sturken claims that the memorial’s 
most outstanding feature is its ambivalence. While for some it speaks to 
the heroism, honour and sacrifice of those who fought in Vietnam, for 
others it gives voice to the loss and pain of men who died in an unjust 
and shameful war. In her more theoretical remarks, Sturken credits 
ambivalence with the ability to resist a desire for coherence and narrative 
closure, which, she writes, inevitably leads to the erasure of all the details 
that may not fit into a neat frame. Ambivalence thus works to keep sto-
ries told about the past open and incomplete. In doing so, ambivalence 
preserves the political aspect of memory, which follows from the fact that 
memory is inherently selective, partial and contingent on decisions that 
could have been taken differently. Sturken’s concern for the political as 
something valuable and important but endangered by closure and the 
illusion of completeness brings her close to theories of hegemony. 
However, her claim that ambivalence does not necessarily work to stabi-
lise hegemony but instead keeps alive an awareness of how inherently 
political memory always is sets her apart from those who view ambiva-
lence mainly as a manipulative tool in the hands of rulers.
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 Ambivalence and History Teaching
How should history teaching position itself towards ambivalence? 
Should it embrace ambivalent accounts as an indicator of complexity? 
Should we deliberately use narratives open to competing interpretations 
in order to prevent narrative closure? Should students be invited to 
deconstruct ambivalent narratives understood to serve the stabilisation 
of hegemony?
Peter Seixas (2000) has suggested we can distinguish between three 
different approaches towards history teaching (2000), which are not 
only based on different epistemological beliefs (Parkes 2009) but can 
also be understood as dealing differently with ambivalence. The first 
aims at conveying the best story of the past by including as many different 
perspectives as possible. Implicitly subscribing to the view that historical 
accounts are able to mirror past reality, this approach would likely result 
in closed narratives and a positive assessment of ambivalence as the inev-
itable outcome of the attempt to give voice to many different historical 
actors. Starting from the premise that all we have from the past are 
sources and artefacts as the building blocks from which historians con-
struct their accounts, the second approach focuses on equipping stu-
dents with the disciplinary knowledge they need to check on the 
robustness of competing accounts with the help of evidence inferred 
from sources. From this perspective, ambivalence could be viewed either 
as an adequate reflection of complex evidence or as the result of a ‘messy’ 
way of storytelling. The third approach aims to aid students in decon-
structing historical accounts by rendering visible the traces of the present 
in narratives about the past. In all likelihood, this would also entail 
exploring how ambivalence serves present interests or reflects different 
discourses.
While these three approaches can be expected to yield different ways of 
dealing with ambivalence, problems may arise from combining them 
without being aware of the epistemological shifts involved.
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 Ambivalence and the Political in Stories 
about the Cold War
The Cold War was contested between East and West right from its start. 
Since the early 1960s, however, we can also observe a ritualised stand-off 
between two competing approaches in the West (Lundestad 2014), with 
traditionalists blaming the USSR for having caused the conflict and revi-
sionists ascribing responsibility for the break-up of the wartime alliance 
to the United States. Both engage in a debate informed by binary opposi-
tions. While traditionalists portray the United States as having been pre-
dominantly concerned with demobilisation in the immediate aftermath 
of the Second World War, revisionists point to the far-reaching expan-
sionist agenda the United States pursued, relying upon, among other 
things, the Marshall Plan. While traditionalists explain the shift towards 
a more assertive stance in American foreign policy as a response to the 
tightening Soviet grip over Eastern Europe, revisionists describe Soviet 
policies in Eastern Europe as a defensive reaction to the global ambitions 
of the United States, bolstered by its atomic monopoly and overwhelm-
ing economic might. In the 1970s, Gaddis launched an attempt to com-
bine bits and pieces from both accounts into a new narrative (1972; 
1987), which later received the label ‘post-revisionist’. While pointing to 
US policies as an important factor in aggravating the conflict, he also 
claimed that these policies responded to perceptions of Soviet behaviour. 
Instead of raising questions of guilt and responsibility, he pointed to the 
role of perception and misperception. He understood political decisions 
to be the contingent outcome of political interaction between both sides, 
neither of which could fully control the situation.
Recent trends in writing about the Cold War have rather added new 
vigour to old arguments and controversies. Shifting the focus of the 
debate from Europe to the so-called ‘third world’ and from politics to 
culture has lent new credibility to old revisionist arguments. Authors 
have thus argued, for example, that US policies of lending support to 
postcolonial dictatorships (Engerman 2010) or racial discrimination at 
home (Dudziak 2011), undermine the American claim of having 
defended the principles of freedom and democracy against a totalitarian 
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Soviet Union. We can also observe a revitalisation of traditional dis-
courses in the writings of authors who insist on a crucial difference 
between an American empire based on invitation and a Soviet empire 
based on imposition or in the work of those who argue that the Cold War 
could have been avoided if not for a paranoid Stalin obsessed with world 
revolution (Gaddis 1997).
 Mapping Ambivalence: Reading a Textbook 
Quotation
The rivalry between competing explanations given by historians on the 
origin of the Cold War has left its mark on the quotation from the text-
book which we asked history teachers to comment on. We did not choose 
this particular quotation to serve as a catalyst in our interviews because it 
is representative of current textbooks in general. For us it instead resem-
bles a ‘rich point’ (Agar 1994), as it appears to be particularly illustrative 
of a larger trend towards ambivalent representations of the past. By com-
paring what is said with what could have been said in the quotation, and 
by comparing our trigger narrative with narratives found in other text-
books, I will explain why I read the following lines as ambivalent.
[1] At the Potsdam Conference of 1945, the USA, the USSR and Britain 
agreed on a specific approach to be taken towards Germany. [2] After that 
point, political differences determined their subsequent approaches. [3] In 
its sphere of influence, the USA championed democracy and economic 
liberalism. [4] The USSR organised a socialist sphere of influence extend-
ing as far as central Europe to meet its security concerns. [5] The Soviet 
army was stationed in Eastern and Southeastern European countries. [6] 
There, governments supported politically and economically by the Soviet 
Union came to power. [7] As in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria 
and Romania, a ‘people’s democracy’ emerged in what was to become the 
GDR. [8] The Western powers regarded these developments as an  expansion 
of the Soviet sphere of influence (Ebeling and Birkenfeld 2011, 190–91).1
To my mind, this paragraph bears not only the marks of both traditional-
ist and revisionist accounts, but is also open to different readings.
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The systematic difference between the activities ascribed to the United 
States and the USSR in sentences three and four recalls the traditionalist 
discourse on the Cold War. While the United States ‘championed democ-
racy and economic liberalism’, the USSR ‘organised a socialist sphere of 
influence’. Difference is amplified by the particular choice of words here. 
While the Americans are portrayed as standing up for something and 
thus as supporting universal values, the Soviets are described as organising 
a sphere of influence that happened to be socialist. The word ‘organising’ 
conjures up notions of efficiency and says nothing about the values pur-
sued. Quite the reverse; learning that the Soviets invested their efficiency 
in enhancing their security needs, we see them only as having followed a 
highly particularistic agenda. The binary opposition introduced here is 
intensified by sentence five. While it offers details on the deployment of 
Soviet troops, it keeps silent about the whereabouts of American troops, 
whose very existence is thus pushed to the back of the reader’s mind.
However, sentence four introduces Soviet ‘security concerns’, a term 
that is regularly used as a kind of ‘flagship word’ (Hermanns 1982) in 
revisionist accounts. Ambivalence is further increased by polysemous 
expressions (Hermanns 1989). When sentence eight emphasises that ‘the 
Western powers regarded these developments [in Eastern Europe] as an 
expansion of the Soviet sphere of influence’, this can be understood in 
two different ways. We can read it as a caveat, reminding us that this 
statement does not necessarily reflect objective truth but is rather a sub-
jective assessment by one side to the conflict. But we can also arrive at the 
opposite conclusion, arguing that an assessment made by those in the 
West appears to be particularly trustworthy.
My impression that the text seems quite ambivalent is corroborated by 
a comparison with alternative accounts. The traditionalist elements I 
have identified in the excerpt clearly pale in comparison to the following 
sentences from a textbook published in West Germany in 1961, during 
the Cold War:
[1] Soon after the end of the war, more and more tension arose between the 
victorious great powers, between the USSR on the one hand and the 
Western Allies, mainly the USA, on the other. [2] The reason was the 
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increasingly blatant imperialist drive of the USSR, which imposed the 
Bolshevist system of rule on one occupied country after another (Ebeling 
1961, 259).2
Criticism of the Soviet Union is much more outspoken in the older text, 
which treats Soviet aggression as a fact beyond all doubt. Furthermore, 
relations within the Soviet bloc are represented differently. While the cur-
rent textbook speaks about Eastern European governments that came to 
power with a little help from Soviet friends, the older textbook talks 
about Bolshevik systems of rule being imposed on them.
Comparison with a third textbook shows that revisionist discourses 
can also be expressed much more clearly.
At the end of the Second World War, the Soviet Union had lost more than 
20 million people and was devastated to a large extent. But the Red Army 
had occupied almost all of Eastern Europe and moved as far as Germany. 
These territories were under Soviet control and represented an increase in 
power. The most important goal after the war was the reconstruction of the 
[Soviets’] own land. In order to achieve this, the Soviet Union wanted to 
use German reparation payments and American credits. In the long run, 
the Soviet head of state, Stalin, feared a conflict with the USA and other 
capitalist states. The military and economic strength of the USA had con-
tributed significantly to its victory over Nazi Germany. It was the only 
country among the great powers not to suffer devastation. Its factories were 
producing more than ever before. Unlike after the First World War, the 
USA firmly decided to help shape the political reordering of the world. 
Democracy and human rights should be established everywhere. But the 
Americans also wanted to secure their economic dominance, and to reach 
this goal they needed free access to the markets and resources of the entire 
world (Burkard 2010, 72).3
This text makes a greater effort to justify Soviet security needs by remind-
ing the reader of the Soviet experience of the Second World War. Pointing 
to the military might and economic power of the United States lends 
more urgency to these needs. Moreover, this textbook presents the United 
States as not only in pursuit of the noble goal of encouraging the spread 
of democracy and human rights but also as motivated by the rather ego-
istic aim to secure access to markets and resources.
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 Mapping Ambivalence: Teachers Making Sense 
of a Textbook Quotation
 Methodological Approach
How readers approach a text empirically can never be predicted by analy-
sis of the text alone. I therefore  invited nine history teachers from the 
former West Germany, nine from the former East4, and ten from 
Switzerland to share their interpretations of the quotation discussed 
above with my colleagues and myself. We asked them (i) how they read 
the quotation, (ii) how they judged its appropriateness, and (iii) what 
they themselves think about the events represented in it.5
When talking with them about their reading, we started with rather 
general questions but ended by directing their attention to the aspects we 
found to be reflective of traditionalist, revisionist and ambivalent dis-
courses in the text. Accordingly, we asked them to comment on (i) the 
activities ascribed to the United States and the USSR, (ii) the emphasis 
given to Soviet security needs and (iii) the accent placed on the way the 
Western powers perceived Soviet policies. These questions addressed the 
teachers in their different roles as both members of a professional group 
and also as participants of different memory cultures. Being asked to 
assess a text written by another person clearly reminded them of their 
daily job grading papers. The invitation to elaborate on their thoughts 
about the origins of the Cold War as private individuals, however, might 
have been perceived as interfering with the objectivity and neutrality 
teachers are often expected to display.
I interpret the data gathered from these interviews in three steps. Since 
I want to know whether and, if so, how people deal differently with an 
ambivalent text, I will first provide an analytical description of the teach-
ers’ answers. Since I also want to explore how (mostly) national memory 
cultures and textbooks influence teachers’ own narratives of events, I will 
then conduct a cross-national comparison. And, since I am interested in 
the implicit or explicit stances the teachers take with regard to ambiva-
lence, I will finally discuss the way they position themselves in relation to 




An overwhelming majority of teachers from Germany, 15 out of 18, 
reads the quotation as blaming the Soviets for having triggered the Cold 
War. Exactly the same number of teachers argues in line with post- 
revisionist positions when they discuss the events the text is dealing with. 
According to them either both or neither of the two rival superpowers is 
to be held responsible. Reflecting on the quality of the text, ten teachers 
criticise it for being too pro-American, one denounces the same lines for 
being too pro-Soviet, two praise it for being well balanced, and two assess 
it as being appropriately pro-American.
If we compare teachers from East and West Germany, differences 
appear to be rather minimal at first glance. Teachers from both sides of 
the Iron Curtain interpret the quote as placing the blame on the USSR. 
Both even advance similar arguments. They speak ironically about the 
super-stereotype6 of the Americans as the good guys and the Soviets as 
the epitome of evil7; they point to the disturbing silence regarding 
American soldiers and American spheres of influence8; and, finally, they 
criticize the authors for mixing apples and oranges by contrasting a 
Western commitment to democracy with an Eastern drive for expansion.9
However, as soon as one looks into the position from which this cri-
tique is raised, differences come into view. Our West German teachers 
argue very much from the position of putting blame on the Americans by 
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mentioning, for example, the harassment of leftists and communists in 
the West10 or reminding us of the United States’ economic agenda.11 At 
the same time, the East German teachers are much more concerned with 
taking away blame from the Soviets by normalising their policies. They 
point out that what the Soviets did was nothing but natural, since the 
side that wins the war always pushes through its interests12 and ideals,13 
imposes its own political system on others14 and dictates its will.15 To 
reframe the contrast once more: While the critical teachers from West 
Germany we spoke to accuse the text of not being persistent enough in 
its moral reasoning, the critical colleagues from East Germany we have 
interviewed take offence with what appears to them as an unnecessary 
high level of moralising.
Differences among West German teachers come to light especially 
when we focus on how they relate the text’s emphasis on Soviet security 
needs and on Soviet expansionism. Diverging answers on how to account 
for the tension between these two statements seem to correlate with dif-
ferences in the assessment of the text. Those who are very critical of the 
quotation because they perceive it as being one-sided and pro-American 
downplay the relevance attributed to Soviet security needs. Some even 
claim that Soviet security needs are clearly referred to as a sheer pretext.16 
For them they function as a mere excuse for further expansion. Others 
argue that the quotation purposefully constructs the Soviets as maniacs, 
crazy enough to fear even the democracy- and freedom-loving Americans.17 
Those, however, who appreciate the quotation as being relatively bal-
anced cite the text’s emphasis on Soviet security needs as the decisive 
factor that marks a clear-cut break from the black-and-white stories about 
the thoroughly evil Soviets to whom they had been exposed as children.18
The teachers from East Germany show different patterns of reasoning. 
Unlike us, their interviewers from the West who raised the question in 
the first place, they do not construct a morally charged opposition 
between having legitimate security needs and pursuing an expansionist 
agenda. Indeed, they are generally hesitant to make moral claims. Most 
of them simply state that the two motives do not exclude but rather 
complement each other,19 or they argue that expansion naturally follows 
from security needs.20 Others talk openly about their struggle with a 
question21 that raises too many moral issues.22 They defend the emer-
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gence of clearly demarcated spheres of influence not only as a legitimate 
process but also as a necessary precondition for the preservation 
of peace.23
The degree of removal of some of the East German teachers’ dis-
course from West German standards becomes especially visible at 
moments during two interviews, when the West German interviewer 
and both East German interviewees talk past each other. One of these 
moments occurs in an interview with a teacher born in 1961, here 
referred to as Kristin Schreiber.24 Everything begins with her claim that 
the emphasis the quotation gives to Soviet security needs serves an alibi 
function. Initially, she remains quite vague on what she actually means: 
‘This is an excuse for what one does; this kind of alibi function’, she 
says, without specifying who the culprit might be, who is in need of an 
‘alibi, an excuse’. Only at a later point in the interview does she identify 
the United States as the party seeking an alibi to cover up its evil deeds. 
In that moment she is thinking aloud about a question that appears 
rather troubling to her against the backdrop of what she has previously 
learned to be historical facts. She tries to understand why the Western 
power could have perceived Soviet policies as being expansionist and 
why the text would give so much emphasis to this perception. 
She argues:
It is a su-, a subjective thing, because, I mean it is a kind of excuse for hav-
ing built the Iron Curtain, right. I mean, it is a kind of excuse: ‘We wouldn’t 
have done that if the security needs of the USSR and the expansion of their 
sphere of influence hadn’t been so significant. We didn’t actually want it 
at all’.25
By implying that the Americans built the Iron Curtain and then invented 
Soviet expansionism as a kind of retrospective justification, she com-
pletely inverts the version usually told in the West about the division of 
Europe. At the same time, Schreiber argues as if her explanation were not 
only the dominant one but also the one the textbook authors had in 
mind when writing these lines.
Something very similar happens in an interview with another East 
German teacher,26 referred to here as Matthias Fürst. Asked to sum up 
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the textbook quotation in his own words, he produces the follow-
ing account:
Okay, in principle it is about, uh, the representation of, the development 
of, uh, the Soviet sphere of influence. Not only the representation, but also 
a certain assessment, how the Western powers, how, I guess, it is also made 
clear, how the authors perceive this. Um, that the Soviet Union in Southern 
and Southeastern Europe, through their policy of occupation, which, uh, 
ultimately resulted from and is still resulting from the course of the war, 
how it was pushed into it, that such a [...] a Soviet sphere of influence was 
established there.27
Fürst also reads the text as a confirmation of something he clearly believes 
himself: Soviet policies in Eastern Europe were not simply an outcome of 
the Second World War. These policies, which led to the establishment of 
a ‘sphere of influence’, arose as a result of the Soviets being ‘pushed’ to do 
something, something they would not have done otherwise and which 
was not for their own sake but rather the outcome of external, rather than 
internal, pressures. To this teacher, such a conclusion is hardly new or 
surprising. Like the GDR discourses he grew up with, Fürst takes it for 
granted that everybody sees the Soviets as the ones who liberated Eastern 
Europe from the Germans, as the ones who occupied it. At the same 
time, the rest of the interview reveals two things clearly. First, the West 
German interviewer has a hard time catching up with all of the assump-
tions and ideas Matthias Fürst implicitly relies on without explicitly stat-
ing them. Second, as soon as the interviewer articulates her bewilderment, 
as soon as she reminds him – without realising it – of the discursive shift 
that had turned his version of historical events into a story too strange to 
be comprehensible, he retreats:
I:  So, you just said that the Soviet Union was pushed to establish a 
sphere of influence [...]
MF:  No, they pushed it forward, [it was] that way around.28
Very quickly, without further remarks, Matthias Fürst adapts to what 
he perceives as the dominant discourse. In his newly adopted narrative, 
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the Soviets are no longer pushed by others; they are the ones to push. 
Some minutes later, another case of hastily correcting a ‘mistake’ occurs 
in the same interview. When Matthias Fürst comments on the relation 
the text constructs between the security needs and the expansionist drive 
ascribed to the Soviets, the dialogue between interviewer and interviewee 
again runs into trouble:
I:  Now, there is also something else, if one looks at how the USSR is 
portrayed and its motives. [The text] says, ‘it expanded its sphere 
of influence and it met its security concerns’ [...] How (MF: Mhm) 
do these two things relate to one another from the perspective of 
the text? Are they presented as motives that can go hand in hand? 
Can one have security concerns and expand at the same time? Or 
are they motives that mutually exclude each other because one is 
rather defensive and the other aggressive? [...] From the perspec-
tive of the text?
MF:  Well, it implies that, um, in the end it was wanted by the Eastern 
European countries as well.
I:  Mhm [...] So there was a security concern, but it was not [...] 
there?
MF:  For their security/no, nonsense, (I: Yes), yes. For their, um, it is 
about the Soviet Union (I: Yes). For their security concerns. Well, 
that is this cordon that they would like to have today (I: Mhm) 
again too, yes.29
Again, the misunderstanding is mainly caused by the fact that interviewer 
and interviewee draw on completely different background knowledge to 
fill in the gaps left open by the text. Whereas Matthias Fürst automati-
cally thinks of the Eastern Europeans as the ones who had security con-
cerns, the interviewer no less automatically identifies the Soviets as the 
ones concerned about their security. Interviewer and interviewee mobil-
ise completely different stories from their cultural repertoires in order to 
make sense of the same lines. Again in line with GDR historiography, 
Mathias Fürst constructs the Eastern Europeans as the concerned benefi-
ciaries of protection offered to them by the Soviets. The interviewer, on 
the contrary, draws on revisionist accounts of the Cold War, which regu-
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larly mention Soviet security concerns. In the end, however, it is again the 
interviewee who steps back and bows to the new hegemonic discourse 
with which he is confronted, because he realises the power difference 
between the two narratives.
Summing up, we can conclude that the quotation leads the teachers 
from both parts of Germany to position themselves in different ways. The 
teachers from Lower Saxony (West) are pretty much divided. Some read 
elements of revisionist accounts within, or into, the textbook lines and 
appreciate the quote for its balance and fairness. Others fail to see traces 
of revisionism and reject the same quote for being too one-sided. As we 
can see, it is rather differences in interpretation but not differences in 
evaluative standards that account for the divide in their assessments. 
Interestingly, the same does not apply to the teachers from Saxony-Anhalt 
(East). Most of these teachers project onto the quotation a sceptical and 
morally neutral view of a world inhabited by countries, for them under-
standably, invested in their own self-interest. Occasionally, we observe 
these teachers drawing upon moral narratives from the GDR period. 
However, this seems to happen exclusively in situations when the teach-
ers being interviewed temporarily seem to lose control and react almost 
automatically. As soon as they recognise the bewilderment their answers 
have caused, they immediately withdraw from their initial position – as if 
they sense that they had crossed a line demarcating what may be said.
To a certain extent, the Swiss teachers we interviewed do exactly the 
opposite of the German teachers. Whereas the majority of German teach-
ers read the quotation as blaming the USSR, 8 out of 10 Swiss teachers 
Table 13.2 How teachers from Switzerland react to a text
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come to the conclusion that neither superpower is ascribed any blame for 
having caused the conflict. And while only 1 out of 18 German teachers 
criticised the text for being too pro-Soviet, 5 out of 10 Swiss teachers do so.
In contrast to the case study of German teachers, a closer examination 
of the arguments put forward by the Swiss teachers does not undermine 
the first impression of unanimity. Most of them do not only read the 
quotation in line with post-revisionist accounts, as emphasising struc-
tural causes of the Cold War, but most of them also do so for similar 
reasons, drawing mainly on a rather general knowledge concerning 
human behaviour and interaction. One teacher characterises the alliance 
between the Soviets and the Americans during the Second World War as 
a marriage of convenience that could not help but break up as soon as 
Germany, the common enemy, was defeated.30 Another compares the 
conflict to an argument between children in the ‘sandbox’.31 A third one 
claims, ‘one always ends up with the same human drive for power and 
self-preservation’.32 At the same time, these teachers have no difficulty 
emphasising the fundamental differences between the United States 
and the USSR.
From this perspective, the difference between the majority of eight 
teachers, who read the text as being rather neutral, and the minority of 
two, who read it as either blaming the Soviets33 or being biased towards 
the United States,34 begins to diminish. All of these teachers agree that 
the United States was in pursuit of morally superior goals compared to a 
USSR which they perceive as following a much more egoistic agenda; the 
only thing they disagree about is whether the quotation reflects this 
belief or not.
Something similar can be observed with regard to the assessments the 
Swiss teachers give to the text. On the surface we observe a variety of 
statements, with 5 teachers rejecting it for being too pro-Soviet, 2 embrac-
ing it as well balanced, 2 giving inconclusive answers and only 1 criticis-
ing it  – as over half of the German teachers do  – for being too 
pro-American. The teachers who accuse the textbook authors of being 
too cautious with regard to the USSR refer to a historical reality missed 
by the text. The Soviet approach in Eastern Europe, they insist, could 
have been described in a much more drastic and outspoken way.35 The 
label ‘people’s democracy’ to describe the Soviet-style regimes, they con-
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tinue, is highly misleading, rendering invisible the pure dictatorship to 
which the text is actually referring.36 Others are offended by the casual 
way in which the text depicts the establishment of dictatorships in the 
satellite states without giving voice to the oppressed Eastern European 
people.37 Considering all of these omissions, which he describes as incom-
prehensible, one teacher even assumes that the text must have been 
 written by a person born in the former GDR and still very much influ-
enced by everything he or she had learned back then.38
Overall, the teachers who criticise the text for casting the Soviets in too 
positive a role, do so on the basis of the same distinction – equally upheld 
by the rest of their colleagues – between a morally superior United States 
and a morally questionable USSR. Furthermore, even the most outspo-
ken critics of the text paint rather complex pictures of the historical real-
ity. For example, of the group of Swiss teachers, the two individuals who 
draw a line of continuity between the aggression of Soviet Russia and 
Tsarist Russia,39 and who portray the Soviet Union as a society never 
touched by the Enlightenment and thus deeply enmeshed in autocratic 
traditions,40 are particularly sympathetic to the socialist idea of justice 
and equality.
We can learn two things from these conclusions. Firstly, anti- 
communist sentiment seems to be deeply internalised by all of the Swiss 
teachers, including those leaning towards the political left. Secondly, 
although they argue in line with traditionalist accounts and clearly take 
sides with the West in what they consider to be a conflict between Western 
democracy and Eastern dictatorship, the Swiss teachers also tend to talk 
about aspects such as social justice and equality, issues which often go 
unrecognised by pure traditionalists. The combination of anti- 
communism and a concern for complexity thus creates a position that all 
Swiss teachers can identify with, even if they may differ with regard 
to nuances.
This impression is reinforced when we look at the ways in which Swiss 
teachers talk about the United States. Some engage in criticism of the 
Western superpower, but all the Swiss teachers stop short of drawing an 
equal sign between the United States and the USSR. Speaking openly 
about the Americans having lost their image as saviours of the world, and 
admitting that the same Americans are now perceived as the ‘policemen’ 
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of the world, mainly motivated by their interest in oil, one teacher 
 nevertheless insists on the crucial difference between American democ-
racy and Soviet one-party rule.41
In contrast to their German colleagues then, these Swiss teachers’ 
individual narratives share many similarities. Minor discrepancies 
among these narratives do not refer to core beliefs or evaluative stan-
dards but rather to the degree to which these teachers read the quota-
tion as either confirming or questioning their own beliefs. Half of the 
teachers appreciate the neutral treatment of both superpowers on the 
part of the text but simultaneously point subtly to the moral differences 
between them. The other half equate subtlety with caution and argues 
that this caution is bought at a dear price as it entails a silence in regards 
to what was endured by the people of Eastern Europe under the 
Soviet regime.
To my mind, there are two compelling insights to be gained from a 
comparison of the interview data: The textbook quotation triggers many 
different and, at times, openly contradictory reactions. At the same time, 
the variation we observe follows a clearly recognisable national pattern.
The most obvious contrast is probably between the 11 teachers who 
read the quotation as blaming both superpowers for causing the Cold 
War and the 17 teachers who understand it to ascribe responsibility 
exclusively to the Soviet Union. If we look at how the text is assessed, we 
can distinguish between those who appreciate it and those who reject it 
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or even suspect that it was written by an ideologically brainwashed per-
son from the East. Furthermore, among the critics, 11 teachers blame the 
text for being too pro-American, while six others perceive it as being too 
pro-Soviet. Something similar happens with the teachers who are positive 
towards the text. While two teachers praise it for being appropriately pro- 
American, 4 teachers like the text for being well balanced.
To my mind, all these differences support the thesis that the textbook 
quotation is indeed ambivalent, in the sense that it is open to many dif-
ferent readings. Teachers obviously read opposite meanings into the same 
lines, most vividly exemplified by the different understandings of the 
quotation concerning the Western powers’ perception of Soviet behav-
iour as aggressive. All of this points to the fact, that even schools, as 
 institutions expected to convey consensual knowledge (Höhne 2003), 
cannot easily reach any consensus on how to make sense of the Cold War.
However, we see considerable variation between national samples. 
While the Swiss sample is far more homogeneous with the majority of 
teachers stressing – in line with traditional accounts on the origins of the 
Cold War – a crucial difference between the democratic United States 
and the dictatorial USSR, the German sample displays strong heteroge-
neity. While most of the German teachers read the quotation as blaming 
the USSR, they tend to strongly disagree as to whether this represents an 
adequate reflection or a distortion of historical reality. Furthermore, since 
it is mainly West German teachers with these clearly diverging views, the 
phenomenon can hardly be explained with reference to the former divide 
between East and West alone. It also seems to point to the social effective-
ness of textbooks, which, in the case of Germany, display rather diverse 
viewpoints, each mixing traditionalist, revisionist and post-revisionist 
accounts on the origins of the Cold War in multiple ways (Christophe 
2017). In line with a theoretical argument according to which textbooks 
simultaneously shape and mirror societal discourses (Williams 2014), we 
can expect teachers to be influenced by the textbooks to which they are 
exposed and with which they work on a daily basis, and we can also 
assume that textbook authors are themselves influenced by the cultural 




Yet, despite the diversity of narratives offered in German textbooks, 
there still seem to be certain limits on what can be legitimately said. East 
German teachers, at least, perceive these limits, as we can see in moments 
when they find themselves saying something that would have been nor-
mal in GDR times but appears almost incomprehensible to the West 
German interviewer. It is in these moments that they seem to feel com-
pelled to correct themselves immediately.
 Discussion
As we have seen, none of the teachers interviewed gives voice to the pos-
sibility of reading different meanings into a text that has clearly enabled 
rather different interpretations. From interviews with these teachers, it is 
clear that their belief in hegemonic narratives seems to have outlived even 
the end of the hegemonies themselves. Although all of the teachers appear 
to hold different positions when discussing the textbook quotation, each 
seems to believe that there exists only one appropriate position from 
which to speak the truth.
The situation we are faced with simultaneously resembles and differs 
from the memory practices Marita Sturken has observed at the Vietnam 
Memorial (1997). Like her, we observe people drawing on competing 
discourses in order to fill in the gaps left open by an ambivalent represen-
tation of the past; like her, we are able to witness the emergence of many 
different voices on how to make sense of the past. But there is one crucial 
difference. While contestation and thus the political character of all 
memory is in the open in the case of the Vietnam War, the illusion of 
hegemony, which is encouraged by these teachers, still renders invisible 
the degree of conflict and competition extant in the study of the Cold 
War. We can assume that under these conditions, ambivalence does not 
contribute to smoothing the sharp edges of which everybody remains 
painfully aware; instead, ambivalence helps to circumvent the recogni-
tion of those edges.
Concerning the question of what keeps the political out of the teach-
ers’ discourses on the Cold War, epistemological beliefs about the rela-
tionship between history as events past and history as the narrative told 
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about these events seem to play a role as well. When thinking aloud about 
how to assess the textbook narrative, all of the teachers refer to the com-
plexity of historical reality sooner or later. And while they arrive at rather 
different conclusions, all of them perform the same kind of evaluation 
exercise. In the spirit of historians like Peter Novick (1999), all check 
whether the shape of the narrative adequately reflects what they know 
about the shape of historical reality; additionally, all of them seem to be 
convinced that this reality is accessible to them. For someone standing on 
this epistemological ground, history is about truth, narratives are not 
fully negotiable, and the political has only limited relevance for the 
historical.
Again, the German teachers are an exception to the general rule. The 
epistemological positions from which they argue appear to be much more 
ambivalent. Like their Swiss colleagues, they also evoke images of the 
historical past in order to either approve or disapprove of the textbook 
narrative. But, especially among the most outspoken critics of the quota-
tion, some switch the epistemological position from which they argue 
and engage in the discourse-analytical enterprise of deconstruction. 
Instead of comparing the textbook story to an image of historical reality, 
there are instances when they identify absences in the narrative by scruti-
nising it in light of possible alternatives. From here it would be only one 
small step to recognise the political nature of history and memory. 
However, they do not take that step, perhaps because they can always fall 
back on the first strategy of evoking images of historical reality in order 
to evaluate the appropriateness of a narrative.
As we can learn from our interviews with the German teachers, shifts 
in epistemological assumptions can create a certain ambiguity, which 
may then prevent teachers from fully exhausting the potential of ambiv-
alent representations. As long as the teachers aim to tell the most inclu-
sive or appropriate story about the past, they embrace the ambivalent 
narrative as an adequate response to complexity. As soon as they aim to 
deconstruct stories, they criticise the same ambivalent narrative for the 
absences or imbalances it entails. But unless the teachers recognise that 
their guiding assumptions about the status of historical facts change 
when pursuing these two aims, the operations they perform may easily 
interrupt each other. History teachers seem to be stuck between two 
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opposing epistemological positions. We may even assume that the com-
peting demands they face require them to dwell on the shifting ground 
between those two poles. In the end, they hardly have a chance of attain-
ing a third position, one that could be rather appealing in the age of 
increasingly plural and ambivalent memory cultures: They do not read 
the ambivalent text as Umberto Eco (1998) suggests, as an invitation to 
generate a multitude of different interpretations. To accept such an invi-
tation would require acknowledging the political in teaching history. It 
would moreover involve a readiness to remove persistent limits on what 
can be said – limits of which some of our East German teachers remain 
all too aware.
Notes
1. ‘Auf der Potsdamer Konferenz 1945 vereinbarten die USA, die UdSSR 
und Großbritannien ihre gemeinsamen Positionen im Umgang mit 
Deutschland. Danach bestimmten die politischen Gegensätze das weit-
ere Vorgehen. In ihrem Machtbereich setzten sich die USA für 
Demokratie und wirtschaftlichen Liberalismus ein. Die UdSSR organ-
isierte bis nach Mitteleuropa für ihr Sicherheitsbedürfnis einen sozialist-
ischen Machtbereich. Die sowjetische Armee stand in den Ländern 
Ost- und Südosteuropas. Dort kamen Regierungen an die Macht, die 
von der Sowjetunion politisch und wirtschaftlich gestützt wurden. 
Neben Polen, der Tschechoslowakei, Ungarn, Bulgarien und Rumänien 
vollzog sich auch in der späteren DDR die Entwicklung zu einer 
Volksdemokratie. Die Westmächte sahen diese Vorgänge als Expansion 
des sowjetischen Einflussbereiches an’.
2. ‘Schon bald nach Kriegsende kam es zu immer stärkeren Spannungen 
zwischen den siegreichen Großmächten, der UdSSR auf der einen Seite 
und den westlichen Alliierten, besonders den USA, auf der anderen. Der 
Grund war das immer unverhülltere imperialistische Streben der UdSSR, 
die einem von ihr besetzten Staat nach dem anderen das bolschewist-
ische Herrschaftssystem aufzwangen’.
3. ‘Am Ende des Zweiten Weltkrieges hatte die Sowjetunion mehr als 20 
Millionen Kriegstote zu beklagen und war in weiten Teilen verwüstet. 
Doch die Rote Armee hatte fast ganz Osteuropa besetzt und war bis 
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nach Deutschland vorgestoßen. Diese Gebiete standen nun unter sowje-
tischer Kontrolle und bedeuteten einen großen Machtzuwachs. Das 
wichtigste Ziel nach dem Krieg war der Wiederaufbau des eigenen 
Landes. Dazu wollte die Sowjetunion deutsche Reparationsleistungen 
und amerikanische Kredite nutzen. Langfristig fürchtete der sowjetische 
Staatschef Stalin einen Konflikt mit den USA und anderen kapitalist-
ischen Staaten. Die militärische und wirtschaftliche Stärke der USA 
hatte entscheidend zum Sieg über das nationalsozialistische Deutschland 
beigetragen. Als einziger der großen Staaten war das Land ohne 
Zerstörungen geblieben. Seine Fabriken produzierten mehr als jemals 
zuvor. Anders als nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg waren die USA fest 
entschlossen, die politische Neuordnung der Weit mitzugestalten. 
Demokratie und Menschenrechte sollten dabei überall durchgesetzt 
werden. Die Amerikaner wollten aber auch ihre wirtschaftliche 
Vorrangstellung sicherstellen; dazu brauchten sie den freien Zugang zu 
den Märkten und Rohstoffquellen der Welt’.
4. ‘West German’ refers here to individuals born in pre-1990 West 
Germany, who currently teach in states that were part of that territory; 
‘East German’ teachers were born in the GDR and currently teach in 
states that were part of the former East Germany.
5. The following section is based on interviews I conducted between 
December 2013 and August 2014 together with my colleagues Kathrin 
Zehr and Nora Zimmermann. I thank them for their support not only 
in gathering but also in discussing and coding the data. All interviews 
were recorded, transcribed and rendered anonymous by giving code 
names to persons and places mentioned and assigning each interview a 
number. As a rule I cite each interview by its number, date, and the 
interviewee’s country of origin (WG for western Germany, EG for east-
ern Germany and CH for Switzerland). Only in cases where I discuss 
answers from a single interview in more detail is the interviewee’s code 
name mentioned. The interviews in Germany and Switzerland were con-
ducted in German using the original quotation in German.
6. WG 8 (6 May 2014).
7. EG 1 (15 July 2014); EG 2 (15 April 2014); EG 6 (19 June 2014); WG 
5 (11 February 2014); WG 9 (29 April 2014).
8. WG 1 (13 May 2014); WG 8 (6 May 2014); EG 4 (13 May 2014); EG 
6 (19 June 2014).
9. WG 8 (6 May 2014); EG 7 (18 June 2014); EG 9 (26 June 2014).
10. WG 1(13 May 2014).
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11. WG 5 (11 February 2014); WG 8 (6 May 2014).
12. EG 5 (19 May 2014), EG 8 (19 May 2014).
13. EG 4 (13 May 2014).
14. EG 2 (15 April 2014); EG 8 (19 May 2014).
15. EG 3(27 March 2014).
16. WG 9 (29 April 2014).
17. WG 8(6 May 2014).
18. WG 10 (15 July 2014).
19. EG 2 (15 April 2014)
20. EG 3 (27 March 2014; EG 6 (19 June 2014).
21. EG 4 (13 May 2014); EG 5 (19 May 2014); EG 8 (19 May 2014).
22. EG 6 (19 June 2014).
23. EG 5 (19 May 2014).
24. EG 6 (19 June 2014).
25. EG 6 (19 June 2014): ‘Es ist eine su/ subjektive Sache, weil, ist ja auch 
eine Art Entschuldigung dafür, dass sie dann äh den eisernen Vorhang (I: 
Mhm.) errichten, ja. Also es ist ja auch eine, eine Art Entschuldigung. 
“Wir hätten es ja nicht gemacht, wenn das Sicherheitsbedürfnis der 
UdSSR und der Ausbau des Machtbereichs nicht so groß gewesen wäre. 
Wir wollten das ja eigentlich gar nicht’.
26. EG 7 (18 June 2014).
27. EG 7 (18 June 2014): ‘Okay, na ja, es geht im Prinzip hier um die, äh die 
Darstellung der, der Entwicklung des äh s/ sowjetischen Machtbereichs. 
Nicht nur Darstellung, auch eine gewisse Wertung, wie es a) von den 
Westmächten, wie es, hm, denke mal, wird auch deutlich, wie es, wie es 
die Autoren sehen. Ähm dass also die Sowjetunion in Süd- und 
Südosteuropa durch ihre äh Besatzungspolitik, die durch den 
Kriegsverlauf letztendlich zus/ äh sich ergeben hat oder auch noch weit-
erhin äh ergibt, ja, dazu getrieben wurde, dass dort so eine, (...) ein sow-
jetischer Machtbereich aufgebaut worden ist.’
28. EG 7 (18 June 2014): I: Ähm Sie hatten gerade gesagt, dass die 
Sowjetunion getrieben wurde dazu, einen Machtbereich zu errichten. 
MF: Nee, sie haben das vorangetrieben, so rum.
29. EG 7 (18 June 2014): I: Jetzt ist ja dann noch so was, also wenn man sich 
anguckt, wie die UdSSR dargestellt wird und ihre Motive. Da steht: “Sie 
erweitert ihren Einflussbereich und sie erfüllt Sicherheitsbedürfnisse”. 
[...] Wie (MF: Mhm.) stehen diese beiden Dinge aus Sicht des Textes 
miteinander in Beziehung? Werden die als Motive aufgefasst, die mitein-
ander einhergehen können? Also man kann ein Sicherheitsbedürfnis 
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haben und gleichzeitig expandieren? Oder sind das Motive, die sich 
gegenei/ äh gegenseitig ausschließen, weil das eine defensiv ist eher und 
das andere aggressiv? [...] Also aus Sicht des Textes?
MF: Na ja, es impliziert, dass ähm das letztendlich durch die osteu-
ropäischen Länder ja schon auch gewollt wurde.
I: Mhm. [...] Es gab zwar ein Sicherheitsbedürfnis, aber das war nicht 
[...] da?
MF: Für ihr Sicherheits. Nee, Quatsch, (I: Ja.) ja. Für ihr, äh/ Hm, es 
geht ja um die Sowjetunion. (I: Ja.) Für ihr Sicherheitsbedürfnis. Ähm 
na das ist dieser, dieser Gürtel, der/ den sie heute auch (I: Mhm.) gerne 
wieder hätten, ja.
30. CH 1 (1 April 2014).
31. CH 2 (1 April 2014).
32. ‘... und da landet man ja letztlich ja eigentlich immer beim selben men-
schlichen Urtrieb von Macht und Erhaltung’, CH 9 (17 April 2014).
33. CH 7 (10 June 2014).
34. CH 6 (2 October 2014).
35. CH 2 (1 April 2014).
36. CH 1 (1 April 2014); CH 9 (17 April 2014).
37. CH 3 (14 May 2014); CH 4 (20 May 2014).
38. CH 3 (14 May 2014).
39. CH 2 (1 April 2014).
40. CH 10 (14 April 2014).
41. CH 1 (1 April 2014).
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1968 in German-speaking Switzerland: 
Controversies and Interpretations
Nadine Ritzer
‘1968’ has become an ‘associative space of societal attributions and autho-
rial interpretations of the self ’ (Frei 2008, 211). A study of the Swiss 
print media of the time reveals that two protests in particular had been 
responsible for moving public opinion in 1968, both of which relate to 
the Cold War to an equal extent: protests against the repression of the 
Prague Spring and against the war in Vietnam (Kleger 1999). Both events 
are distinctive in that they thoroughly destabilise bipolar constructions of 
the Cold War.
Reformers in the circles of Alexander Dubček and Ludvík Svoboda 
were fighting neither for liberalism nor for capitalism; rather, they sought 
a brand of socialism with a human face (Karner 2008). This is why anti- 
communist interpretations of the Prague Spring generally fall short. More 
recent studies now read the events in Prague as part of the international 
68 movement and emphasise parallels between the forms of action taken 
and the demands made by both East and West (Frei 2008, 190–197). 
Similarly, the war in Vietnam and the role of the USA as an advocate of 
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freedom and democracy are radically questioned. At the same time, the 
war in Vietnam had always been more than a mere proxy war in the East- 
West conflict. Many historians assume today that the North-South com-
ponent was just as significant as the East-West aspect: ‘[...] the First 
Indochina War was simultaneously a colonial conflict and a Cold War 
confrontation’, writes Fredrik Logevall (2010, 286), for instance. Others 
even maintain that from the ‘third world’ perspective there were hardly 
differences between the superpowers that were the USSR and the USA 
(Westad 2000, 564).
With this in mind, this chapter inquires as to how the Prague Spring 
and the Vietnam War have been and continue to be interpreted in schools 
in German-speaking Switzerland, based on three source types: teacher 
periodicals from the relevant period,1 history textbooks from the relevant 
period and the present day, and teacher interviews.2 The study design is 
informed by two key lines of inquiry: How homogeneous or controver-
sial have the various interpretations negotiated in different media been 
and to what extent do these controversies continue? Can shifts in these 
interpretations be identified over the course of time?
The results of the comparative study unveil ambivalences that surpris-
ingly recur in all analysed formats, indicating that both events were from 
the outset too complex to be mapped within a simplistic structure of 
East/West dualism.
 Switzerland in the Cold War
While Switzerland assumed an officially neutral position in the Cold War, 
it was western-oriented in terms of ideology, economy, geography and 
national policy. This was not least evident in its generally  anti- communist 
stance, shared by the population at large as well as the prominent political 
parties. As Kurt Imhof (1999) emphasises, anti-communism served as a 
societal ‘basic consensus’, a buttress of Helvetian identity construction and 
‘organising principle of political communication’. The latter also informed 
the school, which  – in the context of the so-called ‘spiritual national 
defence’ (Geistige Landesverteidigung) – also sought to ‘arm’ its young peo-
ple for the fight against communism (Ritzer 2015, 129–162). Events in 
Czechoslovakia in 1948 and Korean War had fuelled fear of the ‘red men-
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ace’. In 1951, the Swiss Federal Council issued a secret decree on ‘preserv-
ing national security’, which led to some 900,000 persons being registered 
by the state on lists of potentially suspicious individuals. It was not until 
these surveillance mechanisms were unveiled in the so-called ‘secret files 
scandal’ (Fichenaffäre) of 1990 that the decree was revoked (Bretscher-
Spindler 1997, 213; Kreis 1993). Although Switzerland was shocked and 
unsettled by the scandal, the resulting reinterpretation of the events of the 
Cold War was nevertheless slow in coming.
 The Early Autumn of the Prague Spring
The violent end to the Prague Spring brought by the Warsaw Pact troops 
shaped the news reports in Swiss media like no other event in 1968 (Kleger 
1999). Thousands of Swiss citizens, including entire school classes, took to 
the streets in order to protest against ‘the Russians’. During a special ses-
sion of the national council, Walther Hofer declared the solidarity of ‘free-
dom-conscious Switzerland’ with the ‘violated’ people of Czechoslovakia. 
Switzerland, he proclaimed, was appalled by the infringement of ‘the right 
of self-determination of a small state and of its endeavours towards a self-
defined and independent existence’ (www.dodis.ch/32187, 2). Federal 
Council President Willy Spühler evoked an instructive lesson to the Swiss 
people not only to remember the value of, but also to defend, their own 
civil liberties. Members of parliament praised in particular the commit-
ment and enthusiasm of young people for the flame of freedom being 
ignited amongst the Czechoslovakian people (www.dodis.ch/32187, 
29–33). The SLZ considered it the ‘serious duty of all teachers’ to address 
these events in class (N.N., SLZ 113, 1968, 1315).
 Contemporary Interpretations in the Teacher 
Periodicals
In July 1967, twenty Czechoslovakian teachers paid a visit to members of 
the Swiss Teachers’ Association, who returned the visit in Czechoslovakia 
in the spring of 1968. This visit was intended to significantly shape initial 
interpretations of the Prague Spring and indeed was subject to detailed 
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commentary in various reports following the crushing of the Prague 
Spring (Hänni, SLZ 113, 1968, 1299; Adam, SLZ 113, 1968, 1299–1310 
and 1350–1357). These interpretations repeatedly moved beyond the 
bipolar structure conventionally applied to the Cold War. The reports 
focus on the political euphoria in the ČSSR and the cautious optimism 
of the host teachers: ‘We felt so free, we could have been anywhere’, a 
member of the Association described the atmosphere in Prague in the 
spring of 1968 (Adam, SLZ 113, 1968, 1354). The reporter emphasises 
the openness of the people, who were speaking  – uninhibited by the 
recently lifted censorship of the press – of old grievances and new hopes. 
In these jubilant days, one teacher writes, public criticism on the part of 
artists and intellectuals had become a thing of possibility (Adam, SLZ 
113, 1968, 1350–1357). What were perceived as the objectives of the 
‘Czech Revolution’? The ČSSR was in the process, thus the general theme, 
of ‘becoming a democratic socialist state’, a state with ‘all civil liberties’ 
(Adam, SLZ 113, 1301). The Swiss seemed to believe that the 
Czechoslovakians found themselves on the threshold of breaking through 
the conventional dichotomy of ‘democracy’ and ‘socialism’, and taking a 
third path (Adam, SLZ 113, 1968, 1299–1310 and 1350–1357; Hruby, 
SLZ 114, 1969, 1240–1245). Following the Warsaw Pact invasion, how-
ever, the tone of the reports changed somewhat, even in the SLZ. The 
dichotomous worldview dominated perceptions of the events, which 
were also interpreted in terms of the national master narrative of a 
Helvetian ‘tradition of liberalisation’, as the struggle of an ‘enslaved peo-
ple’ for freedom and against Soviet communism. If the report is to be 
believed, the climate at universities and schools was one of denunciation, 
intimidation, fear and dismissal, the teachers being held responsible for 
the ‘failure to Sovietise Eastern Europe’ (N.N., SLZ 115, 1970, 
1572–1575). This led to the Czechoslovakian education system being 
ransacked in search of ‘unreliable persons’ by means of ‘inquisition 
papers’, demanding all those questioned to inform against critically 
minded colleagues. Although, according to the SLZ, some 95 per cent of 
teachers refused to complete the ‘inquisition papers’, a ‘cleansing’ of pro-
fessors and academic staff nevertheless took place (N.N., SLZ 115, 1970, 
1572–1575; N.N., SLZ 115, 1970, 115).
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The Swiss teacher periodicals took on the task of denouncing the 
instrumentalisation of education by these communist governments, and 
painted pictures of the courageous and clever resistance measures on the 
part of the people against the system of injustice. Particularly striking is 
that the teachers were usually portrayed as victims of the regime rather 
than as the agents and vehicles of the ruling ideology (Ritzer 2015, 
85–94). The euphoria in the ČSSR in the spring of 1968 and the quest 
for a new form of socialism on the part of the ‘reform communists’ were 
now hardly mentioned. The protesters were considered role models in the 
struggle against communism due to their civil courage, working in the 
interests of ‘spiritual national defence’ (Frei, PB 62, 1968, 69). The pro-
tests in Prague or Bratislava served as a warning to the Swiss to fight to 
preserve their own civil liberties. Because the martyr image suited the 
concept of ‘intellectual national defence’ better than that of reformer, not 
only the protesters but also the reform communists, in particular Ludvík 
Svoboda and Alexander Dubček, were celebrated as heroes in the struggle 
against Soviet communism.
In Switzerland, numerous young people organised demonstrations 
and rallies. Many teacher teams and education authorities were critical of 
their political activities. One outraged teacher reported how a colleague 
had spoken out against young people being encouraged to demonstrate 
and thus being ‘instrumentalised’ for other people’s ideals; ultimately, 
young people can be equally motivated to ‘do completely the opposite … 
as in the case of the Hitler Youth’. Criticising his colleague, the teacher 
continues: If he, as a teacher, is no longer in a position to clearly con-
demn ‘such a nefarious attack on human rights’ and to name the  ‘culprits’, 
‘if I am no longer in a position to present the judicious courage and reso-
lute determination of the Czech people as an example of civil courage and 
civic duty, then I can no longer be a teacher. Then I am no more than the 
infamous “conveyor of facts”’ (N.N., SLZ 113, 1968, 193–1194). He 
was not alone. Many teachers were impressed by the initiatives taken by 
their pupils, supporting or encouraging them to participate in protest 
marches (N.N., SLZ 113, 1968, 1193–1195; G.S., ScS 55, 1968, 725).3 
Blue, white and red pennants were displayed on bicycles and cars and 
flags were carried to demonstration marches and silent protests. During 
one of the largest demonstrations in Bern, hundreds of pupils  – with 
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permission from their teachers – performed a sitting strike in front of the 
Soviet embassy, disregarding, however, police regulations (Schweizer 
Fernsehen, 21 August 1968).
The SLZ also showed great interest in the youth demonstrations of the 
ČSSR, most of which were portrayed as the spearhead of the anti- 
communist movement. Only seldom were parallels drawn between the 
1968 movements in East and West. The newsletter of the SLV declared 
the attempt to communise ČSSR youth a failure (N.N., SLZ 115, 1970, 
1572–1575). Recent research, however, refutes this claim. The rebellion 
of Czech youth may have turned against Soviet Orthodox communism; 
not, however, against reform communism (Karner 2008, 8). Demands 
were also made for societal change (Frei 2008, 190–197), dramatically 
exceeding the hopes of many Swiss protesters for the ČSSR. It was only 
seldom pointed out that the young people of the ČSSR were questioning 
‘authorities’ and criticising the education system as were young people 
everywhere. Although a speaker pointed to the transnational character of 
the 1968 protests during a demonstration, at the same time he strongly 
criticised the ‘rebellion’ in Switzerland:
Young people in Czechoslovakia also experienced demonstrations and riots 
only a few months ago. And in Prague too, for the same - quite unspectacu-
lar - issues as in almost all large cities of the world. The apprentices, stu-
dents and pupils who took to the streets in Prague were no more original 
than their counterparts in Berlin, Rome and Paris. What was unique and 
exemplary in Czechoslovakia, however, was that it was the young people 
and not only the much more experienced and mature adults who in the 
space of these few months had admirably taken on responsibility and self- 
discipline, thus achieving resistance in its most effective form (Fuchs, SLZ 
113, 1968, 1195).
Some warned, however, that anti-communist reflexes could not do justice 
to the complexity of the conflict in the ČSSR. Even some pupils acknowl-
edged that the ‘Czechs were and wanted to remain communists, that in 
this case anti-communism would not have the desired effect’ (G.S., ScS 
55, 1968, 725). Sociologist Karl Hruby (SLZ 114, 1969, 1244) put it in 
plain terms at an international teacher conference in 1969: ‘No one has 
demanded that state capitalism - in the East referred to as “socialism” - be 
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abolished’. As suggested above, the teachers who reported of the hospital-
ity of their ČSSR friends knew this too, albeit not without emphasising 
that these ‘amiable people are communists who believe in an improved 
social order and fight for it with honesty and conviction’ (Adam, SLZ 
113, 1968, 1299–1310). It was the protesters themselves, and not so 
much the periodicals, who pointed to the ambivalent interpretations that 
could be applied to the events in the ČSSR: In Basel, the streets echoed 
with the call of ‘Dubček! Svoboda!’ Posters drew parallels between the 
violence in Prague and in Vietnam. Both American and Soviet ‘imperial-
ism’ were given a harsh verdict: At a demonstration in Basel on 22nd 
August 1968, protest banners read: ‘ČSSR  – out with the UdSSR! 
Vietnam – out with the USA!’ (NZZ, 22 August 1968, 4). In Zürich, 
too, the ‘interventions’ of both superpowers were denounced by the 
Progressiven Mittelschüler (progressive Gymnasium pupils) or the 
Fortschrittliche Studentenschaft (progressive students) (Becker 2014, 60).
 The Prague Spring in the Textbooks
Although the Swiss textbooks for the most part tend to locate the Prague 
Spring within a bipolar world order, ambivalences are nevertheless per-
ceptible. While a few early portrayals suggest that the Prague Spring 
sought not to defeat but rather to reform the socialist system, two strands 
of interpretative thinking were dominant in the 1970s and 1980s. It was 
only after the end of the Cold War that teaching materials offered a more 
nuanced depiction of the protagonists and their objectives, albeit retain-
ing the fundamental narrative - in images and text alike - of the struggle 
of a freedom-loving people against a dictatorial Soviet communism.
A history textbook of 1968 presents interpretive elements that reap-
pear at later intervals: The dispute between the ‘Moscow-friendly com-
munists and the innovators’, it claims, was won by Alexander Dubček, 
who relaxed the censorship of the press. ‘The elation of young people 
about this glimmer of liberty compelled Dubček to make further conces-
sions.’ This was not tolerated, however, by ‘the Russians’, who conse-
quently ordered the Warsaw Pact forces to invade (CH-1968-Göldi, 61). 
According to this interpretation, the ‘communists’ allowed for the new 
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liberties only under pressure; no autonomous will to reform is attributed 
to them. The dominance of the bipolar logic that informs such interpre-
tations also becomes evident in references to the Brezhnev Doctrine that 
claim ‘Russia’ primarily intervened because no satellite state may be 
allowed to think differently. At the same time, the insurgents were por-
trayed as martyrs; it had been only their non-violent protest that had 
prevented further bloodshed. An image of young protesters around and 
on an army tank, with the caption ‘Prague 1968: Not Afraid of Tanks’ 
emphasises the interpretation of the conflict as a struggle between David 
and Goliath (CH-1968-Göldi, 61).
The history textbook published shortly after the events, Denkwürdige 
Vergangenheit (1969), briefly indicates the will to reform in the political 
leadership of the ČSSR. Svoboda and Dubček, the book explains, had 
attempted to combine the ideals of East and West; to reconcile fraternity 
and liberty. What exactly this meant was not explained in detail. The 
responsibility for the repression of the Prague Spring was attributed to 
the ‘Kremlin powers’. Despite its abrupt ending, the textbook claims, the 
Prague Spring inspired hope, ‘for the unanimously non-violent resistance 
on the part of the Czechoslovakian people bore witness as never seen 
before to the indestructible power of liberty and spirit. And this witness 
came from the communist camp’ (CH-1969-Müller, 266).
Here too, non-violent protest is a model for the Swiss pupils. This 
author, however, unlike many articles published in the association 
 newsletters, expressly points out that the insurgents belonged to the 
‘communist camp’ and were not acting in opposition to communism. 
This interpretation destabilised the bipolar logic of ‘spiritual national 
defence’: positive political activity was even possible in the communist 
camp! This reading tends, however, to constitute the exception to the rule 
in Swiss textbooks. Portrayals from the 1970s and early 1980s retain the 
differential semantics of ‘freedom and democracy’ versus ‘coercion and 
communism’. A widely used textbook, for example, presents a highly 
emotional depiction of the attempt of ‘courageous men’ to liberate them-
selves from the Soviet pressure (CH-1970-Jaggi, 306–307). Here too, the 
book mentions that the leaders of the protests in the ČSSR retained com-
munism, albeit with ‘as much liberty and humanity as possible’. Was the 
author suggesting here that most of the insurgents - unlike the leaders - 
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were questioning communism? Certainly, the insurgents were depicted as 
heroes: ‘Many women are crying. The men, however, are becoming 
embroiled in heated debate with foreign soldiers. Their words are lost in 
the din from the Russian tanks. Foolhardy citizens of Prague succeed in 
exploding Russian tanks’. Interestingly, the author makes an alteration 
with regard to those responsible for ending the Prague Spring. In 1970 he 
had emphasised that ‘powerful Russia’ had not been willing to grant more 
liberties (CH-1970-Jaggi, 306). Another version of his history textbook, 
published eight years later, includes the ruling powers of the Soviet ‘sub-
ordinate countries’ amongst those responsible for the ČSSR invasion, 
rather than just ‘the Russians’ (CH-1978-Jaggi, 382).
It was not until the mid-1980s that these narratives shifted. At this 
time there was also a change in the design of history textbooks. Since the 
end of the 1970s, increasing numbers of sources had been used, with the 
intention of inspiring learners to form their own perceptions of history. 
The book Zeiten Menschen Kulturen (ZMK), published in 1985, for 
example, primarily features sources. The text describing the Prague Spring 
was reduced to a table outlining the history of events in the ČSSR since 
1918, with a focus on structural differences between East and West. The 
production of consumer goods in the ČSSR had been neglected in favour 
of heavy industry, leading to a division in the Communist Party between 
the ‘Moscow-faithful’ and ‘reformers’. Initially, the reformers had pre-
vailed. Their goal had been paving their own way to socialism, ‘holding 
on to communism, but guaranteeing civil liberties’, which had been 
thwarted by the invasion of the ‘Warsaw Pact States’ (CH-1985-Ziegler, 
61–63 and CH-1993-Ziegler, 61–63). Interestingly, ambivalent interpre-
tations were inherent in the sources. Excerpts from the ‘Two Thousand 
Words Manifesto’ and the Brezhnev Doctrine were printed, along with 
an opinion piece by Swiss social democrat Walther Bringolf, who claimed 
the CPSU had had strategic reasons for hindering the ‘ideological libera-
tion’ of the ČSSR from the ‘corset of communist discipline’. Were the 
ČSSR to fall away, he argued, the ‘southern flank’ of the CPSU would 
have been open to attack, bringing about the end of the ‘Soviet-Russian 
superpower policy towards the West’ (CH-1985-Ziegler, 62 and 
CH-1993-Ziegler, 62). The pictorial sources, on the other hand, con-
tinue the ‘David and Goliath’ theme, showing soldiers or tanks in the 
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midst of a peaceful demonstration with the caption ‘Russian invasion of 
Czechoslovakia, 1968: Tanks against freedom fighters’ (CH-1993-Ziegler, 
53). Depite the juxtapositioning of contradictory interpretations of 
events – the economic East-West divide, the threat to communism posed 
by the freedom movement in the CSSR and the strategic military motives 
of the USSR – learners are never explicitly made aware of these differences.
After the end of the Cold War, the portrayal of the Prague Spring 
gained further in nuance. The history textbook Weltgeschichte im Bild 
(WiB), volume 9, 1996, was the first to point out that the Communist 
Party, alarmed by the level of unrest in the country, had placed itself at 
the ‘spearheard of the movement’. Dubček sought to develop a form of 
communism with ‘a human face’ (CH-1996-Bühler, 51); indeed, as a 
pictorial source suggests, ‘a deeply democratic society suitable for the 
Czechoslovakian conditions’, having himself initiated the Prague Spring: 
‘Following a long period of police rule, terror and oppression, now better 
times seemed to be on the horizon’. But the USSR did not approve of this 
unique path, the textbook seems to suggest. Accompanied by catcalls, 
invading tanks of the Warsaw Pact had put an end to the Prague Spring 
(CH-1996-Bühler, 51). Despite the nuances in the text, the pictorial lan-
guage continued the established theme.
Differences in living standards between East and West also constituted 
a theme in a history textbook published after the Cold War with several 
new issues published over twenty years without any changes to the Prague 
Spring narrative. The lower standard of living as compared to the West 
and also the monitoring of the population by the Communist Party had 
fomented displeasure in a number of countries. As a result, 1968 saw 
upheaval within the Party in the ČSSR and also various reforms. As the 
USSR had feared that this development could ‘spread to other countries’ 
and endanger the ‘communist system of government’, it intervened with 
the purpose of ‘saving socialism’, establishing a party leadership that 
reversed the reforms in the ČSSR (CH-2010-Meyer, 73–74). Although 
this textbook, still used today by some learners, does address the upheaval 
within the ČSSR Communist Party, the opposition between the protes-
tors and Soviet communism – the pattern ‘freedom fighters versus com-
munist oppressors’ – remains the central motif of the narrative, echoed in 
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the pictorial source (CH-2010-Meyer, 74). Above all, the textbook fails 
to mention that the reforms were introduced by the communists.
 The Prague Spring in Memory Construction
The teachers interviewed emphasise varying aspects of the Prague Spring: 
the protests against ‘the Russians’, the biased anti-communist interpreta-
tion of the events, and the general anti-communist feeling in Switzerland.
One teacher, here referred to as Heinz Sutter (*1943), speaks of the 
demonstration in Bern ‘against the Russians’, which led to skirmishes 
with the police, riots and tear gas, as the demonstrators, among them our 
interviewee, did not follow police instructions.4 Protesting against the 
injustices in Prague and Bratislava therefore did not automatically sug-
gest acceptance of the ‘western’ order. The protest against ‘the Russians’ 
was at the same time a protest against the authorities: against teachers and 
parents who had forbidden participation, against the government and the 
police, whose rules were ignored. Not only ‘the Russians’ were infringing 
upon the constitutional order; Swiss youth too, blocking the roads, 
choosing their own demonstration routes and ultimately protesting with-
out permission in front of the Soviet embassy.
As I have shown, some teachers approved of their pupils’ demonstra-
tions. One (*1940) reports that his pupils, like many others, had 
demanded permission to demonstrate ‘for Czechia’, which, ‘of course’, 
was granted:
They [the pupils, N.  R.] extended breaktime, assembled and marched 
across the playground. They were carrying a Czechian flag and shouting 
‘Dubček! Svoboda! Dubček! Svoboda!’ They knew about demonstrating 
from the news media and had been so moved by it that they wanted to take 
an active part themselves. It really made an impression on us.5
Another interviewee (*1944) reminds us that the shouts of ‘Dubček and 
Svoboda’ were for most people the call for a new, anti-communist begin-
ning.6 He himself, under observation by state security due to numerous 
trips to Eastern Europe, questioned this reading, emphasising that protest-
ers in the ČSSR sought to re-examine, but not overcome, communism. At 
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the same time he pointed out that ‘people’ certainly sympathised with 
some ideas of the Eastern bloc. ‘One’, he continued, had the feeling that 
‘socialism with a human face’ would be an interesting model with future 
potential.7
A secondary-school teacher (Gymnasium, *1958), reports that he had 
heard about events in the ČSSR in the primary school and on the radio 
and ‘simply understood that it was the evil Russians occupying a peaceful 
country and population against their will, and that that’s a bad thing’.8 
Another teacher (*1961) mentions the many sources of information, 
unable to recall from whom he had heard what exactly was happening in 
the ČSSR. In his recollection, television images and newspaper reports 
are blended with explanations from his parents. His father was an officer 
and as a boy he had learnt that the USSR constituted a permanent threat, 
which influenced his understanding of the events in Prague.9 Today, his 
memory of the protests is overshadowed by his memory of a new 
Czechoslovakian schoolmate, a refugee.
 The Vietnam War in Focus
In Switzerland too, the 68 movement brought protests against the war in 
Vietnam onto the streets and into the lecture halls. As early as 1965, the 
organisation Fortschrittliche Studentenschaft Zürich (Progressive Students 
of Zurich), convened a ‘teach-in’ at the ETH Zurich on the conflict in 
Indochina, understood here as a result of colonialism and imperialism 
(Peter 2008, 62–73). In this sense, the Swiss critics of the Vietnam War 
were part of the ‘counter-cultures’ described by Jeremi Suri, who fought 
against ‘imperialism’ and ‘fascism’, thus casting doubt on the ‘Cold War 
order’ (Suri 2010, 470). In Switzerland there was a growing debate in the 
Vietnam War context about the forms which ‘development aid’ and soli-
darity with the ‘third world’ should take (Holenstein 1998, 115–125). At 
the same time, interdependencies between the ‘Third World problem’ 
and the Cold War led to public discourse on the Vietnam War shifted the 
East-West dualism into one of North and South. The result was that anti- 
communism decreased in credibility as a sustainable basic consensus for 
civil society (Imhof 1996, 26–27).
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Further, the Vietnam protests were also the scene of generational con-
flict. Western Europe’s youth questioned the policies of their political 
leaders and glorified the Viet Cong peasant warriers as well as Mao 
Zedong or Che Guevara as ‘symbols for a revolution against not just 
political institutions, but the basic organization of society’ (Suri 2010, 
469). The hippies were only one manifestation of the ‘counter-cultures’ 
experimenting with new forms of protest in San Francisco, Prague or 
Zurich. Various forms of active protest such as American ‘anti-Vietnam 
songs’ and peace activists as well as demonstrations, sit-ins and ‘teach-ins’ 
are firmly anchored in the Swiss collective memory.
Despite the wide support for the protests, significant voices in 
Switzerland defended the Vietnam War as a necessary measure to protect 
against communism and condemned the protests as communist intrigue. 
In 1966, the Federal Political Department informed the ambassador in 
Washington, D. C. of an ‘extreme left-wing inflitration’, a torchlight pro-
cession in Bern to protest against the Vietnam War (www.dodis.
ch/31167). The reporting on the war in Vietnam by the media was also 
criticised by Peter Sager, founder of the Swiss Ost-Institut, where numer-
ous – often anti-communist – brochures on the Eastern bloc were pub-
lished for readers including schools. He even considered democracy 
endangered; it had become impossible, he claimed, to form an objective 
opinion because the people were overwhelmed by the images and por-
trayals of Vietnam. He not only rejected the heroising of the Viet Cong 
as inappropriate; he also compared the war in Vietnam with World War 
II. Inspired by domino theory, he argued that the Americans in Vietnam 
must oppose communism, just as the Allied Forces had done with Hitler 
(Sager 1968, 82).
 Contemporary Reception in Teacher Periodicals
Unlike the daily press (Imhof et al. 1999, 246–249), the teacher periodi-
cals barely registered the war in Vietnam. No discourse relating to the war 
is discernible in either the SLZ or the ScS, nor did any of the association 
periodicals comment on the demonstrations. It was not until the USA’s 
retreat that the SLZ addressed the topic, focusing on the humanitarian 
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catastrophe and calling for support for the ‘International Youth Aid 
Union’ (Internationale Vereinigung für Jugendhilfe) to help children and 
young war victims in Vietnam (N.N., SLZ 120, 1975, 313). Following 
the communist annexation of South Vietnam, and the inclusion of the 
‘Boat People’ in the discourse, the SLZ called once again for solidarity 
with those affected and loudly criticised not only the communist regime 
but also the ‘leftist’ students at the University of Bern with their provoca-
tive slogan ‘No to Hirschy; yes to Giap!’10 (Gut, SLZ 124, 1979). There 
was no critique of the US warfare, no question of the great western power 
sharing responsibility for the humanitarian crisis. It was not until 1989, 
in an article on Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, that the cause and course 
of the war was given candid attention (Rudolf, SLZ 134, 1989, no. 9, 
14). It is striking that, while the article speaks of ‘efforts towards indepen-
dence’, there is no mention of a ‘struggle against communism’. Following 
the author’s historical overview of the colonial period, a ‘Vietnamese 
woman’ speaks of the era under French rule and the Vietnamese struggle 
for independence, and then describes – with precise year dates and spe-
cialist terms – how the ‘cruel rule of terror’ under Ngo Dinh Diem ‘per-
secuted all “leftist suspects”’, supported by the Catholic Church and the 
USA. She states that the American bombings began in 1965, without, 
however, mentioning a catalyst for these attacks. She also described the 
losses on the US side and the end of the war, the forced reunification, and 
the fact that some 2.5 million people resettled or fled the communist 
powers (Rudolf, SLZ 134, 1989, No. 9, 14–16). Although at the end of 
the narrative it was the communist North that showed its ugly face, this 
presentation breaks through the long-dominant reading of the war in 
Vietnam as a struggle between communism and capitalism. Criticism of 
the warring parties was expressed in the depictions of a ‘contemporary 
witness’, a popular method often used by history teaching materials.
 The Vietnam War in the Textbooks
As Richard Lachmann and Lacy Mitchell (2014) have shown, the por-
trayal of the war in Vietnam changed dramatically in American text-
books. While the atrocities of the war were barely mentioned in the 1960s 
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and 1970s, they were given increased attention from the 1980s. This 
went hand-in-hand with growing criticism of US foreign policy. US text-
books had been placing more value on ‘the hellish and personal aspects of 
the Vietnam War’ since the 1990s. Pictorial sources increasingly showed 
wounded or dead US soldiers, the trauma of the latter depicted in the 
text, while the Vietnamese victims were still only mentioned in passing. 
The anti-Vietnam-War protests have only seldom been mentioned until 
today, although attention paid to this subject is now increasing (Lachmann 
and Mitchell 2014).
What form does this take in the Swiss textbooks? Although the con-
flicts in the French colony were already escalating in the 1950s, the 
 conflict in Indochina was ignored by most Swiss textbooks of the 1960s. 
Even in 1978, the subject was merely a note in the margin of one of the 
most widely used textbooks of German-speaking Switzerland, stating 
that communism, propagated by Russia and China, had spread through 
Indochina as had been the case in Korea. Vietnam was divided, it states, 
once the USA, NATO and France had deployed ‘opposition troops’ 
(CH-1978-Jaggi, 377). The first textbook to mention the war was 
Denkwürdige Vergangenheit (1969). The author, Otto Müller, dedicates a 
great deal of attention to the subject of human rights, as well as decolo-
nialisation and the ‘third world’, unlike the authors of other textbooks 
(Ritzer 2015, 294–295). Müller mentions the French phase of the con-
flict in Indochina and the defeat of the colonial power at Dien Bien Phu. 
The battles ended, Müller continues, with the division of Vietnam into a 
communist North and ‘a dreadful gulf between rich and poor in the 
South’ (CH-1969-Müller, 261), ultimately leading to civil war. In a rela-
tively critical manner for the time, the author notes that the USA sup-
ported a government in South Vietnam that primarily backed the interests 
of large landowners and not those of the desperate rice farmers. 
Subsequently, however, he is also careful to justify – or at least explain – 
US intervention, with recourse to domino theory: ‘They [the Americans; 
N. R.] wished to prevent the communism that was ruling North Vietnam 
from coming to power in South Vietnam, possibly even across the whole 
of South-East Asia’ (CH-1969-Müller, 264). No criticism of the US war 
strategy can be found here; indeed, a critical voice is heard for the first 
time in a teaching brochure of 1975, in which the author begins by 
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describing the colonial history of Indochina and the French phase of the 
war in great detail. Here, he mentions both the role of the People’s 
Republic of China in the anti-colonial freedom struggle of the ‘Vietnamese 
Independence League’ (Viet Minh) and the ambivalent role played by 
Ngo Dinh Diem’s supporters and the Viet Cong (CH-1975-Göldi, 
45–57). Here too, the struggle against communism is given as the reason 
for the US intervention, triggered by the Tonkin Incident. At the same 
time, the text repeatedly emphasises that the USA determined the course 
of the war events. The author harshly scorns the ‘war tactics’ of the 
Americans, such as the expulsion of thousands of civilians, the use of new 
weapons such as cluster bombs and firebombs, and the use of gas and 
defoliants. The author depicts the My Lai massacre by citing from a 
source, an unusual method for this author:
The clearer it was becoming to the Americans that the Viet Cong could not 
be taken, the more they lost control and resorted to massacres. The best- 
known example is the obliteration of the My Lay village. Because the 
Americans believed it to be a Viet Cong stronghold, Leutenant Calley was 
given the order to eliminate the village and all its inhabitants. Machine 
guns mowed down men, women and children. No one gave a precise num-
ber; it was certainly far more than a hundred. (Excerpt from the booklet 
Du und der Krieg, quoted in: CH-1975-Göldi, 53)
Within this source, the author not only criticises the murder of women 
and children on the part of American soldiers; he also provides an expla-
nation for the US atrocities. The guerrilla tactics of the Viet Cong led, he 
claims, the Americans to ‘lose control’. A similar oscillation between 
naming the horrors of American warfare and putting them into propor-
tion and context can still be perceived in textbooks published towards the 
end of the Cold War. In the history textbook Weltgeschichte im Bild 9 
(WiB) of 1989, for example, we read: ‘Because it was impossible to dif-
ferentiate between the guerrillas and ordinary farmers, the government 
troops burned suspicious villages to the ground with napalm bombs. In 
some cases, all inhabitants of a town, men women and children alike, 
were all killed (CH-1989-Bühler, 60). It is striking that the author speaks 
of ‘some cases’; even the most recent of the textbooks examined insists 
that the US soldiers were ‘at a disadvantage’ due to the guerrilla warfare 
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tactics and the good camouflage of the Viet Cong. The book sequatiously 
describes the actions of the US soldiers and their allies as ‘retaliatory 
strikes’ for the Viet Cong attacks, pointing out that these strikes often hit 
innocent civilians (CH-2005-Argast, 124).
It is still striking that criticism of the Americans, not necessarily in line 
with the general public opinion of the time, is usually ‘hidden’ within the 
source texts. This is also the case for the book Weltgeschichte im Bild 9 
(WiB) of 1978, which only allocated little space to the Vietnam War. The 
dichotomised reading of the conflict prevails: ‘The Americans took up 
defence in South Vietnam against the communist North. They did not 
move from this warzone until after decades of bloodshed’ (CH-1978- 
Allemann, 42). This book, otherwise generous with sources, depicts 
hardly any pictorial or textual sources at this point; the war is not 
addressed again until in a later chapter, ‘Korea – Vietnam’, with a picto-
rial source showing children behind barbed wire, yet without any contex-
tualisation. The text mentioned that the war was extended due to support 
from the Americans and Chinese. In 1968, it continues, the USA armed 
500,000 men against the ‘freedom fighter Ho Chi Minh’. The war cost 
more than two million lives before counting the civilian losses (CH-1978- 
Allemann, 54). There is insufficient mention of the use of chemical weap-
ons and the atrocities of soldiers; rather, criticism of the USA confined 
itself to the mild reproach that its intervention prolongued the war. Use 
of the term ‘freedom fighter’ for Ho Chi Minh could be interpreted as a 
quiet expression of sympathy as the term had positive connotations in the 
context of the Swiss ‘tradition of liberation’. It remains open whether the 
authors considered the war necessary to suppress communism; no verdict 
is given in the 1985 edition, although critical nuances are perceptible in 
the source texts. The history textbook Zeiten Menschen Kulturen (ZMK) 
provides a table showing how the conflict had developed since the 1940s, 
and names the ‘alleged’ Tonkin Incident as the catalyst for the first US air 
raids over North Vietnam. Alongide textual sources of American origin – 
many of which came from the office of President Johnson, who pointed 
to the necessity of the war against communism – space is also allocated to 
critical voices, such as that of Ho Chi Minh, denouncing US warfare and 
‘murder’ (CH-1985-Ziegler, 26–31), albeit in the absence of a source to 
support the charge of ‘murder’ at My Lais, for instance.
14 1968 in German-speaking Switzerland: Controversies… 
306
It was only in history textbooks published towards the end of the Cold 
War that space was allocated to a discussion of the consequences of the 
Vietnam War for civil society. In the new 1989 edition of Weltgeschichte 
im Bild 9 (WiB), the Vietnam War was even made a key topic of the Cold 
War, and thus contextualised from the outset within the East-West con-
flict. At the same time, however, the same book also addresses – albeit 
implicitly – the North-South conflict that manifested itself in the war, 
via, for instance, depictions from the perspective of a rice farmer strug-
gling neither for communism nor for democracy, but simply for a better 
life. Similarly, the authors emphasise that it was primarily the high 
 poverty level that had moved the people of South Vietnam to support the 
‘National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam’ (Viet Cong). Text 
and images alike sketch a picture of an unequal struggle in which the 
highly technologized yet powerless USA ultimately surrenders to a badly 
equipped yet efficient Viet Cong. The consequences of the US interven-
tion, such as destruction by napalm or Agent Orange, were now explicitly 
mentioned in this textbook, tellingly accusing both sides of torture 
and murder:
Once it was established that not only the guerrilla fighters but also the 
American soldiers had tortured prisoners and killed innocent civilians, a 
storm of protests against the war overcame the USA. Tens of thousands 
took to the streets. Young men tore up their call-up papers and Vietnam 
veterans threw their medals of bravery on the steps of the White House 
(CH-1989-Bühler, 60).
Discussion of the protests against the Vietnam War was also new.
As we have seen, while the 1989 history textbook WiB addresses the 
North-South component of the Vietnam conflict, it locates the latter pri-
marily within the East-West pattern. This remained the case until 1991, 
when the textbook Durch Geschichte zur Gegenwart 4 (GZG) expressly 
discussed the Vietnam War in the chapter ‘From Colonisation to the 
“Third World”’, thus removing it from the Cold War context. This shift 
of emphasis led to a detailed overview of French colonialism becoming 
integrated into the narrative. The textbook explained that the popula-
tion’s siding with the Vietminh was due to the farmers’ hopes for a redis-
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tribution of land (CH-1991-Meyer, 111). The atrocities of the war were 
portrayed in great detail; the sources provided evidence of napalm, of 
defoliants and massacres of civilians. Consequently, the book points out 
in all clarity, the perception of the American role in world politics had 
shifted dramatically. The former saviour from fascism and communism 
had now – such was increasingly public opinion – become a butcher. It is 
also noteworthy how the textbook has recourse to the ‘David and Goliath’ 
motif here. The authors suggest between the lines that ‘little Switzerland’ 
has far more in common with the small, yet courageous, North Vietnam 
than with the American giant. This becomes especially clear in an exercise 
asking the learners whether Switzerland, like North Vietnam, would be 
able to prevail against a world power (CH-1991-Meyer, 116).
The 2005 textbook, Menschen in Zeit und Raum 9 (MZR) seemed to 
permenantly oscillate between varying perspectives of the war, which, 
despite being introduced in the title as a ‘proxy war’, is traced in its ori-
gins back to the Vietminh struggle for independence from imperial 
France (CH-2005-Argast, 122–125). As soon as the book speaks of 
dividing the country into a ‘communist and a capitalist part’ (CH-2005- 
Argast, 122), however, the East-West dualism regains in dominance. 
Although learners read that Ho Chi Minh was drawn to socialist and 
communist ideas primarily in his desire to reform the economy and soci-
ety following the effects of colonialisation, the text continues to state that 
the Vietminh considered the ‘European forms of state’ unjust, partly due 
to their colonialist association. Later again, however, the text claims that 
China and the USSR had encouraged the communist aspects of the 
reform. At the same time, the alliance of the USA with the ‘dictatorial 
president’ in South Vietnam is given cautious justification on the basis of 
domino theory and containment: ‘For the USA, the government leader 
Diem – despite the lack of democracy in his own dealings – was a reliable 
ally in the battle against communism’ (CH-2005-Argast, 123). MZR 
also discusses the devastating consequences of the war for the Vietnamese 
civilian population and for the American veterans. With this war, the 
book concludes, the USA has damaged its reputation in the world.
We can thus ascertain that the textbooks, similar to the case of the 
Prague Spring, reveal continuities in their interpretative patterns; how-
ever, the shifts are more dramatic than in the narrative of the protest 
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movement in the ČSSR. As early as 1969 there were first signs of a North- 
South reading of the conflict, as is the case in research today; the bipolar 
logic being especially dominant in the 1970s. Domino theory, based on 
an East-West divide, is repeatedly referred to in the context of motives for 
the American intervention. Towards the end of the Cold War, the domi-
nance of these dichotomous readings was to a certain extent destabilised. 
References to French colonialism became more explicit and discussion of 
social injustice became more important. However, the 1991 textbook 
explicity located the conflict in Indochina within the decolonisation con-
text, thus introducing the ’68 discourse’ to the classroom. Yet the most 
recent textbook under analysis, published in 2005, still refers to the 
Vietnam War as a proxy war between communism and capitalism.
The US’ form of warfare was criticised as early as 1975, much earlier 
than in the American textbooks, and often sources are used to express 
critique. At the same time, and still today, Swiss authors explain the 
atrocities committed by the USA and its allies with an apologetic descrip-
tion of the soldiers’ desperation as a result of the Viet Cong guerilla tac-
tics. Swiss textbooks urge the remembrance of the victims of both sides, 
although there are only very few images of American victims. The pro-
tests in the USA were mentioned only as of 1989, in the margins of 
textbook narratives, and it is these protests, criticising the ‘imperialism’ of 
the West as early as 1968, that constitute the focus of the teacher 
interviews.
 Remembering the War in Vietnam
These teachers, for whom discussing the events of 1968 means to a large 
extent discussing the protests agains the war in Vietnam, strays rather far 
from the interpretative guidelines provided by the textbook. While many 
emphasise that the war in Vietnam had been a taboo subject during their 
studies, others recount that they had witnessed the war being taught. This 
does not mean that all interpretations were ‘sayable’ everwhere. In debates 
on whether and how ‘contemporary history’ should be addressed in his-
tory lessons, warning voices advised against ‘letting oneself be defined by 
the events of the day, doing politics rather than history’ (Ritzer 2015, 
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267–269). Possibly many tutors considered the Vietnam War ‘too politi-
cal’ to be discussed in the classroom. At the end of the 1960s, a too pro-
nounced anti-Americanism did not yet seem opportune, as the following 
example of a teacher examination reveals. In 1968, a teacher in training – 
referred to in the following as Fritz Meier – was required to discuss the 
Vietnam War with his pupils in front of the school inspector. In his inter-
view this teacher said that he had heard that the sympathies of this inspec-
tor were for America. He ‘came to the defence of the Vietnam War’ and 
argued that the USA must protect the world from the communist threat. 
This must have impressed the inspector; Meier passed the test.11 A differ-
ent teacher, who was having difficulties finding a job on account of his 
refusal of military service, criticises in an interview that the Americans, 
and right-wing circles in Switzerland, had attempted to reduce the 
Vietnam war to an East-West dualism. As a self-avowed ‘pacifist student’, 
he believed ‘developing countries’ to have been exploited in Indochina.12 
Similarly, a different interview partner (*1950) reports that he gradually 
became aware that the Americans were not always the good ones and the 
communists not always the ‘bad’.13
 Conclusion
This chapter has sought to fulfil a twofold objective: to render visible the 
homogeneity of and controversies inherent in interpretations of the 
Prague Spring and the Vietnam War at different points in time and in 
different media discourses; and to examine how readings of both events 
have changed over time. Four key results emerge from the analysis. First, 
the study has shown that the willingness to address both these topics with 
a sophisticated awareness of nuance has diminished with time. While in 
the 1960s, varying readings are perceptible in the sources analysed, from 
the 1970s onwards the dominant interpretations were those which fol-
lowed a bipolar logic, thus gaining compatibility with other prevailing 
Cold War discourses (Ritzer 2015). With increasing distance to the event 
there seems to have been a cementing of the narrative; indeed, an ideolo-
gism of the various readings.
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Second, two factors inspiring change in the textbooks were identified: 
innovative design of the medium textbook, leading to more multiper-
spectivity via sources, which were sometimes contradictory in nature; and 
the end of the Cold War itself, which required a (if only partial) reorien-
tation process on the part of society, to reflect the historico-cultural work 
that bore witness to these events of 1968. The conflict over the Vietnam 
War, for example, reflected historical and cultural manifestations. It was 
in the context of the Vietnam War debate that textbooks from 1990 
onwards articulated more scathing criticism towards the Western hege-
monic power that would not have been possible before. In the Prague 
Spring discourse, on the other hand, despite two main nuances from 
1990 onwards, elements of continuity with key interpretative patterns of 
‘spiritual national defence’ can still be observed. Third, we have seen that 
the debate surrounding the war in Vietnam in German-speaking 
Switzerland was much more controversial than that on the Prague Spring. 
Fourth, in the light of the present day, we can ascertain that the teachers 
interviewed certainly deviated from the readings prescribed by the text-
books, by locating the Vietnam War more clearly within the context of 
the ‘Third World problem’, for example. They were thus also criticising 
the long-dominant concepts prevailing in Switzerland of ‘spiritual 
national defence’ and the ‘semantic gap’ with regard to the East- 
West conflict.
As a whole, the analysis shows that interpretations of the Prague Spring 
and the Vietman War based on a bipolar understanding of the Cold War 
are repeatedly destabilised in all media formats examined in the study, 
even if the occasional clichéd idea remains even today. Interpretations of 
the Cold War have thus become more fluid and fragmented, as if the 
ideologically painted narratives have been gradually deconstructed; cer-
tainly a result of the fading concept of ‘spiritual national defence’ as well 
as the end of the Cold War itself.
Notes
1. The periodicals analysed are the Schweizerische Lehrerzeitung (SLZ) (with 




2. The study is based on interviews with 27 teachers, 17 of which were 
guided interviews conducted during my doctoral research on the Cold 
War in Swiss schools (Ritzer 2015). Ten further interviews were con-
ducted by Nora Zimmermann for the international research project, 
Teaching the Cold War – Memory Practices in the Classroom, whom I thank 
for access to the data. All interviews are cited by their assigned number, 
date, and the interviewee’s country of origin (CH for Switzerland).
3. See also interview with CH12 (24 March 2010).
4. Interview with CH13 (26 March 2010).
5. Interview with CH12 (24 March 2010).
6. Interview with CH16 (1 April 2010).
7. Interview with CH18 (1 April 2010).
8. Interview with CH03 (27 August 2014).
9. Interview with CH04 (20 November 2014).
10. In February 1973, Hirschy was to give a guest lecture at the University 
of Berne on the valeur éducative of the army. The lecture was howled 
down by the students (Rogger 2008, 29–31). Giáp was a leading mili-
tary strategist of the Viet Minh.
11. Interview with CH19 (9 April 2010).
12. Interview with CH11 (22 March 2010).
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A few years ago, a long-term study showed that German Reunification 
has produced highly ambivalent stances among many citizens of the for-
mer German Democratic Republic (GDR): While most Eastern Germans 
in their 30s view the reunification as positive and identify with the Federal 
Republic of Germany (FRG), they have also continued to feel connected 
with the GDR. Some have remained critical towards capitalism, for 
example, and most prefer the GDR’s welfare system (Förster 2011, 144, 
189 and 233; Förster 2008, 1531). Ambivalence also characterises aca-
demic debates about the Cold War. The downfall of the Soviet Union has 
destabilised binary patterns of interpretation – both in East and West – 
and Cold War history is discussed more controversially than ever (Erll 
2011, 3). The various positions have been categorised as traditionalist, 
revisionist and post-revisionist. Stemming from the era of the Cold War 
itself, these different schools of thought used to be primarily concerned 
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with assigning responsibility for the conflict. While some argue that the 
question of guilt has become obsolete in the post-Cold War era (Jarausch, 
Ostermann and Etges 2017), others insist that it is still dominant 
(e.g. Lundestad 2014). The topics of debate, in any case, have broadened. 
They include such questions as whether the conflicts between East and 
West were more crucial as compared to those between North and South, 
and whether the fear of nuclear war or the development of the welfare 
state was more characteristic of the era (Iriye 2014).
While the academic community is far from reaching a consensus, his-
tory teachers from the former GDR seem to sense the presence of a tra-
ditionally western hegemonic discourse. They often do not seem to view 
themselves in legitimate speaker positions when interpreting the past, 
especially in the presence of a West German.2 They are, as Sabine Reh has 
observed, under an implicit pressure to justify themselves and to express 
‘confessions’ and ‘commitments’ (Reh 2003, 19, 169). Reh partly traces 
this back to the fact that, after Reunification, the education system of the 
GDR became a major target of critique in a western-dominated discourse 
on education that was interwoven with broader academic discourses on 
East German identity (transformation) (ibid., 18). As public education 
in the East was viewed as an emblem of a repressive political system, its 
teachers were believed to have been either disenfranchised or part of the 
regime (ibid., 111–119).3
On the grounds of these insights, this case study will explore an East 
German history teacher’s ‘talking’ and ‘doing’ (Ahlrichs et al. 2015) in 
relation to Cold War history. I will investigate how the teacher, Julia4, 
perceives and positions herself within the current discourse on the Cold 
War in the presence of a West German researcher, what strategies she 
develops to construct coherent narratives and where she (re)produces the 
limits of what can be said (Foucault 1969). By explicitly looking at differ-
ent contexts and social situations, I acknowledge recent trends in mem-
ory studies that view memory as context-bound (Ahlrichs et al. 2015) 
and have replaced the ‘individual’ versus ‘collective’ dichotomy with the 
notion of ‘entangled’ memory (Feindt et al. 2014, 24–44).
Born in 1956, Julia experienced working life both before and after 
reunification, beginning her career in the GDR and continuing to work 
once her state had become part of the reunited FRG. According to Bernd 
Lindner, members of this ‘integrated generation’ are characterised by their 
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full social integration into GDR structures. They grew up in a divided 
country, experienced the development of a GDR youth culture, and ben-
efited from social reforms in the 1970s. Most of them therefore identified 
with their state and had a positive image of it (Lindner 2003). ‘Overrun’ 
by the collapse of the GDR, however, the ‘integrated generation’ is ascribed 
a ‘twofold horizon of experience’, as its members have spent much of their 
adulthood in the Western system (Welke 2012, 75). By focusing on a 
teacher from this generation, I follow Barbara Christophe’s suggestion to 
view history teachers ‘in their double function as members of memory 
cultures and as professionals specialised in conveying state-approved pat-
terns of interpretation’ (p. 256 of this volume; see also Chapter 17).
Thematically, I will focus on the immediate post-1945 period, the 
interpretation of which is relevant for memory politics in divided 
Germany. The GDR officially adopted the image of the ‘Soviet liberators’ 
from National Socialism (Kleßmann 2010; Müller 2008), while the FRG 
insisted on the concept of political defeat and accused the GDR of hav-
ing upheld a totalitarian system. The GDR, in turn, presented itself as the 
truly anti-fascist German state in which the entire Nazi elite had been 
eliminated. They claimed that the Western allies, in contrast, had failed 
to overthrow old structures, and that the FRG was thus the immediate 
successor of Nazi Germany. It was only with the social movements of the 
1960s that some of this criticism was in fact adopted by left-winged activ-
ists in the West, who demanded structural reforms (Kleßmann 2010).
As a hinge between World War II and the Cold War, the post-1945 
period has also been a major issue of post-reunification historiographical 
discourse. Proving the ultimate failure of the Eastern system, the collapse 
of the GDR revealed the full ambivalence of the year of 1945 (ibid; 
Möller 1995). While official GDR interpretations of history have become 
obsolete, historians have put a new focus on individual experiences of 
German victimhood during the post-World War II period (Kleßmann 
2010, 7–8). Debates about the Cold War have also renewed both tradi-
tionalist and revisionist arguments regarding the role of the superpowers 
during this phase (Lundestad 2014).
Looking at a variety of social situations, this study explores Julia’s rep-
ertoire of strategies with which to create narratives about an ambiguous 
past. This approach requires different types of data. We audio-recorded 
and transcribed a biographical interview as well as a guided interview on 
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the basis of textbook passages about the Cold War. We further video- 
recorded two history lessons and had them transcribed.5 As I will outline, 
Julia produces different accounts of the Cold War while re-employing 
narrative templates (Wertsch 2002, 60–62) that interconnect political 
history and the personal sphere. Despite her awareness of Cold War con-
troversies, her (re)actions imply a deep insecurity regarding the social 
legitimacy of her positions. However, she also engages in resistance.
 Methods
The biographical interview addresses Julia as a private person, serving to 
access her life story. The construction and constant revision of our life sto-
ries enables us to ascribe meaning to our lives and ‘to exist in the social 
world with a comfortable sense of being a good, socially proper, and stable 
person’ (Linde 1993, 3). Attempting to create a sense of coherence and 
agency, we draw on unspoken, culture-specific supplies of expected life 
events and acceptable reasons for our decisions (ibid., 3, 11, 19 and 93). 
The life story approach is particularly promising for this case study: Since 
Julia is a member of the ‘integrated generation’, the cultural supply- kit has 
changed in the course of her life. Especially in the presence of a West 
German, she may feel required to re-adapt her story, which can provide 
hints at how she perceives her own position in discourse. The rather per-
sonal set-up of the biographical interview may thus not be as ‘innocent’ as 
it seems (cf. Reh 2003, 17–18). Following the recommendations by Fritz 
Schütze, we started the interview with an open question and asked follow-
up questions only after Julia had finished speaking (Schütze 1982, 570).
The textbook-related interview addresses Julia in her professional role 
as a history teacher. Using a questionnaire, we specifically asked her what 
she thinks about selected ambivalent passages about the origins of the 
Cold War (cf.  Baier, Christophe und Zehr 2014) and how useful she 
finds them for class.
The classroom, as a third social context, places Julia in a position of 
relative power. The more she engages in discussion and textbook work, 
however, the less she is in control over the course of events and elements 
entering from outside discourses (see Binnenkade 2015). I will therefore 
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compare situations that vary in their forms of interaction: first, situations 
in which Julia talks (almost) uninterruptedly to the class; second, situa-
tions with more lively dialogues; third, a situation in which Julia interacts 
with both the students and the textbook, the latter providing an addi-
tional conveyer of narratives6.
I will draw on Wertsch’s (2002, 60–62) concepts of ‘specific narratives’ 
and ‘schematic narrative templates’ to interpret the data.7 The former 
refers to stories that people construct in order to make sense of specific 
events of the past. The latter describes generalised narrative forms and 
patterns that underlie a range of stories. By exploring the narrative tem-
plates employed by Julia, I aim to identify continuity across the different 
contexts and situations.
 Life Story: Connecting Political and Family 
History
Julia’s life story is characteristic of the ‘integrated generation’. She 
describes her childhood as ‘free’ and ‘cheerful’,8 detailing how she went 
through the entire GDR school system. She was given special attention 
because of her father’s position with the police, and received a university 
scholarship. As ‘the first year to benefit from the social reforms’, Julia and 
her husband could afford a flat and two children while studying.9 Her 
attitude towards the GDR is ambivalent. She experienced its collapse as 
‘enormous’.10 ‘[Y]ou had these questions in mind. What will happen? 
How will things continue?’11 As a history teacher, she was ‘close to a 
coma’ by mid-November 1989, not knowing what to teach and test any-
more.12 Unlike her father, who was too old ‘to fully enjoy’ the new situa-
tion,13 however, Julia adapted to life after Reunification. While continuing 
her career as a teacher, she read West German literature in order to learn 
‘what’s going on on the other side’.14 She also retrospectively denounces 
her education in the GDR through the public system as a form of indoc-
trination: Her teachers ‘taught the curriculum’ and ‘clearly positioned’ 
themselves.15 At university, they studied ‘two years of GDR history’ with 
‘dates, dates, dates [about] the founding of the GDR and of the SED 
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[Socialist Unity Party of Germany]’, all of which was ‘written by follow-
ers, of course’, and represented ‘uncritically and heroically’.16 Professors 
blocked any challenging questions, and Julia ‘simply absorbed what they 
said’.17 When talking about the 1970 movie The Strawberry Statement 
about student protests in the US, she provides an explanation which 
reads like a self-justification for why she and her university friends did 
not rebel more: ‘We were probably too mellow, thinking “oh well, we are 
pretty well off”’.18
The division of the country is a prominent element of Julia’s life story. 
She is the daughter of East Prussian refugees who had ‘put down new 
roots’ in her East German home town19 while part of her mother’s family 
had settled in the West. ‘Reorientating’ himself, her father became a 
painter and then joined the GDR police force20, which implies a 
 significant occupational and social advancement in the system. Because 
of the father’s position, Julia’s family was officially forbidden to maintain 
any contacts in the West. Since her mother’s relatives lived there, this was 
a subject of constant tension between Julia’s parents.21
What strategies does Julia employ to construct coherence in a life story 
that is characterised by division and ambivalence? Looking at two pas-
sages from the interview, I argue that she constructs her family history 
analogous to German history by intertwining the narrative templates of 
‘family and nation’, ‘victim’ and ‘reconciliation’. In the first passage, Julia 
talks about her father’s position as a police officer and its consequences 
for their family life:
(1)22 Er hat sich immer nur gewundert, dass das mit […] der Beförderung 
bei ihm nicht hingehauen hat. […] Und er schob das dann immer auf 
diesen Punkt [dass die Familie Kontakte in den Westen hatte] (2) Und das, 
denke ich, ist so ein Zeichen für diese Sa/ für diese Zeit, für das Leben, was 
dann in Deutschland so/ oder in der DDR so eingekästelt war (3) Dass 
man so nach außen keine Beziehungen pflegen durfte […]. (4) Und wenn 
dann die Großmutter mal zu Besuch war, dann suchte meine Mutti einen 
Tag aus, wo der Vater zur Schicht war […]. Und dann war die mal für zwei, 
drei Stunden da, also und dann war es das (5) Also daran, denke ich, 
konnte man bei uns in der Familie sehen, wie gespalten […] das eigentlich 
war und wie schlimm (6) Denn so eine Familie auseinander zu reißen, das 
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ist/ durch diese Grenze, das ist wirklich schlimm gewesen. (7) Und, und 
das hat man eben bei der Mutter gemerkt. (8) Und ich denke, die hat da 
auch so einen richtigen Lebensschmerz gehabt, die ist mit 48 Jahren ver-
storben. […] (9) Ähm, puh, das ist/ gibt viele Ursachen, aber ich denke, 
das ist auch eine da mit, dass sie da nicht so, eben nicht glücklich 
[…] war.23
(1). He always wondered why […] he was never promoted […] and he 
always blamed it on [the fact that the family had contacts in the West]. (2) 
And this, I think, is indicative of those times and of that life that was so 
restricted in Germany, or in the GDR. (3) That you weren’t allowed to have 
any outside contacts. […] (4) When my grandmother was in town, my 
mother would pick a day when my father had shift-work, and my grandma 
[…] would stay with us for two, three hours and that was it. (5) From that, 
I think, you could see in our family how divided […] this really was and 
how awful. (6) Because to tear apart a family by this border was really 
awful. (7) And you could see that with my mother. (8) I believe she had a 
really hard life. She died at the age of 48 […] (9) There are many reasons, 
but I think one of them was that she just wasn’t happy there.
The account merges political and family history by relying on the theme 
of division and a strategy of obscuring. On a linguistic level, the merge is 
epitomised in the phrase ‘you could see in our family’ (5), where the 
demonstrative pronoun ‘das’ (this) could refer to the family, the country, 
society and culture, or all of them. Similarly, the phrase ‘to tear apart a 
family’ (6) does not specify an agent. On the basis of this interplay, Julia 
describes the consequences of the division as ‘awful’ and ‘really awful’ 
(5–6) and even connects them to her mother’s early death (7–9); again, 
the word ‘there’ in ‘she just wasn’t happy there’ could refer either to the 
family or the state, thus connecting the two. Against this background, 
Julia employs the narrative template of ‘victim’ to describe how her father 
was being disadvantaged in his career as a result of having contacts in 
the West (1).
In a later passage, the father’s role changes from being a victim of divi-
sion to being an active obstacle of ‘reconciliation’, which represents 
another narrative template:
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(10) Und dann haben wir es ja geschafft, dass sich die West- und die 
Ostverwandtschaft äh wieder trifft. Das war ‘94. (11) Da hatten wir sie 
dann mal am Tisch […] dass man diesen, diesen Bruch versucht zu behe-
ben. […] (12) Wir hatten [meinem Vater] gesagt: ‘Es kommt dein Schwager 
[…] und deine Schwägerin’ – ‘Oh nee […]. Kann ich nicht, halte ich nicht 
aus’. (13) Da haben wir gesagt: ‘Du, das müssen wir jetzt einfach 
versuchen’.24
(10) We managed to arrange a reunion of the Western and Eastern relatives 
[…] in 1994. (11) We had them all at one table […] to try and resolve the 
divide […]. (12) We had said [to my father]: ‘Your brother- and sister-in- 
law are coming’ – ‘Oh, no, […] I can’t bear it’. (13) And we said: ‘We just 
have to try’.
(14) Also mein Vater wollte das nicht einrühren. (15) Das haben wir 
eingerührt, einfach weil wir neugierig waren und weil wir das nicht 
verstehen wollten, dass sich Familien so trennen […]. (16) Das kann 
ich bis heute nicht. Wenn ich mich mit jemandem zanke, dann kann 
das sein. Aber dann muss man irgendwo den Punkt finden […]. (17) 
Und ähm das fand sich dann eben. (18) Die sind so aufeinander zu 
gegangen so wie Katzen und sich umschlichen und dann haben sie sich 
doch auf die Schultern geklopft […]. Und da war alles gegessen, (19) da 
[…] konnte man sich an den Tisch setzen und in Ruhe reden und ähm, 
ja, und dann wurden auch so Jugenddummheiten rausgekramt. […]. 
(20) Und das hätte noch mehr gebraucht davon […]. So, aber wenig-
stens der Punkt, dass sie sich alle finden und sagen: ‘Ja, ausgestan-
den. So’. 25
(14) My father didn’t want it (15). We initiated it, simply because we were 
curious and because we didn’t want to accept that families split up like that. 
[…] (16). I still cannot. It might be possible if I argue with someone. But 
eventually you have to find a point […] (17). And it was found then (18). 
They approached each other like cats, tiptoeing around each other, but 
finally they patted each other’s shoulders. And the subject was closed (19). 
We were able to sit down at the table and talk calmly, and youthful follies 
were dug out (20). More of that would have been needed […] but at least 
there was this point where everyone comes together and says: ‘All right; let’s 
put it all behind us’.
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While Julia describes herself and her siblings as putting a lot of effort into 
re-uniting the family, their father, who ‘didn’t want it’ (14), now appears 
as a defender of division. The shift in the father’s role is possible because 
of the ambiguous interconnection of political and family history in both 
passages, which does not clearly assign responsibilities. The narrative here 
is again constructed around the theme of division, evoked by the terms 
‘Bruch’ (break/divide) (11) and ‘trennen’ (split up) (15). The tensions in 
the family are released when finally ‘everyone comes together’ (20). 
According to Julia’s narrative, the reconciliation of the family is thus 
intrinsically entwined with the reunification of the country.
 A Textbook-Related Interview: ‘Sometimes 
the West is as Good as the East’
The template of ‘reconciliation’ recurs in the context of the guided, 
textbook- related interview. First of all, it expresses itself in Julia’s post- 
revisionist view of the Cold War. On the basis of a textbook passage that 
is ambivalent about assigning responsibility for the conflict’s origins, she 
was asked whom she holds responsible: ‘I believe each political system 
contributed its share by defining certain spheres of control’.26 ‘[It was 
about] resources and also markets. Ultimately, it was about money in the 
economy’.27 Distancing herself from both traditional Eastern and tradi-
tional Western narratives, Julia thus opts for a compromise position. In 
another instance, she reconciles the Western perspective by constructing 
a narrative that raises the West to the moral level of the East. While dis-
cussing a textbook excerpt about the policies and considerations of the 
commanders in the British and American occupation zones, the inter-
viewer asks Julia whether she believes in a German consensus regarding 
the role of the Western allies. Julia replies:
(21) Ich denke eher, das wird sehr kontrovers betrachtet. Die einen haben 
solche/ Es gibt doch eine Erfahrungswelt. Ähm und dann liegt es noch 
ähm sehr im Auge des Betrachters, auf welcher Seite der Grenze er groß 
geworden ist. Da gibt es überhaupt noch keinen Konsens. Da gibt es nur 
punktuelle Erfahrungen und äh Dinge, die man als Quellen gelesen hat 
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(22). Da fällt mir dieser wunderbare Film ein zum, zum, zur Rettung der 
Kunstwerke […] ‘Monuments Men’ […]. Da ging es doch um die Rettung 
der Kunstwerke, die aus ähm, die zusammengeraubt wurden, […] und 
ähm dann versteckt und anschließend, ja, im Film von den Amerikanern 
gerettet wurden (23). Das ist aber nur eine Seite […] (24). Es gibt eine 
ähnliche Geschichte für die Kunstwerke in Dresden. Da haben sie die 
Russen aus dem Stollen geholt […] (25). Für mich war das höchst interes-
sant, […] der/ (…). Clooney […], der erklärte die Aufgabe der ameri-
kanischen Armee bezüglich der Rettung der deutschen Kunstwerke […] 
(26). [B]in ich so groß geworden mit den Geschichten, dass von den 
Russen, und jetzt kommt für mich die/ es war ein Wissensgewinn […] 
(27). Und wir haben ja gedacht, ach die Amis, die waren ja immer so 
schlecht, und das war ja alles sowieso nicht so gut, und dann ist daraus der 
Westen entstanden, ja (28). Ähm das, […] da wurde in meinem Kopf auch 
noch mal was gerade gerückt[.]28
(21) I think this is very controversial. […] There are realms of experience. 
And then it also depends on the eye of the beholder, which side of the 
border one grew up on. […] There are only selective experiences and things 
you read as sources. (22) I remember this beautiful movie […] Monuments 
Men […] about rescuing artwork that had been robbed […] and hidden 
and was then rescued by the Americans, according to the movie. (23) But 
that is only one side. (24) There is a similar story in Dresden, [where] the 
Russians took [artwork] out of a mine tunnel. (25) It was extremely inter-
esting for me how […] [George] Clooney […] explained the task of the 
American army regarding the rescue of German artwork […]. (26) I grew 
up with the stories about the Russians, [so] this was new knowledge […]. 
(27) And we used to think that those Americans were always so bad, and 
that it all wasn’t good, and that the West resulted from it […]. (28) That 
sorted out something in my mind[.]
Julia suggests that the different views on the Western allies are equally 
legitimate: She refers to differences in experience, the geographical posi-
tion, the ‘eye of the beholder’, and the selectiveness of historical sources 
(21). However, she expresses great surprise over learning that the 
Americans were not only ‘bad’ (26–27) but devoted themselves to 
Germany just as the Russians did (26). Whereas the Russians’ good deeds 
are a given to her, the idea of American good deeds is a ‘new knowledge’. 
Rather than reversing her ideas of good guys and bad guys, Julia identifies 
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good in both sides, thus constructing a narrative that can be summarised 
as ‘sometimes the West is as good as the East’.
 The Variety of Accounts in Different Classroom 
Situations
When teaching the Cold War in class, Julia constructs three different 
types of accounts that correlate with different forms of interaction. The 
narrative templates of her life story are developed accordingly. I will first 
look at two situations in which Julia speaks uninterruptedly and con-
structs a relatively coherent historical account. In the first lesson, she has 
the students discuss a cartoon depicting a horse that Franklin D. Roosevelt 
and Winston Churchill ride in one direction and Josef Stalin in another. 
Standing in front of a wall map of central Europe, Julia produces the fol-
lowing monologue:
(29) Und das ist […] hier die Scheidewand zwischen diesen beiden Systemen 
[deutet Grenze zwischen Ost- und Westeuropa an]. Für uns das hier [deutet 
Grenze zwischen Ost- und Westdeutschland an] […] (30) Da passiert jetzt 
was ganz Besonderes. (31) Wer sich nicht leiden kann und sich nicht angu-
ckt, der spricht nicht miteinander. (32) Der zieht in Gedanken eine Grenze 
[…]. (33) Der zieht politisch eine Grenze. (34) Der zieht eine Grenze 
wirtschaftlich. (35) ‘Dir borge ich keinen Kuli. Du kannst mich mal. Was, 
du hast was vergessen? Dann sieh doch zu, wie du klarkommst. Mit dir 
nicht’. (36) Ich stelle mal noch ein paar Forderungen. Ich will dies, das und 
jenes haben. Sprich, Reparationen. […] (37) Aber dann ist es Rille. (38) Es 
schließt sich jetzt hier zwischen diesen beiden Teilen Deutschlands […] (39) 
Der eine der demokratisch geführte, und der andere der in diese Richtung 
geführte [deutet in Richtung Ost] […]. (40) Da schließt sich wie so ein 
Vorhang. […]. (41) Und wenn der Vorhang unten ist, dann sieht man nicht 
mehr, was auf der anderen Seite passiert. Dann hört man vielleicht noch was, 
aber das ist alles nur schon noch die Hälfte […]. (42) So entstehen Gerüchte, 
falsche Meldungen (43). Und in dem Moment: ‘Na ja, bei euch ist das ja 
jetzt so. Bei uns so’, entwickeln sich die beiden Staaten auseinander […]. 
(44) Hier senkt sich wie im Theater jetzt ein Vorhang. (45) Die in, in der 
[…] sowjetischen Besatzungszone, […] wissen nicht mehr, was im Westen 
passiert. Und umgedreht. 29
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(29) [T]his […] is the dividing line between these two systems [indicates line 
between Eastern and Western Europe]. For us, it’s here [indicates line 
between East and West Germany] […] (30) Something exceptional is hap-
pening here now. (31) If people don’t like each other and don’t see each other, 
they don’t talk to each other. (32) They draw a mental line […] (33) They 
draw a line politically. (34) They draw a line economically. (35) ‘I won’t lend 
you a pen. Go to hell. You left something at home? Don’t come to me for 
help’ […] (36) I make a couple of demands […] Reparations, that is […] 
(37) But then I couldn’t care less. (38) It’s closing down now between these 
two parts of Germany […] (39) The one that is democratically ruled and the 
other one that is ruled in this direction [points towards the East] […] (40) It’s 
like a curtain that is closing […] (41) And once the curtain is down, you can 
no longer see what is happening on the other side. You might hear some-
thing, but only partially […] (42) That’s how rumours and false reports 
develop. (43) And at that moment: ‘where you are, it’s like this. Where we are, 
it’s like that’, the states are drifting apart […] (44) Like in a theatre, a curtain 
is closing here now (45). Those […] in the Soviet occupation zone […] don’t 
know what is going on in the West anymore. And vice versa.
While telling the story of German division, Julia re-applies elements of 
the narrative template ‘nation and family’ as well as the strategy of not 
assigning agency. The theme of division is translated into multiple 
 metaphors. Starting out from the geo-political ‘dividing line between 
these two systems’ (29), which she physically indicates on the map, Julia 
first transfers the divide onto the abstract level of a ‘mental line’ (32). This 
connects the political sphere to everyday realities where people ‘don’t like 
each other’, ‘don’t see each other’ and consequently ‘don’t talk to each 
other’ (31). The Cold War is thus constructed as a conflict that simulta-
neously takes place on a personal and political level, resembling Julia’s 
description of the break than ran through her family and separated her 
Eastern and Western relatives. She continues to intertwine these spheres: 
The same people who draw a mental line also draw ‘political’ and ‘eco-
nomic’ ‘lines’ (33–34). The fictitious person who demands reparations 
(36) is the same who ‘won’t lend you a pen’ (35).
The intermingling of the political and personal level is epitomised in 
the metaphor of the curtain, borrowed from the concept of the Iron 
Curtain that, according to a speech by Winston Churchill from 1946, 
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separated the Soviet sphere from the West. Julia also employs this meta-
phor to emphasise the idea of ‘division’, but she transfers it onto the level 
of everyday life, where ‘you can no longer see what is happening on the 
other side’ (41) and have to rely on ‘rumours and false reports’ (42) while 
developing a sense of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ (43). The emphasis of the metaphor 
thus shifts from the iron wall that painfully separates people to a curtain 
that hinders visual contact and thus encourages mutual stereotyping. The 
political component is only re-introduced when Julia finally refers to the 
two sides as ‘the Soviet occupation zone’ and ‘the West’ again (45).
Julia’s curtain metaphor also moves the focus away from finding a 
scapegoat. By generalising the concepts of conflict and division, she sup-
ports the notion that the early Cold War was a conflict between two 
equals. At the end, the curtain is the actor that is ‘closing’ (40), forcing 
people in both occupation zones to become ignorant of each other (45). 
Once again, the blending of the spheres relies on a lack of agency. The 
Eastern part of Germany ‘is ruled’ in a particular yet not further specified 
way (39), ‘rumours and false reports’ appear to ‘develop’ by themselves 
(42), and ‘the states are drifting apart’ without any apparent agent (43).
In a lesson about the air strikes on Dresden in February 1945 and the 
aftermath, Julia draws on the notion of division and conflict to construct 
the Cold War as a story of reconciliation. She re-employs her ‘specific 
narrative’ about the moral standing of the Russians and the Americans:
Julia:  (46) Da hat man ja in Dresden sämtliche Kunstgegenstände ver-
sucht, in Sicherheit zu bringen, indem man diese schönen 
Gemälde in Kisten verpackt in irgendwelche Bergwerksschächte 
verfrachtet hat. […] (47) Anschließend gehen die Gemälde nach 
Moskau zur Restauration und werden dann drei, vier Jahre später 
wiedergebracht und dann erst wird in Dresden eine neue Galerie 
der alten Meister aufgebaut. […] (48) Diese anderen Gebäude in 
Dresden an der Elbe, die das schöne Panorama immer ausmachen 
bei jeder Sendung über Dresden, die waren Zentrum, 
Angriffspunkt, dort war platt. Da war alles platt. […] (49) So, 
Dresden. Hier (ziemlich bei uns). […], auch mit dem (Herzen). 
[…] (50) Bombardiert hat wer? Welche Fliegerverbände waren 
denn das? […]
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Julia: (46) In Dresden they tried to secure all the works of art by 
putting these beautiful paintings in boxes and storing them 
in mine tunnels. […] (47) Afterwards, they were taken to 
Moscow for restoration and returned three, four years later, 
and only then a new gallery of the old masters was built in 
Dresden. (48) The […] buildings by the riverside […], 
always shown in attractive panorama shots in television pro-
grammes about Dresden, were the centre, the point of attack. 
That was all flattened. (49) Here, relatively close to us, also to 
our hearts. (50) Who did the bombing? Which bomber 
squadron?
Student: (51) Die Amerikaner?
Student: (51) The Americans?
Julia: (52) Die angloamerikanischen Kriegsverbände. […] Die 
[Frauenkirche] hatte so ein schickes Kreuz auf dem Altar 
stehen. Und das ist in dieser Bombennacht kaputtgegangen 
(53). Also als die Frauenkirche vor vier Jahren wieder einge-
weiht wurde, haben die Amerikaner und die Briten aus 
Spendengeldern ein neues Kreuz dieser Art für die 
Frauenkirche gespendet und praktisch überreicht (54) […]. 
Das ist richtig schick mit ganz vielen Edelsteinen. Also es 
war sehr/ Es war wirklich ein tolles […] und wertvolles 
Stück. (56) Und das hat man den Dresdnern wiederge-
schenkt. […] So, die Dresdner haben sich wahnsinnig 
gefreut.
Julia: (52) The Anglo-American army groups. […] (53) The 
Frauenkirche [Church of Our Lady] had a lovely cross on its 
altar, [which…] was destroyed during this night of bombing. 
(54) When the Frauenkirche was re-inaugurated four years 
ago, the Americans and the British donated a new cross of 
the same kind … and formally presented it. (55) It’s huge 
[and] […] truly impressive, with many gemstones […]. It 
was really a wonderful and valuable object. (56) And that 
was given back to the people of Dresden. […] (57) The peo-
ple of Dresden were delighted.30
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The narrative template of ‘reconciliation’ provides the basis of this 
account. Just as in Julia’s life story, the concept of a successfully solved 
conflict thus features prominently. Taking up the topic of rescued art-
work, she marks the final phase of World War II as the beginning, and 
the present age as the end of a conflict between the Americans and 
British on the one hand and the people of Dresden on the other. By 
pointing out the merits of the new cross (55) and how delighted the 
people were (57), she represents the donation as a gesture that finally 
ended hostilities. The Cold War, as the intervening period, has thus 
come to a happy end.
The narrative template of reconciliation comes along with the re- 
employment of the idea that the Americans became as good as the 
Russians had always been. In the first part of the dialogue, Julia portrays 
the Russians as rescuers, restorers and donors of ‘beautiful’ and culturally 
significant artwork (46–47) in a city we are all fond of (49). Implicitly 
creating a contrast between ‘us’ and the Western allies, she then lets the 
students conclude that the Americans and British were responsible for 
the bombing (50–51). The two sides are reconciled when the Americans 
and British donate an extraordinarily ‘impressive’ and ‘valuable’ (55) 
cross, i.e. when they show themselves as devoted to art culture, and hence 
the people of Dresden, as the Russians did.
Not all of Julia’s Cold War accounts in class are reconciliatory. In the 
following, I will analyse more interactive situations, beginning with a 
unit about the different political and social orders in the future occupa-
tion zones. Talking about changes in Germany after 1945, Julia first por-
trays the Western powers, especially the US, in a traditional Western 
fashion as representatives of democracy:
Julia:  (58) Könnt ihr mir bitte sagen, […] in welcher Gesellschaftsstruktur 
die Amerikaner ‘45 gelebt haben? […] Was ist das für ein Land? 
Wer regiert? Wer hat die Regierung dahin gesetzt? Wie ist dieses 
Land gesellschaftlich aufgeteilt? […]
Julia:  (58) Could you please tell me […] in what social order the 
Americans were living in 1945? […] What kind of a country is 
that? Who rules it? Who put the government in power? […]
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Student:  (59) In Demokratie.
Student: (59) [In a] democracy.
Julia: (60) Sehr schön.
Julia: (60) Very good.
[After elaborating on the roles of Britain and France, Julia writes on the 
blackboard: ‘USA, GB, FR democracy’.]31
When continuing about the Western economic system, however, Julia 
brings in an element of an interpretation that was officially supported 
by the GDR:
Julia: Wer besitzt die Cola-Fabriken, die Jeans-Fabriken, 
Autofabriken? Wer besitzt Geschäfte? […] [I]ch will das 
Prinzip wissen. […]
Julia: (61) Who owns the Coca-Cola factories? The jeans factories? 
The car factories? I […] want to know the principle. […]
Student: (62) Ja, dem, dem die Fabrik gehört.
Student: (62) Well, whoever owns the factory.
Julia: (63) Genau. Da ist eine Privatperson der Besitzer. […] Das 
ist also ein privatwirtschaftlich organisierter Staat. Man 
nennt das auch kapitalistisch oder imperialistisch. […] (64) 
So, jetzt brauche ich hier die Mitte der Tafel. […] (65) Und 
jetzt die Frage, wie ist das in der Sowjetunion […]?
Julia: (63) […] Exactly. A person has private ownership […] So it’s 
a privately organised state economy. This is also called capi-
talist or imperialist. (64) Alright […] Now I have to write in 
the middle of the board. [For the US, Britain and France, she 
writes ‘capitalist/imperialist (private ownership of capital 
goods)’ on the blackboard.] Property is also privately owned 
by individual people. (65) And now the question is, what 
about the Soviet Union?32
Mixing elements of Eastern and Western narratives, Julia produces mixed 
representations of Cold War actors. What is striking is her use of the term 
‘imperialist’, a concept frequently used to describe the West in traditional 
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Eastern and revisionist interpretations. Casually dropping the term in as 
a mere synonym for ‘capitalist’, Julia equalises the principle of ‘private 
ownership’ with imperialism (63). She does not specify on the black-
board that this refers to the economy. Consequently, the terms ‘capitalist/
imperialist’ can be read right underneath the term ‘democratic’, all of 
which are listed as features of the Western powers. The equalisation of 
‘capitalism’ with the clearly negatively connoted term ‘imperialism’ is not 
clarified or discussed. Even when a student later asks ‘what it says there’ 
next to ‘capitalism’, Julia merely repeats ‘imperialist’, which the student 
then copies into his exercise book.33
The mixing of discourses with the resulting ambivalence also affects 
the representation of the Soviet Union. In one lesson, a student is asked 
to repeat some of the contents from a previous lesson at the wall map:
(66) Student:  Berlin. Wurde von den Sowjet/ von den, von der 
Sowjetunion besetzt. […]
Student:   […] Berlin wurde halt auch in vier Teile geschnitten 
sozusagen. […]
Student:   […] Die Briten haben den westlichen Teil besetzt. Die 
F/ ähm Franz/ die/
(66) Student: Berlin [was] occupied by the Soviet Union. […]
Student:  […] Berlin was also cut into four pieces […]
Student:   […] The British occupied the Western part. […] The Fre 
[…]
Julia  (67) Nein, die Amis.
Julia:  (67) No, the Yanks.
Student:   (68) Die Amis haben den südlichen Teil besetzt und die 
Sowjetunion den östlichen Teil.
Student:   (68) The Yanks occupied the southern part and the 
Soviet Union the Eastern part. […]
Student:   (69) […] Zu den politischen Problemen gehörte, dass 
die vier Länder aufeinander trafen. […] Sie wollten die 
sozusagen Demokratie machen.
Student:   (69) […] One of the political problems was that those 
four countries encountered each other […]. They wanted 
to make democracy, so to speak.
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Julia:  Die Sowjetunion auch?
Julia:  (70) The Soviet Union, too?
Student:   (71) Nee, die Sowjetunion nicht. Nur die Frankreich, 
Amerika und die britische. […]
Student:   (71) Nope, not the Soviet Union. Only France, America 
and the British. […]
Julia:   (72) Bei Berlin aufpassen: Es wurde tatsächlich äh hier 
von der Roten Armee die Befreiung ähm geschafft. Und 
dann erst die Einteilung, du hast das Wort ‘geschnitten’ 
benutzt, kann man ruhig sagen. Es passt da irgendwo an 
diese Stelle, mhm (zustimmend). Gut. So. Das ist 
Deutschland. Jetzt frage ich dich […] nochmal: Du hast 
irgendwann mal gesagt, du hast einen Ausflug gemacht 
in eine dieser Weststädte. Wo warst du denn?
Julia:   (72) Alright […] Careful with Berlin: Its liberation was, 
in fact, achieved by the Red Army. Only then was it 
divided […] (73) Now I’m asking you again […]: You 
once said that you went on a trip to one of those 
Weststädte [towns in the West]. Where did you go?34
The Soviet Union is portrayed with a mix of traditionalist Western inter-
pretations and a terminology stemming from traditional Eastern dis-
course. Whereas Julia makes the student re-construct the 
democracy-dictatorship dichotomy as the major political problem 
(69–71), she later states that the Red Army ‘achieved’ the ‘liberation’ of 
Berlin (72). Representing the Soviets as liberators, she employs an essen-
tial element of official GDR narrations of the post-World War II period. 
This is supported by the formerly pejorative colloquial term ‘Amis’ 
(Yanks) (67), which has its origins in the post-World War II and early 
Cold War period (the slogan ‘Ami, go home!’ was upheld especially by the 
GDR).35 By finally referring to certain German cities as ‘those Weststädte’, 
Julia employs another term that is based on a clear division between East 
and West. She thus re-creates the same ‘us’ versus ‘them’ mentality she 
explicitly criticises in the previously analysed lesson. Again, none of the 
contradictions are identified, discussed or clarified.
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In the final classroom situation, Julia reconstructs former GDR dis-
course when interacting with the students and dealing with the textbook. 
As for post-World War II history, the textbook from the series Entdecken 
und Verstehen, published by Cornelsen, takes a traditional Western per-
spective on the Soviet Union (Christophe 2017). Regarding denazifica-
tion in the Soviet occupation zone, it says:
Mit der Parole von der ‘Ausrottung der Überreste des Faschismus’ wurden 
die bisherigen Eliten in Schule, Justiz, Verwaltung, Polizei und Wirtschaft 
radikal entmachtet und durch Sozialisten bzw. Kommunisten ersetzt. Die 
Kommunisten nutzten die Entnazifizierung aber auch, um politische 
Gegner […] auszuschalten. So wurde die Entnazifizierung hier zum Mittel 
kommunistischer Herrschaftssicherung. […] Die SED ging davon aus, 
dass die antifaschistische Gesinnung wichtiger sei als Fachkenntnisse […]. 
Andererseits wurden bereits nach wenigen Jahren auch in der DDR viele 
ehemalige Fachleute wieder in staatlichen Funktionen (Polizei, Militär) 
eingesetzt, soweit ihnen nicht konkrete Vergehen angelastet wurden und 
wenn sie vor allen Dingen nur glaubhaft die ‘richtige’ Gesinnung zeigten 
(Entdecken und Verstehen, 25).
Under the slogan ‘eliminating the remnants of fascism’, the elites in the 
school, judiciary, administration, police and economy were radically dis-
empowered and replaced by socialists and communists. But the commu-
nists also used denazification to eliminate political opponents […]. 
Denazification was thus used as a means to secure communist power. […] 
The SED assumed that an anti-fascist attitude was more important than 
expertise […]. On the other hand, in the GDR, too, many former experts 
were returned to their public offices (police, military) after only a few years 
as long as they were not accused of any specific misdeeds and, most impor-
tantly, if they could convincingly display the ‘correct’ attitude.
According to the text, denazification in the Soviet zone was flawed by 
communist ideology. While interacting with a student, however, Julia 
turns this interpretation into a ‘successful denazification in the East’ nar-
rative. In the following scene, the student was asked to summarize the 
implementation of denazification in the Soviet zone as described in 
the textbook:
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Student: (74) Na, Lehrer wurden entlassen und ersetzt durch 
Sozialisten und Kommunisten. Ähm Entnazifizierung wurde 
zum Mittel kommunistischer Herrschaftssicherung. Ähm es 
wurde klar unterschieden zwischen aktiven Nazis und 
Mitläufern. Äh in der DDR wurden ehemalige Fachleute äh 
wieder eingesetzt.
Student: (74) Well, teachers were released and replaced by socialists 
and communists. Denazification was used as a means to 
secure communist power. […] (75) In the GDR, former 
experts were put back in office.
  [Meanwhile, Julia writes on the blackboard: teachers released, 
communists take over positions.]
Julia: (76) Gut. Ihr habt mitgeschrieben. Richtig. (77) Hier ist es 
klar. (78) Vorhin haben wir noch gefragt, was ist in den 
anderen Besatzungszonen los? Was ist in den Ämtern los? 
(79) Wahrscheinlich, heißt es, die Amerikaner übernehmen 
oder die Briten oder die Franzosen. (80) Und hier ist es klipp 
und klar, raus mit den Nazis. (81) Und an ihre Stelle kom-
men alle die, die sich äh während der Nazizeit in einer kom-
munistischen Partei oder auch in einer sozialdemokratischen 
Partei engagiert haben.
Julia: (82) Good. You have all copied from the board. Right. (83) 
It’s a clear case. (84) Earlier, we asked: what is happening in 
the other occupation zones? What is happening in the offices? 
(85) Probably, it says, the Americans took over or the British 
or the French. (86) And here it’s clear as day: out with the 
Nazis. (87) And their positions are taken over by all those 
who were active in communist or social democratic parties 
during Nazi times.36
The student, who does not seem disturbed by the textbook account, cor-
rectly repeats its major claims. Julia, however, tacitly turns the traditional 
Western portrayal on its head. On an explicit level, she agrees with the 
student’s summary (‘good’, ‘right’ [82]) and hence with the textbook 
account of denazification in the Soviet occupation zone. Her highly selec-
tive notes on the blackboard (‘teachers released, communists take over 
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positions’), however, provide the ground for transferring this account to 
match former GDR narratives. Catching merely the first and relatively 
neutral point of the student’s summary, they ignore the aspects that mark 
the narrative as traditionally Western, i.e. the claims that the communists 
used denazification for their own purposes and that former Nazis were 
put back in office. This reduction of the text makes it possible for Julia to 
develop the contrary argument that, in East Germany, ‘it’s clear as day: 
out with the Nazis’ (86). She backs this up by contrasting the situations 
in the East and West zones (84–86). Again, the East is constructed as the 
model for success against which the West is measured and with which the 
latter cannot compete this time, thus reversing the textbook’s logic. 
Finally, Julia turns the communists and socialists who, according to the 
text, took over the positions, into communists and social democrats (87). 
This small alteration has significant consequences, as it deconstructs the 
idea that denazification in the East was used to eliminate political 
opponents.
 Conclusion
This study has explored how a teacher of the ‘integrated generation’ 
relates to contemporary Cold War discourse in different contexts and 
situations. My analysis shows that Julia has developed a repertoire of 
accounts of the Cold War consisting of both individual narratives and 
underlying narrative templates. She employs the concept of ‘reconcilia-
tion’ for constructing her life story as well as for evaluating textbooks and 
teaching history. She thus de-politicises the historical conflict while also 
attributing a political component to the division within her family. This 
twofold process also applies to the template of the ‘victim’, which she uses 
to describe her father’s situation in GDR times. While the spheres of 
‘family’ and ‘nation’ become deeply intertwined, the non-assignment of 
agency weakens the political element: It remains obscure who is respon-
sible for the division and thus for the victimisation.
In class, the mixing of the spheres and the non-assignment of agency 
recur in reconciliatory accounts of the Cold War. Other classroom situa-
tions triggered different accounts. In student-teacher dialogues, Julia 
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constructed ambivalent images of the two major actors by combining 
traditional Eastern and Western patterns of interpretation. When includ-
ing the traditional Western textbook as an additional authority, and thus 
relinquishing her own level of control to a certain extent, she resorted to 
former GDR narratives.
While Julia seems to have acquired some traditionally Western ideas, 
these instances suggest an internalisation of GDR discourse. This ambiv-
alent condition expresses itself in narratives such as ‘the West is some-
times as good as the East’, in which she turns around the logic by 
measuring the West against the East.
The fact that Julia reinterprets narratives not by openly criticising but 
by tacitly altering them confirms James C.  Scott’s observations about 
resisting hegemonic ideas in social contexts with asymmetrical power- 
relations. According to Scott, whose subject of study was a group of 
Malaysian peasants in the 1970s, such resistance usually does not occur 
in the form of conscious and articulated revolution, but (partly) by con-
structing alternative narrations on the basis of shared norms (Scott 1985). 
Julia’s acts of reinterpretation can thus be seen as a form of negotiation 
that avoids fuelling antagonism and hostility. This also indicates that it is 
still taboo to openly challenge presumably official versions of history in 
Germany. The instance of resorting to GDR narratives as a reaction to 
the textbook’s one-sided view on denazification in the Soviet zone can 
then be read as an escape mechanism; it may result from not daring to 
publically deconstruct a perspective on the GDR that is considered 
socially dominant. The teaching of recent history thus reveals a severe 
lack of discussion.
The ambiguity Julia produces when dealing with the past also reveals a 
broader challenge that members of the ‘integrated generation’ face: Given 
that the GDR is primarily viewed as a failed dictatorial regime today, the 
values with which this generation grew up can no longer serve as a ‘cul-
tural supply’ of acceptable means to construct a life story (Linde 1993). 
Instead, members of this generation are urged to adapt the images they 
construct of themselves to new expectations, which, however, remain 
vague and unspoken. In the course of this study, we have encountered 
traces of a considerable gap between the way in which Julia experiences 
and positions herself towards Cold War discourse and the way in which 
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the students relate to it. More research on the younger generation is 
needed to enrich the debate and contribute to our understanding of how 
the legacy of the GDR and the history of the Cold War are dealt with 
in Germany.
Notes
1. Both publications refer to the Sächsische Längsschnittstudie, which has 
analysed the transformation of (young) Eastern Germans from GDR 
into FRG citizens since 1987. http://www.wiedervereinigung.de/sls/
index.html (accessed 22 February 2017).
2. Cf. this and the previous sentence with Chapter 13 of this volume, by 
Barbara Christophe.
3. As Reh points out, some actors, such as the union Erziehung und 
Wissenschaft (Education and Science), had a more differentiated view on 
education in the former GDR (ibid., 112–113).
4. Real name withheld.
5. The material was collected between June and November 2014 by Kathrin 
Zehr, whom we would like to thank for her support. The interviews and 
lessons were recorded, transcribed, and rendered anonymous by giving 
code names to persons and places mentioned. As a rule I quote from 
them by indicating the file name and the location of the quote in min-
utes of recording as indicated in the transcription. The quotes I use in 
the text were translated from German by the author. The original files 
can be consulted at the Georg Eckert Institute in Braunschweig on the 
basis of respecting and guaranteeing the privacy rights of the people 
involved.
6. See his concept of ‘cultural tool’ in Wertsch 2002.
7. In his development of the concepts of ‘specific narratives’ and ‘schematic 
narrative templates’, Wertsch draws on MacIntyre 1984 and Propp 
1968.
8. ‘Ja, dieses freie Kindsein, wir haben das gelebt’.TCW_Biogr_9_SA.doc, 
#00:18:14-2#  - #00:19:19-9#, #01:21:49-6#  - #01:22:45-5#; ‘Wir 
haben gespielt und sind da äh durch die Siedlung getobt und haben uns 
vergnügt.’ Ibid, #00:01:41-2#-#00:04:08-3#.
9. ‘Und wir hatten auf der gleichen Etage, wo mein Vater wohnte, nebenan 
so eine geteilte Wohnung. Die hat nur 10 Mark gekostet. […]Ach so, 
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wir haben fürs Kind auch noch mal 60 Mark gekriegt im Monat. Ja. Da 
gab es noch diese Unterstützung für Studenten mit […] Kind. Wir 
waren, glaube ich, der erste Jahrgang, bei dem das da so alles mit diesen 
Sozialmaßnahmen dann kam.’ Ibid, #00:47:05-7# - #00:49:29-5#.
10. ‘[…] die Wende. […] Die war für mich enorm.’ Ibid, #01:49:25-8# - 
#01:50:14-4#.
11. ‘Na ja, vor der Wende schon, dieses 89er Jahr dann. […] Aber, hm, […] 
man hatte selber die Fragen im Hinterkopf, was wird? Und wie geht das 
hier alles weiter?’ Ibid, #01:43:36-9# - #01:46:28-8#.
12. ‘Wende und Schulsystem. Ja, das war schon hart. Ich habe am 19. 
November, wenn das der Montag war, eine Klassenarbeit schreiben wol-
len. Thema: “Die Mauer”, 19. November ‘89. Das war also wochenlang 
vorher Thema. Ähm, hm. An dem Tag saßen sieben Schüler in der Klasse 
mit der Bild-Zeitung bewaffnet. (Laughs) Ich habe diese Klassenarbeit 
nicht geschrieben, aber ich war irgendwo dem Koma nahe’. Ibid, 
#01:32:04-0# - #01:38:02-7#.
13. ‘Da gab es dann ein paar wenige Gespräche dazu, aber der ist auch ‘96 
verstorben, also […] er konnte das nicht mehr voll genießen.’ Ibid, 
#00:53:21-5# - #00:55:46-3#.
14. ‘Nach der Wende. Ich habe dann sämtliche Bücherläden wieder mal und 
immer noch und, ja, na das, das ist dann so, ja, wenn man einmal den 
Anstoß hat und Franziska Linkerhand gelesen hat, dann muss man auch 
wissen, was ist denn da in der anderen Seite los?’ Ibid, 
#01:21:49-6#-#01:22:45-5#.
15. ‘Und dann hat [die Staatsbürgerkundelehrerin] unterrichtet, was im 
Lehrplan steht. […] Sie hat sich da schon klar positioniert. Auch bei den 
anderen Klassenlehrern so.’ Ibid, #01:05:30-2# - #01:06:42-4#.
16. ‘Da standen Daten, Daten, Daten, […] ähm DDR-Gründung, ähm 
SED-Gründung aus der und der dann und dann das und das. So. “Lesen 
Sie dort und dort nach.” Und das war ein Werk, was natürlich von einem 
der Mit/ Mitläufer, Mitmacher äh geschrieben wurde, also unkritisch. 
Also nur heroisch dargestellt.’ Ibid, #01:17:32-7# - #01:19:24-9#.
17. ‘Genau, die [Fragen] wurden abgebogen. […] Ich habe brav das Wissen 
aufgesogen.’ Ibid, #01:17:38-5#-#01:19:24-9#.
18. ‘Ja, wenn, wenn ich dran denke, wie das in den 68er-Kreisen eigentlich 
war, wir haben dann hier “Blutige Erdbeeren” angeguckt und haben 
gestaunt, dass man sich als Studenten äh so engagieren und so aufreiben 
kann. […] Ich glaube, da haben wir zum ersten Mal drüber nachge-
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dacht, ob man das mal machen sollte. […] Aber nie ernsthaft irgendwo 
in eine Richtung. Da waren wir vielleicht auch schon wieder zu sanft 
und haben uns gesagt: “Och, es geht uns doch eigentlich ganz gut.”[‚].’ 
Ibid, #01:23:54-2# - #01:25:56-8#.
19. ‘Ja, und irgendwann zwischen ‘51 und ‘52 haben sich meine Eltern dann 
(fester) gefunden und ‘54 geheiratet. […] Ja, und dann haben sie das 
getan, was alle taten, irgendwo die Grundlagen legen für […] das 
gemeinsame Nest. Ja, und weil ähm eben diese Flüchtlingsgeschichten 
dahinter stecken, ist das ja so neues Wurzelnsuchen oder Wurzelnbilden.’ 
Ibid, #00:18:14-2# - #00:19:19-9#.
20. ‘Und das hat sich ergeben, weil er mit seiner Familie […] aus Ostpreußen 
äh geflüchtet ist. Hier dann 1945 ankam und sich praktisch neu orien-
tieren musste.’Ibid, #00:15:24-7# - #00:19:19-9#.
21. ‘Da gab es […] so einen Befehl, wo sich die Angehörigen dieser 
Einrichtung von ihrer Westverwandtschaft lossagen mussten. […] Und 
ich denke, deswegen ist auch die Beziehung schwer belastet gewesen.’ 
Ibid, #00:24:05-9#-#00:27:09-0#.
22. The numbers in brackets are added by the author for the reader’s 
orientation.
23. Ibid, #00:27:09-0# - #00:29:44-2#.
24. Ibid, #00:53:21-5# - #00:55:46-3#.
25. Ibid, #00:55:50-7# - #00:56:55-0#.
26. ‘Ich denke, da hat jedes politische System seinen Teil zu beigetragen. 
Indem man eben bestimmte Machtbereiche abgesteckt hat und bestim-
mte wirtschaftliche Interessen ähm bedienen wollte’. TCW_Amb_9_
SA.doc, #01:34:48-8# -#01:35:10-5#.
27. ‘Rohstoffe, […] ähm auch Märkte. […] Letztendlich um Geld in der 
Wirtschaft’. Ibid, #01:35:18-7# - #01:35:30-1#.
28. Ibid, #00:44:15-1# - #00:47:12-0#.
29. 2014-11-14_Vid-L_9_SA.doc; 2014-11-14_Vid-L_9_SA.avi, #00:40: 
11-9# - #00:43:04-2#.





34. 2014-10-24_Vid-L_9_SA_a.doc; 2014-10-24_Vid-L_9_SA_a.avi; #00: 
04:45-4# -#00:07:40-3#.
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35. This slogan partly became popular through the song ‘Ami, Go Home’ by 
Ernst Busch, published in his Internationale Arbeiterlieder of 1953 (142–
144). See the lyrics at erinnerungsort: Materialien zur Kulturgeschichte: 
http://www.erinnerungsort.de/Ami-2C-go-home-21-_88.html 
(accessed May 15, 2018).
36. 2014-10-24_Vid-L_9_SA_a.doc, #00:43:48-0# - #00:45:00-6#.
Bibliography
Textbook Cited
Entdecken und Verstehen 10. Vom Ende des Zweiten Weltkriegs bis in die Gegenwart. 
2010. Thomas Berger-v. d. Heide, Stephan Burrichter, Bettina Mende, Ulrich 
Mittelstädt, Karl-Heinz Müller, Dieter Potente and Cornelius Schley. Berlin: 
Cornelsen.
Further References
Ahlrichs, Johanna, Katharina Baier, Barbara Christophe, Felicitas Macgilchrist, 
Patrick Mielke and Roman Richtera. 2015. ‘Memory Practices in the 
Classroom: On Reproducing, Destabilizing and Interrupting Majority 
Memories’. Journal of Educational Media, Memory, and Society 7, no. 2: 
89–109.
Baier, Katharina, Barbara Christophe and Kathrin Zehr. 2014. ‘Schulbücher als 
Seismographen für Diskursive Brüche: Ein Neuer Ansatz in der 
Kulturwissenschaftlichen Schulbuchforschung Dargestellt am Beispiel der 
Analyse von Schulbucherzählungen über den Kalten Krieg’, Eckert. Working 
Papers 4. http://www.edumeres.net/urn/urn:nbn:de:0220-2014-00184, last 
accessed 23 October 2018.
Binnenkade, Alexandra. 2015 ‘Doing Memory: Teaching as a Discursive Node’, 
Journal of Educational Media, Memory, and Society 7, no. 2: 29–43.
Christophe, Barbara. 2017. ‘“Eigentlich hingen ja alle mit drin.” Entnazifizierung 
und Kalter Krieg in deutschen Schulbüchern und in den Erzählungen von 
Lehrenden’. In Das Geteilte Deutschland im Schulbuch: Die Darstellung des 
Kalten Krieges am Beispiel Deutschlands in den (Geschichts-) Schulbüchern von 
 E. Fischer
343
1945 bis in die Gegenwart, edited by Franziska Flucke and Ulrich Pfeil, 
147–164. St. Ingbert: Röhrig Universitätsverlag.
Erll, Astrid. 2011. Kollektives Gedächtnis und Erinnerungskulturen: Eine 
Einführung. 2nd rev. ed. Stuttgart/Weimar: Metzler.
Feindt, Gregor et  al. 2014. ‘Entangled Memory: Toward A Third Wave in 
Memory Studies’. History and Theory 53: 24–44.
Förster, Peter. 2008. ‘Noch Immer Keine Zukunft im Osten! Bericht über 
Wesentliche Ergebnisse der 22. Welle’, http://www.wiedervereinigung.de/sls/
PDF/foersterstudie2009.pdf, accessed 22 February 2017).
Förster, Peter. 2011. ‘Zwischenbilanz: Zwei Jahrzehnte nach Wende und 
Deutscher Einheit ist die Generation der Mittdreißiger tief gespalten in 
Gewinner und Verlierer!’ Ergebnisbericht zur 23. Welle der Sächsischen 
Längsschnittstudie. Leipzig,. http://www.wiedervereinigung.de/sls/PDF/
foersterstudie2010.pdf, accessed 22 February 2017.
Foucault, Michel. 1969. L’Archéologie du Savoir. Paris: Gallimard.
Iriye, Akira. 2014. Global Interdependence: The World after 1945. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts [u.a.]: The Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press.
Jarausch, Konrad H., Christian F. Ostermann and Andreas Etges, eds. 2017. The 
Cold War: Historiography, Memory, Representation. Berlin: De Gruyter.
Kleßmann, Christoph. 2010. ‘1945: Welthistorische Zäsur und “Stunde Null”, 
Version 1:0’. Docupedia-Zeitgeschichte 15 October 2010. http://docupedia.
de/zg/1945, accessed 23 October 2018.
Lindner, Bernd. ‘Kriterien für ein Modell der Jugendgenerationen in der DDR’. 
In Generationalität und Lebensgeschichte im 20. Jahrhundert, edited by Jürgen 
Reulecke, 187–215. München: R. Oldenburg Verlag, 2003.
Linde, Charlotte. 1993. Life Stories: The Creation of Coherence. New  York/
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lundestad, Geir. 2014. East, West, North, South: International Relations since 
1945. 7th ed. Los Angeles: Sage.
MacIntyre, Alasdair C. 1984. After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. Notre 
Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press.
Möller, Horst. 1995. ‘Die Relativität Historischer Epochen: Das Jahr 1945 in 
der Perspektive des Jahres 1989’. Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 18: 3–9.
Müller, Birgit. 2008. ‘Erinnerungskultur in der DDR’. Geschichte und 
Erinnerung. Berlin: Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung. http://www.bpb.
de/geschichte/zeitgeschichte/geschichte-und-erinnerung/, accessed 24 
October 2016.
15 Reconciling Opposing Discourses: Narrating and Teaching… 
344
Propp, Vladimir. 1968. Morphology of the Folktale. Translated by Laurence Scott. 
Austin: University of Texas.
Reh, Sabine. 2003. Berufsbiographische Texte ostdeutscher Lehrer und Lehrerinnen 
als ‘Bekenntnisse’: Interpretationen und methodologische Überlegungen zur erzie-
hungswissenschaftlichen Biographieforschung. Bad Heilbrunn: Klinkhardt.
Scott, James C. 1985. Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance. 
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Welke, Tina. 2012. Tatort Deutsche Einheit: Ostdeutsche Identitätsinszenierung im 
‘Tatort’ des MDR. Bielefeld: transcript.
Wertsch, James V. 2002. Voices of Collective Remembering. Cambridge: 
Cambridge Univ. Press.
Schütze, Fritz. 1982. ‘Narrative Repräsentation Kollektiver 
Schicksalsbetroffenheit’. In Erzählforschung: Ein Symposium, edited by 
Eberhard Lämmert, 568–590. Stuttgart: Metzler.
Open Access  This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons 
Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction 
in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original 
author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence and 
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the 
chapter’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line 
to the material. If material is not included in the chapter’s Creative Commons 
licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds 




Memory Practices in the Classroom
347© The Author(s) 2019
B. Christophe et al. (eds.), The Cold War in the Classroom, Palgrave Studies in 
Educational Media, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-11999-7_16
16
Introduction to Part Three: Memory 
Practices in the Classroom
Peter Gautschi, Barbara Christophe, and Robert Thorp
Teaching is a difficult task. As Lee S. Shulman determined in 1986: ‘From 
the perspective of complexity management, teaching is a far more 
demanding occupation than is medicine’ (Shulman 1986). Doyle (1986, 
394-395) has identified six reasons for this complexity: multidimension-
ality, simultaneity, immediacy, unpredictability, publicity and historicity.
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When it comes to the teaching of history, we can add six further rea-
sons for the particular difficulty in this subject area (Gautschi 2007): 
First, the learning objects usually elude the primary view. History lessons 
address something now in the past and which must, however, be set 
within a present context and mindset. Second, this universe of history 
grows with each passing day – there is increasingly more past – while the 
time available for history teaching is becoming increasingly limited and 
demands are growing with regard to the choice of topic. Third, history 
teaching is to a large extent confronted with digital change. This is rele-
vant both to the representation and to the visualisation of the past and, 
of course, as in all other domains, also to the teaching and learning pro-
cesses themselves. Fourth, history teaching aims not only at teaching 
knowledge but also at initiating historical thinking, an ‘unnatural act’, as 
Sam Wineburg (2001) has put it, which is not simply intuitive and whose 
facilitation is highly demanding. Fifth, the mediation of history is also 
always about individual and social identity. Jörn Rüsen even wrote in his 
work Historik that ‘Identity formation is therefore one of the most impor-
tant functions, if not the most important function, of historical thinking 
in the life practice of its time’ (Rüsen 2013, 267, trans. PG). Sixth, bring-
ing the past to the present mind always involves the working out of cul-
turally shaped common memories which have a say in defining what counts 
as a relevant history (Ahlrichs et  al. 2015). All in all, history teaching 
requires navigating back and forth between different poles: between trans-
mitting knowledge, enabling historical thinking or building up identity, 
between history and the past as well as between history and memory.
Research into history teaching is no less complex than its research 
object (Gautschi 2013, 2014). How do we define and describe such a 
volatile and multidimensional object of research? How do we find and for-
mulate relevant questions or hypotheses in view of the complexity and 
unpredictability of history teaching? How can we access a field that in 
theory is a public sphere but to which entry is restricted or even denied 
by a large number of gatekeepers in order to protect teaching processes 
and personal rights (Gautschi 2012)? How should we address the huge 
challenges of data collection and ascertain which methods of data evalu-
ation prove appropriate, productive and target-orientated (Diekmann 
2017, 194)? In recent years, videography has proved to be a particularly 
productive way of collecting data for research into history teaching, 
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because it allows the scholar to implement the basic idea of field research: 
‘to examine its subject in as natural a context as possible in order to avoid 
distortions caused by the intervention of research methods or by the 
unrealistic external perspective’ (Mayring 2002, 54).
Video-based classroom analysis has a number of advantages over tradi-
tional methods (questionnaires, interviews and direct observation in the 
classroom), in particular the fact that videos can be used to view the 
classroom activities of different people as often as desired and indepen-
dently of the time of recording (Gautschi 2016). Further, video analysis 
provides deeper insight into the complexity of teaching processes, allows 
the researcher to analyse teaching sequences from several perspectives and 
guided by different questions, and it facilitates the integration of quanti-
tative and qualitative analyses. Secondary analyses of the data material are 
possible at a later point in time, the communication of results becomes 
possible on the basis of examples, and the findings can also be reflected 
back into practice. In short, the result is an enriching combination of 
research, theory and practice (cf. Seago 2004; Krammer et  al. 2008; 
Rauin, Herrle and Engartner 2016). In particular, instructional videos 
are an excellent basis for a case-by-case analysis of history teaching, as the 
following three chapters will unveil.
Research into history teaching can be carried out in six different direc-
tions (cf. Gautschi 2014):
 a) Phenomenon research aims at a sophisticated description and analysis 
of the realities of teaching; that is, the manifestations and production 
patterns of historical teaching and learning, of methodological and 
medial aspects of history teaching, but also the description of condi-
tions such as timeframes, curricula and textbooks.
 b) Outcomes research aims at collecting and measuring the learning out-
comes (performance, interest in the subject, topic-specific attitudes 
and skills) of students after a history lesson, unit or period, insofar as 
this teaching effect can be interpreted. The collection of learning out-
comes receives an evaluative character by comparing different groups 
or through clearly defined standards and objectives.
 c) Effectiveness research deals with the causal analysis of condition-effect 
relationships in history teaching. Factors which ensure educational 
success are to be identified. In this context, teaching and learning 
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quality are seen as characteristics of effectiveness in the sense of a 
multi-dimensional understanding of education: attitudes, learning 
motivation, topic-specific interest and performance interact and need 
to be investigated simultaneously (Reusser 2001). Effectiveness 
research connects phenomena and outcomes research and searches for 
relations between teaching processes and outcomes. In contrast to 
descriptive outcomes research, it aims at identifying and determining 
the conditions needed for successful teaching (Van Drie and Van 
Boxtel 2008).
 d) Intervention research generally involves developing, implementing and 
evaluating concrete teaching sequences, units or products on the basis 
of didactical and theoretical considerations. Its aim is not to describe 
the empirical reality of teaching, but rather to create and examine the 
quality of a new reality of teaching. Accordingly, it seeks to improve 
the process-oriented practice. In the methodological ideal case, inter-
vention research coincides with experimental effectiveness research.
 e) Research on historical consciousness is concerned with the analysis of 
the thought paths of individuals in relation to history. Typical ques-
tions ask (i) what exactly teachers and students do when they engage 
in historical thinking (Wineburg 2001), (ii) what kind of historical 
consciousness they display (Seixas 2006) and (iii) how students per-
ceive key concepts such as time, change, perspective, significance or 
evidence (Voss et al. 1998).
 f ) Finally, the sixth direction is research on history teaching as an insti-
tutionalised and at the same time socially embedded setting in which 
we may investigate how people who happen to be teachers and stu-
dents negotiate the meaning of the past (Ahlrichs et  al. 2015; 
Christophe 2017; Binnenkade 2015; Macgilchrist et al. 2017). In this 
research, the focus is on the patterns of meaning that emerge during 
classroom talk and on the many strands that connect these meaning- 
making processes with wider social and cultural discourses. It deals 
with memory practices in the classroom. To quote an intriguing 
phrase coined by Alexandra Binnenkade, teaching is construed as a 
discursive node of all the discourses to which teachers and students are 
exposed and in which they take part when watching films, reading 
newspapers, talking to family and friends, browsing the internet or 
perhaps also the textbook.
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These six directions are characterised by a clearly recognisable shared 
objective. They are not clearly defined categories but rather serve to convey 
a big picture. For example, for a long time the fifth research direction was 
strongly perceptible. In view of the narratives more-or-less handed down 
in the established nation states of Western democracies, researchers 
turned to individuals and their historical consciousness. However, this has 
changed notably over the last few years with the increasing awareness of 
living in plural and fragmented postmodern societies that are divided 
with regard to interpretations of the past but also the advance of populism.
While most studies follow more than one single research direction, the 
following three chapters show clear trends. Whereas Barbara Christophe 
analyses meaning-making in the classroom as politically loaded memory 
practices, Robert Thorp looks at narratives offered by teachers and stu-
dents as indicators for a specific type of historical consciousness. Peter 
Gautschi and Hans Utz, meanwhile, apply a broad range of concepts 
from history didactics in order to make informed judgements about the 
quality of history lessons. However, all three chapters share one crucial 
feature: while other studies in history education primarily analyse what 
the history classroom as a setting with certain rules and procedures would 
do with a certain historical topic (Henke-Bockschatz and Mehr 2012; 
Hollstein et al. 2002), these three studies investigate what the Cold War 
as a socially contested historical topic does with the history classroom. 
Moreover, all three of the following contributions implement phenome-
non research and are based on the same data, namely on the same four 
videographed history lessons from the different countries, all of which 
deal with the origins of the Cold War.
The researchers working on these studies and the authors of the follow-
ing three contributions contacted secondary-school history teachers in 
Germany, Switzerland and Sweden, with the request that we observe and 
film their teaching on the Cold War. We also asked the students’ permis-
sion to observe and film the lessons; only those who consented were 
filmed. The observed lessons varied in length. The material was tran-
scribed shortly afterwards, and it is these transcriptions and videos that 
are used in the following analyses. The transcriptions were then translated 
from German and Swedish into English. The four teachers included in 
the study were born before 1970 and thus all had personal experience of 
the Cold War period. The rationale here was that these teachers would 
16 Introduction to Part Three: Memory Practices in the Classroom 
352
have a richer and more complex understanding of the Cold War period 
and that this socio-political circumstance in itself would have informed 
their own lives and experiences (Gautschi et al. 2014). The lessons anal-
ysed here are introductory lessons to the Cold War period, offering an excel-
lent basis for comparison between the four teachers and for insights as to 
how the Cold War is introduced and framed in the classroom.
The lesson from Sweden was the shortest. It lasted 27 minutes and 
consisted of four parts: At the beginning of the lesson, the teacher intro-
duced the subject with her own experiences and those of her generation. 
She then showed the class a film about the rise of the Soviet Union and 
the USA and their struggle against Hitler’s Germany during the Second 
World War. Subsequently she introduced the three politicians Stalin, 
Roosevelt and Churchill, presented the Yalta Conference, and showed 
another film excerpt about the origin of the Cold War and Truman’s con-
tainment policy. At the end of the lesson, the teacher explained the sig-
nificance of the Cold War and Sweden’s position with formal neutrality 
and yet an informal belonging to the West.
The lesson from Switzerland, which lasted 60 minutes, also used a film 
excerpt of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima; however, this was preceded 
by an introduction to the topic using a caricature entitled ‘Tandem or 
Unicycle?’ from a Swiss textbook. The pupils worked in groups to contex-
tualise both caricature and film. Then the teacher and the class discussed 
the characteristics and interests of the Cold War blocs, recording the 
results in tabular form on the blackboard. The pupils then received two 
text sources representative of the two Cold War parties, to be interpreted 
working in pairs. At the end of the lesson the teacher gave an overview of 
the prehistory of the Cold War (1941-1945), in particular of the treat-
ment of Germany by the victorious powers in the aftermath of World 
War II according to the principles of democratisation, denazification, 
demilitarisation and decentralisation.
We observed two double lessons from Germany on the origins of the 
Cold War, one from the former West and one from the former East 
Germany. Each double lesson lasted around 85 minutes. The teacher of 
the lesson in Lower Saxony began by brainstorming the students’ previ-
ous knowledge of the Cold War, noting keywords. Interestingly, this 
teacher also introduced the topic using a caricature, this time with the 
caption ‘Draft of a Memorial to the Victors’ (Entwurf für ein 
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Siegerdenkmal), and a quotation from Stalin. More detailed analyses of 
these lessons and how they approached the material are given in the 
following three chapters.
The courses taken by the fronts in Europe at the end of the Second 
World War were traced in a group effort. The teacher then presented a 
brief historical outline of the development of Russia and the Soviet Union 
since the 19th century, subsequently asking the pupils to do the same for 
the USA on the basis of their previously acquired knowledge. At the end 
of the double lesson, the pupils elicited the self-images of the two camps 
on the basis of representative text sources, juxtaposing these with the 
image of the other side.
Similarly, in the lesson we observed in Saxony-Anhalt the pupils were 
confronted with the same caricature used by the lesson in Lower Saxony 
(‘Draft of a Memorial to the Victors’) at the beginning of the double les-
son, to be analysed with the help of worksheets. The evaluation of this 
working phase took place in class. Then the pupils were presented with 
text sources on the Truman doctrine and the Shdanov theory and asked 
‘who?’, ‘what?’, and ‘with what cause’? Here, too, the results were discussed 
in class. Afterwards, the class discussed the term ‘Cold War’ on the basis of 
an image of Checkpoint Charlie in Berlin. The learning results were com-
pared with the text from the school history book and led to the definition 
of the term ‘Cold War’. At the end of the double lesson, the topics covered 
were summarised and reinforced with the help of another worksheet.
Although the following three contributions all implement phenome-
non research and are based on the same data, they differ considerably in 
interpretation as well as methodology. This section of the book thus fol-
lows on from a strand of research in history didactics which, with this 
comparative approach, strives both to sharpen the theories and methods 
and to provide new insights into the object of research (Meyer-Hamme 
et al. 2012). These ‘crossed glances’ result in a more colourful and detailed 
picture, which is certainly stimulating if not free of contradiction.
Barbara Christophe’s contribution on ‘Selecting, Stretching and Missing 
the Frame: Teachers and Students from Germany and Switzerland Making 
Sense of the Cold War’, compares two introductory lessons on the Cold 
War held in two year-10 classes in western Germany and Switzerland. 
From a theoretical perspective her analysis is inspired by memory studies; 
methodologically she draws on a discourse-based frame analysis. Focusing 
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on rich points, on moments when something unexpected is of particular 
relevance to processes of framing and interaction, the paper raises three 
questions. It explores (i) to what extent frames offered by the teachers are 
shared or contested, (ii) how coherent these frames are and (iii) how 
frames established by teachers and students interact. Christophe arrives at 
three conclusions: She shows that both teachers mobilise two clearly rec-
ognisable, if opposing, frames, both of which have political implications. 
She also demonstrates that they ‘stretch’ and ‘bend’ their preferred frames 
in order to integrate all the details they wish to mention. And she argues 
that students regularly miss the frames offered by their teachers by either 
failing to recognise their narrative and political logic or by tacitly resisting 
them. Discussing these empirical insights against the backdrop of debates 
in memory studies and history didactics, Christophe argues that the mis-
understandings we observe when teachers and students negotiate the 
meaning of the past as representatives of different generations appear to 
be an important third pattern in communication about memory beyond 
the alternatives of consensus and conflict often discussed in theoretical 
debates. Moreover, she contends that by missing the chance to explicitly 
recognise the political character of Cold War memory, teachers contrib-
ute to the likelihood of persistent misunderstandings.
In their chapter, ‘Learning from Others: Considerations within History 
Didactics on Introducing the Cold War in Lessons in Germany, Sweden 
and Switzerland’, Peter Gautschi and Hans Utz compare the four different 
lessons in which teachers are confronted with the same challenge, namely 
how to begin teaching a subject such as the Cold War when the teacher is 
not only an educator but also a witness of the conflict itself, for which 
there is no universally accepted master narrative. The chapter is  structured 
around basic didactic questions such as: What is taught in the introduc-
tory lessons on the Cold War? How do teachers structure the lessons? 
What is the learning objective? At the end of the chapter the authors rec-
ommend that, when teaching contemporary topics, teachers should teach 
history while consciously broaching the issue of memory. If successful 
then history education will be instrumental not only in building knowl-
edge but also in constructing identity and developing critical thinking.
In his chapter ‘Pedagogical Entanglements and the Cold War: A 
Comparative Study on Opening History Lessons on the Cold War in 
Sweden and Switzerland’ Robert Thorp analyses the two lower-secondary 
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school opening lessons on the Cold War from Sweden and Switzerland. 
The opening lessons are analysed according to the content covered, the 
educational media used, and how the teachers interact with their students. 
The study finds that the opening lessons vary to a great extent. Whereas the 
Swiss lesson predominantly focuses on establishing a critical narrative of 
the origins of the Cold War conflict, the Swedish lesson disseminates what 
could be considered a traditional narrative of the Cold War. The lessons 
also differ in terms of the different forms of educational media employed 
by each educator. While the Swiss teacher makes use of caricatures to insti-
gate pupil-oriented discussions about what caused the Cold War, the 
Swedish teacher uses personal analogies and a video during class. The study, 
however, finds that neither teacher engages with the contingencies of his-
tory culture that affect historical content and how we approach it; instead, 
both disseminate a closed rendering of the history of the Cold War.
Although the three contributions examine the same introductory les-
sons on the subject of the Cold War in very different ways, there are some 
important common insights: First, life experiences, memories and teachers’ 
beliefs shape their teaching activities decisively. Second, the situations in 
which individuals engage with the past, i.e. the persons they talk to, the 
media they use but also the political issues that dominate in the present 
moment, all these situational factors have an influence on practices of 
teaching the past. When we place emphasis on these factors, we construe 
teaching and learning history as memory practices.
Third, rendering these processes explicit reduces the risk of misunder-
standings in history lessons. Being reflective about the contingency of 
one’s own approach to the past is thus not only a requirement of fairness 
in the plural societies of today; it also enhances cognitive understanding. 
At the same time, reflection on the contingency of one’s own approach to 
the past appears to be a rarity in societies considered established nation 
states. When common-sense assumptions are strong and socially effec-
tive, the work they perform tends to be invisible. As many studies show 
(Psaltis et al. 2017; Bentrovato et al. 2016), this contrasts sharply with 
the conditions of teaching history in post-conflict societies where every-
body is painfully aware of the political involved in debates about the past. 
This leaves us with the insight that history can indeed ‘bite’ or ‘bore’, 
depending on the specific context. It can suffer from both the disappear-
ance and from the overwhelming presence of the political.
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The fourth common insight is that the theories, methodologies and 
convictions of scholars used for teaching research shape their results 
largely, and finally, all three studies recognise that adherence to these 
insights reduces the risk of absolute conclusions.
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17
Selecting, Stretching and Missing 
the Frame: Making Sense of the Cold 
War in German and Swiss History 
Classrooms
Barbara Christophe
Memory studies present us with two narratives, both of which tend to 
offer somewhat opposing images of how we should think about collective 
memory. According to one school of thought, collective memory appears 
to be strong and powerful, moulding pasts, rather effectively, according 
to the needs of shifting presents (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1992; Zelizer 
1998). According to the second, collective memory is the precarious 
result of an attempt to square the circle (Assmann 2006). While it has to 
decouple from the polyphonic memories of individual persons in order to 
achieve coherence, it also has to tie in with individual memories in order 
to be accepted as an appropriate and meaningful frame. It is in line with 
this second narrative that authors place emphasis on conflict and strug-
gle. When talking about collective memory, one must not expect it to be 
consensual, coherent or stable (Schwartz 2016, 10), they argue. Memory 
does not primarily result in social cohesion but instead can serve as an 
object of contestation (Bodnar 1992; Sturken 1997; Sierps 2014) and 
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fragmentation (Leggewie 2009; Hoskins 2011); it not only clearly orients 
an individual but also creates ambivalence and inconclusiveness (Ryan 
2011; Sturken 1999; Beattie 2008). It does not travel untouched across 
time and space, but is instead subject to continuous mutation every time 
it is invoked.
Against the backdrop of these debates, this chapter analyses how teach-
ers and students in a German and a Swiss history classroom ‘do’ memory 
(Macgilchrist et al. 2015), when discussing the origins of the Cold War. 
Conceived of as a meeting place between members of different genera-
tions (Menk 2006), the history classroom is studied from the perspective 
of memory practices. Looked upon from that angle, teachers and students 
whose formative experiences took place in different historical periods and 
who have been exposed to different discourses could be expected to recall 
the past rather differently (Schuman and Scott 1989).
Focusing on the discursive frames applied by both groups, this chapter 
explores (i) to what extent the emerging patterns of interpretation are 
shared, contested or simply diverse, (ii) how coherently they connect to 
culturally shaped frameworks and (iii) how they interact with one another. 
I will proceed in three steps: I begin by looking into the discourses enacted 
by the two teachers, then continue to examine how coherently both of 
them use framing strategies. Finally, I focus on patterns of interaction 
that evolve between teachers and students in both classrooms. Comparing 
both teachers, I show that they differ in selecting frames with opposing 
political implications but converge in stretching and bending these 
frames in order to integrate all the details they wish to mention. Analysing 
classroom talk as an exchange between members of different generations, 
I point out that students often appear to miss the frames their teachers 
use, at times because they fail to recognise the political and narrative logic 
behind them and at other times because they tacitly resist them. 
Translating these empirical findings into a theoretically relevant contri-
bution to memory studies, I argue that misunderstanding and misper-
ception constitute  a likely third option when members of different 
generations remember the past, alongside conflict and consensus. I more-
over contend that generational differences in judging the past can be 
linked to the fading of common-sense assumptions as well as to differ-
ences in moral demands. With regard to history teaching, I point out that 
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both teachers simultaneously invoke and suppress the political due to 
how each remembers the Cold War, thus making it considerably more 
difficult for their students to understand them. 
 Method
My analysis draws mainly on two video-recorded lessons on the origin of 
the Cold War.1 In addition, the interpretation of some particularly dense 
moments of classroom discourse is corroborated by referring back to dif-
ferent types of interviews2 conducted with the two teachers, as well as to 
observational data gathered during ethnographic field work in their 
respective classrooms.3 While I do not aspire to present findings represen-
tative of German or Swiss history lessons as a whole, I do depict in detail 
situated classroom talk that should allow us to better understand what 
happens when members of different generations interpret a contested 
past like the Cold War.
Conceptually, this chapter is geared towards frame analysis, which 
aims at identifying the major cognitive schemata people use to organise 
experience and give meaning to reality (Goffman 1974). Beyond this 
rather general definition, my understanding of the concept of the frame 
is based on three crucial claims. First, I take frames to be a ‘configuration 
of positions’ (Lombardo et al. 2009, 11), which are not restricted to cog-
nitive schemata alone but also include normatively loaded bias and 
assumptions of which people are not aware. Accordingly, I pay close 
attention to hidden assumptions implied but not explicitly stated when 
approaching the framing of discourses in the classroom. Second, in line 
with discourse-based approaches I assume that the frames used by indi-
viduals are embedded in socially shared networks of frames, which we 
shall call frameworks for the sake of clarity (Marx Ferree 2009). This 
leaves me with the task of identifying culturally influenced interpreta-
tions of issues and events within the frames used in the two classrooms. 
Finally, I believe that frames play a vital role in helping us to make sense 
of the world by reducing complexity and by pointing our attention to 
certain factors while bracketing out others. Frames order and link events 
together into packages.
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 Selecting Different Frames
A first comparison of both lessons quickly reveals that both teachers 
adhere to surprisingly similar strategies on some levels, while making 
completely different choices on others. To begin with similarities, both 
start their lessons with caricatures focusing on the break-up of the Anti- 
Hitler Coalition. While the German teacher refers to the famous Swiss 
drawing, ‘Draft of a Memorial to the Victors’, which features Roosevelt 
and Stalin sitting on a horse with two heads pointing in opposite direc-
tions, the Swiss teacher employs a caricature of Truman and Stalin on a 
tandem which then breaks apart into two unicycles heading different 
ways. Moreover, during the latter part of each lesson, both teachers ask 
their students to use fragments of the famous speeches given by Truman 
and Stalin in 1947 to illustrate their initial thoughts on the opposing 
ideas Americans and Soviets stood for. However, as we shall see, each 
Fig. 17.1 Cartoon entitled ‘Tour du Monde: Tandem oder Einrad?’ by Jean Leffel. 
From German textbook: Menschen in Zeit und Raum 9, Edition for Lower Saxony, 
113 (Zurich: Schulbuch Verlag plus AG, 2012)
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teacher contextualises these materials in very different ways, integrating 
them into opposing frames that support conflicting stories on the origin 
of the Cold War.
 The History Teacher from Germany
The most prominent feature in the lesson given by the German teacher, 
here referred to as Ms. Burmeister, is her outspoken anti-Soviet bias. 
Although she starts the classroom discussion with the cartoon described 
above, which seems to equally distribute blame for having caused the 
Cold War between both superpowers, in the remainder of the lesson she 
places an almost exclusive focus on the Soviets as the main culprits. In 
order to contextualise the cartoon she draws her students’ attention to the 
famous speech Stalin gave in April 1945. Asking them to read aloud his 
unambiguous statement that the victorious powers would impose their 
social systems on all occupied countries as far as their armies advance, she 
Fig. 17.2 Cartoon entitled ‘Entwurf fur ein Siegerdenkmal’ or ‘Draft of 
A  Memorial to the Victors’, published in  Schweizer Illustrierte (11  April 1945). 
Reproduced here from the German textbook: Entdecken und Verstehen 3, Edition 
for Lower Saxony, 99 (Berlin: Cornelsen, 2010)
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evokes the image of an aggressive Soviet Union. Something similar hap-
pens in the next phase of the lesson.
00:28:37- Tfem Would you please look in your atlases for a map that shows 
where the borders were between the armies after the 
Second World War?
00:29:00 S8 Um, what it looked like, or the occupying forces?
00:29:03 Tfem Hm?
00:29:11 S8 Well, what it/ it looked like, or, [...] or a map with the whole 
occupying forces and stuff? #00:29:12-1#
00:29:17- Tfem With the occupying forces. We have here ‘how/ as far as his 
armies can reach’. #00:29:17-4#
00:30:08 Tfem So, now everyone has, no perhaps not. [...] Some are still 
flicking through. #00:30:00-8#
00:30:17 S4 When was the cartoon from again?
00:31:18 Tfem April ’45. But not much changed after that. [...] So. How far 
did the Soviet [...] zone of occupation reach? [...] Either look 
at the map on page 62 or on page 92, there look at map 4.
In this scene, we see how the teacher subsequently reframes the task 
she is giving to her students without reflecting explicitly on the 
 implications brought about by her change of wording. While she initially 
asks her students to browse the atlas and search for a map that illustrates 
the borders between the allied powers in 1945, she then suddenly instructs 
them to look only for the Soviet zone of occupation. In line with this pat-
tern of placing blame on the USSR while remaining silent on the subject 
of the USA, a large portion of the lesson—34 out of 90 minutes—is dedi-
cated to a presentation which she gives on the role of the Soviets and the 
Russians, both of which are repeatedly described as being aggressive and 
backward (Neumann 1999; Macgilchrist 2011; Lawless 2014). She cites 
the inclusion of Siberia and Central Asia in the Tsarist Empire as an 
example of Russia’s expansionist drive in the nineteenth century. After 
the Second World War, the USSR is said to have started its ‘march towards 
the west’.4 At the same time, according to Ms. Burmeister, Russia never 
really had any chance to compete with a West which proved superior on 
all levels. Economically and socially, Russia, she argues, is ‘fairly undevel-
oped’,5 even ‘very primitive in terms of social equality’.6 A look at the 
map illustrates ‘that there is not very much [there]’, particularly in con-
trast to ‘a map of Germany or maybe Great Britain or France’.7 The arbi-
trariness of the Russian Tsar, who was not restrained by any law, contrasts 
sharply with European monarchies which had adopted constitutions by 
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the nineteenth century at the latest. In terms of abolishing serfdom, 
Russia lagged behind by more than 70 years according to Ms. Burmeister. 
In the end, she describes Russia as defeated, as a country where ‘reforms 
did not come to anything’,8 where political disputes triggered either 
assassinations or civil war with ‘all members of the population [...] fight-
ing in groups against one another’.9
 The History Teacher from Switzerland
Most of the time, the history teacher from Switzerland, here referred to 
as Ms. Reger, establishes frames that are  completely different to those 
used by Ms. Burmeister. At the beginning of the lesson, she contrasts the 
cartoon, which depicts the Cold War as the result of a disrupted relation-
ship, with a film that focuses on the atomic bomb dropped on Japan by 
the Americans in 1945. Ms. Reger thus draws on a source that portrays 
Americans not only as having killed thousands of Japanese civilians, but 
also as enjoying unrivalled military superiority. To ensure that they get 
the message, Ms. Reger asks her students whether the film they have seen 
‘connect[s] at all with the cartoon’.10 Subtly preparing the ground for the 
‘right’ answer, she raises the question of ‘who’s got the better seat on the 
tandem’.11 Bringing home her own conclusion, she then emphasises that 
Truman, who is riding in the front seat, clearly had the better position 
given that ‘the one in front can steer’.12 Undermining the position articu-
lated by the cartoon, she finally encourages the students to reflect on 
whether the unicycles are the proper size: ‘And [...] are the proportions 
right at the bottom, the two unicycles? Would they be right at that time, 
straight after the Second World War?’13 For her, it is crystal clear that 
America ‘ha(s) got the upper hand’14 due to its nuclear weapons, a detail 
which, she points out, is not mentioned at all in the cartoon. Later in the 
lesson, when she talks about the general situation different countries 
faced after 1945, she speaks of the USA as ‘the number one as a world 
power [...] economically and [...] of course militarily’,15 as ‘a power that 
can pack a punch’.16
While she highlights the power disparities between these two rivals 
and clearly assigns the position of superiority to America, Ms. Reger 
downplays political or moral differences, resolutely excluding all tra-
ditionalist ideas about a morally superior USA or West. This becomes 
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particularly apparent during a classroom discussion on the Truman 
and Zhdanov speeches when she asks students to stage a clash of argu-
ments between the two. Summing up the discussion, she concludes 
‘both have the same roles probably using the same means’.17
At the end of the lesson and during a short lecture on Allied policies in 
occupied Germany, Ms. Reger openly accuses Americans of having coop-
erated with the same Nazis they fought against in the Second World War.
01:00:5218 Tfem And what then, what happened after that, the rats, or these 
Nazis, they were recycled, well, that’s how it‘s put according 
to, in this, um, book. It was like this, they then, or in the Cold 
War, there were plenty of uses for them. In Latin America, 
when people wanted communist rabble-rousers tracked 
down. And an example is, um, Klaus Barbie, he was the 
Butcher of Lyon. He was one of those who fled and was 
recruited by the CIA in Bolivia and was one of those 
responsible for tracking down Che Guevara. [Barbie’s] past 
was irrelevant [to the CIA in recruiting him], but the point is, 
he was tracked down. (2 sec). So this is referred to as 
recycling.
She bases her talk on a book that investigates how the Nazis fled legal 
persecution like rats vanishing through thousands of loopholes.19 On a 
purely linguistic level, she persistently neglects to ascribe responsibility. 
She speaks of the ‘plenty of uses’ that were made of the Nazis, who were 
‘recycled’, in Latin America where the ‘people’, i.e. a rather poorly identi-
fied historical protagonist, wanted to track down ‘communist rabble 
rousers’, apparently with the help of Nazis. However, with the strategi-
cally placed example of Klaus Barbie, who despite his criminal past as the 
‘Butcher of Lyon’ was ‘recruited’ by the American intelligence agency, the 
CIA, Ms. Reger clearly invites her students to view the USA as the driv-
ing force behind these machinations.
 Comparison
By framing the stories they offer to their students quite differently, both 
teachers show us that competing approaches in Cold War historiography, 
declared prematurely dead by some, still play a vital role in school history. 
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Probably unwillingly, they moreover remind us of the inescapably politi-
cal nature that characterises representations in general (Hutcheon 2007) 
and historical accounts in particular (Sturken 1997).
 Stretching the Frame
While the two teachers clearly differ by invoking culturally opposed 
frames, both of them encounter similar difficulties in integrating all the 
details they feel should be mentioned. In the end, both stretch and bend 
their respective frames successfully in order to make them fit the contours 
of the stories they wish to tell.
 The History Teacher from Germany
In the case of the history teacher from Germany, traditionalist discourse 
is interrupted in two significant instances. The first occurs when Ms. 
Burmeister is talking about the historical dynamics that led to the October 
Revolution in 1917.
00:54:1520- Tfem In 1917 the military situation and the economic 
situation in Russia were so catastrophic that Tsar 
Nicolas II decided, and was forced of course really, to 
abdicate. So he did. Then there was a [...] government, 
provisional government they were called, that came to 
power and attempted to er, the [...] to contain the 
military situation, which ultimately they were not able 
to do. They were expected, really, to make peace. And 
they should have addressed social injustice more, and 
especially they should have helped the farmers. For 
example they should have divided up the land. And 
that didn’t happen. [...] And then there was a, er, 
group, has been for a long time, since the end of the 
19th century, we had them in Germany too, Social 
Democrats. A party that spoke for the workers. And on 
the (clicks on the next slide) erm. On the Russian side 
there were those known as the Bolsheviks. It means 
‘majority group’. They were particularly radical. And 
they wanted social equality, land redistribution. They 
were responsible for what was really a putsch in 
October 1917.
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In this moment Ms. Burmeister speaks in a rather ambivalent manner 
about the Bolsheviks. On the one hand, she emphasises the shortcomings 
of their predecessors, i.e. the provisional government which, according to 
her, failed to address issues of ‘social injustice’, thus giving ample cause for 
upheaval. She even portrays the Bolsheviks as the only historical figures 
who cared for the viable interests of ordinary men and women and prom-
ised ‘social equality’ and ‘land distribution’, two things which by today’s 
moral standards appear to be just and fair. On the other hand, Ms. 
Burmeister describes the same Bolsheviks as ‘radical’ and as having organ-
ised ‘what was really a putsch’, thus connecting them with two words that 
definitely have negative connotations in German discourses.
Something similar happens when she introduces Karl Marx as the 
founding father of Soviet communism.
01:04:3521 Tfem They advanced that far. [...] All in the name of a system. 
The system that was behind it, was called, and is called 
‘Communism’. [...] Can we now? I’ll just turn this off. 
(Turns the computer screen off.) Er, the idea behind it is 
[...] from Karl Marx in the 19th century: Society is very 
unequal. Wealth is very unfairly distributed. Decisions 
about where money should be spent in a nation are too 
unfairly distributed. That, how the workers have to live 
and work, how low their wages are, that is simply not 
fair. It must be changed. [...] Basically those that own 
things, should no longer own them. That there should 
be no more industrialists who decide by themselves ‘I’m 
going to close my firm, or I’m going to produce this and 
that’ but rather it should be under the control of the 
workers. That is the central idea. [...]
Marxism is not only presented here as an adequate and legitimate 
response to a number of unpleasant realities in the nineteenth century – 
when wealth was distributed unfairly, workers received appallingly low 
wages and common sense would lead one to the conclusion that ‘it must 
be changed’ – but the measures Marxists would have implemented in the 
event of their success are actually openly praised. There is no doubt that, 
to Ms. Burmeister, depriving ‘industrialists’ of the ability to shut down 
factories sounds like a good idea.
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Displaying a surprising degree of attraction to the ideas of Marxism, 
this teacher is actually close to cracking the traditionalist frame to which 
she usually refers when  telling the story of the Cold War. In such 
moments, Ms. Burmeister engages a strategy aimed at repairing the dam-
age she may have done to the coherence of her account.
01.02.2022 Tfem And the Soviet Union claimed ‘We have realised this. We 
have done it like this‘. [...] It was opposed to for example 
(Turns computer screen back on and goes to ‘Stalinism’ 
slide) um, in agriculture the farmers could no longer 
decide themselves what, er, they produced, and at what 
price and so on. That was all decided for them. In 
businesses the workers could not decide what they 
produced, and at what prices and so on. It was all set by 
the state. [...] But the claim was ‘We have abolished 
individual decisions, the individual power of 
businessmen. We are working for the people’.
Ms. Burmeister’s strategy mainly rests on denying the Bolsheviks the 
right to present themselves as legitimate heirs to Marx and Marxism. 
She points out that after 1917 they did quite the opposite of what Marx 
had once demanded. Instead of letting workers and farmers determine 
what they were going to produce and how much money they would 
charge for their products, she argues, the Bolsheviks simply replaced the 
former industrialists with the state, thus altering close to nothing for 
working people, who were still subject to decisions taken by others. In 
Ms. Burmeister’s account there thus appears to be a huge gap between 
the values the Bolsheviks claim to represent and the cruel reality 
they created.
 The History Teacher from Switzerland
There is only one moment when Ms. Reger is in danger of transgressing 
the limits of the revisionist discourse she generally employs: when she 
talks about the position in which  the Western states found themselves 
after 1945. Broadening the perspective and switching from a hitherto 
exclusive focus on the USA to allow for a quick glance at the circum-
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stances the United Kingdom was facing at that time, she first of all draws 
her students’ attention to the upcoming end of the British Empire. 
Putting an emphasis on decolonisation as an important historical process, 
she touches upon an issue which is regularly raised by authors who argue 
that the Cold War paradigm is a much too narrow one with which to 
make sense of all the relevant historical trends that took place across the 
globe after the Second World War (Conelly 2000; Iriye 2013). However, 
she herself is far from arriving at this conclusion. Quite the reverse, as 
becomes evident when she appears anxious to bring the Cold War back 
in to the discussion. She actually tries hard to explain how an admirable 
goal like decolonisation was achieved morally under the hegemony of the 
USA, the world power of which she is otherwise critical.
0:26:3123 Tfem Because, um, in the Atlantic Charter Roosevelt and 
Churchill spoke of it, of the right of peoples to self-
determination. And the inhabitants of the colonies, they 
were listening carefully, right, and they thought: Yes, 
absolutely! Only, they of course hadn’t meant it like that, 
or that they [would] give up their colonies, but instead 
they were thinking of, yes, that the regions occupied by 
Germany should be given up. And so now, after the 
Second World War, decolonisation began too.
Ms. Reger mobilises a rather abstract narrative here, according to 
which events do not necessarily reflect the initial intentions of those 
who may have caused them but may well be the unintended side-effects 
of another conscious action. More concretely, she argues that, in setting 
up The Atlantic Charter and in subscribing to the principle of self-
determination, Roosevelt and Churchill would primarily have had in 
mind the European countries formerly occupied by Nazi Germany as 
beneficiaries of their actions. To Ms. Reger, it is clear that these two 
leading Western politicians simply failed to anticipate that the same 
principle could be applied to colonised parts of the world as well. ‘Of 
course they hadn’t meant it like that’, Ms. Reger says, ‘drawing author-
ity from an unspoken premise’ (Geertz 1992, 6) by presenting her judg-





Both teachers successfully walk the line between stretching and bending 
the frame while preventing it from breaking. Both appear to have similar 
reasons to deviate from culturally shared narratives. From the life-
story interviews we conducted with them, we know that in both cases the 
historical details they could not help but mention, although they have 
the potential to undermine the coherence of the overall account, are bio-
graphically relevant to them. While Ms. Burmeister spent a lot of time 
reading Marx in circles of politically active students as a young adult,24 
Ms. Reger had made many trips to postcolonial countries such as Vietnam 
or Cuba.25
Differences between these two educators in dealing with ambivalences 
mainly pertain to the repair strategies they apply in the process of modi-
fying the frames they have selected. Portraying the USA as a power which 
by sheer miscalculation happened to be supportive of the noble goal of 
decolonisation, Ms. Reger largely preserves the picture she has previously 
drawn within a revisionist frame. At the same time, Ms. Burmeister 
allows more ambivalences to enter her discourse. While she mostly draws 
a rather bleak picture of the Soviet Union, she also admits that the Soviet 
system was based on noble ideas dating back to Marx. Although she rec-
onciles both perspectives by pointing to an implementation gap, she nev-
ertheless also credits the Soviets with good intentions.
 Missing the Frame
As I argue above, frames are culturally shaped cognitive schemata which 
help us to recognise a ‘messy’ reality by imposing a structure upon it. Yet, 
in order to be readable to people, they are also dependent on culturally 
shaped common-sense assumptions. As soon as these common-sense 
assumptions are no longer shared socially, frames may be overlooked. 
This is what we can observe in both classrooms. In some situations, teach-
ers and students talk at cross purposes. They fail to recognise each other’s 
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frames because they are unable to infer the other’s preferred frame from 
what has been said.
 The History Classroom in Germany
In the German history class we observed, the students were most actively 
involved during the last phase of the lesson when they were asked to stage 
a discussion between Americans and Russians, based on their reading of 
the famous Truman and Zhdanov speeches from 1947. They were split 
into four groups with each being instructed to identify either with the 
Soviets or with the Americans. More specifically, they were tasked with 
deriving images of the ‘self ’ and the Cold War ‘other’ from the two 
speeches. However, all groups had considerable difficulty grasping what 
the teacher viewed as the bottom line of the claims made by both histori-
cal parties.
Looking at the two American groups, we came across two striking 
moments. Generally speaking, much of the pathos in Truman’s speech in 
1947 was completely lost in the representation offered by the students. 
While the American president spoke dramatically about two lifestyles 
opposing each other, contrasting freedom with oppression and promising 
help to all free nations ready to resist submission, the students spoke 
rather dryly of the economic and financial support offered by the USA to 
the free nations. Moreover, in one particularly striking moment, one 
female student, here referred to as Marie, who was given the task of sum-
ming up Truman’s accusations against the USSR, misreads the core words. 
While the American president spoke about his firm commitment ‘to sup-
port free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed 
minorities or by outside pressures’,26 Marie speaks of ‘the subjugation of 
the armed minorities as a result of external pressure’.27 According to her, 
the Soviets are thus not guilty of having allowed armed minorities to 
oppress others; rather, they are charged with having subjugated armed 
minorities. The teacher quickly corrects Marie by drawing attention to 
how she has replaced ‘by’ with ‘of ’. She also offers her own summary 
according to which the Soviets did not ‘really want to create a democracy’ 
but were ‘in fact [...] doing the opposite and oppressing’.28 Surprisingly, 
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and despite the political disparities between the two versions that are 
brought to the table by the teacher and Marie, the intervention of the 
former meets with neither resistance nor further enquiries. Obviously, 
Marie has failed to make sense of the Truman speech, because she had 
neither enough historical knowledge nor sufficient stereotypical ideas 
about the Soviets to compensate for her lack of knowledge. The fact that 
she does not see any reason to defend her version of the story seems to 
point to either a lack in awareness about the clash of positions she has just 
contributed to or to an indifference towards history teaching in general 
and history teaching about the Cold War in particular. In any case, it 
seems that the history of the Cold War does not hold enough relevance 
for Marie for her to make significant effort towards an appropriate inter-
pretation (Schwartz 2016).
If we turn to the groups that were set the task of identifying with 
Zhdanov, things seem initially to go more smoothly. The ease with which 
the students seem to grasp the logic behind the Soviet position is perhaps 
somewhat surprising given Ms. Burmeister’s extensive othering of Russia 
and the USSR earlier in the lesson. The students cast in the role of the 
Soviets counter the altruistic American self-image the other group had 
difficulty articulating, claiming that all this was in fact only about impe-
rialism and that the Americans ‘just want that so that they can be a world 
power’.29 In addition, they correctly reconstruct the Soviet self-image by 
pointing out that they, the Soviets, wanted ‘to reintroduce democracy 
and to act against, er, against American imperialism’30 and ‘to beat fas-
cism and, er, act in the name of our people’.31
However, at one point, the smoothness of the students’ identification 
with the Soviets is interrupted, although it seems unclear what is actually 
happening in the following situation:
00:34:3832-4 Tfem So let’s have the opposite-um-version. How does 
the Soviet Union present itself? And the 
Americans have to respond [...] Go, S13, S7, S18, 
now it’s your turn. How do you see yourselves?
00:34:43 S13masc We want to destroy democracy
00:34:46 Tfem You want to destroy democracy?
00:34:48 S13masc Yes. We want to destroy democracy.
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00:34:54 Tfem I think there’s a bit of a misunderstanding there, 
S13. The Soviets wouldn’t say that about 
themselves.
(General restlessness and some laughter.)
00:35:09 S13masc Yes, first we want er, the position, the same 
economic position as America, that’s what we 
want to achieve.
At first glance, the student who is talking here, whom we henceforth refer 
to as Markus, seems to start off on the wrong track. Trying to contribute 
to the construction of the Soviet self-image, he says, ‘we want to destroy 
democracy’. His classmates respond with laughter. They immediately 
seem to understand that Markus is violating the general rule of the game 
by vilifying, instead of glorifying, the Soviet self he was told to 
identify with.
But what has actually happened? Has Markus made a mistake? The 
ease with which he presents a better, a more accurate alternative soon 
after the corrective intervention by the teacher sows doubt. This doubt 
increases if we look at how Markus behaved in the other lessons we 
observed. To give one telling example: Asked to describe the feelings of 
school children who were receiving CARE parcels in the aftermath of the 
Second World War, he responded with open irony to what appears to 
him to be a ridiculously simple and obvious task. In contrast to the posi-
tive responses of his classmates, who even elaborated on the difference 
between the truly grateful children of that time and themselves as the 
spoiled youngsters of today, he made a witty comment suggesting that 
CARE actually stood for ‘Calorien-armes-Reste-Essen’ (low-calorie 
leftovers).33
Is something similar happening in the role-play? Maybe Markus is 
simultaneously exploiting and undermining the role ascribed to him with 
his strangely inappropriate self-description of the Soviets as democracy-
destroying monsters? Perhaps he wishes to unveil the hidden transcript of 
the lesson according to which these Soviets are always the bad guys? Or 
possibly he is not the slow but the smart pupil who subtly points to the 
paradox of staging a seemingly open-ended debate between Soviets and 




According to this line of thought, Markus acts as a discourse analyst 
(Macgilchrist et al. 2017) who uncovers the rules of a discourse according 
to which it is beyond question that the Soviet are the culprits. We cannot 
prove this interpretation, but looking at all the mishaps and glitches dis-
cussed so far, it is clear that the role-play turned out to be full of lapses 
and misunderstandings.
 The History Classroom in Switzerland
In the Swiss case, the most obvious instance of missing the frame occurred 
during a classroom discussion on the peculiarities of the situation the 
Soviet Union faced on the eve of the Cold War. We observed the follow-
ing exchange between Ms. Reger and two of her most actively 
engaged students.
0:26:3134 Tf OK then, so now there’s, um, the Soviet Union here (2 
sec). Where does the Soviet Union stand, or what is 
there to say here about [...] this state at the end of 
the war? (16 sec) SmA?
0:27:08 SmA (Peter) It pulled out, I mean, from this [...] I mean, after the 
world [...] you know, after the two world wars it was 
[...] it’s shown, there’s like a conflict, or sort of a 
silent conflict between the two ideologies.
0:27:20 Tf Hmhm, hmhm.
0:27:22 SmA (Peter) And I have the feeling, I mean, America’s scared of 
this communism thing.
0:27:26 Tf Hmhm.
0:27:27 SmA (Peter) And the Soviet Union is making propaganda against 
capitalism [...] like sort of on two fronts.
0:27:34 Tf Yes, exactly, that’s what happens now. But actually, to 
complete this here, basically: that was the [...] here: 
the coalition against Hitler, right? (4 sec). At the end 
of the war. So we can see that here. That’s it, the, 
the tandem you can see [...] see in the cartoon [...] 
And now… yes? SmA?
0:28:12 SmA (Peter) Perhaps there’s also [...] gaining land [...] Germany 
gets divided up.
0:28:18 Tf That’s it. Yes, precisely.
0:28:20 SmA (Peter) And [...] afterwards, after Europe, this, this, um, Iron 
Curtain becomes very strongly felt between East and 
West.
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0:28:28 Tf Hmhm, hmhm. Exactly. Let’s look at the war now… 
Perhaps you remember the US entering the war or, 
put a better way, um, the Soviet… the Soviet Union 
was attacked and the consequence was – was – huge 
losses [...] millions of victims (4 sec). And in spite of 
this: where in the ranking – to come back to the 
ranking – where are, where’s the Soviet Union? (4 
sec) Yes, um, SmB?
0:29:08 SmB Actually in second place, because it[’s] actually still a 
really, really big military power.
0:29:13 Tf That’s right. (8 sec) Number two. (10 sec)
0:29:35 Tf That’s certainly, um, a point. And SmA said it already: 
Expansion to the west, that’s a given, right? (11 sec)
0:29:55 Tf And someone said that already, it’s like this: (If I 
[could] just a bit [...]) They, I mean, they’re winners 
too, aren’t they? And they’re winners, they’re both 
winners, but it became clear that communism’s an 
alternative to this liberal, this liberal democracy. 
Clear as day, that’s the alternative. And why 
shouldn’t communism be the best model? With a 
[...] with communism you can [...], I mean, you can 
win wars. So here: communism as an alternative 
form of society.
The first striking thing to be observed in this intense scene is the careful 
manoeuvring of the student, ‘Peter’, who is responding to the teacher’s 
introductory question. He starts to talk only after a rather long period of 
silence where none of his fellow classmates appear to have sufficient prior 
knowledge on the Soviets to answer the question. Upon closer examina-
tion we can clearly see that even Peter is not really sure about the point he 
wants to make. We see him cautiously probing, withdrawing and offering 
contradictory stories of how the Soviets have acted while paying close 
attention to his teacher’s reactions.
Initially, he talks about the Soviets pulling out and thus seems to 
be invoking a revisionist frame according to which the Soviets would be 
an exhausted and therefore cautious power. Describing the Soviets as 
being in retreat in the literal sense of moving back from occupied territo-
ries, he is, however, referring to incorrect historical facts. Accordingly, 
Ms. Reger’s reactions are hesitant at best. Mumbling a somewhat indeter-
minate ‘hm’, we see in the video that her face clearly shows disapproval. 
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Given her general inclination towards revisionism, she is, in all likeli-
hood, not disapproving of the overall line of thought that the student is 
offering but rather of his failure to provide convincing proof.
Reading her face correctly, while probably failing to understand the 
reasons for her lack of enthusiasm, the student intuitively performs a 
radical turnaround. Without reflecting on the change in his attitude, he 
starts to speak about the propaganda war the Soviets have been waging 
against the Americans who, according to him, were fearful of the Soviets 
he now suddenly describes as representing a threat. Encouraged by a fel-
low student who is nodding approvingly at him, Peter continues to elabo-
rate more resolutely the traditionalist frame he has easily switched to by 
talking about the Iron Curtain the Soviets had erected and the territorial 
gains they had made.
Ironically, the evolving conversation aptly demonstrates that he could 
not have missed his teacher’s preferred frame more clearly. Again, he is 
misled by Ms. Reger’s ambivalent feedback. While Peter seems to take 
encouragement from the repeated phrases ‘yes, exactly’, ‘yes, precisely’, he 
simultaneously seems to ignore the critique she is raising.
As soon as he has finished his description of the aggressive and 
expansive Soviets, Ms. Reger begins to give a kind of counter-speech. 
However, it is only the concessive phrase ‘but actually’ that reveals her 
intention to break with what Peter just has said. She then makes two 
claims, both of which are clearly meant to reintroduce the revisionist 
frame that Peter referred to at the beginning of this scene and was 
unable to substantiate with appropriate evidence. Ms. Reger recalls 
the enormous losses the USSR experienced in the Second World War 
after they were attacked, and she emphasises how attractive the Soviet 
Union and the social order it stood for must have been in the eyes of 
contemporaries who had just seen them winning the war against 
the Nazis.
There are four interesting insights to be gained so far: Firstly, in order 
to satisfy his teacher, Peter is ready to alter his account. Secondly, Peter 
repeatedly misjudges his teacher’s preferences. Thirdly, Ms. Reger picks 
up only on those comments from the classroom talk which fit her pre-
ferred frame, without even mentioning any tension between her 
17 Selecting, Stretching and Missing the Frame: Making Sense… 
380
own claims and the claims put forward by students. Finally, her story 
quickly acquires authoritative status without any resistance. As a result, 
the meaning of the Cold War is quickly fixed, despite the fact that it had 
been mutable just a moment before. All participants in the discussion 
simultaneously collude in rendering invisible the disagreements and mis-
understandings that preceded the fixing of meaning.
Another scene from the Swiss classroom shows that, at times, some-
thing more fundamental is involved than simply an array of different 
assumptions about the Cold War and its main participants. The follow-
ing exchange takes place during the discussion about the cartoon depict-
ing Truman and Stalin riding a tandem.
0:12:0335 Tf (Reger) And, um, [...], what do you think? [...] The top part of 
the picture [...] this tandem, who’s got the better 
seat on the tandem? (2 sec) Yes? SfC?
0:12:18 SfC (Anne) (Smiling) Yes, it’s Stalin. Because he actually has to do, 
you know, less work. I mean, he has to do less 
pedalling, but he doesn’t get to decide [where to go].
0:12:23 Tf (Reger) Yes, precisely. So you think that the back seat’s the 
better one? (brief laugh)
0:12:28 SfC (Anne) (Smiling) Yes, then nobody sees if he doesn’t do 
anything. I mean, he’s working, the one in front, and 
the one at the back can put his feet up.
0:12:34 Tf (Reger) Hmhm. Quite. But on the other hand, as you said, the 
one in front can steer.
0:12:40 Now, um, what about, um, this film, I mean, what’s it 
saying? How can we link it in to this [...] cartoon? 
SfB?
Ms. Reger’s question concerning which of the two leaders had the better 
seat on the tandem produces a discord which is not openly addressed. 
Whereas Anne clearly points to Stalin as the privileged one who could 
relax in the back seat while letting Truman do all the work, Ms. Reger 
sees the advantages on the side of the American president who was able 
to direct the tandem.
At this point, significant differences in value orientation emerge. For 
the teacher it seems beyond question that what really counts, especially in 
politics, is having power over others and thus the ability to shape the 
world according to your ideas. Anne clearly has other priorities. To start 
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with, she bases her judgement on her own everyday experience, which 
seems to tell her that in an age where one is constantly seeking self-
enhancement (Ehrenburg 1998), you are well advised to escape addi-
tional responsibilities and get as much rest as you can. Such assumptions 
and the values behind them are clearly at odds with the quintessential 
logic in many narratives of the Cold War, which is portrayed as a fierce 
competition between two rival powers, both striving to impose their own 
social system upon the rest of the world.36
 Comparison
At first glance, teachers and students in the two classes seem to adopt 
opposing stances. However, if we look at structural issues and focus on 
the interaction between the two sets of protagonists, we discover surpris-
ing similarities. While the German teacher clearly articulates traditional, 
anti-Soviet perspectives, her students show much more scepticism and 
restraint with regard to the USA. And whereas the Swiss teacher plays the 
revisionist card, being much more critical towards the USA, students 
tend to blame the USSR more strongly. Hence, in both cases we see a 
degree of mismatch between the positions taken by teachers and 
their students.
Obviously, students do not relate with the same naturalness to the com-
peting ways of framing the Cold War as do the two teachers, who were for 
many years exposed to discourses surrounding the conflict. As we can see 
from the example of Ms. Reger in Switzerland, teachers may oppose the 
discourses they have grown up with and question the common-sense 
assumptions upon which these are built. However, at the same time, they 
have apparently deeply internalised the binary oppositions that come with 
them. None of this seems to be true for the students as members of a 
younger generation born long after the end of the Cold War.
Some, like Peter from Switzerland, switch frames with astonishing ease 
when trying to come up with an ‘appropriate’ story on the USSR. Others, 
like Marie in Germany, confuse words when trying to summarise the 
American point of view. Phrasing the same observations in the language 
of frame analysis, we can state that the two teachers are using Cold War 
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frames as a configuration of positions to package beliefs about social 
stakeholders in more or less coherent parcels. Yet students pick up indi-
vidual elements while mostly ignoring relationships and connections as 
the key units of frames (Marx Ferree 2009). While teachers use, recognise 
and remember those frames as being embedded in social discourses that 
structured the political universes in which they grew up, the same frames 
do not seem to have any practically relevant meaning for the students.
 Discussion
Translating the empirical insights I have presented so far into a more 
general contribution to the fields of memory studies and history didac-
tics, I would like to make the following points.
 Neither Resisting Nor Complying: The Mnemonic 
Weapons of the Weak
In the introduction to this chapter I briefly touch upon the opposition 
between two perspectives on social processes of remembering, with one 
emphasising consensus and the other stressing conflict. Against the back-
drop of this controversy, the most intriguing observation we have made 
in the two history classrooms pertains to patterns of interaction between 
teachers and students. We do not see them achieving a consensus on how 
to make sense of the Cold War. But nor do we see them clashing over 
competing interpretations. Rather, we observe frequent instances of 
troubled communication when both students and teachers come up 
with statements that are either irritating or incomprehensible to the 
other party.
Reflecting on the likely causes for this phenomenon, a typical feature 
of the history classroom comes to mind. Teaching has often been described 
as a rather asymmetrical setting (Gies 2004, 172; Pandel 2017, 44). As 
we know from anthropological research, these kinds of settings encourage 
neither resistance nor full compliance (Scott 1985). Those who are in a 
subordinate position are more likely to simulate the acceptance of the 
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status quo while simultaneously striving to undermine it. Some scenes in 
the German classroom can be seen as fitting into this picture. One stu-
dent in particular seems to play the role of the joker, on the surface unable 
to deal properly with the tasks assigned to him while actually mocking 
the whole idea behind the task. His predominantly ironic attitude thus 
prevents him from either accepting or rejecting the mnemonic frames 
offered by his teacher. Berthold Molden (2016) has described something 
intriguingly similar when discussing how many older people in post-
socialist Central Eastern Europe simply ignore the hegemonic narratives 
about a totalitarian regime that had allegedly taken an entire population 
hostage and subjected it to relentless oppression. As they would not risk 
waging a fight they could not hope to win, they did not resist official 
memory frames but simply undermined them by recalling how normally 
and even happily they had lived under communism. Above all, these 
frames appear to be fairly powerful, as they resonate with corresponding 
stories told in the West about the triumph of freedom and democracy.
 Fading Common Sense: The Missing Link in the Trans-
generational Transmission of Mnemonic Frames
We can only compare the situation the students in the two history class-
rooms – and the older Eastern Europeans – face, however, in terms of 
power asymmetries. They differ dramatically in one crucial respect: While 
the Eastern Europeans discussed by Molden were contemporaries of the 
Cold War, our students cannot rely on personal experiences to define 
their relationships with the frames imposed upon them. As a result, they 
are indifferent rather than sceptical. Usually, excepting the example 
above, they do not respond with irony but with dispassionate inattention 
to the narrative given by their teachers. This attitude contrasts starkly 
with that of the teachers, who strive to use the frames coherently even in 
those rare moments when they stretch and bend them. The fact that they 
are then eager to engage in ‘repair strategies’ suggests that they must be 
aware of the strain they are putting on these frames.
Simultaneously, students generally appear to be relatively poor at 
recognising frames. This is particularly evident when individual stu-
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dents try to please their teachers and ultimately fail. It is as if the teach-
ers have provided the students with a rough sketch, clearly expecting 
them to be able to complete the picture they themselves have in mind, 
while the students see only isolated items randomly pinned together 
with little indication as to how to proceed. At the core of this issue is 
that the common-sense assumptions the teachers grew up with appear 
to have faded away or simply lost their relevance to the lives of the 
young people they are teaching. As we know from discourse analysis 
(Fairclough 1989), common-sense assumptions play a vital role in 
helping people to fill the voids inevitably left by each discourse. It is 
thus those implicated but not explicated common-sense assumptions 
that assure the comprehensibility of social discourse and ways of fram-
ing these discourses.
 Speaking Different Moral Languages: The Deep-seated 
Roots of the Mnemonic Divide
The interactions in the Swiss classroom especially reveal that students, 
as members of a post-Cold War generation, not only lack something in 
comparison to their teachers who constitute the ‘Cold War generation’, 
but also possess something peculiar. This was illustrated during the 
classroom discussion of the cartoon showing Stalin and Truman riding 
a tandem. As I have argued, perceiving the figure able to take a rest in 
the back seat as the more privileged in comparison to the figure in the 
front seat who has to do all the work, students display hierarchies of 
values that clearly differ from the attitude expressed by their teacher, 
who takes it for granted that everyone would be eager to steer from the 
front seat.
To a certain extent, this finding challenges an observation made by the 
memory researcher James Wertsch (2008), who suggests some useful ana-
lytical categories that should help us to make sense of empirical data on 
the trans-generational transmission of memory. Comparing accounts of 
the Second World War given by members of different generations in 
Russia, he introduces a distinction between what he calls specific narra-
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tives on the one hand and schematic narrative templates on the other. 
While the former transform concrete, temporally situated events into a 
story, the latter offer ‘a generalised narrative form,’ ‘an underlying pat-
tern’, that may be instantiated in many different situations talking about 
many different events (Wertsch 2008, 56). Based on this distinction, and 
referring to his empirical research, Wertsch argues that schematic narra-
tive templates have a better chance of surviving generational change than 
specific narratives, as repeated use has deeply inscribed them into the 
cultural repertoire of each society.
In the Swiss classroom we observe something slightly different. 
Apparently, what sets the teacher’s accounts of the origin of the Cold War 
from those of the students are rather general and abstract patterns of 
sense-making, patterns which delineate what humans can be expected to 
strive for. We see the two groups speaking different moral languages and 
thus, perhaps inevitably, failing to understand each other.
We can assume that these different languages are shaped by two pri-
mary factors. On the one hand, we might expect generational differences 
to be at play in such a situation; the teacher belongs to a generation that 
believes in the possibility of social change through political organisation, 
whereas the students live in ‘cynical, post-hegemonic times’ when ‘every-
body knows […] that politics is deceit’ (Beasley-Murray 2010, ix). Yet, 
on the other hand, the peculiarities of the school setting, with its rigid 
and institutionalised roles, are also a significant factor. Charged with 
steering the learning process, teachers must be constantly aware of their 
objective to give direction to others and take control of situations. At the 
same time, performing their ‘job’ as students (Breidenstein 2006), young 
people have a tendency to minimise their efforts. Maintaining a certain 
image among peers may oblige them to disparage any over-achievers and 
thus avoid being identified with them.
From this perspective and in accordance with a new trend in memory 
research (Feindt et al. 2014), the differences between the schematic nar-
rative templates articulated by the teacher and those of  her students 
would be perceived as not only expressions of a generational divide but 
also as the fluid results of the specific situation.
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 Being Political Without Admitting It: The Illusion 
of Mnemonic Hegemony
Looked upon from the angle of history didactics, the empirical material I 
have presented seems to speak of the salience of one oft-forgotten aspect: 
Both teachers I observed reveal themselves to be persons with easily recog-
nisable political beliefs. But although these beliefs clearly determine the 
selection choices they make as teachers, as well as the judgements they pass, 
they are not made explicit. The political is thus simultaneously invoked 
and backgrounded. The teachers are political without admitting to it.
What we are dealing with, then, are arguably not so much the indi-
vidual attitudes of two teachers but instead deeply ingrained social habits. 
The settled societies of the Global North seem to have moved beyond 
mnemonic conflict, at least in the imagination of part of the cultural 
elite. Open contestation is often perceived to be an exclusive feature of 
post-conflict settings or of newly (re)emerging nation-states (Sindbæk-
Anderson and Törnquist-Plewa 2016). The ease with which the master-
narratives of successful democratisation and westernisation have come to 
dominate public discourse in Germany (Hertfelder 2017) appears to be a 
case in point, as does the familiar statement that we have moved beyond 
old controversies when it comes to the Cold War. Certain tendencies in 
history didactics also seem directed towards putting constraints on what 
can be contested legitimately. While some authors would agree that stu-
dents should be introduced to competing frames of interpreting the past, 
they would simultaneously insist on teaching them the undisputable facts 
of the past first (Garske 2017). This whole concept seems to be based on 
the idea that frames and facts exist independently of each other. However, 
the two lessons I have discussed here suggest that facts and frames are 
closely interrelated. The frames the two teachers draw on emerge only as 
a result of their attempts to establish connections between the facts they 
mention. The facts the teachers rely on are constituted as relevant and 
part of important historical evidence only by the frames they are meant 
to support.
Neglecting these insights means neglecting the persistent presence and 
even the usefulness of conflict between competing historical frames, 
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potentially with serious repercussions for both remembering and teaching 
the past. While Michael Kammen (1993, 13) argues that ‘memory is more 
likely to be activated by contestation and amnesia is more likely to be 
induced by the desire for reconciliation’, my analysis shows that the absence 
of conflict also deprives students of the opportunity to comprehend mem-
ory narratives against the background of counter-narratives.
Notes
1. The German lesson took place on 12 October 2014 in Year 10 of a com-
prehensive school; the Swiss lesson took place on 13 October 2014 in 
Year 10 of a grammar school (Gymnasium). The lessons were recorded, 
transcribed and rendered anonymous by giving code names to persons 
and places mentioned. I quote them by indicating the file name and the 
location of the quote in minutes of recording as indicated in the tran-
scription. The quotes I use in the text were translated from German by 
the author. The original files can be consulted at the Georg Eckert 
Institute in Braunschweig on the understanding that the privacy rights 
of the people involved are respected and guaranteed.
2. In 2014 my Swiss colleague Nora Zimmermann and I conducted bio-
graphical-narrative interviews and guideline-based interviews on text-
book representations with 10 history teachers in Germany and a further 
10  in Switzerland. All teachers were born before 1970 and were thus 
eyewitnesses of the Cold War period themselves. The interviews which 
were recorded and transcribed are cited by their number, date and the 
interviewee’s country of origin (WG for western Germany, CH for 
Switzerland).
3. The field notes are quoted by indicating the date when the lesson took 

























24. WG Teacher 2 biographical-narrative interview 2 (3.06.2014)
25. CH Teacher 1 biographical-narrative interview 11 (12. 05. 2014)











36. Observations I made in another history classroom support the assump-
tion that differences between the values taken for granted by teachers 
and students have learnt to take for granted can contribute to misunder-
standings. In 2015 students in a tenth grade class in western Germany 
were working in pairs for several weeks preparing presentations on Cold 
War topics. Two girls had just started to look for material they could use 
to compare popular culture in East and West Germany during the Cold 
War. Their teacher, who was born in 1950, recommended that they 
browse the internet to gather information on the case of Udo Lindenberg. 
Quickly they ascertained that Lindenberg was a West German singer-
songwriter who tried for a long time to organise a concert in the GDR 
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before finally receiving an invitation. Initially, the ruling party, the SED, 
would not give him a permit because they suspected him of being too 
critical of authority in general. The two girls had great difficulty under-
standing why Lindenberg had been so keen to travel to East Germany 
in the first place. Based on their common-sense knowledge, East 
Germany was a grey and dull place nobody would have wanted to visit 
but everybody tried to escape. The teacher, for whom it was natural that 
citizens of the FRG would want to keep in touch with their co-nation-
als in the GDR, had a hard time comprehending the confusion the 
girls felt. Cf. 2015-01-23-FN-WG-teacher3.
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Learning from Others: Considerations 
within History Didactics on Introducing 
the Cold War in Lessons in Germany, 
Sweden and Switzerland
Peter Gautschi and Hans Utz
Every beginning is hard, yet, as the saying goes, well begun is half done. 
As regards getting things started, we could use a number of other apho-
risms, and almost all of them emphasise the significance of the beginning. 
That holds true in the context of teaching as well, since here the start of a 
lesson or topic, in fact, constitutes a key phase and is plannable like no 
other teaching situation (Gautschi 2012, 114–117). It is particularly dif-
ficult to begin teaching the topic of the Cold War, because there does yet 
not exist any unanimously accepted master narrative about it (Furrer and 
Gautschi 2017, 16–21).
How, then, does history teaching on the Cold War begin? We compare 
the introductory lessons on the topic of the Cold War in four school 
classes, one in the former East Germany, one in the former West Germany, 
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one in Switzerland and one in Sweden. This comparison allows us, firstly, 
to identify the similarities and differences between the observed lessons. 
Secondly, the teaching settings which are actually realised in these class-
rooms can be compared with possible alternatives, on the basis of consid-
erations guided by theory. Thirdly, criteria can be proposed and applied1 
which allow us to judge how successfully each chosen introduction to 
each of the four lessons ensures historical learning.
This chapter intends to draw teachers’ attention to different ways of 
introducing topics in history lessons and to generally encourage teachers 
to reflect on their own role in teaching history lessons. At the same time, 
it is aimed at scientists who observe, analyse and interpret history teach-
ing. It will provide them with theories and possible approaches for discus-
sion, and is structured around three sets of basic questions concerning 
history didactics: What issues and debates do teachers tackle in introduc-
tory lessons on the Cold War? What subjects, terminology, concepts and 
narratives are discussed? What perspectives do teachers approach past 
events from? The second set of questions allows us to ask: How are these 
perspectives related? How do teachers design their lessons? What processes 
and structures do they use and what forms of teaching, learning opportu-
nities and presentation concepts are offered? Finally, we introduce the fol-
lowing questions: What purpose does this method of teaching serve? What 
new knowledge and skills will students acquire and what are the opinions 
and attitudes that they will build up and be able to differentiate between?
 Learning Subjects: The ‘What?’ of History 
Teaching
While the topic ‘the Cold War’ can be covered in many different school 
subjects, three particular aspects render this topic a learning subject for 
history teaching: (a) If development contexts, meaning the causes and 
effects of the event and continuity and change over the course of time, are 
discussed. The teacher might ask what happened before and after the 
event, and what the reasons for and consequences of the phenomenon 
were. (b) The Cold War also becomes a topic for history education if 
individuals’ actions and issues of identity are explored, especially in regard 
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to social practice concerning rule, economy and culture. Who acted? 
Who had to bear the consequences? How do past events concern differ-
ent groups of people? Finally (c), the topic becomes relevant for the his-
tory classroom if concrete examples, methods and principles of historical 
knowledge are included in the lesson. What are the findings from the 
sources? Are there any contradictory sources and representations? How 
does historiography differentiate between the memories of people 
involved in the event and the current objectivities of historical and mem-
ory cultures? (Gautschi and Fink 2016, 138–140). One and the same 
subject can be taught in radically different ways. In other words: With 
respect to the ‘what?’ of history teaching, the narratives presented and 
tackled in these lessons are thus of particular interest (Mayer 
2005, 223–228).
 Development Contexts
Whoever wants to document, characterise and analyse the ‘what?’ of his-
tory teaching, first of all, must record the chronological markers which 
can be found in teaching. It is particularly important to note whether the 
date, duration and sequence of events and processes are precisely laid out 
and how changes are depicted. For example, the teacher in the lesson tak-
ing place in Lower Saxony refers back to the Russian Revolution when 
explaining the prehistory of the Cold War:
02:04 Tf In that time there was, however, a war against Japan in 1905 in 
which the Russians were without much ado defeated. This was the 
trigger for more and more violent protests in the cities. So that 
certain reforms were initiated, but [...] in 1914 war broke out from 
the part of Russia and from the part of Germany. And the reforms 
for the time being got stuck again.
The causes and consequences of the event being taught also need to be 
identified in historical development contexts. Indicators for these are 
word particles like ‘afterwards’, ‘therefore’, ‘eventually’, ‘thus’ or ‘because’ 
which are, for example, used by a student in Saxony-Anhalt:
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21.09 PmA Yes, there were no active actions happening between both the 
powers because they knew that they both were very strong, 
they were in possession of nuclear arms. Thus, the deterrence 
was, in fact, also mutual since they knew that if they now 
started a war, perhaps also the world or a Third World War, that 
they were not going to survive it. And, therefore, these acts of 
war did, in fact, partly not happen either. And then, the 
situation was actually so tense because they had partly also 
provoked each other. But, in fact, they knew that the deterrence 
actually existed.
If one compares to what extent development contexts occur in the four 
lessons the following picture emerges:
Fig. 18.1 shows that the date, duration and sequence of events and 
processes can generally be designated precisely. In almost all cases, we can 
see that the emergence of the two ‘fronts’ of the Cold War, after their 
 alliance in the Second World War, is clearly explained and the histories of 
the USA and the Soviet Union contrasted. Only in the Swedish lesson is 
the focus more strongly put on people’s everyday experience in Sweden 
during this period. The lesson in Lower Saxony stands out because of the 
– 0 + ++
1. Scheme of 
changes over time 
and of development 
contexts
a. The description of the date, duration, 
sequence of events and processes is 
precise.
 OX
b. Changes are depicted. O X 
c. The differences of phenomena in 
different time periods are delineated.

OX
d. Possible alternative courses of 
events are depicted.
O X
e. Causes, preconditions of events and 
actions are explored.
O X 
f. Consequences, effects of events and 
actions are described.
OX 
Key: –: not true, 0: just true, +: very true, ++: pronouncedly true
Fig. 18.1 Table of the Scheme of Changes over Time and of Development 
Contexts (Gautschi 2012, 97); Lower Saxony ( ), Saxony-Anhalt (O), Sweden ( ), 
Switzerland (X)
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fact that causes as well as preconditions of events and actions are clearly 
delineated. It is surprising that, in these introductory lessons, teachers 
don’t touch upon the possible results of the Cold War, or what might 
have happened had the superpowers not come to an agreement with the 
intervention of the United Nations. Here the students can imagine how 
different the results of the Cold War could have been.
 Human Action in Social Practice
The central subject of history is the individual human agent, inescapably 
bound in the structural contexts of the time period within which they 
live. Whoever wants to investigate the ‘what?’ of history teaching thus, 
for example, must therefore ask how people and institutions are repre-
sented. Who is described as the actor, who as the sufferer? The teacher 
from Sweden, for example, presents herself and her parents as contempo-
rary witnesses to the period right at the beginning of the lesson:
02:50 Tf [I say] that I was born in 1959. Thirty years I was thus living in a 
historical epoch which is called ‘the Cold War’. Your parents as well 
and especially my mother and parents are really marked by this 
time period.
Furthermore, it is interesting to note the areas of meaning formation 
which become subjects of discussion in the process of teaching the Cold 
War. According to Hans-Ulrich Wehler by areas of meaning formation 
the three equal, continuously ongoing dimensions of society are meant: 
rule, economy and culture (2006, 7). Of course, the Cold War can be dealt 
with from political perspectives and approached from different view-
points in class. But economic and cultural issues also play an important 
role especially when it comes to this particular topic.
An analysis of these lessons makes clear that in the introductory lessons 
in Switzerland, in Sweden and in Lower Saxony humans become 
 particularly visible as actors (Stalin, Roosevelt, Churchill and others, for 
example), as well as emphasising the idea that the Cold War is best dealt 
with from political viewpoints, seen as a conflict which emerged because 
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of a contrast between two worldviews (see Fig.  18.2). Surprisingly 
enough, within these lessons, economic and cultural factors are practi-
cally ignored. However, popular songs from both camps, historical mon-
uments, comics or the recorded memories of ordinary people about their 
youth in the East and the West, that is to say relevant cultural artefacts, 
for example, would be useful as starting points when introducing the 
topic of the Cold War, and perhaps would generate more interest 
among students.
 Principles and Methods of Historical Knowledge
In order to teach the topic of the Cold War in history lessons in particular 
teachers must both carefully select content and also present methods and 
principles of approaching historical knowledge. Since the past is past and 
cannot be directly observed, because history is thus always constructed, 
the examination of the validity of these constructions is an important 
task. At the same time, whenever possible controversial sources and 
multi-perspectival representations need to be consulted (Pandel 2006, 
16). As regards the topic of the ‘Cold War’, this is often very well achieved 
in the observed lessons, with the exception of the Swedish lesson, as the 
following excerpt from the Swiss lesson illustrates:
– 0 + ++
2. Thematisation of 
human action in 
social practice.
a. Humans are visible as actors.  XO
b. Rule and participation are 
thematised.
X O
c. Poverty and wealth as well as work 
are thematised.
OX 
d. Culture is thematised. OX 
Key: –: not true, 0: just true, +: very true, ++: pronouncedly true 
Fig. 18.2 Table of Evaluation of the Thematisation of Human Action in Social 
Practice in Four Introductory Lessons on the Cold War; Lower Saxony ( ), Saxony- 
Anhalt (O), Sweden ( ), Switzerland (X)
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33:34 Tf Well, your task is the following: In the book there is a source by 
Truman, the American president who talks about the Soviet Union, 
and there is a source by Zhdanov, the secretary of the Central 
Committee. And it is your task, that means somebody adopts the 
role of Truman, somebody the role of Zhdanov, and you work out 
the core messages of this source and you will try and convince the 
other of what, in fact, is good about Communism or likewise 
Capitalism.
Teachers can better ensure that their students acquire historical knowl-
edge if references to the present and the living environment are provided 
and if the dealing with sources, representations and historico-cultural fac-
tors follows methodological rules which can be taught and learned. As 
Fig. 18.3 shows the four lessons are similar in that all of them hardly 
make any mention of living environments but do make reference to the 
present. With a view to the other criteria, differences are rather stark.
 Core Content of the Introductory Lessons
Whereas the criteria discussed so far allow for interesting comparisons 
about the learning subject, they do not expound at all upon narrative 
meaning formation. If we refer back to the concept of ‘narrative  templates’, 
a term coined by James V. Wertsch (2008, 133–156), we can see just how 
important this understanding is. According to Wertsch, narrative tem-
plates differ from ‘formal history’ as they make use of ‘templates’ at two 
– 0 + ++
3. Exemplary and target-group-adjusted representations O  X
4. Validity, multi-perspectivity, controversy  O X
5. Reference to the present OX
6. Reference to the learners’ living environments OX
7. Methods of historical knowledge O X
Key: –: not true, 0: just true, +: very true, ++: pronouncedly true 
Fig. 18.3 Table of Evaluation of Principles and Methods of Acquiring Historical 
Knowledge in Four Introductory Lessons on the Cold War; Lower Saxony ( ), 
Saxony-Anhalt (O), Sweden ( ), Switzerland (X)
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levels: ‘Specific narrative templates’ contain concrete data- supported (not 
necessarily objective, scientific-based) messages which give their validity 
to a narrative through concrete events. ‘Schematic narrative templates’ 
are based on universal convictions shared by the narrator as well as the 
addressee. These convictions establish a connection between individual 
events in a narrative, which reveals itself to the addressees even when the 
explanation lacks detail.
If we compare the four lessons by referring back to the narrative tem-
plates used each time, we discover startling similarities with regard to the 
‘schematic narrative templates’, which can be summarised in four points 
made by the teachers: Firstly, a common enemy brings two entities 
together in an attempt to overwhelm that enemy with joint forces. 
Secondly, in each lesson the teacher poses the question of whether indeed 
such a union can be achieved, pointing to how, afterwards, the differ-
ences between the two forces prevail once again, causing conflict. Thirdly, 
the teachers argue that, because the two forces do not want to have 
another conflict after the first, they distance themselves from each other. 
The fourth point the teachers make, which accords with this ‘schematic 
narrative template’, is that, instead of a violent fight with severe losses, an 
indirect, dogged, ‘cold’ conflict breaks out, namely the Cold War. This 
‘schematic narrative template’ dates back to a post-revisionist interpreta-
tion of the Cold War, according to which neither the Soviet Union nor 
the USA can unequivocally be made responsible for its beginning. It not 
only serves as an explanation for the Cold War, but can also applied to 
both inter-human or socio-political constellations. For example, the 
female student PfB illustrates this at the start of the lesson: The students 
first discuss their partner work, which is to analyse a caricature. Amongst 
other things, they find out that Truman and Stalin are depicted in it, and 
that the two of them are first portrayed together and then separately. 
Afterwards they start reflecting on the reason for their separation.
02:34 PfB The reason for which they separated? Yes, what does Stalin want? 
What does, what does the USA want? What does the Soviet 
Union want?
02:42 PfC Yes, already clearly together, but you know how they before 
together [...] together fought. (Afterwards) simply because [...]
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02:47 PfB Yes, because there is no reason anymore which they fight for.
02:48 PfC Yes, that is also true again.
02:50 PfB That is, in fact, sometimes also the case with political parties, they 
fight for something, and after that election it is over because [...] 
they actually want totally different things. But sure, for this they 
are [...]
02:57 PfC Yes, yes. This is actually clear.
02:58 PfB Because, it had the advantage for both that – that Hitler was, for 
example, overthrown.
At the level of the ‘specific narrative templates’, different narratives are 
developed in the four classrooms.
 The Process: The ‘How?’ in History Teaching
Apart from the ‘what?’, the question as to the ‘how?’ always arises when 
teaching history. Here, three factors play a central role, namely the cho-




The common enemy binds together different parties/interests.
After its defeat, conflicts between former allies come to light openly.
Each party defines its sphere of influence.






· Second World 
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the Allied 
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Fig. 18.4 Table of a Common ‘Schematic Narrative Template’ and Different 
‘Specific Narrative Templates’ in Four Introductory Lessons on the Cold War
18 Learning from Others: Considerations within History… 
402
clear classroom management and the form of presentation preferred by 
the teacher.
 The Form of Teaching, Functional Rhythm and Media
History can be approached and staged in class through four different 
forms of teaching, which we refer to as ‘presenting’, ‘dialogue-oriented’, 
‘task-based’ and ‘discovery’ history teaching.
Presenting history teaching can be identified when the teachers explain 
or narrate something. Therefore, the teachers might read out or present 
texts freely. Of course, here the teacher can enrich the learning experience 
with further materials, such as pictures or film extracts. Sequences in 
which the form of teaching remains the same during five minutes are 
referred to as presentations. In this regard, the observed introductory les-
sons on the Cold War can be divided into two groups and two lessons fall 
into each one: Firstly, in the lessons from Sweden and Lower Saxony the 
presentations take up a lot of time: In Sweden the female teacher narrates 
the prehistory of the Second World War and the development of the 
Soviet Union, respectively, and shows a narrative film, which together 
occupy almost half of the short lesson (min. 15–27). In Lower Saxony, a 
teacher gives a speech about the Russian/Soviet history of the second half 
of the nineteenth century up to the Stalin era, which, including interrup-
tions, lasted eleven minutes. Secondly, in both the other lessons there are 
only short (content-based) presentations which aren’t central to the les-
son. The presentation explicitly labelled as a ‘teacher speech’ by the female 
teacher in the Swiss lesson (min. 55–60) refers to an excursus, a book 
about the flight of former Nazi functionaries before punishment. The 
presentation of the teacher in the lesson of Saxony-Anhalt (min. 72–75) 
does not even last five minutes and takes the form of a mere 
recapitulation.
Dialogue-oriented history teaching must be distinguished from pre-
senting history teaching. This form can be recognised by the fact that 
teachers and learners engage in a conversation or mutual exchange in order 
to deal with a topic. Often teachers ask questions which learners should 
answer. Teachers and students become aware of things together, explore, 
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interpret and develop common value judgements. Dialogue- oriented his-
tory teaching is demanding for the learners as well as for the teachers. The 
four lessons we observed and analysed once again strongly differ from each 
other: In Lower-Saxony and in Switzerland dialogue- oriented history 
teaching, in the form of a class discussion, takes up a lot of space. In the 
lesson from Lower-Saxony the dialogue-oriented teaching lasts 29 minutes 
(min. 18–47): This approximate half-hour teaching sequence – by far the 
longest one out of the four lessons – is devoted to the interpretation of a 
caricature which showed Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill back to back 
mounted on horse with two heads (the two halves of which are supposed 
to trot in the opposite direction). The female teacher gathers the observa-
tions of the class and links them with information about the emergence of 
the conflict between the super powers. Thus, in the course of the lesson the 
students work out the prehistory of the Cold War through engaging in a 
dialogue guided and enriched by the teacher. In the lesson from Switzerland 
the dialogue-oriented teaching lasts twelve minutes (min. 17–29): This 
teaching sequence also takes place at the beginning of the lesson. From the 
prior knowledge and the assumptions of individual students, the female 
teacher delineates the situations in which the victors, the defeated and the 
different countries in the ‘third world’ find themselves after the end of war. 
However, in the lessons in Saxony-Anhalt (min. 32–37) and Sweden (min. 
6–14) the sequences of dialogue-oriented teaching are considerably 
shorter. They are, as it were, pushed to the fringes by the task-based 
(Saxony-Anhalt) and the presenting teaching (Sweden) methods.
In sequences where the teachers use task-based and discovery history 
teaching methods, they do not directly control the ‘what?’ and the ‘how?’ 
of the teaching any more. Instead of mediating knowledge, they instead 
find themselves in the role of the coaches and the learning guides. In task- 
based history teaching, the learners are given mostly sources or representa-
tions as well as written questions, prompts and assignments. They receive a 
task and work independently and, guided by their individual assignments, 
deal with historical documents directly. In discovery history teaching, nei-
ther the ‘what?’ (sources and representations) nor the ‘how?’ is given 
straightforwardly to the students. In a self-directed fashion, the students 
discover things for themselves, explore, interpret, judge and present. Such 
teaching is usually referred to as ‘project teaching’. The task-based history 
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teaching takes place most intensively in the lesson in Saxony-Anhalt: In the 
space of 90 minutes the students are given seven assignments, pausing 
often to regroup and analyse the processes with which they are working. 
They, in fact, work independently, but are nevertheless kept on a short 
leash, with tasks aimed at generating short, closed answers. The lessons in 
Lower Saxony and in Switzerland include task-based teaching at the begin-
ning, obviously in order to engage the students, and then once again after 
half (Switzerland) or two thirds (Lower Saxony) of the elapsed time, prob-
ably to counter the students’ tiredness by introducing something new. The 
tasks thereby require from students not only the competence to draw infor-
mation from historical sources and accounts but also the competence to inter-
pret historical events as well as, partly, the ability to position themselves in 
relation to past experiences. The students must analyse materials, draw con-
nections between them and form their own opinions based on the argu-
ments they (and other students) have made. In the lesson from Sweden 
task-based teaching is not prominent. All these forms of teaching can be 
used in different classroom formats, including individual work, partner 
work, small-group and large-group work, as well as summarising sessions.
Fig 18.5 shows what the profile of the Swiss lesson looks like if for each 
minute respective codes are assigned. This lesson is characterised by a fre-
quent change of teaching forms. In the first quarter of an hour task- based 
and presenting history teaching is most prominent. The students are 
engaged in partner work and watch a film extract. In the second quarter 
of an hour dialogue-oriented teaching follows. In the third quarter of an 
hour, task-based teaching predominates, and in the last quarter of an hour 
presentations occur again, taking the form of explanations by the teacher.
In order to compare several lessons, profiles which only present the 
three teaching forms and in which we can assign a code every five  minutes 
are most useful. Table 18.1, for example, allows us to compare the four 
introductory lessons. At first glance, the structural similarity of the les-
sons from Switzerland and Lower Saxony becomes evident. These are 
double lessons with a central focus based in a long class discussion. 
Presenting and task-based teaching lead up to it and away from this focus, 
respectively. Concerning the Swiss lesson, these forms of teaching are 
divided into shorter steps than in the Lower-Saxony lesson.
The lesson in Saxony-Anhalt is almost entirely built up on task-based 
teaching. The tasks are evaluated in a group session before the next task is 
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46 50 55 60 Lesson duration: 60 minutes
Task basis Presentation Class discussion
t = task z = (to tell) D = development by 
questions
c = class work E = to explain di = (discussion)
g = (group work) v = (to read out)
p = partner work M = to show a movie Residual category
i = (individual work) S = (subject-related)
a = analysis N = (not subject-related)
Fig. 18.5 Table of Presentation of the Form of Teaching: Profile of the Swiss 





Fig. 18.6 Table of Presentation of the Form of Teaching in Five Minute Coding: 
‘Task-based’ (black), ‘Presenting’ (white) and ‘Dialogue-oriented’ (grey) Forms
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introduced in class teaching. This rhythm is strictly adhered to over the 
length of a double lesson.
In the short lesson in Sweden task-based teaching is, however, missing. 
The female teacher provides an introduction into the topic of the Cold 
War through an explanation. The class discussion is thus given a frame, 
and it obviously serves to involve the students in the discussion. This 
finding is supported by the more detailed quantitative evaluation.
The four lessons differ as regards teaching forms, but also concerning 
the staged learning processes. At all times the teachers obviously had 
found their own functional rhythms to best teach their students. It is 
important to consider how a complete learning process is correctly built 
up. In the Swiss lesson, for example, the female teacher tries to spark the 
students’ curiosity and to engage them at the beginning of the lesson. 
Afterwards the students repeat the things they have learned, linking these 
with what they have learnt previously. After that the students work on 
learning tasks which serve to deepen their new knowledge, and at the end 
the teacher first provides a thematic overview once again, so that the stu-
dents’ new knowledge is reinforced, and then gives a summary on other 
interesting topics which will be dealt with in future lessons.
Such a learning process ensures a wide variety of stimulating, engaging 
and appropriate learning opportunities. If one compares the four lessons 





1a Share of task-based teaching 78% 37% 0% 40%
1b Share of presenting teaching 6% 17% 65% 33%
1c Share of dialogue-oriented 
teaching
16% 46% 35% 27%
In total 100% 100% 100% 100%
2a Average duration of a 
task-based, presenting and a 
class-discussion sequence
7 min. 12 min. 4 min. 5 min.
2b Standard deviation from 2a 5.5 9.4 2.4 3.6
2c Median value analog to 2a 6 min. 12 min. 4 min. 4 min.
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a. The teacher adjusts the learning tasks 
according to the students’ knowledge. 
He/she makes sure that the majority of 
the students can master them.
O X
b. The teacher adjusts the complexity of 
the topic according to their students’ 
stage of development.
O  X
c. The teacher chooses student activities 
which are well-suited for achieving the 
objectives and ensure efficient learning.
 O X
d. The teacher makes sure that all the 
learners are cognitively engaged.
 OX
e. The teacher makes sure that the 
students’ new knowledge will be long 
term. He/she links new content with 
already existing knowledge.
  X O
Key: –: not true, 0: just true, +: very true, ++: pronouncedly true 
Fig. 18.7 Table Ensuring Stimulating, Engaging and Appropriate Learning 
Opportunities: Lower Saxony ( ), Saxony-Anhalt (O), Sweden ( ), Switzerland (X)
from the perspective of these criteria, the lesson from Switzerland obtains 
the best rating.
Apart from the form of teaching and the functional rhythm, the media 
used in each lesson allows us to see the inclusion of the ‘how?’ of history 
teaching to a considerable extent. Besides the traditional media such as 
text sources, pictures or maps, various other types of other media, for 
example caricatures, comics, films or hypermedia, are also used in these 
lessons. In the Swiss lesson the variety of media used is stark compared to 
the other three lessons. The lesson starts with the interpretation of a pro-
jected caricature, which was also handed out on paper (min. 1) and its 
message is compared with a film on YouTube (min. 5–9). The second 
sequence relies on a partly prepared, partly dialogue-oriented blackboard 
text in tabular form (min. 15). The third sequence is based on two text 
sources in the textbook, which in partner work are opposed and com-
pared to each other (min. 35). Afterwards (min. 45), the female teacher 
presents a chronological overview of the period in the form of a PowerPoint 
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presentation, draws the division of Germany onto a map projected onto 
a screen (min. 47) and shows her students a book, the content of which 
she briefly summarises (min. 56).
 Classroom Management, Classroom Climate 
and Clarity
Classroom management and the use of time in the class, the classroom 
climate as well as clarity and structure of the teacher’s explanation also 
play an important role when designing teaching lessons (Gautschi 2012, 
81–88). In order to manage a class efficiently and to use the teaching time 
well, it is important for teachers to set clear rules and make sure they are 
followed. Here rituals which support learning are useful. Special atten-
tion should be paid to the start and the end of the teaching: Are the 
teaching forms used here appropriate to the situation? Do they support 
the management of the class? Teachers can ensure that they use as much 
available teaching time as possible if they keep transitions streamlined. 
Good time management also leads to successful learning. Figure  18.8 
shows the evaluation of the four lessons in this area. Here again, the Swiss 
lesson comes out best.
Gerhard Schneider outlines four different ways teachers might start a 
lesson: They can arouse interest in the topic (A), activate the prior knowl-
edge and the prior experiences of their students (B), problematise the 
topic (C) or calm down the class (D) (2008, 26). In the lessons we anal-
ysed, types A, B and C occur. Type A stops the teacher from giving merely 
Key: –: not true, 0: just true, +: very true, ++: pronouncedly true 
– 0 + ++
9.  Ensuring efficient classroom management and use of 
time
 X O
10. Fostering a supportive classroom climate O X
11. Ensuring appropriate clarity and structure O X
Fig. 18.8 Table Ensuring a Classroom Environment Conductive to Learning: 
Lower Saxony ( ), Saxony-Anhalt (O), Sweden ( ), Switzerland (X)
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an explanatory introduction and instead suggests that the teacher con-
front the class with a source, despite their lack of knowledge. The gaps in 
the students’ knowledge mean they are more engaged, as they want to fill 
these gaps. In contrast, type B possibly activates existing prior knowledge 
but it also draws on the students’ assumptions, thus falling back on ideas 
from the sphere of historical culture. Type B represents a ‘sound of the 
bell’ type of teaching, enriched with content: The lesson starts, the class 
engage with and focus on the topic.
Table 18.2 Table of Beginning a Lesson, according to Gerhard Schneider (2008)
Saxony- Anhalt Lower Saxony Sweden Switzerland
Type A B D A
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The teachers in Sweden and Lower Saxony introduce the topic and the 
term ‘Cold War’ when they start the lesson, whereas the teachers in the 
two other lessons, with the type A method of starting a lesson, do not 
(Switzerland, min. 0: ‘I still do not exactly tell you what the [topic] is’). 
Thus, the teachers seem to want to avoid pre-empting any interpretation 
of the caricature presented and used as an introduction.
 Presentation Concepts
According to Michele Barricelli, we can distinguish six presentation con-
cepts which, on the one hand, constitute a basic pattern of historiogra-
phy, but, on the other, are also applicable to teaching (2012, 202–223; 
see also Table 18.3).
Table 18.3 Table of Presentation Concepts according to Barricelli




Presenting and explaining 
history over the course of time, 




Longitudinal cut Concentration of the genetic 
narratives on one single topic 
relevant to the present
No historical but 
thematic linking, 
marked gaps in 
continuity
Cross section Concentration on a time period 
in one area including many 
historical areas (society, 
politics, culture, economy)
Linking of contexts
Case analysis Reduction of complexity of 
information; on the other 
hand, focus on opinion and 
decision making on the part of 
the students
Reference to a problem 





Presenting and working out 








Focus on the human being in 
history, in the sense of 
personification, often in the 
form of collective biographies
Vividness, concreteness
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An analysis of the lessons as regards the presentation concepts again 
reveals a striking similarity between them: All four teachers put into prac-
tice a constellation analysis (Fig. 18.9). The political, economic and (partly) 
ideological constellation of the Cold War is brought into focus. In all cases, 
both the camps are opposed to each other in verbal as well as visual terms 
and compared with one another with respect to economic order, the func-
tion of the state or the weighting of the individual. A chronological-genetic 
derivation of this constellation is touched upon in three of the four lessons 
but does not in any of the cases contribute to the explanation of the emer-
gence of the Cold War. Events mentioned, such as the nuclear bomb, the 
Fig. 18.9 Table of Visualisation of the Presentation Concepts according to 
Barricelli on a Timeline in the Four Lessons
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Second World War, the Great Northern War or the Berlin Wall, are there 
mainly to reinforce the students’ knowledge and thus serve the purpose of 
illustration. The illustration makes up for the weakness of a constellation 
analysis which as an abstracting model hardly allows a teacher to draw on 
the students’ own daily lives. On the other hand, it allows for an overview 
and proffers easy-to-learn knowledge by reducing complexity.
At the same time, the constellation analysis, which allows the students 
to see an overview of the issues and acquire knowledge easily, requires a 
great deal of intellectual preparatory work from the part of the teacher. 
The teacher must first understand these constellations, so must fall back 
on both specialised literature and their own knowledge of the topic.
 For the Students’ Use – the ‘What for?’ 
of Teaching History
By dealing with history, individuals can answer crucial questions regarding 
their existence: How have I become the person I am today? How have we 
become what we are? What has changed, in what way and why? How do 
I arrive at my judgement on history? What shall I do? What do I want to 
do? In helping tackle these questions, history teaching contributes to 
building individual and social identity by providing the basic narrative of 
a society (Gautschi, Furrer and Sommer 2014, 9–12). At the same time, 
history teaching also enables students to think in historical terms. They are 
able to acquire the knowledge and abilities to build opinions and attitudes.
 Historical Learning
For teachers and learners historical learning involves four different, but 
interwoven, mental processes (become aware of things, explore, interpret, 
orient oneself ) which allow for historical narration. In Fig. 18.10, these 
mental operations are illustrated in a structure and process model: The pro-
cesses are represented as arrows, the products as squares.
Historical learning takes place when an individual, imbedded in soci-
ety and thus in change over time, approaches a certain period of history. 
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Historical learning starts when learners specifically focus their attention 
on a section of the past and become aware of facts from this period (sources, 
representations) or when they encounter people who represent or narrate 
history. The learners draw information from their findings, reconstructing 
narratives of the period from historical testimonies. They work out a ‘fac-
tual analysis’ (Jeismann 2000, 63) in which ‘factual findings’ (Weymar 
1970, 202) are presented by them. In a next step they interpret these 
factual findings, establish relations to other historical testimonies and, in 
doing so, place their findings in a larger context of causes and effects. 
Thus, they arrive at a ‘historical factual judgement’ (Jeismann 2000, 64). 
Then the learners can establish a relation between this historical factual 
judgement and their own personal opinion. They arrive at a ‘historical 
value judgement’ (Ibid., 64) with respect to present or future, individual 
or social situations and problem areas. The value judgement will eventu-
ally be compatible with the currently valid and accepted moral values of 
Fig. 18.10 Structure and Process Model of Historical Learning
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the present society in which the individual lives, and, therefore, it needs 
to be examined on the basis of this. This happens within the ‘objectivity- 
forming discourse’ in which the ‘normative validity’ is established by means 
of ‘reflection and justification’ of one’s own viewpoint (Rüsen 1997). 
Therefore, the value judgement becomes the starting point for dialogue 
with others, which in itself is again the cause of further questions about 
history, the past, the present or the future. The value judgement might 
furthermore trigger an individual to act.
This process might also happen in reverse: The learners question a 
value judgement on the basis of the underlying factual judgement and in 
turn question that factual judgement on the basis of the underlying fac-
tual analyses. Both processes, both of de- and reconstruction, are empha-
sised by the authors of the working group ‘FUER Geschichtsbewusstsein’ 
(FOR Historical Awareness) (Schreiber et al. 2007, 21).
These mental processes between questions, factual analyses, factual 
judgements and value judgements come up in ‘historical narration’ (Rüsen 
2008, 75). Therefore, ‘historical narration’ is represented as a basic com-
petence in Fig. 18.10 (centre).
 The Role of the Learner in History Teaching
In what way is such historical learning then fostered in the four lessons? 
Overall, it must be said that in the observed lessons little historical learn-
ing can, in fact, be observed. The lessons are knowledge-oriented, espe-
cially the ones from Switzerland and from Saxony-Anhalt.
It comes as no surprise that students hardly have the opportunity to 
become aware of things by themselves, as Criterion 11  in Fig.  18.11 
shows. If teachers include selected topics with a constellation analysis, 
there is hardly any space for the learners’ own awareness to develop.
What is more successful in the observed lessons is the ability of the 
students to interpret (Criterion 13). Because interpreting (Criterion 15) 
is closely linked to acquiring knowledge, this assessment is not surprising.
In the observed lessons the students hardly have a chance to orient 
themselves. Only very few value judgements are openly made. This might 
also be a characteristic of introductory lessons. Possibly the students 
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might have developed only very few factual analyses and factual judge-
ments as yet and are therefore not confident enough to make any value 
judgements, which, in fact, can be considered rather positive.
 Conclusion
 Overall Evaluation of the Lessons
Fig. 18.12 summarises the results of applying the above findings to the 
four introductory lessons. Two aspects are particularly striking: First of 
all, differences mainly emerge in the process of history teaching, in crite-
ria which are independent of both the topic being taught and general 
didactic expectations. Secondly, we can see that, overall, only few simi-
larities exist between the lessons observed, despite the fact that in all four 
lessons the same ‘schematic narrative template’ and the same presentation 
rationale was used.
Generally, we can ascertain that (a) in all 4 lessons a reference to the 
present was made, without, however, drawing upon the students’ own 
11. Awareness of historical testimonies and of changes
over time 
OX 
12. Exploring, examining and presenting of historical
factual analyses (competence to draw information from
historical sources and accounts)
O
X
13. Interpretation (analysis and interpretation of history
(competence to interpret historical events)
O X
14. Orientation: Meaning formation via past experiences
and value judgement examination on the basis of past
experiences (competence to position oneself in relation
to past experiences)
O X
15. Acquiring and reproducing knowledge about past
events and the understanding of history
 OX
Key: –: not true, 0: just true, +: very true, ++: pronouncedly true 
Fig. 18.11 Table of Evaluation of the Use of History Teaching; Lower Saxony ( ), 
Saxony-Anhalt (O), Sweden ( ), Switzerland (X)
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- o + ++
1. Significant topic XO
2. O X
3. Thematisation of human action 
in social practice
OX
4. Exemplary and target-group-
adjusted representations of 
history
O  X
5. Validity, multi-perspectivity and 
controversy 
 O X
6. Reference to the present XO
7. Reference to the students’ living 
environment 
OX
8. Methods of historical knowledge O X
9. Ensuring of an efficient 
classroom management and use 
of time
 X O
10. Fostering a supportive classroom 
climate
O X
11. Ensuring of stimulating, 
engaging and appropriate 
learning opportunities
O X













 13. Awareness of historical 
testimonies and ofchanges over 
time
OX 
14. Exploring, examining and 
presenting of historical factual
analyses 
XO
Thematisation of changes over 









































15. Interpretation (analysis and 
interpretation) of history
O X
16. Orientation: Meaning formation 
via past experiences and value 
judgement examination on the 
basis of past experiences
O X
17. Acquiring and reproducing of 
knowledge about past events and 
understanding of history
 OX
Key: –: not true, 0: just true, +: very true, ++: pronouncedly true 
Fig. 18.12 Table of Overall Evaluation of the Lessons after Points; Lower Saxony 
( ), Saxony-Anhalt (O), Sweden ( ), Switzerland (X)
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experiences, (b) in 3 of 4 lessons, significant topics were taught; (c) 3 of 
4 lessons were factually correct, multi-perspectival and controversial; 
(d) 3 out of 4 lessons featured engaging and appropriate learning oppor-
tunities; d) hardly any attention was given to human action in societal 
practice, and finally (e) the students had only few opportunities for their 
own perceptions, to draw information from historical sources, or for 
their own orientation. We therefore conclude that little historical learn-
ing occurred in the lessons observed.
 Students at the Focus!
What was the reason for the pronounced lack of historical learning in 
these lessons? One explanation might be that, in introductory lessons in 
particular, teachers often think from the angle of the topic per se. This 
may be reinforced by particularly demanding analysis that was selected in 
order to present that subject matter.
When it comes to selecting a presentation concept, there are other 
opportunities which would allow teachers to reference both the present 
and the daily lives of their students. We shall briefly outline 4 alternatives 
here. Firstly, there is the longitudinal cut, in which students would be 
taught the history of the Ukraine, for instance, from the brief period of 
independence (1917–1920), through the Second World War, the inte-
gration into the Eastern bloc, the independence in 1991 until the annex-
ation of Crimea and the separatism of Eastern Ukraine. Secondly, teachers 
may opt for a cross-section, which would examine the situation in 1945 
and the lives of those in war-ravaged countries as well as those spared 
from war, further allowing students to look at society, economy and cul-
ture. Thirdy, a case study would present a specific scenario, such as the 
abduction of the lawyer Dr. Walter Linse from West Berlin into the East 
sector on 8th July 1952, as well as the mechanics of the Cold War at the 
level of the population, the governments in East and West Berlin and 
even in the USA and the Soviet Union. All of this can be demonstrated 
vividly, rendering clear to students the impact of the Cold War on indi-
viduals. Fourth, teachers might select an individualising procedure, cov-
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ering, for instance, the history of displaced people from East Prussia in 
1945 and their later integration in the FRG.
In order to ensure that historical learning does take place, even in 
introductory lessons, teachers must stress the relevance of the topic to the 
students’ own living environments. The learners’ question when con-
fronted with the Cold War, ‘and what has this got to do with me?’ (cf. 
Thurn 19932), can be answered in different ways; however, it is crucial 
that students recognise and understand ‘what reflecting on past events 
has got to do with their present and future’ (Bergmann 2004, 91–92). 
When learners apply historical learning as their method, they have to first 
know what historical learning is. This idea has as yet not been given 
enough attention. However, the standard history textbooks all feature 
explanations in their preliminary pages as to what history is, also provid-
ing definitions of terms such as ‘sources’, ‘representations’, ‘chronology’ 
or ‘archaeology’. Yet what exactly historical teaching is and wherein 
 historical thinking differs, for example, from mathematical thinking is 
not explained (cf. Fuchs et al. 2016, 4–5)3.
It is evident that students learn best if they know the reasons why they 
are studying certain topics and why they are being taught via certain 
methods (Cf. Beck et al. 1995; Messner 1998). Successful students begin 
to learn with the prior knowledge of how they will be taught. They 
observe and reflect upon how they themselves learn and control their 
own learning efficiently. In contrast to the less successful students, the 
successful ones learn with awareness (Messner 1998). It is certainly not a 
new discovery that students themselves must reflect upon their own ways 
of learning or that history teaching should relate to the students’ own liv-
ing environments and offer them the opportunity to be a part of guiding 
their own learning. The popularity of student-oriented history teaching 
has increased in the last few years, particularly in regards to competence 
orientation. Obviously, however, such an approach to teaching history 
does not occur on a day-to-day basis. Our analysis of the four introduc-
tory lessons suggests that subject- and science-driven approaches still pre-
dominate when it comes to teaching history (Rohlfes 1986, 177). Those 
involved in teaching history must ensure that in the future students come 
even further into the focus!
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Notes
1. The evaluation of the lessons was carried out by Peter Gautschi and Hans 
Utz together with research assistant Antje Suter and student assistant 
Jasmine Steger, using the criteria on a four-point scale. The four evalua-
tions were averaged and rounded. No examination of the inter-rater reli-
ability was conducted due to the explorative character of the procedure.
2. Cf. Susanne Thurn: ‘[...] und was hat das mit mir zu tun?’: Geschichtsdidaktische 
Positionen (Pfaffenweiler: Centaurus). She presents the objectives of her own 
teaching in regards to history education and writes: ‘I would like that my 
students [...] when having pressing – pressing them and pressing our soci-
ety – problems ask inquiring historical questions because they have learnt 
that the historical dealing with intentions, conditions restricting action and 
hindrances of all sorts might be useful for them’ (Thurn 1993, 255).
3. An exception is the school history textbook Zeitreise, which at the begin-
ning of each volume, on the basis of a monument, defines historical learn-
ing (Fuchs et al. 2016).
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and the Cold War: A Comparative Study 
on Opening History Lessons on the Cold 
War in Sweden and Switzerland
Robert Thorp
The Cold War was a complex series of events that came to have a great 
impact on most countries in Europe. This article analyses two lower second-
ary schools’ opening lessons on the Cold War, one taught in Sweden and the 
other in Switzerland. The study finds that the opening lessons vary to a great 
extent, regarding both what content is covered but also how that content is 
covered. Whereas the Swiss lesson predominantly focuses on establishing a 
critical narrative of the origins of the Cold War conflict, the Swedish lesson 
disseminates what could be considered a traditional narrative of the Cold 
War. The lessons also differ due to the  different forms of educational media 
employed by each teacher. While the Swiss teacher makes use of caricatures 
to instigate pupil-oriented discussions about what caused the Cold War, the 
Swedish teacher uses personal analogies and a video during class. The study, 
however, finds that neither teacher engages with the contingencies of his-
tory culture that affect historical content and how we approach it; instead 
both disseminate a closed rendering of the history of the Cold War.
R. Thorp (*) 
University of Stockholm, Stockholm, Sweden 




Teaching history is a complex enterprise. There are always a number of 
factors that come into play when a teacher sets out to disseminate a cer-
tain historical content. Not only should the teacher reflect on what con-
tent to cover in a teaching situation, but he or she also needs to reflect on 
how that content should be presented to the pupils. Here, the preconcep-
tions and prior knowledge of the pupils needs to be taken into account 
(Duraisingh 2017; Stymne 2017), as well as that of the teacher (Thorp 
2016). Furthermore, history education can also be understood as a kind 
of cultural endeavor in which collective memories, personal experiences, 
beliefs and opinions as well as official curricula are at work (Furrer and 
Gautschi 2017). History teachers have to navigate these challenges when-
ever they set out to teach their subject. Approaching history teaching 
from this perspective means that we come to regard such a process as a 
kind of entangled activity where both subject-related constraints and 
social and cultural constraints come into play (Parkes 2013; Thorp 2016).
Indeed, the subject of history itself might also be regarded as subject to 
a similar kind of entanglement. One important aspect of history is the 
study of the past with the aim to understand how it has influenced societ-
ies today. However, and this is another important aspect, history must 
always be reconstructed and is, thus, contingent on this reconstruction. 
With this view, it follows that knowing history basically means grasping 
two different but inter-related concepts: the existence of facts about the 
past and its events and the concept that history is also always a recon-
struction of this past (Wineburg 2001; Parkes 2011). Moreover, when-
ever we make use of history we continuously reconstruct the reconstruction 
of the past in what perhaps might be called a never-ending cycle of recon-
struction. German philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer posited the idea 
that an awareness of how history is always constructed within a certain 
context for certain purposes, how it is always the subject of historicity, 
was one of the greatest achievements of modern thought (Gadamer 
1975). This awareness of historicity, or historical consciousness, it could 
be argued, is an essential component in an understanding of history that 
seeks to disentangle an entangled historical subject. This in itself poses 
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another difficult challenge to history teachers. Following this line of argu-
mentation, the Cold War can serve a particularly interesting historical 
topic to study due to its historical proximity and looming consequences 
for many (if not all) European countries. Furthermore, the Cold War as 
a historical topic allows historical and didactical entanglements to come 
to the fore. It is a historical event that goes beyond simply having a his-
torical relevance since it also affects ideological, social and cultural con-
ceptions of ourselves, our national and international affairs (Furrer 2017). 
From a disciplinary perspective, the Cold War is also the perfect case 
study because it is still close to us; we have, therefore, an excellent oppor-
tunity to explore how it has been constructed as a historical event. The 
binary opposition between the USA and the USSR at the core of the 
event also makes it ideal for these purposes, since we have two agents who 
deliver different narratives in regards to the same historical event. 
However, since the Cold War is an historical event that goes beyond just 
being an historical event, it can also pose great challenges to history 
teachers, since it feeds into our basic common sense assumptions of how 
we should understand people, politics and the world, playing such a 
prominent part in European post-war societies. In other words, we might 
argue that the Cold War itself is a highly entangled historical subject.
In order to tease out what implications the interplay and ensuing 
entanglement between history, collective memory, personal experiences 
and classroom teaching practices have for the teaching of history, I wanted 
to study how teachers from two different national contexts taught the 
same historical subject. For these reasons, secondary school history teach-
ers in Sweden and Switzerland were observed when they introduced a 
teaching unit on the Cold War to their students. The rationale here was 
not that I would be able to get at the historical cultures of these countries, 
or to be able to say something about how teachers in these two countries 
teach the Cold War in general. Rather, it was seen as an excellent oppor-
tunity to study how two teachers from two different contexts, who taught 
the same historical topic, went about delivering that same topic to their 
pupils. Thus, the focus of this study was to more deeply understand how 
these teachers dealt with the complexities and entanglements I have out-
lined above. Recent research on teaching history, assuming not only dis-
ciplinary difficulties in teaching history but also social and cultural ones 
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has shown that matters of curricular demands, collective memory, cul-
tural entanglement and awareness of historicity all play prominent roles 
in how history teachers perceive their subject, their own roles as educa-
tors and how to best teach the subject (Persson and Thorp 2017; Persson 
2017; Thorp 2017; Zanazanian 2009). This study should be seen as a 
further exploration of this field of research into educating students in the 
subject of history.
Consequently, the aim of this article is to analyse how two history 
teachers from two different contexts approach the Cold War in a teaching 
situation and how they engage with the historicity of the historical con-
tent they disseminate. Attention will be given to the strategies and educa-
tional media the observed teachers used, as well as to how particular 
content was covered. The presentation below will start with an outline of 
the theoretical and methodological concerns regarding the teaching of 
history. Following on from this explanation, I will present the main 
results of the study, and then discuss how these results might be used to 
encourage further understanding of the cultural entanglements that char-
acterise the teaching of history.
 Approach
 Theoretical assumptions
A basic theoretical assumption that has been made here is that history 
inevitably is a reconstruction of past events. This reconstruction in turn 
is subject to historicity in the sense that it is always contextually 
 contingent (Thorp 2016). Historians (and others who produce accounts 
of history) always meticulously select and interpret past sources in order 
to construct history. In this sense history is always alienated from the past 
it wishes to reconstruct (cf. Roth 2012), and it is this alienation that gives 
rise to history as a serious methodological and critical study of past events 
(cf. Wilschut 2012, 47–52). Because of this inherent contingency in his-
tory, any historical narrative is open to scrutiny and is, in a way, provi-
sional: other perspectives, methodologies and interests may generate 
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other historical accounts using the same source material. Thus, it might 
be argued that the merits of any historical account lie not so much in the 
actual history it conveys, but instead in the methodological aspects of 
how that particular historical narrative was produced. This means that 
epistemological concerns take the front seat, particularly when it comes 
to the academic subject of history (Thorp 2016).
Yet there is also another aspect of history that needs to be taken into 
account, especially when it comes to teaching history. History is not only 
the careful reproduction of past events through a critical methodological 
inquiry, it is also a central component of how we construct meaning, in 
regards to both ourselves, our fellow human beings and the world. Thus, 
history shapes existential, ideological, moral and pedagogical aspects of 
our lives. If we want to argue or establish something about ourselves or 
our societies, we often use history to do so (cf. Karlsson 2014). Following 
this line of argumentation, we can say that there is a kind of inherent ten-
sion in history: It is something which we both use to make sense of things 
and which we, more or less, may come to take for granted (or even should 
take for granted). Yet it is also something that is constructed, provisional, 
contingent and, thus, dynamic. A challenge for any history teacher is to 
try to relate to this tension whenever he or she teaches history. Furthermore, 
history teachers are also individuals with personal experiences, interests 
and beliefs that affect how they view themselves, their fellow beings, the 
world and, therefore, history. From a perspective on pedagogical 
approaches to history, then, it becomes a matter of whether these 
approaches engage with this tension, or if they are particularly orientated 
towards representing and reproducing specific historical narratives. There 
is a strong consensus in history education research that pedagogical 
approaches ignoring the constructed nature of history are problematic, 
since they may foster a limited understanding of history and result in 
chauvinism and intolerance. The proposed solution is to teach history as 
critical inquiry and to foster historiographical insights, instead of merely 
presenting a particular historical narrative (Foster and Padgett 1999; 
Lévesque 2008; Seixas 2000; Wineburg 2001). Through a rational, 
autonomous stance towards the subject of history, a position commonly 
referred to as historical thinking, pupils (and others) will be able to 
approach historical narratives and history carefully and will not be swayed 
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by the normative pull of history. I argue, however, that this is a formida-
ble challenge due to the role history plays in our commonsense assump-
tions about ourselves and the world. Additionally, the education students 
receive in the subject is always a cultural and ideological enterprise; the 
subject matter which we apply our historical thinking to therefore goes 
beyond matters of critical inquiry (Thorp 2017). Even historians are 
affected by the cultural contexts in which they live and work.
I argue that an important means of acknowledging and involving this 
tension in our study of history and our pedagogical methods of teaching 
the same subject is to focus on matters pertaining to historicity and his-
torical consciousness, i.e. an awareness of how all historical narratives and 
all our encounters with these narratives exist in time. This means that 
everything historical is contingent on historical factors and is thus open 
for reinterpretation. Historical consciousness should here be understood 
as the ever-present awareness that all human beings and all forms of social 
integration they have created exist in time, i.e. they are subject to histo-
ricity. Historical consciousness is manifested in human representations 
and conceptions, and results in an understanding or appreciation of how 
contextual contingency is inherent in these representations and concep-
tions, thus safeguarding common human rationality (Jeismann 1979). In 
this sense historical consciousness should be regarded as a kind of epis-
temic stance towards history that enables the individual to appreciate 
how history is reconstructed but at the same time omnipresent in all our 
encounters and uses of it. Approaching historical consciousness like this 
puts focus on the inherent tension in history outlined above: history is 
there for us to critically scrutinise and construct, but it is also the fabric 
of the historical meaning we make. This means that the critical gaze 
should not only be turned outwards towards historical accounts that we 
encounter, but also inwards towards our own meaning making and con-
ceptions of history (Parkes 2011).
In order to empirically analyse how we epistemologically approach his-
tory and historical narratives, I devised a model of narratological uses of 
history in order to exemplify and categorise how we make use of history 
from the perspective of historical consciousness. Borrowing from and 
modifying Jörn Rüsen’s typology of historical narratives (2012), I formu-
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lated three cognitively and narratologically different ways of using his-
tory: (i) A traditional narratological use of history presents history as 
static and acontextual, (ii) A critical narratological use of history attempts 
to destabilise other historical narratives or presents alternative historical 
narratives; and (iii) A genetic narratological use of history portrays history 
as dynamic, contingent and characterised by continuity and change 
(Thorp 2017, 132).
If we understand historical consciousness as an awareness of historicity, 
we can claim that historical consciousness should be understood as an 
epistemic approach towards history. If we are aware that history is a result 
of interpretation and reconstruction that historians (and others) make, 
we have a different kind of understanding of history than if we did not 
possess such an awareness. These different kinds of understanding of his-
tory correspond to the narratological uses of history above. A traditional 
use of history disregards how history is always the result of interpretation 
and reconstruction and instead presents history in a factual way; it pur-
ports that when we study history we can understand what really hap-
pened. A critical use of history uses history in a way that straddles the 
distance between the traditional and the genetic uses of history, since 
history is perceived as something that is contingent on perspective and 
interpretation, although there remain correct ways of understanding his-
tory. This can either result in a kind of relativistic stance towards history 
(meaning that all historical accounts are equally true or false) or in an 
understanding that claims that some historical accounts are ‘true’ and 
others are not (in the traditional sense of the term). A genetic use of his-
tory instead focuses on how all historical accounts and all approaches to 
history are characterised by interpretation, perspective and meaning 
making and is inevitably contingent on these factors. Here we can see a 
close theoretical connection to historical consciousness, as an awareness 
of historicity.
If we relate this framework to the study at hand, it becomes important 
to look not only at the content covered in class and the framing of that 
content, but also at the presentation of the content. Do the teachers 
engage with the entanglements of the Cold War, or do they present the 
pupils with a traditional narrative of how the events unfolded? It becomes 
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more relevant to analyse the tasks and assignments the students are pre-
sented with: do they invite discussions of the complexity of the historical 
event at hand and the multitude of possible relationships to it, or are the 
pedagogical approaches used aimed at inculcating students with a par-
ticular historical account of the Cold War which they then unconsciously 
internalise?
In my initial analysis of the material, I analysed the teaching meth-
ods and materials the teachers employed when introducing the Cold 
War. I further analysed what pedagogic approach each teacher used in 
their respective classroom. For instance: Was the lesson focused on 
pupil activity or was it more of a session to orient the pupils? The 
next step in the analysis was to look at the content covered in these 
opening lessons. Who were the most prominent figures, what was the 
Cold War about? What aspects of the Cold War were highlighted and 
how was this content framed? The final stage of the analysis was 
directed at analysing how the teachers approached the lesson content 
from the perspective of engaging historical consciousness and narra-
tological uses of history. This means that particular attention was 
paid to how the two teachers engaged with the entanglements and 
tensions of history and the teaching of history which were high-
lighted above.
 Results
 Teaching strategies and educational media
The two observed lessons show two distinctly different teaching strate-
gies, but also some important similarities. The Swiss lesson could be char-
acterized as pupil centered, although the teacher was in full control of the 
assignments and the content covered. The class began with the teacher 
showing the pupils the cartoon ‘Tour du Monde: Tandem oder Einrad’ 
by Jean Leffel, printed in the German textbook Menschen in Zeit und 
Raum 9 (2012, 113; see the introduction to this section). This cartoon 
depicts Harry S. Truman and Joseph Stalin riding bicycles. In the above 
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picture we see them riding a tandem bicycle. Truman is in front and 
seems to be in charge of the direction they’re going, with Stalin helping 
him. We could interpret this as relating to the relationship between the 
two during the Second World War and the fight against Hitler. The 
expressions on their faces are those of contention. The picture under-
neath shows Stalin and Truman riding unicycles in opposite directions. 
Their bodily poses and facial expressions are equally defiant. What I find 
particularly interesting with this cartoon is the historical message it seems 
to convey: Stalin and Truman (i.e. the USA and the USSR) both acted 
defiantly after the end of the Second World War, and thus both could be 
blamed for the escalation of the Cold War conflict. This is at odds with 
the typical Western view of the Cold War, which posits Stalin and the 
USSR as solely responsible for the Cold War (Holmén 2006; Ritzer 2012; 
Thorp 2015).
The pupils in the Swiss classroom were instructed to reflect on how 
the cartoon relates to a film about the American bombings of Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki and the extent of the destruction it caused. The teacher 
then returned to the cartoon and asked the pupils to discuss how they 
thought the cartoon related to the film they had just been shown. The 
most part of the lesson was devoted to this activity. While the pupils’ 
answers drove the ensuing discussion in class and they were quite active, 
the teacher was still in control of the direction of the discussion, using 
various prompts and leading questions. The pupils were then asked to 
perform a role play activity, in which they read quotations by Harry 
S. Truman and Andrei Zhdanov, each arguing that the political orienta-
tions of their respective countries after the Second World War were the 
correct ones. The pupils were then asked to perform mock debates 
where they pretended to be either Truman or Zhdanov. At the end of 
the lesson the discussion in class was directed towards Germany and 
Japan and the culpability these nations should share for their actions 
during the Second World War. German nationalism, for instance, was 
problematized in relation to how the Germans celebrated the World 
Cup victory in football with flags. Pupils commented on how this out-
burst of national pride in particular made some Germans feel uneasy 
due to their past experiences with nationalism. Finally, the teacher 
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directed the discussion towards the agenda the Allied forces decided on 
in relation to Germany.
The Swedish teacher used a different strategy. The lesson started with 
the teacher briefly, but still comprehensively, introducing the Cold War. 
The teacher’s narrative was oriented towards giving the pupils an under-
standing of what the Cold War was and when it took place, and the nar-
rative focussed on the conflicts of the Cold War; the teacher stressed that 
it was a war between the USA and the USSR fought by proxy. She also, 
when discussing Sweden’s role during the Cold War, emphasised how 
Sweden was neutral in the conflict but that there was also a long tradition 
of conflict with Russia in Sweden, which prompted the Swedish govern-
ment to orientate themselves towards the West and the USA. The next 
activity involved showing the pupils a French documentary film about 
the origins and escalation of the Cold War conflict. As an introduction to 
this activity the teacher introduced historiographical aspects, focussing 
on how history is always presented for a purpose and that it is contingent 
on this purpose. She then asked the pupils to reflect on whether the film 
might present a Western or Eastern perspective on the conflict, given that 
it is of French origin. The pupils replied that the film would probably be 
told from a Western perspective.
In brief, the film’s narrative of the conflict focussed on the USA and 
USSR as two countries with similar pasts that cooperated during the war 
against Germany, but then came to oppose each other. In my view, the 
reason for the conflict between the USA and USSR is related to Stalin’s 
breach of the Yalta conference agreement and the imposition of 
 communist dictatorships in the countries that were occupied by the Red 
Army. These actions then made the USA realise that there was a commu-
nist threat and that they had to act upon this threat. This is what could 
be called the traditional Cold War narrative (Lundestad 2004). 
Throughout the showing of the film the teacher commented on what she 
perceived to be key aspects of the film’s narrative. The teacher then ended 
the lesson by summing up and stressing the key features of the lesson: (i) 
the Cold War is a period that has shaped our present society, (ii) it was a 
troublesome period and (iii) Sweden was frightened of the USSR and 




The Swiss lesson centred around two aspects of the Cold War period, i.e. 
the origins of the conflict and the reverberations of the Second World 
War on Germany and Japan. Regarding the origins of the conflict, the 
Swiss teacher placed great emphasis on explaining the conflict as a power 
struggle between the USA and the USSR and tried to ascribe agency to 
both actors. The cartoon used in the beginning of the lesson illustrated 
this well: in it, both Truman and Stalin are both unwilling to cooperate 
and thus both responsible for the escalation of the conflict. Furthermore, 
Truman and the USA are depicted as in charge of the course of events 
before the end of the Second World War and might in this sense be 
regarded as having the upper hand in the relationship between the two. 
This impression was further accentuated by the film portraying the 
American atomic bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki the teacher chose 
to show her pupils, and the assignment she gave them to relate the car-
toon to the film’s content. The aim here seemed to be to show that the 
USA and their military capacities did pose a threat towards Joseph Stalin 
and the USSR. This conclusion was further strengthened by the discus-
sion between the teacher and the pupils that followed after the film.
To begin with, the teacher asks her pupils ‘OK, right then, this film, 
what it showed, does that connect at all with the cartoon? And if so, 
how?’ A pupil replies after some reflection:
Yes, it is easy to explain, first they worked together. And then […] 
Hiroshima happened. And then they [the USA and the USSR] split up and 
that made the world split up, actually.
In this interpretation, that went unchallenged by the teacher, you could 
argue that the USA caused the conflict through its atomic bombings in 
Japan. The teacher then instructed her pupils to look at the top picture of 
the cartoon (showing Truman and Stalin riding a tandem bicycle) and 
asked them ‘Who’s got the better seat on the tandem?’ A pupil then 
replied, ‘Yes, it’s Stalin. Because he actually has to do, you know, less 
work. I mean, he had to do less pedalling, but he couldn’t decide [where 
to go]’. The teacher is not entirely content with this interpretation and 
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replies: ‘Quite. But on the other hand, you already mentioned, the one in 
front can steer’, suggesting that Truman had the better seat, after all.
Focus then shifted towards the bottom picture of the cartoon (showing 
Stalin and Truman riding unicycles in opposite directions). The teacher 
asked the students ‘Are the proportions right in the bottom [picture], the 
two unicycles? Would they be right at that [particular] time [in history]?’ 
The teacher here wanted her pupils to reflect upon whether the USA and 
the USSR entered the conflict on equal terms, as is suggested by the pic-
ture. Two pupils replied that they thought the proportions were right due 
to the spread of communism in the world after the Second World War. 
The teacher then replied:
Yes, that’s right. From the point of view of population numbers, it’s a good 
idea. Which aspect of [the relationship between the USA and the USSR] is 
not featured here? What else should there be here, again relating to the 
USA? Perhaps, […] they’ve got the upper hand? For what reason, at this 
particular moment in time? (Swiss teacher)
To which a pupil replied, ‘Because they’re the only country in the world 
that had the atom bomb’. This reply seemed to satisfy the teacher as she 
replied: ‘Yes, precisely. OK, then, I think you have interpreted this car-
toon here well’. The teacher here seemed to be intent on stressing the role 
of the USA in the conflict, even though her pupils seem more inclined 
towards thinking that Stalin and the USSR did indeed pose a threat and 
had the upper hand in the conflict. The teacher then asked the pupils to 
rank the USA’s world standing after the Second World War, and a pupil 
replied that they were number one both economically and militarily. The 
teacher confirmed this and then asked the pupil to explain why the USA 
should be ranked as number one militarily; the pupil then replied that it 
was because of the atom bomb.
When asked how they might rank the USSR, a male pupil replied that 
‘America’s scared of this communism thing. And the Soviet Union is 
making propaganda against capitalism […]’. He further added that that 
USSR was also gaining land, which he connected to the fall of the Iron 
Curtain and the division of Europe into East and West. To this the teacher 
replied: ‘Exactly. Let’s look at the war now. Perhaps you remember the US 
entering the war or, put a better way, the Soviet Union was attacked and 
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the consequence was huge losses, millions of victims’, again stressing the 
inferiority of the USSR compared to the USA. A pupil then replied that 
the USSR should be ranked in second place. The teacher then went on 
the sum up the discussion:
They [the USSR], I mean, they’re winners too, aren’t they. […] It became 
clear that communism is an alternative to this liberal democracy. Clear as 
day, that’s the alternative. And why shouldn’t communism be the best 
model? With communism you can win wars. So here: communism as an 
alternative form of society. (Swiss teacher)
Here, the teacher reiterated what, it could be argued, is a part of her own 
agenda with the assignment: In 1945 the USA was by all means the world 
leader and was in possession of the atom bomb. The USSR had suffered 
great losses in the war and was therefore inferior to the USA. Furthermore, 
by winning the war against Germany, the USSR had also shown that 
communism was a legitimate alternative to the liberal capitalist democracy.
The next activity was a role play activity in which pupils were given 
quotations by Truman and Zhdanov and were asked to perform a mock 
debate where they should argue that their country’s trajectory after the 
Second World War was a legitimate one. According to the pupils, 
Truman’s main argument was that the USA is there to protect ‘free peo-
ple, […] people should choose for themselves’. Zhdanov’s argument was 
interpreted by a pupil as a kind of ‘conspiracy theory’,
I mean [they actually said that] America just because of their economic 
interests took part in the war and that [it] has imperialistic features, […] 
and that the communist and democratic countries, to which [the USSR] 
count themselves, are fighting against this [imperialist] injustice. (Male 
Swiss pupil).
Here the pupil distanced himself from Zhdanov’s interpretation of why 
the USA entered the Second World War. He then continued:
I have the feeling that both major powers want to put themselves, I mean, 
in a good light and […] have a sort of trailblazing role. I mean for instance 
when America says: “Yes, we want to respect everyone, we want everyone 
to decide things for themselves”. And Russia’s doing exactly the same, but 
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history shows us something else. That afterwards they actually didn’t inde-
pendently or selflessly support other countries, if we look at, for example, 
the war in Afghanistan.
To which the teacher replied: ‘So both [have] the same role, probably 
using the same means. We’ll see this later on’. The teacher then shifted 
attention from the USA and the USSR towards Germany and Japan at 
the end of the Second World War. She asked her pupils ‘Now at the end 
of the war […] what image […] does humanity have of these two states 
[Germany and Japan]’. A pupil replied that people thought that Germany 
and Japan had to suffer the consequences of being ‘megalomaniac’, sug-
gesting that their fault lay in being too hungry for power and world dom-
ination. The teacher, however, seemed to have something else in mind as 
well. She asked:
And on top of that? I mean, [what about] what happened in Germany with 
the racial ideology that was put into practice? And Japan also committed 
unbelievable atrocities [during] the war. How is that received, how do peo-
ple approach the Japanese and the Germans […] after everything that 
people realized was happening there? (Swiss teacher)
A pupil here replied that people became aware that ‘people were capa-
ble of a lot [more] than we used to think’. Another pupil then went on: 
‘[…] People had suddenly found the scapegoat for everything’. The 
Germans and Japanese ‘had to pay’ for the war. The teacher then stressed 
another aspect of this and asked her pupils to reflect upon how people 
still regard Germany and Japan morally, ‘to this day’. One female pupil 
replied that:
Yes, it’s the same to this day. But for them personally as well. […] I was at 
a camp there were three Germans there and we were talking about it and 
they said it was so extreme that the first time they could hang German flags 
again was four years ago when the World Cup [in football] was on. (Swiss 
female pupil B)
The pupil here suggested that this sentiment still affects Germany and 
Germans today. The remainder of the lesson was devoted to outlining 
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the denazification process in Germany after the war and how Nazis man-
aged to escape justice because of a lax effort on the part of the Allied 
forces and  the USA in Western Europe and the active support of 
the Vatican.
The Swedish lesson was introduced comprehensively by the teacher, as 
she outlined what the Cold War was about and then tried to relate it to 
the Swedish national context. When discussing the definition of the Cold 
War, she warned her pupils not to think of the Cold War as related to 
winter but instead asks her pupils to imagine a metaphor:
Imagine that you just entered a room where your mother and father just 
had a row, or two of your friends had a row, or something similar. You enter 
the room and feel […] in the atmosphere that something has happened, or 
that there is a risk that something will happen. You maybe have been in a 
fight with someone and argued and you have been very close to losing 
control, and that is a symbol of what the Cold War is. (Swedish teacher)
She then went on the explain that the Cold War was a war fought by 
proxy between the USSR and the USA, with Sweden being neutral but 
caught in between the two powers. Concerning Sweden’s stance towards 
the USA and the USSR, the teacher stressed that:
We are neutral, and that means that Sweden during this period in history 
and still today lie in-between [the USA] and [the USSR]. But then we also 
have a tradition. If you ask grown-ups at home, they will tell you that they 
are a little bit more scared of [the USSR]. And historically we can explain 
this by Sweden more often […] having fought [the USSR] than [the USA]. 
(Swedish teacher)
The teacher then asked her pupils to reflect on what the Cold War can 
be if it is not a traditional war fought between two belligerents. The pupils 
replied that it was a war about politics, technology and Germany, to 
which the teacher repeated that this was a war fought by proxy and asked 
her pupils to imagine a situation where they are unfriendly with someone 
and asks their friends to attack this person. The teacher then went on to 
introduce a film about the emergence of the Cold War conflict, but before 
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she shows the pupils the film she asks them to reflect on historiographical 
aspects of history:
When you study history it’s extremely important that you always think, 
and this is not only in relation to the Cold War, but also when we write 
history today, when your grandchildren will read the history books they 
will assess “Who wrote this?” and “Did this really happen?” […]. It’s really 
important when you study history, when something has been passed on [or 
told by someone else], [to reflect] on whether it’s true or false and if it has 
been written for a specific purpose. (Swedish teacher)
She then told her pupils that the film they are about to watch is French 
and whether France was on the American or Soviet side of the conflict. A 
pupil replied that they were on the side of the USA. This was confirmed 
by the teacher, who adds ‘and then maybe they regard the conflict in a 
certain way’. She then left the historiographical aspect to one side and 
played the film to the class.
In the film a voice over narrates a history of the emergence on the con-
flict centered on how US and British troops advanced into Germany 
from the west and Soviet troops advanced from the east. It is then 
explained that the USSR was a ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ and that 
Soviet economy and political activity was state controlled. The USA is 
described as a country where the government’s power is regulated and 
where private ownership and free competition is regarded as a guarantee 
for the well being of its citizens. Regarding the escalation of the conflict 
between the USA and the USSR, Stalin’s breach of the Yalta conference 
agreement and imposition of communism in the countries occupied by 
the Soviet troops is presented as a key event, which made the USA realise 
that the USSR posed a threat to world peace and security, prompting 
Truman to issue his declaration. Here, the Swedish teacher interjected 
with: ‘In Sweden you said: “The Russian is coming, the Russian is com-
ing, be wary of the Russian […]’. The lesson was then ended by the 
teacher summing up the content of the day’s lesson:
What we have started with today and will study in the coming two weeks 
is a period that has meant a lot to me because I have lived during this 
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period. It has also meant a lot to your parents and grandparents because 
there was a situation in the world […] where [the USSR] and [the USA] 
distrusted each other, they were very afraid of each other and sometimes 
during this period, starting 1945, things got heated [and war was very 
close]. So, it’s a troublesome time and Sweden tries to be neutral but from 
tradition we have been more afraid of [the USSR], and therefore we 
approached [the USA]. (Swedish teacher)
 Narratological uses of history
As has been shown above, these two lessons provide us with two rather 
different approaches to introducing the Cold War, but there are also simi-
larities between the two pedagogical approaches in regards to how history 
is used narratologically. In the Swiss lesson, the teacher seemed to have a 
personal agenda with an introduction that was oriented towards destabi-
lising the traditional grand narrative of the Cold War as a result of Soviet 
aggression. The teaching material used, i.e. the cartoon, the film segment 
and the quotations from Truman and Zhdanov, all seem to support this 
conclusion. The cartoon shows us how Truman and the USA were in 
charge of matters and how Stalin and Truman defiantly headed in differ-
ent directions at the end of Second World War. The film segment high-
lights how US bombings in Japan wreaked havoc and that the USA had 
a terrible weapon of mass destruction that they were willing to deploy. 
Furthermore, the quotations from Zhdanov and Truman ascribe agency 
to both actors and gives voice to the Soviet interpretation of what was 
happening in Europe and across the world, i.e. that the USA was an 
imperialist force intent on imposing their model of society on the world. 
Throughout the lesson the pupils did, however, give voice to what may be 
the implicit commonsense assumptions concerning the conflict in Swiss 
historical culture. This was evidenced, for example, when a pupil inter-
preted Zhdanov’s view of the world as a conspiracy theory and an exam-
ple of hypocrisy. The teacher engaged with these views throughout and 
attempted to direct the discussion towards an understanding of how the 
USA was also an aggressive force, one which had the upper hand in 
 relation to the USSR in 1945. Perhaps the teacher was trying here to 
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show an alternative way of interpreting events after 1945, to challenge 
commonsense assumptions about the Cold War. This could be a risky 
enterprise since the teacher could come across as politically and ideologi-
cally motivated (and therefore less credible) in trying to put forward an 
alternative view of the Cold War, but there are no indications that the 
pupils perceived her this way.
From a pedagogical perspective on history, it could be argued that the 
repeated clashes between the teacher’s agenda and the pupils’ insistence 
on a traditional rendering of the Cold War provided many opportunities 
for a discussion about the role perspective plays in how we understand 
history, highlighting how history both underlies our understanding of 
the world, but also remains contingent on how we approach it. This 
opportunity was, however, not explicitly grasped by the teacher who 
instead repeatedly challenged her pupils’ interpretations and directed 
them towards accepting her own interpretations of both the media used 
in the class and the reasons behind the Cold War. In this sense, you could 
say that the Swiss teacher chose to use history critically, seeking to desta-
bilise one way of understanding the origins of the Cold War by proposing 
another approach to the topic.
The Swedish lesson differed in that the Cold War was addressed by the 
class as a whole. The teacher (and then a film) narrated a version of the 
Cold War. Here we might argue that the pedagogical approach taken 
facilitated an understanding of the conflict and history as something 
fixed and stable, the teacher spelling out the origins of the Cold War. The 
teacher repeatedly reached out to her pupils during her presentation and 
tried to engage them in the subject with personal and private analogies, 
i.e. the Cold War as a family row, the war by proxy as attacking someone 
through your friends. These analogies were, however, directed towards 
facilitating an understanding of the Cold War. In this sense history is 
presented transparently: no specific perspective or construction is dis-
cernable (cf. Ankersmit 2013).
One interesting facet to this lesson was that the teacher introduced 
historiographical aspects before the showing of the film. She urged her 
pupils to think about how history can be constructed for particular pur-
poses by different groups of people, both in the class and in the future. 
She further remarked on how narratives can become distorted when they 
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are retold or passed on by people. The Swedish teacher here addressed 
two aspects of history and historical truth: the idea that history is always 
contingent on perspective (and therefore suspicious), and the difficulty of 
knowing what is ‘true’ in history. It could therefore be argued that the 
Swedish teacher pushed toward her pupils a kind of relativistic notion of 
history (it is only a matter of perspective) and the idea that historical 
truth concerns primarily whether the narrative at hand corresponds with 
or does not correspond with original events. These two views on  historical 
truth might be understood as conflicting, since one is relativistic in rela-
tion to truth, and the other is what could be called a classical positivist 
notion of truth and history. This makes it difficult to understand what 
message the Swedish teacher intended to convey to her pupils. Here the 
teacher had what could have been an excellent opportunity to discuss the 
historiographical aspects of the narrative presented by both herself and 
the film and to engage with the Western historical cultural context of 
these interpretations of the Cold War, but instead the teacher chose to 
resume the lesson with the narrative at hand. Thus, you could argue that 
the Swedish teacher used history traditionally in the observed lesson, 
since the pupils were presented with one narrative and one perspective on 
events after 1945.
 Discussion: cultural entanglements 
and historicity
The results above reveal that the perception of the Cold War as a conflict 
between the USA and the USSR is a commonly held assumption when it 
comes to defining the Cold War, regardless of who might be at fault for 
causing it. Both lessons centred around this frame when addressing the 
period after 1945 and no teacher mentioned, for instance, that the period 
after 1945 was also one of unprecedented improvement in living stan-
dards for people in Switzerland and Sweden. The period furthermore saw 
the introduction of the welfare state in these countries and in most cases 
further democratisation, historical examples which can be used to prob-
lematise the commonsense understanding of the Cold War.
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The Swiss lesson was characterised by the teacher’s method of engage-
ment with the past and her encouragement to her pupils to do the same: 
the definition of the Cold War is not something that is once and for all 
settled but it is still contingent on whose version we are getting. In this 
way the Cold War is a topic used to provoke not only ideological but also 
moral discussions, as in the example of how the world viewed Germany 
and Japan after the Second World War. In this sense, the teacher showed 
that the Cold War is an event that still affects us and shapes how we view 
the world. There was, however, a kind of distancing in the Swiss lesson 
that was brought about by the focus on international affairs and interna-
tional politics. Switzerland and its role in the world after 1945 was not 
mentioned at all in the observed lesson.
The Swedish lesson was also characterised by engagement, but in con-
trast to the Swiss lesson, this engagement did not concern how we might 
understand the Cold War. Instead, the engagement in this lesson was 
related to how the teacher perpetually related the events after 1945 to 
national and personal perspectives, portraying Sweden as caught in-
between the USA and the USSR, perhaps even helpless. This was accen-
tuated by the teacher’s repeated gesturing to a long Swedish tradition of 
war with Russia, which pushed Sweden towards the USA and the West. 
Concerning such engagement, we might note how the teacher related the 
Cold War to her own upbringing and her pupils’ parents and grandpar-
ents, emphasising that it was an event that affected these groups a lot and, 
furthermore, how the pupils’ older relatives might also vouch for Russia 
and the USSR traditionally having posed a threat to Sweden. Significant 
too, in the Swedish lesson, was the stress the teacher put upon the atmo-
sphere of the Cold War period as one which was fearful and troubled. 
Sweden was afraid of the USSR, and the USA and the USSR were also 
afraid of each other. Thus, the Swedish lesson reproduced cultural aspects 
of fear and distrust towards the USSR and Russia and, in a sense, might 
have even contributed to the reproduction of Russia as Sweden’s eternal 
enemy. This is a trend that is strong in the Swedish historical culture of 
the Cold War (cf. Holmén 2006; Thorp 2015, 2017; Persson in this vol-
ume). Therefore, the Swedish teacher in this lesson presented the Cold 
War from a national and personal perspective: the conflict, either viewed 
from a national perspective or as part of wider international politics, she 
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emphasised, is related to personal experiences (i.e. family relations or 
relations to friends) or personal feelings (e.g. the fear of the USSR 
and Russia).
Concerning how the observed lessons relate to the aspects of historic-
ity and the ensuing inherent tension within the subject of history, we can 
say that even though the two teachers in our case studies manifested a 
variety of pedagogic strategies and approaches to the Cold War, none of 
these seemed directed towards raising questions regarding how our own 
positions might affect how we render history and make sense of the past. 
Instead, we observed that both teachers chose to approach history as a 
knowable past impervious to perspective and interpretation. While the 
Swiss teacher seemingly aimed to destabilise one particular perspective on 
the Cold War, she nevertheless constructed an alternative understanding 
that is posited as more legitimate. The Swedish teacher presented one 
narrative of the Cold War in a personal and affectionate manner, seeking 
to engage her pupils on a personal level, but this narrative did not invite 
her pupils to relate to either the Soviet or Eastern perspective in a per-
sonal sense, even though this would also have been possible. Consequently, 
both lessons reproduced perspectives of history which disregard how his-
tory is always, and must be, contingent on both how and why different 
parties choose to approach it.
 Concluding remarks
As I pointed out in the introduction to this article, the teaching of history 
is a complex enterprise that poses challenges to history teachers for a 
variety of reasons. The lessons described here provide good examples of 
how a historical topic might be approached in the course of teaching his-
tory. Lessons in which pupils are active and contribute to shaping the 
historical topic presented provide rewarding ways of prompting pupils to 
engage with and relate to the historical topic at hand. When pupils are 
presented with narratives which invite them to reflect on the historical 
topic on a personal level, in order to make sense of what is portrayed, we 
witness another potentially effective method of bringing history to life for 
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these students and showing them how it has personal relevance for 
all learners.
Still, the examples presented here also stress the challenges of teaching 
history, which inevitably crop up due to the subject matter, and reveal the 
importance of historical self-awareness and historical consciousness. Such 
recognition is important in order to enable us to engage with the provi-
sional, contingent and dynamic character of history at the same time as 
we reconstruct and make sense of it. This may be an easy task to describe 
in theory, but it is a lot harder to do in practice. It is my wish that this 
chapter may be used to inspire new perspectives on how we may approach 
the teaching of history, both to highlight the pedagogical challenges and 
complexities of the subject and to emphasise the importance of history as 
a subject in schools and elsewhere.
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